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Banking Law. These are the ones now in use by the banking department of this State, and show brevity and clearness. Following this are over 100 pages devoted to the text of decisions of the general subject, which is followed by an excellent index in general and one for the State laws as well as one for the National Bank Act.

Published by Matthew Bender, 511-513 Broadway, Albany, N. Y.

NEGLIGENCE OF IMPOSED Duties. BY CHARLES A. RAY, LL.D., Ex-CHIEF JUSTICE OF INDIANA SUPREME COURT, AUTHOR OF NEGLIGENCE OF IMPOSED DUTIES, PERSONAL; AND CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS, AND CONTRACTUAL LIMITATIONS..

This text-book is divided into twenty-two chapters and contains over a thousand pages devoted to the subject above referred to. The first chapter is devoted to Liability and Duty to Provide Safe Transportation. Following this are chapters on Limitation of Liability by Contract and by Statute; Acceptance of Goods by Carrier; Bill of Lading; Validity of Bill of Lading; Act of God; Perils of the Sea; Fire Clause; Freight Charges Regulated by Value of Article; Transportation of Cattle; Packing and Stowing Goods; Deviation from Route, Delay of Transportation of Goods, Negligent Loss or Illegal Capture of Cargo, Transportation by Carriers over Connecting Lines, Liabilities, Charges, Facilities, Connecting Carriers, Combinations; terstate and State Commerce; Competition, Discrimination and Continuous Carriage; Unjust Discrimination; Freight Charges; Delivery of Goods; Action against Carrier of Goods; Insurance; Presumption; Statutory Limitation of Liability.

In

The arrangement of this book, with the foot-notes at the bottom of each page, makes it very easy for reference, while the reference and citations are numerous and from every State in the Union, as well as from the United States courts, As a general text-book it should receive the careful consideration

of the bar. Its facility of reference by means of the index makes it a valuable book for a lawyer's library.

thousand pages. After the index is found a table of cases digested. The volume is bound in sheep and is published by the West Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minn.

FRENCH CIVIL CODE. Translated by Henry Cachard, B. A., counsellor-at-law of the New York bar.

This book is one of the most valuable additions to the list of English law books which has been made for many years, and will find a welcome place from the members of the bar in English speaking countries. It will be valuable not alone to the practising lawyer but will be of great literary importance and worth to students of general literature. It will be easily remembered that many foreign courts when called upon to decide questions of French law have almost uniformly rendered decisions not in accordance with the law of that country and this work will, at least, give easy access to English speaking courts to the Code which now exists in France with all its amendments and changes to date. Aside from this practical value which the work has, it will be entertaining to lawyers and students alike when it is remembersd that Napoleon, when presiding over the meetings at which the articles were discussed, showed the greatest aptitude and cleverness in assisting and framing many of the provisions of the code now found in the present work. The Napoleonic craze of the last few years, which has induced so many writers to enter upon a discussion of more or less of Napoleon's life, have, perhaps, wearied many by the ceaseless prattle on the one well-worn subject. To them this work comes as a fresh and entirely new evidence of Napoleon's ability and natural gifts and as such will be most gratifying to many who have become wearied of so much that has been written. To New Yorkers it will be peculiarly interesting when it is recalled that one of the efforts of one of the greatest lawyers of this State, David Dudley Field, was largely devoted to the framing of the Civil Code and to attempts to have the same made part of the statute law of this State. It will also give some idea to many lawyers of the value of codification of some of the common

Published by The Lawyers' Co-Operative Publish- law and will give a definite plan of what might be ing Company, Rochester, N. Y.

AMERICAN DIGEST, 1895, annual.

The appearance of this work gives another large volume to the editions which have preceded it, while it is sufficient to say that the Digest is apparently of all the decisions of the different courts of this country. Naturally, we have been unable to thoroughly examine the work than to have any other assurance that it was published by the West Pub-| lishing Company. The volume contains over five

comprehended within statutory limitations. As will be remembered the code is divided into three books. The first of these books contains eleven titles, the second four titles, and the third twenty titles. The first book deals with persons, the second book with property and the third book deals with the different ways of acquiring property. The present work covers over five hundred pages devoted to the text of the code, and an index of one hundred pages is added. Published by Banks & Brothers, New York and Albany.

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, NOVEMBER 23, 1895.

Current Topics.

[All communications intended for the Editor should be ad

corporations transacting the same kind of business in different States as competitors and entirely independent of each other, manufacturing and selling among other products ninetynine per cent of the cigarettes manufactured. and sold in the United States; that said firms and corporations, for the purpose of preventing

dressed simply to the Editor of THE ALBANY LAW JOURNAL. competition among themselves and in order to

All letters relating to advertisements, subscriptions, or other business matters, should be addressed to THE ALBANY LAW JOURNAL COMPANY.]

obtain a monopoly of the manufacture and sale of this particular line of goods, and to arbitrarily the 19th of November, 1895, Attorney- fix and maintain the prices of that commodity,

On an

decision in the case of C. A.Whelan & Co. against the American Tobacco Company, a proceeding preliminary to the commencement of an action to prohibit the American Tobacco Company from doing business in this State. It is claimed that the attorney-general in granting this petition has taken the first step in the movement against the different trusts which do business in this State. The action from now on will be productive of great interest among lawyers of all the States and will probably be conducted by the most distinguished counsel in the United States. In view of the numerous interests which are involved from a financial standpoint, not to speak of the legal principles which must be settled, it is proper that we should publish the full opinion of the attorney-general, which is as follows:

"Application has been made to the attorneygeneral to commence an action in the name of the people against the American Tobacco Company to obtain a judgment restraining the company from transacting the cigarette business in this State and to cancel the certificate of au

thority heretofore granted to the company authorizing it to carry on business in the State of New York. It appears from the papers presented upon the hearing that the American Tobacco Company is a New Jersey company, incorporated on or about Jan. 20, 1890, with a capital stock of $35,000,000."

After referring to the company's receipt of a certificate authorizing it to do business in this State, the attorney-general continues: “An action is now pending against the company in the State of New Jersey, in which it is alleged in substance that the company was organized for unlawful purposes; that the incorporators of the company originally consisted of firms and VOL. 52 - No. 21.

poration to be known as the American Tobacco Company, in which they should respectively become stockholders, receiving full paid stock in payment for the purchase of them, by said company, of the property used by each of them in the business in which they were then engaged; that said company was thereupon organized and its stock divided among the various corporations and firms entering into the agreement; but that the incorporators never intended to establish any factories or depots in the State of New Jersey, and that neither they nor any of them, nor the company itself ever had any place of business in that State, but that the original corporations and individuals continued to transact business in their respective localities as before, and that the object of the organization of said company was to restrain trade, prevent competition and to secure a monoply in the manufacture and sale of cigarettes. Various other allegations are contained in said complaint, charging a conspiracy and unlawful combination. Substantially the same statements are contained in the papers presented to me, all of which are specifically denied by the officers of the company, and are the subjects of controversy in the New Jersey suits. The allegations charging a conspiracy and unlawful purpose and combination upon the part of the organizers of the company in obtaining its charter, are properly matters to be investigated by the courts of the State where the original articles of incorporation are filed."

Reference is made to the illegality of combinations made to control prices and produce a monopoly, after which the opinion states the tobacco company's method of doing business as follows: "The general plan adopted by the company appears to have been to constitute

the dealers handling and selling the cigarettes furnished by the corporation, its general agents for the disposal of that particular commodity, and to issue to its so called agents what are designated as selling lists. The agreement entered between the company and those dealing with it provides, in substance, among other things, that cigarettes of the various brands manufactured by the company are to be sent to the dealer and received, sold and accounted for by him; that the goods are not to be sold at lower prices than those fixed by the company, the dealer to guarantee all sales made by him, all cigarettes to remain the property of the corporation until sold by the dealer. Commissions for selling and expenses of the dealer are allowed on all goods sold at not less than $2.50 per 1,000, provided the dealer shall fully comply with all the conditions herein contained and shall co-operate with the company and promote its interests and handle its cigarettes to its satisfaction. It is further stipulated that if the company becomes informed and believes that the dealer has directly or indirectly sold cigarettes at lower than the fixed prices, or has not complied with the conditions of the agreement, the company shall have the right to determine and declare that the dealer has forfeited all claims to commissions. It appears to be the fact that, with the exception of certain cheaper brands, the company has refused since March 1, 1892, to sell directly to dealers, but has disposed of this line of goods through its agents appointed in the manner and upon the terms above stated.

to me

In brief the evidence and papers submitted are to the effect that the wholesale dealer, jobber or whoever he may be that obtains this commodity from the company for the purpose of commerce is, with the exceptions I have before stated, at once turued into an agent of the company, and subjected to its direction and control as to the terms and manner in which he shall dispose of this particular line of goods. It is claimed upon the part of petitioner that the real object and purpose of this arrangement and method of doing business is to compel jobbers and dealers to refrain from selling any cigarettes except those manufactured by the company, and that if they handle other brands the company refuses to

The

consign any further goods to them, and that inasmuch as much the larger part of the cigarettes manufactured and sold are produced by the factories of the company, such a withdrawal results in great injury to, if not a destruction of the business of said dealers. Various affidavits have been presented and depositions of witnesses have been read tending to establish the claim of the petitioner. In my judgment a corporation doing business in this State, and having substantial control of the market ought not to be permitted to impose as a general perquisite upon the purchasers of its commodities, whether designated as agents or not, that they shall obtain goods from no other source. enforcement of such a condition must necessarily operate as a restraint of trade and prevent competition. To carry out such a rule to its logical sequence would enable the wealthy corporation which has obtained a monopoly of the market to continue the monopoly and to drive out of business poorer and less fortunate competitors. The purchaser under such an arrangement and contract has been made party to a scheme which has really a tendency to give control of the market to the vendor to the exclusion of all competitors. I think such a method of transacting business under the circumstances disclosed is against public policy and would not receive the approval of the courts of the State in the case of a domestic corporation. Why then should it be permitted in a foreign corporation?

I have examined this application with care, believing that corporations acting within the law are entitled to the protection of the courts, and that actions should not be commenced except for good and substantial reasons. Large interests and immense accumulations of property are represented by companies incorporated under foreign and domestic statutes. I have no sympathy with any disposition upon the part of private citizens or public officials to attack the existence of a corporation because of temporary financial embarrassment or trivial and unintentional deviation from chartered powers. Applications made for purposes of speculation, to redress private grievances or to promote the interests of rival corporations, are unworthy of consideration. I am of the opinion that sufficient evidence has been produced upon the

hearing to authorize the commencement of an action to determine whether the American tobacco company is not transacting its business in the State of New York in an unlawful manner, in restraint of trade and to prohibit it from further transaction of such business. The application is granted and an action may be commenced upon filing a bond sufficient in form and amount to indemnify the people against

costs of suit.

On reading the opinion, it is important to notice that part in which the allegation of the petition that a monopoly exists is discussed. It is especially in relation to the words, "in my judgment a corporation doing business in this State and having substantial control of the market ought not to be permitted to impose as a general prerequisite upon the purchasers of its commodities, whether designated as agents or not, that they shall obtain goods from no other source." Applying this principle by analogy the Attorney-General declares that, as domestic corporations would not be allowed by the courts of this State to do business in a manner clearly against public policy, foreign corporations should not be allowed that right.

A decision in admiralty jurisdiction recently made in the United States District Court for California in Herman v. Port Blakely Mill Co. (69 Fed. R. 646), is worthy of careful consideration In the case in question it was held that where a tort is committed partly on land and partly on water, the question whether admiralty has jurisdiction over it is determined by the locus of the damage and not the locus of the origin of the tort. The tort complained of was that a laborer working in the hold of a vessel was struck and injured by a piece of lumber sent without warning through a chute by a person working on the pier. As the locus of the damage was on board the vessel, the court held that it was within admiralty jurisdiction.

The court said, in part: In the case of the City of Milwaukee v. The Curtis, The Camden and The Welcome (37 Fed. 705) a libel in rem was filed by the City of Milwaukee against the vessels named for injuries to a bridge. The libel was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The proposition involved there was counter to that in the case at bar. It was for an injury to land, and not for an injury originating on land.

Nevertheless, the remarks of Judge Jenkins as to the locality of the damage being conclusive of the question of admiralty jurisdiction are in point. He says:

"In cases of tort, locality is the test of jurisdiction in the admiralty. The ultimate judi cial authority has determined the principle that the true meaning of the rule of locality is that, although the origin of the wrong is on the water, yet, if the consummation and substance of the injury are on the land, a Court of admiralty has not jurisdiction; that the place or locality of the injury is the place or locality of the thing injured, and not of the agent causing the injury (Ex parte Phenix Ins. Co., 118 U. S., 610, 7 Sup. Ct., 25). Within this settled principle, a tort is maritime, and within the jurisdiction of the admiralty, when the injury is to a vessel afloat, although the negligence causing the injury originated on land. (The Rock Island Bridge, 6 Wall, 213; Leonard v. Decker, 22 Fed., 741.) In the former case it was ruled that an action in personam would lie against the owners of the bridge, because the injury was consummated upon navigable waters, being inflicted upon a movable thing engaged in navigation, but that a proceeding in rem against the bridge was not maintainable, because a maritime lien can only exist upon movable things engaged in navigation, or upon things which are the subjects of commerce on the high seas or navigable waters. And so an injury happening through default of the master, to one upon a vessel discharging cargo at a wharf to which she was securely moored, is within the admiralty jurisdiction (Leathers v. Blessing, 105 U. S., 626), but otherwise if the injury occurred to one upon the wharf. (The Mary Stewart, 10 Fed., 137.) In the latter case there is an inadvertent remark to the effect that both the wrong and the injury must occur upon the water a proposition not sustained by It suffices if the damage - the authority. substantial cause of action arising out of the wrong is complete upon navigable waters. (The Plymouth, supra.)"

Counsel for respondent relies greatly upon The Mary Stewart (supra), and particularly upon the remarks criticised by Judge Jenkins in the case just quoted, as indicating that the tort must be complete on the water before a

Court of Admiralty will take jurisdiction. That With reference to other cases cited by counwas a case involving the proposition counter to sel for respondent, they may be disposed of the one at bar, viz, the tort there originated on with the statement that, discarding scattered the water, but the consummation and the injury and isolated expressions, and reading the opinwere sustained on land. The facts of the case ions cited as a whole, they rather make for than were, briefly, that one, an employe of the steve- against the jurisdiction of admiralty. While, dore engaged in loading the vessed, was injured, as previously stated, I have been unable to find while standing on the wharf, by a bale of cot- any case on "all fours" with the one at bar, ton, which was being hoisted aboard the ship, yet there are many authorities upon the counter which fell before it reached the ship's rail. It proposition-viz., where the tort has its origin was contended that a Court of Admiralty could on water, but is consummated, and the injury not take jurisdiction. The district judge cor- sustained, on land-which seem to me to furrectly held that jurisdiction, could not attach, nish convincing authority for the jurisdiction of but, in sustaining this contention, went a little the court in this case. In those cases, where further than the facts justified him. He said: the facts showed that the tort originated on "It is clear that the cause of action set out water, but was consummated, and the injury in the libel is without the jurisdiction of the sustained, on land, it is held that courts of adadmiralty. In cases of tort, the locality alone miralty have no jurisdiction. The authorities determines the admiralty jurisdiction. Only even go further, and hold that where the tort those torts are maritime which happen on navi- originates on water, and results in injury to land, gable waters. If the injury complained of hap-as wharves, piers, bridges, &c. (e. g., a vessel colpened on land, it is not cognizable in the admi-liding what a wharf, etc.), libels for damages susralty, even though it may have originated on the water. (The Plymouth, 3 Wall., 20.) This springs from the well-known principle that there are two essential ingredients to a cause of action, viz., a wrong, and damage resulting from that wrong. Both must concur. To constitute a maritime cause of action, therefore, not only the wrong must originate on water, but the damage the other necessary ingredient must also happen on water. Now, the injury in the case at bar happened on the land."

This language must, of course, be taken subject to the facts of that case, and to the question of law which the learned judge was then considering. I do not think that he meant to lay it down as a general principle that "the wrong must originate on the water," for that would be to make the test of admiralty jurisdiction depend upon the locality where the tort originated a proposition not countenanced by a single authority or dictum. I think that the only true and rational solution of the jurisdictional question, where the tort occurs partly on land and partly on water, is to ascertain the place of the consummation and substance of the injury. This latter elemeut of the wrong is necessarily the only substantial cause of action, otherwise it would be damnum absque injuria.

tained by such wharves, etc., will not be enter-
tained in admiralty, because the injury took
place, to all intents and purposes, on land, and
not on water, and the fact that the agent caus-
ing the injury was afloat made no difference.
(The Plymouth, supra; The Neil Cochran,
supra; The Ottawa, supra; The Arkansas, 17
Fed. 383; The Professor Morse, 23 Fed. 803;
The John C. Sweeney, 55 Fed. 540; The Mary
Stewart, supra; The H. S. Picklands, 42 Fed.
239; The Mary Garrett, 63 Fed. 1009; The
But it is
Rock Island Bridge, 6 Wall. 213.)
held, on the other hand, that if a vessel sustain
injury by colliding with wharves, piers, etc.,
they may maintain an action in personam
against the owners thereof, the damage having
been sustained on water. (Greenwood v. Town
of Westport, 53 Fed. 824; id., 60 Fed. 561;
Hill v. Board, 45 Fed. 260.) The central idea
found running through all these cases is, so far
as jurisdiction over torts is concerned, that the
admiralty law books to the place where the in-
jury was suffered, and not to the locality of the
agent causing the injury. If this be the cor-
rect doctrine with respect to cases where the
tort originates on water, but results in damage
to land or on land, I see no valid reason why
the same test of jurisdiction is not applicable
to cases where the tort originates on land, but

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