If this leading principle in the application of all Law, could in any case be drawn into doubt, it would hardly seem possible to raise a doubt of its fair application to the great Charter of our Union,

The people themselves, have in this case declared, that "We, the people of the United States," do ordain and establish this Constitution for "the United States of America."

Who then, were the people of the United States in 1789, by whom, and for whom, this Constitution was formed?

The people who ordained and established the Constitution, were the people who at that day had but just come out-gloriously, it is true-from a seven year's conflict with one of the most powerful nations of the earth; and had thus, but recently, extorted from that proud nation, the acknowledgment of their rights" to assume their separate and equal station among the powers of the earth."

The "old thirteen,"-Colonies once-States then-and now out-numbering Empires-bound together by the recollection of their common dangers and triumphs, naturally felt anxious to give permanence and durability to the results of their great Revolutionary struggle.

They naturally felt anxious that whatever memorial of their common toils, and sacrifices, and sufferings, in the cause of human freedom, should be left as their legacy to posterity, should be embodied in a form as enduring as the principles for which they had fought, and the glories they had won.

They, therefore, the men of the Revolution, made a Constitution embodying for national purposes the great principles out of which their great struggle had arisen. They made a Constitution in their own imperishable language-" in order to form a more perfect union-to establish justice-ensure domestic tranquillity, and secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and their posterity."

These declared objects of those who made the Constitution, are especially worthy of notice at the present time. It was made "to establish justice, and ensure domestic tranquillity." Would these objects be effected by the admission of fugitives from justice, in all other quarters of the world, to the rights of citizens in this?

It was made "to secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and their posterity,"-Would these blessings be most constitutionally secured, by the spread of involuntary servitude, as far as may be in our power, to all other regions of the earth?

It was made "in order to form a more perfect union,"-this was the leading object. Would this be promoted by the extension of our bounds from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and from Terra del Fuego to the Arctic Ocean? But with whom was this more perfect union to be formed?—with whom, but with those who had fought and triumphed together-with those who had established by their counsels and their arms, the perilous declaration of 1776-" that these united Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent States."

But for what portion of the heritage of man was this Constitution ordained and established?

The obvious answer would be-for the country of those who ordained and established it.

It would hardly be expected, that those who had but just secured their own independence, and become emancipated from foreign control, would have their first sympathies aroused, and their first energies directed, to the construction of a government whose great and progressive benefits would largely, if not principally, fall upon foreign states and foreign territories.

The first and most pressing want, would demand the earliest remedy. The people who had deeply felt the want of "a more perfect union" among themselves, during the perilous progress of the Revolution, would have much more naturally provided in the first place, for that pressing evil. The States that had but just been emancipated from foreign thraldom, would be much more anxious" to establish justice, and ensure domestic tranquillity" at home, than to extend the area of either Freedom or Slavery abroad.

The people then of the once "united Colonies," who had now become absolved from all allegiance to the British Crown, ordained and established this Constitution for the "United States of America."

The territory embraced in our great national act of July 4, 1776, became by that act, and the Treaty with Great Britain

of 1783-" the United States of America," for whom this Constitution was ordained and established."

Who can look at and read the introductory sentence of this great charter of our rights and obligations as citizens of the United States, in the light thrown upon it, and around it, by the history of the men and the times, by whom, and in which, it was formed and adopted, and doubt for a moment, that the Constitution in its design and purpose-in the language and understanding of those who formed and those who adopted it-in every thing in short, which would give it, and which ought to give it, the binding efficacy and effect of a great National Compact, was made by the men of the Revolution for the glorious lands acquired by the blood and treasures of the Revolutionand for no other lands whatever.

The extended domains of Louisiana and Florida, then belonged in full dominion to Spain, and were no more intended to be embraced at that time, or in all time to come, in the term "United States of America," for whom this Constitution was formed, than Spain herself,-they were no more in the minds and purposes of those who made, and those who adopted the Constitution, than Mexico or Brazil,-Patagonia or the Celestial Empire.

The Committee think this is entirely clear on the face, and in the terms of the Constitution itself. But it is equally clear, from the history of the times which preceded and the circumstances which occasioned its formation.

The Constitution was not the work of men who had nothing to do, but to provide means to foster and cherish the same great interests throughout the whole range of the abounding and expanded country, from the torrid to the frigid zone.

Great as was the desire for union, the diversities of origin, of habits and manners, of climate, of soil and productionsbut more than all else—of "the peculiar institutions" of a large and powerful section of the country-these had already created all but insuperable difficulties, in arranging and adjusting the one to the other.

But the work was intrusted to wise heads and patriotic

hearts. The Father of his country was at its head, and it was successful.

It is, however, admitted every where, and on all hands, that it was the result of a compromise of great and conflicting interests, througout the whole extent of the Union.

But how could conflicting interests have been adjusted, or opposing interests compromised, if the nation itself had not then assumed its form, and established its bounds? Interests could never have been balanced or adjusted, or their extent or importance know among the States, until the national boundaries had not only been ascertained, but been fixed, established, and rendered immoveable. The great compromise of the Constitution,-the admitted slave representation in Congress and in the election of President, proves this, the Committee think, beyond all contradiction.

This great surrender of an equality of rights on the part of the free States, consists in granting representation to a species of property, which, if not entirely a "tropical production," is found only in those States under the influence of a peculiar climate, and peculiar institutions-and in excluding all other property-whatever in amount, or wherever situated, entirely from representation.

Would the free States of this Union have ever consented to admit this element of slave property to representation at allif the claim had then been made, as now, that the Constitution gave power to extend the Union over the slave-climate to the equator? Would the same elements of compromise have been in that case presented? Or the same results have followed? Let the calculating spirit of those who have so long been calculating the "value of the Union," ascertain the probabilities in this case, and declare the result.

But it is said, that although the Constitution was originally, and in terms confined to a well known and well defined territory, that it nevertheless contains an inherent power of indefinite expansion, by express powers granted for that purpose, and that the Constitution itself provides, that Congress may admit new States into the Union.

The Constitution does so provide. But does it provide that

these new States, may be formed of territory not originally belonging to the "United States of America?" Let us see how this matter stands?

The Constitution, Art. 4, Sect. 3, provides-that "new States may be admitted by Congress into the Union-but no new State shall be formed or erected, within the jurisdiction of any other State, nor any State be formed by the junction of two or more States or parts of States, without the consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned, as well as of Congress."

Here it is obvious, that all the limitations on the power granted, to admit new States into the Union, most clearly apply to the States and territories then constituting the Union. "New States may be admitted by Congress." This is the power granted.

But "no new State shall be formed within the jurisdiction of any other State," "Nor any State be formed by the junction of two or more States."

These are the limitations on the powers granted. These limitations, all palpably apply to the territory within the then existing Union-and the Committee deem the argument not only fair but irresistible, that the power and its limitations were intended by the people to apply to the same, and only to the same subject matter.

But this is not all.

The Constitution, Art. 7, provides, that "the ratification. of the conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the establishment of this Constitution, between the States so ratifying the same."

Here, then, is a case presented, where the Union, under the Constitution, might have gone into rightful operation, and "four States," out of the "original thirteen" might have been excluded from its benefits.

Was not this a case in point for the application of this express power to admit new States without travelling out of the bounds of the original Union? A case too, appealing with great force and effect, both to the interests and the sympathies of the whole Union ?