MARSTON, J. A hearing and determination was had in the probate court upon the final account of Morrill as administrator of the estate of the deceased.

Morrill, feeling aggrieved, took an appeal to the circuit court, in which he set forth that the probate court did adjudge and decree that certain items in his report contained be disallowed, setting forth the items: "Now, therefore, the undersigned, Charles C. Morrill, administrator aforesaid, feeling himself aggrieved by the decision and determination of the said judge of probate, as to so much and such part of his finding as appears above, does hereby appeal therefrom to the circuit court for the county of Van Buren."

The statute authorizes any person aggrieved by any order, sentence, decree, or denial of a judge of probate, to appeal therefrom. Section 5216.

This clearly does not authorize or permit an appeal to be taken from the disallowance of certain items in an account. The appeal must be taken from the order, which brings up the entire matter, and permits a rehearing upon each and every item in the account.

We regret that the case must be disposed of in this way, as we are of opinion that, upon a full rehearing in the circuit, a judgment would be obtained for a much larger amount against the administrator than was obtained in the probate court. The administrator's management of the estate has been wholly unjustifiable.

The circuit court obtained no jurisdiction under the appeal taken, and the judgment rendered in that court must be reversed. Costs of the circuit court and of this court will be allowed against Morrill individually, and not to be paid out of the funds of the estate in his hands.

ELIZA W. BISSELL vs. FREDERICK F. TAYLOR.
Filed October 21, 1879.

A wife may maintain an action in her own name for fraudulent representations as to property conveyed to and received by her in consideration of her relinquishment of her inchoate dower rights in lands conveyed by her husband. A release by a wife of inchoate dower, or her consent to release a homestead right, and its actual release, will constitute a valuable consideration for a conveyance to her.-[ED.

Error to Kent.

Isaac H. Parish, for plaintiff in error.

J. C. Fitzgerald, for defendant in error.

COOLEY, J. The plaintiff's case is this: That she, being the wife of J. Bissell, was, on the twenty-first day of February, 1877, occupying with her husband certain premises in Grand Rapids, which the husband owned in fee, and in which she had rights as his wife, and the right which a wife has in respect to the husband's homestead, and which entitled her to refuse to assent to any alienation thereof; that while so occupying and so entitled, defendant bargained with her husband for the purchase thereof for the sum of $7,440, which it was agreed should be paid as follows: $4,180 by defendant assuring the payment of certain encumbrances, $1,260 in a mortgage then owned by defendant, and the balance in a certain farm which was to be deeded to plaintiff as a consideration to her for joining with her husband in the alienation of the Grand Rapids property; that defendant, to induce plaintiff to unite with her husband in such alienation, falsely and fraudulently made certain representations in respect to the farm, which are set forth at length in the declaration, and which it is averred he well knew were untrue, by means whereof he succeeded in effecting the purchase, and inducing plaintiff to unite in the deed of conveyance to him, whereby she was defrauded and damnified. For this damage she claims to recover on the special case.

The circuit court refused to receive any evidence under this declaration, on the ground that it set forth no cause of action. We have not the reasons of the circuit judge before us, but we are probably not wrong in assuming that they are the same which are presented here in support of his judgment. If so, they are in substance these: That the contingent right which the wife has in her husband's e.tates, and the power of control which, under the statute, she may exercise in respect to his alienation of his homestead, or of the premises from which he is entitled to have a homestead set off, are not her sole property within the meaning of the statute, which empowers married women to grant, bargain, sell, mortgage and contract their sole property, and consequently she is not entitled to maintain suits under that statute upon any contract she may have attempted to make respecting the same. This is the main position taken by the defendant, and all others depend upon it.

We think the defendant misconceives this case. The plaintiff is not suing for damages suffered through her signature

being fraudulently obtained to a deed, but for being defrauded in the conveyance which was the consideration for such signature. It is not of the least importance in such a suit whether what she gave for the conveyance did or did not pertain to her sole property; it is sufficient that it was something that had value to her, present or prospective, and which she relinquished as the consideration for what she obtained. The question of her interest or right, or power of control, whatever it may be, is purely a question of consideration, and there never was any question, even at the common law, that the wife's inchoate rights in her husband's estates of inheritance had a value which would support a conveyance to her in consideration of its relinquishment, (Farwell v. Johnston, 34 Mich. 342;) and if it will support a conveyance, it will support whatever accompanied the conveyance, and which would have given rights to any one else who might have been purchaser. She has the same right with other persons to make valid contracts for the purchase of sole property, (Tillman v. Shackleton, 15 Mich. 60,) and when it appears that she gave value for that for which she bargained, it is wholly unimportant to the liability of the other party whether the value pertained to her rights in one capacity or in another. The person with whom she has dealt, who has received what he bargained for, is further concerned only in his own performance.

But it is said the plaintiff does not allege that her inchoate right of dower was bargained for. We think otherwise. The allegations of the declaration in this regard are not as artistic as they should have been, but they are sufficient. Besides, the consent to release the homstead right, and its actual release, would have been consideration sufficient.

This covers the whole case.

The judgment must be reversed, with costs, and the case remanded for trial.

(The other justices concurred.)

SARAH T. CARPENTER, Trustee, vs. FRANK BUTTRICK,

Assignee.

Filed October 21, 1879.

Evidence in this case held to support the findings and decree of the court below.-[ED.

Appeal from Monroe.

Charles Kudner, for plaintiff in error.
Romeyn & Romeyn, for defendant in error.

COOLEY, J. Questions of fact alone are presented by this record. We find the facts to be substantially the following:

In 1873 Caleb Ives, residing in Monroe, and being a trustee of the Monroe Baptist society, expressed to some friends in the society a desire to make a loan of money. He had been a large donor to the society in the erection of a church building, and expected to continue to be. The society had need, at that time, of some two or three thousand dollars, and Mr. Ives said to one or more of the members that if he could obtain the $5,000 he wanted he could make enough with it to enable him to give the society the assistance it needed. It was found that a Mrs. Reynolds, a member of the society, had the money, which she was willing to loan, and an arrangement was made by which it was agreed that it should be loaned to Ives, he giving therefor his note, secured by a mortgage of the property of the church society, and by the personal guaranty of the trustees of Ives. The testimony on the part of the complainant tends to show that the inducement to the trustees to make this arrangement was the assurance of Mr. Ives that if he effected the loan he would pay off certain debts of the society amounting to near $3,000. The money, when obtained by him, was used in his business. He continued thereafter to assist the society liberally, and probably to the full extent of his assurances.

In May, 1876, Mrs. Reynolds expressed a desire for other security than she then had, and Mr. Ives consented to give and did give the mortgage now in suit. The amount is $3,000. It was given for so much of the original debt. In the mortgage and the accompanying bond it was provided that the sum, if paid, should be indorsed on the $5,000 note. Mr. Ives becoming seriously embarrassed not long after, the church society paid Mrs. Reynolds the amount of her debt, took an assignment of the $3,000 bond and mortgage to complainant, as trustee for the society, and the complainant proceeded to foreclose. Ives in the meantime had gone into bankruptcy, and his assignee in bankruptcy is the defendant.

The case turns upon the question whether the bond and mortgage of $5,000, given by Ives to Mrs. Reynolds, were given to raise money for Ives exclusively, or, on the other hand, in part for his benefit and in part for the benefit of the church society. Complainant maintains the first position, and defendant the second. We think the proofs sustain the theory of

the complainant, and that such moneys as from time to time were paid by Ives to or for the use of the church society were donations.

It is quite unnecessary to give the reasons for this conclusion, but it is proper to say that the direct evidence nearly all tends to support it.

The decree must be affirmed, with costs. (The other justices concurred.)

EDWARD W. SPARROW vs. HIRAM W. HOVEY.

Filed October 21, 1879.

A commissioner, in his certificate, described himself as "a commissioner in the state of Michigan, within and for said county." It was signed, "Com. for the state of Michigan in New York." The official seal attached was full and clear in the same respect, but the impression only showed the commissioner's first name. Held, sufficient to entitle the deed to which it was attached to be received in evidence.-[Ed.

Error to Shiawassee.

O. L. Spaulding, for plaintiff in error.
Hugh McCurdy, for defendant in error.

MARSTON, J. We are of opinion that the certificate of the commissioner was in proper form, and sufficient to entitle the deed to have heen admitted in evidence. In the body of the certificate he described himself as "a commissioner for the state of Michigan within and for said county." It is signed as "Com. for the state of Michigan in New York," and the official seal attached is also full and clear in the same respect. Objection was made that the full name of the commissioner did not appear in the impression made on the official seal; the first name, Edwin, only appearing.

It was

There is nothing in this that should cause any doubt whatever to be thrown upon the matter. It very frequently happens that a clear and distinct impression in full does not appear, but this has not generally been considered as throwing any doubt upon the genuineness of the official act. not necessary for the commissioner, in the body of the certificate, to recite the source of his power, or that he had duly qualified, any more than it would be for a notary or justice of the peace.

The judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered. (The other justices concurred.)