tion of the prohibition of the act calling the constitutional convention and is therefore null and void. State v. Am. Sug. Ref. Co., 137 La. 407, 67 So. 742.

Under this article special authority is given the attorney general to appear for suits thereunder and ask for ouster of the corporation in the ordinary procedure, without resorting to quo warranto. State v. Am. Sug. Ref. Co., 138 La. 1005, 71 So. 137. (The constitutionality of the various trust acts of the state is considered in the opinion.)

See 7 La. Dig.Trusts and Monopolies, p. 288.

Enforcement by District Attorney. The Constitutional Convention of 1913 had no power to enlarge the duties of the district attorney, or extend them to civil cases. State v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 138 La. 1005, 71 So. 137.

Section 15. No member of the Legislature, or public officer, or person elected or appointed to a public office under the laws of this State, shall directly or indirectly, ask, demand, accept, receive, or consent to receive, for his own use or benefit, or for the use or benefit of another, any free pass, free transportation, franking privilege, or discrimination in passenger, telegraph or telephone rates, from any person or corporation, or make use of the same himself or in conjunction with another.

Any person who violates any provision of this section shall forfeit his office, at the suit of the Attorney General, or the District Attorney, to be brought at the domicile of the defendant, and shall be subject to such further penalty as may be prescribed by law.

Any corporation, or officer or agent thereof, who shall give, or offer, or promise to a public officer any such free pass, free transportation, franking privilege, or discrimination, shall be liable to punishment for each offense by a fine of five hundred dollars, to be recovered at the suit of the Attorney General, or District Attorney, to be brought at the domicile of the officer to whom such free pass, free transportation, franking privilege, or discrimination, was given, offered or promised.

No person, or officer, or agent of a corporation, giving any such free pass, free transportation, franking privilege or discrimination, hereby prohibited, shall be privileged from testifying in relation thereto; but he shall not be liable to civil or criminal prosecution therefor, if he shall testify to the giving of the same.

Free Railroad Passes. A sheriff charged with having accepted "a pass" from a railroad company to travel over its road, forfeits his office at the suit of the attorney general. The defense that the pass was issued as full consideration for official services to be rendered by the officer is contra bonos mores. Coco v. Oden, 143 La. 718, 79 So. 287.

Any present or reward intended to influence an officer with par

tiality or favor, is classed as a bribe under act No. 70 of 1890. Addison, 134 La. 642, 64 So. 497.

State v.

Liability on Passes. The fact that a party injured was riding on a free pass does not affect the liability of the railroad for negligence. Thompson v. Yazoo &c. R. Co., 47 La.Ann. 1107, 17 So. 503.

See 2 La. Dig. Carriers, p. 60.

Section 16. Prescription shall not run against the State in any civil matter, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution or expressly by law.

Prescription does not run against the state. Quaker v. Maierwatt, 134 La. 1030, 64 So. 897; State v. Williams, 131 La. 392, 59 So. 822; Cordill v. Quaker, 130 La. 933, 58 So. 819; Bright v. New Orleans R. Co., 114 La. 679, 38 So. 494; State v. Debenture Co., 112 La. 1, 36 So. 205. This provision concerning prescription does not apply to municipal corporations. New Orleans v. Salmen, 135 La. 828, 66 So. 237.

Actions by the State. See 4 La. Dig. Louisiana, p. 757.

Section 17. The power of the courts to punish for contempt shall be limited by law.

Contempt. The policy of the law is not favorable to extending the scope of contempt proceedings. Generally proceedings for contempt are subject to strict construction. Junius Hart Piano House v. Ingman, 119

La. 1017, 44 So. 850.

The power of a judge to punish contempt of court, within the limit prescribed by the code, is absolute; without review, save on the question of jurisdiction. State v. King, 47 La.Ann. 701, 17 So. 288.

Courts have inherent power to punish for contempt, and our Code of Practice has expressly conferred it, but a judge can not assume that a witness has sworn untruthfully and punish him for perjury as a contempt. State v. Lazarus, 37 La.Ann. 314.

See 2 La. Dig. Contempt, p. 270.

Section 18. The exercise of the police power of the State shall never be abridged.

Police Power Inalienable. It is generally true of governmental power, especially the police power, that it can not be surrendered or alienated. Shreveport Traction Co. v. Shreveport, 122 La. 1, 47 So. 40, 129 Am. St. 345.

Nature and Scope of Police Power. In its broader sense, the term "police power" of the state is in a measure convertible with the term "sovereign power." Citizens' Ins. Co. v. Hebert, 139 La. 708, 71 So. 955.

The police power of the government is founded in and properly limited by a just and reasonable application of the principle "sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas." State v. Judge, 39 La.Ann. 132, 1 So. 437.

The police power is the right of a state, or a state functionary acting under delegated authority, to prescribe regulations for the good order, peace, protection, convenience, and comfort of the community, without encroaching on the like power vested in congress by the federal Con

situation. It is known when and where it begins, but not when and where it terminates. Under it, a man's property may be taken from him, his liberty may be shackled, his person and life imperiled, in cases of great public exigencies. (Bass v. State, 34 La.Ann. 494, cited.) New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Hart, 40 La.Ann. 474, 4 So. 215, 8 Am. St. 544. The legitimate exercise by a state of its police power is not controlled or affected by the provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Shreveport v. Schulsinger, 113 La. 9, 36 So. 870, 2 Ann. Cas. 69.

The legitimate exercise of the police power is not subject to restraint by constitutional provisions for the general protection of rights of individual life, liberty and property. State v. Schlemmer, 42 La.Ann. 1166, 8 So. 307, 10 L. R. A. 135.

Although the courts must uphold the police regulations that are enacted by the Legislature in good faith and with reasonable and appropriate regard for the protection which the state owes to the life, morals, health, and property of her citizens, nevertheless, a statute that invades the fundamental rights of the citizens, under the pretense of promoting public health or safety, but having no reasonable relation to its pretended object, is an abuse of the police power of the state; and it is the province and duty of the courts to adjudge such a subterfuge invalid. State v. Legendre, 138 La. 154, 70 So. 70.

The statute permitting certain corporations, whether foreign or domestic, to act as judicial sureties is not unconstitutional because trenching on the police power of the state. Standard Cotton Seed Oil Co. v. Matheson, 48 La.Ann. 1321, 20 So. 713.

The terms "police power" and "eminent domain” have a meaning coextensive with sovereign power or sovereignty. As understood in American constitutional law, the term denotes the power of the state to impose those restraints on private rights which are necessary for the general welfare of all, and is but the power to enforce the maxim, "Sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas." It is the power to regulate the business of others, but not a power to go into business. Union Ice & Coal Co. v. Ruston, 135 La. 898, 66 So. 262, L. R. A. 1915B, 859, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 1274.

The power to regulate does not include the power intentionally to suppress, and one may not with intention do indirectly that which he is unauthorized to do directly; but, where the police power is exercised with the bona fide intention of regulating a business which is subject to its dominion, it is lawfully exercised, notwithstanding the fact that the business may thereby be made unprofitable and perish for lack of support. Shreveport v. Schulsinger, 113 La. 9, 36 So. 870, 2 Ann. Cas. 69.

Due Process of Law and Regulation of Business. See supra, Art. 1, § 2.

Delegation of Police Power. The Constitution of the state vests all of the legislative power in the general assembly, which grant includes all of the police power; and the general assembly has vested in the city of New Orleans so much of the police power as is required by that corporation for the discharge of its functions, including the power to enact and enforce all ordinances necessary for the protection of the lives and property, the preservation of the health, and the promotion of the comfort,

convenience, and general welfare of its inhabitants, and including the power to regulate the use of the streets and to maintain them in a safe condition. New Orleans v. Le Blanc, 139 La. 113, 71 So. 248.

Under its police power the state has the right to recall and abrogate any powers previously conferred on any municipal corporation and to vest such powers in another and distinct state functionary. Pickles v. McLellan Dry Dock Co., 38 La.Ann. 412.

Police Power of Cities. See 5 La. Dig. Municipalities, p. 409. Health and Sanitary Regulations. The Legislature had the power to make the regulation, declaring that private markets shall not be established, continued or kept open within twelve squares of a public market. This power arises from the nature of things, and is what is termed a

police power. It springs from the great principle, "salus populi suprema est lex." Act 1874 is not unconstitutional. New Orleans v. Stafford, 27 La.Ann. 417, 21 Am. Rep. 563.

An act establishing a hospital for smallpox and other contagious diseases is a proper exercise of the police power of the state, and is not invalid. State v. New Orleans, 27 La.Ann. 521.

An ordinance which provided that faecal matter should be taken care of by the sanitary force, and fixed a charge for such service for each family, and imposed a fine or imprisonment for violation of the ordinance, did not amount to using criminal process or imprisonment for enforcing the payment of a civil obligation, in violation of the state or federal Constitution. State v. Syas, 136 La. 628, 67 So. 522.

Legislation affecting the rights and obligations of property owners and taxpayers, authorizing closing of cisterns, tanks, and wells was void and an ordinance pursuant thereto was inoperative. State v. Billhartz, 146 La. 855, 84 So. 120.

A city ordinance may validly require the filling up of unsanitary wells on premises where bread is made, the object being to prevent the use of unwholesome water in making bread. State v. Schlemmer, 42 La.Ann. 1166, 8 So. 307, 10 L. R. A. 135.

From the point of view, sustained by the facts, that the fees for inspection of wash houses and laundries were compensation for services rendered, the ordinance imposing such fees is not unconstitutional on the ground that the ordinance attempts to use its police powers to enforce the collection of revenues. (New Orleans v. Hop Lee, 104 La. 601, 29

So. 214, cited. St. Martinsville v. Mary Lewis, 32 La.Ann. 1293, distinguished.) New Orleans v. Sam Kee, 107 La. 762, 31 So. 1014.

The danger to the public health from the sale of any article and the extent of the danger is a question for legislative enactment, subject to revision by the court. New Orleans v. Toca, 141 La. 551, 75 So. 238.

Cattle, Dairies and Slaughtering. An act providing for the dipping of cattle to eradicate ticks, was not unconstitutional as an unauthorized attempt of the Legislature to control the police juries in the matter of expenditure of money. Irwin v. Police Jury of Grant Parish, 147 La. 825, 86 So. 269.

An ordinance requiring dairymen to furnish free samples of their milk for inspection and analysis is not unreasonable, vexatious, and oppressive, but a legitimate exercise of the police power for the public

health. State v. Dupaquier, 46 La.Ann. 577, 15 So. 502, 26 L. R. A. 162, 49 Am. St. 334.

An ordinance fixing the limits for keeping dairies is constitutional. New Orleans v. Griffin, 147 La. 1089, 86 So. 554.

In the exercise of its police power, New Orleans has the unquestioned right to restrict the slaughtering of animals for food to certain designated districts or localities. Villavaso v. Barthet, 39 La.Ann. 247, 1 So. 599.

The act incorporating the Crescent City Live Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company, was clearly within the police powers of the state, and was a valid and legal enactment of the general assembly. (Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 36, 21 L. ed. 394; State v. Fagan, 22 La.Ann. 545, cited.) Crescent City Live Stock Landing &c. Co. v. New Orleans, 33 La.Ann. 934.

The designating of the place or places where the slaughtering of animals shall be done, and prohibiting their slaughter at other places, falls within the police powers of the state. Whatever the state can lawfully do itself, it can do through the agency of a corporation. Therefore, the state, through the action of her Legislature, can make whatever police regulations may be necessary to preserve the public health, and can create, by the same authority, a corporation through which the police regulation prescribed by her may be enforced. State v. Fagan, 22 La.Ann. 545.

See 5 La. Dig. Municipalities, p. 417.

Liquor Regulation. An ordinance of the city of New Orleans which provides that no one shall open or establish a drinking house or establishment for the retail of spirituous liquors without first obtaining a license or permit from the city council, is not illegal nor unconstitutional, as it comes within the police power of the city. State v. Mattle, 48 La.Ann. 728, 19 So. 748.

A legislative grant to a municipal corporation to "pass all such ordinances, rules and regulations as they may deem necessary for the police and government of the said town," and "to have exclusive control of the license and sale of spirituous or intoxicating liquors," implies as a necessary incident thereto the power to pass and enforce an ordinance to prohibit the sale of liquors within corporate limits on Sunday, as a police regulation. The exercise of such power is not amenable to the constitutional inhibition against the establishment of any religion by law, or to any other constitutional limitation to legislation. Minden v. Silverstein, 36 La.Ann. 912 (citing authorities).

An ordinance of a police jury forbidding the sale of liquors on Sunday has not for its object the enforcement of the observance of the Christian Sabbath, but is a mere police regulation, under the police power of the state for the preservation of public order; and hence is not obnoxious to any provision of the Constitution of the state, or of the United States respecting religion, nor is such a regulation violative of the general law, or "law of the land." State v. Bott, 31 La. Ann. 663, 33 Am. Rep. 224 (citing numerous cases).

Sunday Laws. The act of 1886, known as the Sunday law, is a valid exercise of the police powers of government, the nature, extent, and ground of which are discussed and expounded, and therefore subject to