of practical men as to a fact merely because they give a bad theoretical reason for it and I am not able to furnish the right one. I have been told that some years ago the pilots in the English Channel uniformly asserted that there was a current setting toward the French shore, and, to allow for that supposed current, they always steered to the north of the course which by the chart and compass they should have held. It was ascertained that there

was no such current, and some ships were lost because their commanders disregarded the rule of the pilots because their reason for it was wrong. On further investigation it was found that the deflexion of an unadjusted compass from the action of the iron in most ships was such as make it right when the ship's head lay either east or west to steer to the north of the course by chart as indicated by that compass. The pilots were quite right in the fact which they had observed, though quite wrong in their reason." The good old man who was examined by Sir Thomas More thought that the building of Tenterden Steeple was the cause of the Goodwin Sands, but the Goodwin Sands are a fact all the same.-Law Times.

THE LAW OF EXTRADITION.

NE of the best arguments in favor of some

National legislation to bring the crime of train

robbing and wrecking within the Federal jurisdiction was the trial for the extradition of Morganfield, the leader of the gang that robbed the Adams Express in Virginia-"within the shadow of the Capitol "—only a few months ago, which has just taken place in Cincinnati courts.

As

Morganfield is, from personal appearances, a very desperate character. Although he has been identified by a link of indisputable evidence as one of the men who held up the train, he maintained a stolid indifference, and even laughed at some of the evidence brought forth, as though it would have no effect. It was rather a dramatic scene when he was brought into Judge M. F. Wilson's court. will be recalled, he was captured through an accident. Smart criminal that he is, he had an idea that the authorities would look for him upon the arrival of the trains at the depots, so he jumped from the car when a short distance from the city, but, being early dawn, he made a miscalculation, and, instead of landing on level ground, found himself dumped into a ditch twenty feet below the track. When found next day with a broken leg, the fact that several thousand dollars were on his person aroused suspicion. Further inquiry developed that he was the train robber. placed under arrest, and for two months has, by reason of his injured limb, been obliged to remain a hospital prisoner.

He was

As stated, Morganfield is a desperate man, and he has found means to employ good legal talent to resort to every technicality of the law to avoid his extradition to the authorties of Virginia. There have been a number of trials, and the object of his counsel is clearly that of delay, and we see now the extraordinary spectacle of a case, where the identity of the prisoner is clearly established, taken from court to court, and thus defeating the ends of justice. The counsel's last effort was an application for a writ of habeas corpus before Judge M. F. Wilson, of the Common Pleas Court of Hamilton county, one of the most eminent jurists versed in criminal law, and he held that Morganfield should be surrendered to the agent of the State of Virginia. An appeal has been taken to the next higher court, but the ultimate result is definitely settled, and that is that Morganfield will be sent back to Virginia. It diction has been raised, because it demonstrates is in one sense gratifying that this question of juristhat, at the present time, train robbers center their operations at or near State lines, so that they can escape to the adjoining State, and thus avoid immediate arrest or conflict with the officers of the State in which they operated. In this way many of the robbers have escaped punishment, while awaiting the slow routine of requisition papers or other steps which are the necessary preliminaries to an

arrest.

The logic of these proceedings is that it is imperative to enact, as speedily as possible, the legislation now pending before Congress, making the offense, to be tried in the United States courts, and crimes of train robbing and wrecking a national calling into service United States marshals, the secret service, and, if necessary, the United States that natural fear which all criminals have of the army-and above all of having the effect of inspiring stern dispensation of justice in the Federal courts.

The legal fight regarding the extradition of Morganfield was stirring, and has attracted so much interest and the points brought forth by the defense were of such a nature as to justify publication in full of the decision ordering the surrender of the prisoner to the State of Virginia.

The first case that I will decide will be the one resting on the arrest of the prisoner on a warrant of extradition. In that case the only points for the court to determine are as to the regularity of the papers and the identity of the prisoner; i. e., is the prisoner the person who is indicted in Stafford county, the one whom the State of Virginia demands as a fugitive from justice? The State of Ohio requires that the demand shall be accompanied by an affidavit that the demand is not made for the purpose of collecting money. That has been complied with in this case by the prosecuting attorney of Stafford county with an affidavit to that effect.

The law also requires that there shall be sworn affidavits that the man is a fugitive from justice, and that also has been complied with by the prosecuting attorney. The law furthermore requires that the demand shall be accompanied by a copy of the indictment, certifying to its authenticity, by the governor of the demanding State. The papers in the case show that the governor has certified that the copy of the indictment, hereto attached, is authentic. In addition to that, a copy of the indictment is certified to by the judge and clerk of the court of Stafford county in accordance with the act of Congress.

One objection made to the indictment is that it does not appear that it was returned by the grand jury, but the certificate of the clerk of the County Court recites that the copy to which he refers is that of an indictment returned by the grand jury. Another objection made is that the indictment does not appear to be certified to as a true bill by the foreman of the grand jury. On the back of the copy the words "A true bill," signed by the foreman, will be found; but, in addition to that, the prosecuting attorney of Stafford county has called my attention to the case 21 Grattan (Price v. The Commonwealth) page 846, where the Court of Appeals of Virginia decides that it was not necessary that the indictment should be signed by the foreman of the grand jury.

It is also objected that the copy does not show that the indictment was signed by the prosecuting attorney of Stafford county. The prosecuting attorney has again called my attention to a case in 86 Virginia (Brown v. The Commonwealth) page 466, in which the Court of Appeals decides that it was not necessary for an indictment to be signed by the prosecuting attorney. The papers, therefore, are regular and in proper form.

Now as to the identity of the prisoner there can be no doubt. (The court here quoted at length the testimony in the proceedings establishing the fact of identity.)

As to the second case-that of habeas corpus. The return of the sheriff shows that he holds the prisoner by virtue of an extradition warrant issued by the governor of the State of Ohio, and a copy of which warrant is annexed to the return. This makes a

prima facie case in favor of the lawfulness of the detention of the prisoner. To overcome this prima facie case the prisoner has offered in evidence a record which endeavors to show certain points which he claims res judicata as to his arrest.

field was being held here. Afterward a warrant of habeas corpus was obtained, and upon a hearing of same, the prisoner was discharged. It is claimed by the prisoner's counsel that these facts are res judicata, and that he cannot, therefore, be rearrested, and must be discharged.

Whatever the law of res judicata might be in case of habeas corpus, it does not apply to extradition proceedings. The one question involved in those proceedings is as to the regularity of the indictment and the identity of the prisoner. If the prisoner is once discharged because the demand is irregular, that does not prevent the demand being made in proper form; and if once discharged because his identity is not sufficiently established, that does not prevent his rearrest and the introduction of further proof as to his identity.

That a plea of res judicata does not apply to proceedings of this kind is decided in 22 Florida, page 36. This same point was also virtually decided in the case of John Larney, otherwise called "Mollie Matches," who was arrested as a fugitive from justice from the State of Illinois, and the courts of Ohio discharged the prisoner on the ground that the extradition warrant issued by the governor of Ohio was invalid because it had been signed by the governor in blank. Afterward another extradition warrant was properly issued. On the hearing of a writ of habeas corpus, Judge Harmon, of the Superior Court of Cincinnati, held that the former proceedings were not a bar to the rearrest, and that the former discharge could not be pleaded in bar, and was not in the nature of res judicata. The case was taken to the Supreme Court of Ohio, and the decision of Judge Harmon was confirmed.

But it is claimed that by section 5747 of the Revised Statutes of Ohio that a prisoner who was set at liberty upon a writ shall not again be imprisoned for the same offense unless by the legal order or proceess of the court wherein he is bound by recognizance to appear, or other court having jurisdiction of the case; or the offense prevents a rearrest of the

prisoner. This section does not apply, however, in this case because the prisoner was not, by the

affidavit filed against him in the Police Court, one who is now charged with committing any offense. The words "committing offense" evidently intending committing any offense in the State of Ohio.

The writ of habeas corpus will be dismissed, and the prisoner will be remanded to the custody of the

sheriff to be delivered in accordance with the governor's warrant to the agent of the State of Virginia.-Express Gazette.

A paper certified by the secretary of state, under his seal, to be a true copy of a description of routes of a trolley line, filed in his office, is not evidence. (State v. Board of Public Works of City of Camden

Abstracts of Recent Decisions.

ACCORD AND SATISFACTION - RATIFICATION. Where plaintiff agreed to a settlement of a claim for injuries while in a condition of physical pain which rendered the agreement voidable, and there was no evidence that the agreement was procured by fraud, an acceptance of the amount of such settlement by her attorney with her consent, at a time when she fully understood what she was doing, is a ratification of the settlement. (Drohan v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. [Mass.], 38 N. E. Rep. 1116.) | ATTACHMENT-DISSOLUTION.—Where a judgment creditor has levied upon personal property subject to the attachment of another party, he is entitled to come into court and move to discharge the property from the attachment, if the writ has been improvidently or improperly obtained. (Bank of Santa Fe v. Haskell County Bank [Kans.], 38 Pac. Rep. 485.) CARRIERS Where a passenger after being warned by the conductor not to do so, entered a car standing at the usual place at a station, and open so as to receive passengers, and which was designed for the train on which he was about to leave, but which was not then coupled to said train, he was guilty of contributory negligence as to any injury sustained by him by reason of boarding said (Tillett v. Lynchburg & D. R. Co. [N. Car.], 20 S. E. Rep. 480.)

car.

PASSENGERS.

PASSENGER

ALIGHTING FROM MOVING

TRAIN. The mere fact that a train fails to stop, as is its duty to do, or as the conductor has promised, does not justify a passenger in jumping off from it while moving, unless notified to do so by the carrier's agent, and the attempt is not obviously dangerous. (Burgin v. Richmond & D. R. Co. [N. Car.], 20 S. E. Rep. 473.)

CERTIORARI.—The office of the common law writ of certiorari, when issued to review the proceedings of such court, in order that the Superior Court may determine therefore whether the inferior court acted within its jurisdictional powers, or whether its procedure was essentially regular, and in accordance with the requirements of law. (Jacksonville, T. & K. W. Ry. Co. v. Boy [Fla.], 16 South. Rep. 290.) CORPORATION ILLEGAL PREFERENCES.-Where an insolvent corporation executes a judgment note to one of its stockholders for a debt due partly to him and partly to two of its directors, a judgment entered thereon, under which all of the corporate assets are seized, is void as to the corporation's other creditors, as being given to hinder and delay them. (Atwater v. American Exch. Nat. Bank of Chicago [Ill.], 38 N. E. Rep. 1017.)

years after it was said to have been made, when there is no written evidence that any such order was in fact made. (Tynan v. Weinhard [Ill.], 38 N. E. Rep. 1014.)

CRIMINAL LAW-HOMICIDE. --An instruction that former threats against defendant not only cannot excuse defendant, if there was nothing indicating a deadly design against defendant at the time of the killing, but are evidence of special spite and special ill-will on the part of the defendant, is erroneous. (Thompson v. United States [U. S. S. C.], 15 S. C. Rep. 73.)

DECEIT SALE OF LANDS.-Neither an agreement to sell land and cause a good title thereto to be conveyed to the purchaser at a future time, nor a deed without covenants, which recites the supposed source of the grantor's title, and purports to grant and convey the land, is sufficient to support an action against the vendor for false and fraudulent representation as to his title, where he makes the agreement and deed in good faith, under color and claim of title, in the honest belief that the title and its source are good, although, in fact, they are both invalid. (Union Pac Ry. Co. v. Barnes [U. S. C. C. of App.], 64 Fed. Rep. 80.)

EXTRADITION-INDICTMENT-CONSTITUTIONALITY.

-The courts of a State from which a fugitive from justice is demanded on extradition do not deny to such person any rights secured to him by the Constitution and laws of the United States by refusing to pass on the constitutionality of the statute of the demanding State under which the indictment against such person is sufficient. (Pearce v. State of Texas [U. S. S. C.], 15 S. C. Rep. 116.)

FEDERAL OFFENSE

CONSPIRACY IN RESTRAINT

OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE.-A combination by railroad employes to prevent all the railroads of a large city engaged in carrying the United States mails and in interstate commerce, from carrying freight and passengers, hauling cars, and securing the services of persons other than strikers, and to induce persons to leave the service of such railroads, is within Act of July 2, 1890, section 1, which provides that every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, "or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the States, is illegal. (United States v. Elliott, U. S. C. C. [Mo.], 64 Fed. Rep. 27.) HIGHWAYS

DEDICATION

-

PRESCRIPTION. A

NEGLIGENCE-INJURIES TO ADJOINING OWNER.— One who erects a chimney on his land is liable for injuries to an adjoining owner by its fall, when it is not the result of inevitable accident, or wrongful acts of third persons. (Cork v. Blossom [Mass.], 38 N. E. Rep. 945.)

PATENTS-DAMAGES FOR INFRINGEMENT.—An infringer cannot escape liability for actual profits made, on the ground that his superior skill and scientific methods in conducting the business enabled him to reap greater profits than others would have done by the infringement. (Lawther v. Hamilton, U. S. C. C. [Wis.], 64 Fed. Rep. 221.)

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-UNAUTHORIZED ACTS OF AGENT.-Where an agent, whose authority is limited to the taking of orders for future delivery, without the knowledge of his principal receives in payment of goods sold chattels which he appropriates to his own use, the principal is not liable for the chattels, nor bound to deliver the goods ordered until they are paid for. (Sioux City Nursery & Seed Co. v. Magnes [Colo.], 38 Pac. Rep. 330.)

CROSSING

INSTRUCTIONS.-It was proper

operate with him in selling to a third person certain property, with knowledge that such person was willing to purchase at a certain sum, induced the owners to sell for less, so that he could make the difference. Held, that he could not recover from the real estate agent his agreed proportion of the | commissions. (Talbott v. Luckett [Md.], 30 Atl. Rep. 564.)

SALE-BREACH OF WARRANTY-DEFENSES.-Payment of a note given for the purchase price of chattels is not a bar to an action by the maker for breach of warranty on the sale, though, at the time of payment, the maker had discovered the breach of warranty. (Gilmore v. Williams [Mass.], 38 N. E. Rep. 976.)

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-PARENT AND CHILD. A parol agreement between father and son for the conveyance of land will not be specifically enforced dence of the agreement consists of rambling and after the death of both of them, where the only evifragmentary conversations occurring years before the trial. (Shovers v. Warrick [Ill.], 38 N. E. Rep. 792.)

VENDOR AND VENDEE-FALSE REPRESENTATIONSRESCISSION.—Unfulfilled representations of the vendor of land as to improvements he intends to make in the neighborhood are no ground for rescinding the contract, since they refer only to future acts. (Day v. Fort Scott Inv. & Imp. Co. [Ill.], 38 N. E. Rep. 567.)

GENCE.

-

LIABILITY FOR MAIL AGENT'S NEGLI

- A notice with respect to throwing United States mail bags off moving trains of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company uses this language: "It must be distinctly understood, however, that this does not in any way relieve baggage masters and mail agents from using all possible precautions against liability of injuring any one in throwing off mail." Held, that on trains carrying a mail agent the failure of baggage masters to observe how the mail agent performed his duty did not, under this notice, make the railroad liable to one injured by a mail bag carelessly thrown by the United States official. (Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Russ [N. J.], 30 Atl. Rep. 524.)

during widowhood, and on her death directed that it be sold, and the proceeds divided equally among his four sons named, "or" their heirs. If his widow married, he directed that the land be sold, and one-half the proceeds should be hers, to be used for her benefit and comfort during her life, and then "revert back" to his children, and that the other half of such proceeds should be equally divided among his children. The sons survived the testator. Held, that the fee of such real estate vested in the sons on testator's death. (Miller v. Gilbert [N. Y.], 38 N. E. Rep. 979.)

Not very long ago, troubles in a well-known Washington family were the cause of divorce proceedings. The wife got a judgment, though the husband had filed a strong cross-bill. In a few months the ex-wife was again married, this time also to a Washington man. One evening, recently, at a large reception, the two met unexpectedly, and an acquaintance, not well up in the family history, was proceeding to introduce them. 'Oh, we've met before," said the last husband; "we're husbands-in-law."-The Barrister.