Whether the Supreme Court had authority to issue the compul sory process of mandamus to the state courts, to enforce the judg ment of reversal, was a question which the court did not think it necessary to discuss or decide; and one of the judges, in the separate opinion which he gave in the cause, seemed to think that the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, was supreme over the parties and over the case, but that it had no compulsory control over the state tribunals. The court itself gave no intimation of an opinion whether it could or could not lawfully resort to compulsory or restrictive process, operating in personam upon the state tribunals; and it was no doubt deemed discreet not to assert more authority constitutionally vested in the court than was necessary for the occasion. If the appellate jurisdiction be founded, as it no doubt was in that case, on a solid basis, it would seem to carry with it, as of course, all the coercive power incident to every such jurisdiction, and requisite to support it. * (2.) Another question which was largely discussed * 322 and profoundly considered by the Supreme Court, was touching its authority to issue a mandamus when not Writ of manarising in a case under its appellate jurisdiction, and damus. when not required in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. In the case of Marbury v. Madison, (a) the plaintiff had been nominated by the President, and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, had been appointed a justice of the peace for the District of Columbia, and the appointment had been made complete and absolute by the President's signature to the commission, and the commission had been made complete by affixing to it the seal of the United States. The Secretary of State, after all this, withheld the commission, and the withholding of it was adjudged to be a violation of a vested legal right, for which the plaintiff was entitled to a remedy by mandamus; and the only question was, whether the mandamus could constitutionally issue from the Supreme Court. (b) (a) 1 Cranch, 137. (b) In the case of Kendall v. The United States, 12 Peters U. S. 524, it was decided, that the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia had authority to issue and enforce obedience to a mandamus, requiring the performance of a mere ministerial act by the Postmaster-General, and which neither he nor the President had any authority to deny or control; for the Postmaster-General is not subject to the direction and control of the The Judiciary Act, sec. 18, authorized the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States. There was no doubt that the act applied to the case, and gave the power, if the law was constitutional; but the court was of opinion that the act, in this respect, was not warranted by the constitution, because the issuing of a mandamus in this case would be an exercise of original jurisdiction not within the constitution, and Congress had not power to give original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in other cases than those described in the constitution. It had not authority to give to the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction, where the constitution had declared that its jurisdiction should be original, nor original jurisdiction where the constitution had declared it should be appellate. To enable the court to issue a man*323 damus, it must be shown to be an exercise, or * necessary to an exercise, of appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court may accordingly issue a mandamus to a Circuit Court of the United States, commanding it to sign a bill of exceptions, for this is an exercise of power warranted by the principles and usages of law. (a) (3.) The constitution gives to the Supreme Court original ju The President, with respect to the execution of duties imposed upon him by law. President has no dispensing power over the law, nor will a mandamus lie to correct the erroneous judgment of an inferior court. It is not the process to review judicial errors of any kind. Ex parte Hoyt, 13 Peters U. S. 279; Ex parte Whitney, 13 Peters U. S 404. This is a settled principle in English and American law. The King v. Justices of Monmouthshire, 7 Dowl. & Ryl. 334; Judges of Oneida v. The People, 18 Wendell, 79; The People v. Judges of Dutchess C. P. 20 Wendell, 658. (a) Ex parte Crane and another, 5 Peters U. S. 190. In the case of Barry v. Mercein, 5 How. U. S. 103, in the Supreme Court of the United States, at Washington, January, 1847, it was adjudged that a writ of error would not lie to the Supreme Court, upon the judgment of a Circuit Court, refusing to grant a writ of habeas corpus, in a case of a father claiming from the mother his infant daughter. The case did not come within the provision of the 22d section of the Judiciary Act of 1789. The case was not within the limits assigned by the act of Congress to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 1 A mandamus against the Secretary of the Navy will not lie, at the instance of an officer to enforce the payment of his salary. The duties of the Secretary in making such payments are not merely ministerial, but are official and to some extent discretionary, and the judicial department has no power to interfere with their discharge. Brashear v. Mason, 6 How. U. S. 92. See, also, Reeside v. Walker, 11 How. U. S. 272. United States v. Guthrie, 17 How. U. S. 284. risdiction in those cases in which a state shall be a when a state party; and in Fowler v. Lindsey, (b) the question arose, is a party. when a state was to be considered a party.1 The parties in that suit claimed title to lands under grants from different states. The plaintiff brought his ejectment in the Circuit Court of Connecticut, claiming title under a grant from that state, and under a claim that the lands lay within the jurisdiction of that state. The defendant claimed title under a grant from New York, and on the ground that the lands lay within the rightful as well as actual jurisdiction of New York. The court laid down this rule on the subject of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, on account of the interest that a state has in the controversy, that it must be a case in which a state is either nominally or substantially the party; and that it is not sufficient that the state may be consequentially affected, as being bound to make retribution to her grantee upon the event of eviction. Though there may be a controversy relative to soil or jurisdiction between two states, yet if that controversy occurs in a suit between two individuals, to which neither of the states is a party upon the record, it is not a case within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, because the states may contest the right of soil in the Supreme Court at any time, notwithstanding a decision in the suit between the individuals. Nor will a decision as to the right of soil between individuals affect the right of the state as to *jurisdiction; and that jurisdiction may * 324 remain unimpaired, though the state may have parted with the right of soil. In such a case the Supreme Court would not allow an injunction, on a bill filed by the state of New York against the state of Connecticut, to stay proceedings in the ejectment suit between individuals, though a general claim of soil and jurisdiction was involved in the private suit, because the state of New York was not a party to the suit in the Circuit Court, nor interested in the decision. (a) (b) 3 Dallas, 411. (a) New York v. Connecticut, 4 Dallas, 3. In the case of the State of Rhode Island v. The State of Massachusetts, 12 Peters U. S. 657, it was decided, after a very elaborate discussion, that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to ascertain and establish boundaries between two states, and to restore and confirm rights of sovereignty and jurisdiction. 1 A suit by or against the governor of a state in his official capacity is a suit by or against a state, within the meaning of the constitution. Appellate ju pends on Con (4.) The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court risdiction de- exists only in those cases in which it is affirmatively gress. given. In the case of Wiscart v. Dauchy, (b) the Supreme Court considered that its whole appellate jurisdiction depended upon the regulations of Congress, as that jurisdiction was given by the constitution in a qualified manner. The Supreme Court was to have appellate jurisdiction, "with such exceptions and under such regulations as Congress should make"; and if Congress had not provided any rule to regulate the proceedings on appeal, the court could not exercise an appellate jurisdiction; and. if a rule be provided, the court could not depart from it. In pursuance of this principle, the court decided, in Clarke v. Bazadone, (c) that a writ of error did not lie to that court from a court of the United States territory northwest of the Ohio, because the act of Congress had not authorized an appeal or writ of error from such a court. It was urged, that the judicial power extended to all cases arising under the constitution, and that where a Supreme Court had not original, it had appellate jurisdiction, with such exceptions and under such regulations as Congress should make; and that the appellate power was derived from the constitution, and must be full and complete, in all cases appertaining to * 325 the federal judiciary * where Congress had not by law interfered and controlled it, by exceptions and regulations. The court, however, adhered to the doctrine which they had before laid down, and proceeded upon the principle, that though the appellate powers of the court were given by the constitution, they were limited entirely by the judiciary statutes, which are to be understood as making exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the court, and to imply a negative on the exercise of such a power, in every case but those in which it is affirmatively given and described by statute. This was the principle also explicitly declared in the case of The United States v. More, (a) and in the case of Durousseau v. The United States. (b) In the first of those cases, the rule of construction was carried to the extent of holding that no appeal or writ of error lay in a criminal case from the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, because the appellate jurisdiction, as to that district, applied, by the terms of the statute, to civil cases only. The rule was afterwards, in Ex parte Kear (b) 3 Dallas, 321. (c) 1 Cranch, 212. (a) 3 Cranch, 159. ney, (c) laid down generally, that the Supreme Court had no appellate jurisdiction from circuit courts in criminal cases confided to it by the laws of the United States.1 Nor has it any appellate jurisdiction over a judgment of the circuit courts, in cases brought before it by writ of error from a district court, though it has over judgments and decrees of the circuit courts, in suits brought before them by appeal from the district courts. (d) Judicial pow cases arising under the con *326 stitution, trea ties, and laws. (5.) The constitution says, that the judicial power shall extend to all cases arising under the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States; and it has been made a er confined to question, as to what was a case arising under a treaty. In Owings v. Norwood, (a) there was an ejectment between two citizens of Maryland, for lands in that state; and the defendant set up an outstanding title in a British subject, which he contended was protected by the British treaty of 1794. The Court of Appeals decided against the title thus set up; and the Supreme Court of the United States held that not to be a case within the appellate jurisdiction of the court, because it was not a case arising under the treaty. The treaty itself was not drawn in question, either directly or incidentally. The title in question did not grow out of the treaty, and as the claim was not under the treaty, the title was not protected by it; and whether the treaty was an obstacle to the recovery, was then a question exclusively for the state court. (b)1 (c) 7 Wheaton, 38; Ex parte Watkins, 3 Peters U. S. 193; 7 Peters U. S. 568, S. P. (d) United States v. Goodwin, 7 Cranch, 108; United States v. Gordon, Ibid. 287. But see supra, p. 199, now altered by act of Congress. Mr. Justice Story, in the case Ex parte Christy, 3 How. U. S. 292, 317, stated that no appeal was given or lies from the judgments either of the District or Circuit Courts in criminal cases. So it was adjudged that the Supreme Court has no power of appeal from the decrees of the District Court sitting in bankruptcy, nor any power to issue a prohibition, except when the District Court is proceeding as a court of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. See, also, infra, p. 383. (a) 5 Cranch, 344. (b) A case, in the sense of the Constitution, says Mr. Justice Story, (Commentaries 1 The U. S. Sup. Court has no power of revision of the judgment of the district and circuit courts, in criminal cases; but it has jurisdiction in criminal as well as civil controversies in cases where judgment is not rendered in the circuit courts by reason of a difference in the opinions of the judges holding such courts, and a certificate of the division is made pursuant to the amendatory act of 1802. Forsyth v. The United States, 9 How. U. S. 571. 1 Henderson v. Tennessee, 10 How. U. S. 311; and see Gill v. Oliver's Executors, 11 How. U. S. 529; Williams v. Oliver, 12 How. U. S. 111. |