obedience; that without this association there might arise a question of utility, the end of all moral action, but there could be no conception of duty or moral obligation; that in the case of natural law that Supreme power is perceived to be the great Creator of the universe, who made man and established him in a situation to sustain those relations, individual and social, from which both his private and public duties result, and which point out to him the laws of his nature; that this is also accompanied with a sense of gratitude to the beneficent Author of existence, which becomes a leading and powerful inducement to obedience. This mode of accounting for the efficient of moral obligation supports the dignity of the law, and with energy brings it home to the mind. There is, indeed, no very material difference between this opinion and that which makes the will of God, as above explained, the foundation of moral obligation. The difference appears to arise, principally, from the manner of expressing an abstract notion. To say that the will of God is a law to man, necessarily implies the supremacy and authority of the law-giver. Another ground of difference may be found in a fondness for definition. The notion of moral obligation may be explained, but is too complicated to admit a concise scientific definition; yet writers have frequently attempted so to define it; and each seizing that idea embraced in the term which appeared to him most prominent, placed it in his definition to the neglect or exclusion of something equally or more important. I believe every definition, which has been attempted upon this subject, leaves something to be sought. Some seem to have excluded every thing but the will of the lawgiver; and those who have laid the foundation in an antecedent fitness of things appear, at least as far as they can be apprehended, to place that will in subordination to their principle. Some have laid the whole stress on the moral relations; while others have found the obligation in utility only. There can in this case be no obligation on the subject, man, without a law, no law without a law-giver, who is God. No obligation can attach independent of the moral relations; nor can it exist without a regard to utility, the end and design of the law; for what obligation can attach on a moral being to perform and act to no end, for no manner of use ? We may here repeat, that the

utility of any class of actions, that is, their general tendency to promote human happiness is a sure, I may say, the only sure test, that the rule requiring them is a genuine law of nature. We may also here observe a material difference between the law of nature as a moral law, and the municipal law. The latter, formed to direct the actions of the subject to a certain object, requires simply obedience, and judges of that obedience by the external act, and no further regards the intention ; the former, the law of nature, requires with obedience a regard to the end of that law, and judges of the obedience by the internal act, the intention. The latter is satisfied with prudence in obeying, the former unites prudence with benevolence.

Vattel, in his introductory discourse, has laid it down as a general law of society, the law of social nature, "that each should do for others what their necessities require, and they are capable of doing without neglecting what they owe to themselves".* This seems intended by the author as a most general or universal rule; and yet if intended to apply to the internal law, I think we may lay down a rule still more general. That it is a law of social nature, that each should so direct his conduct in all his actions, that they shall tend to the general utility, the general interest and happiness of man. The exception expressed in the former rule is certainly just, but it is clearly implied in the latter; for, were every man to neglect the duties which he owes to himself, or wholly to sacrifice his own interest and happiness, in his endeavors to promote the interest and happiness of others, it would, instead of augmenting, tend to diminish if not destroy the general happiness; especially as no one is equally capable as in his own case, of judging what will contribute to the happiness of another. And yet there are cases in which the law of social nature requires a sacrifice to be made. Self preservation is at least one of the first duties. It nevertheless, sometimes, becomes the duty of one man to expose his own life, to a certain degree, to save the life of another in imminent danger. There are other instances, in which it may be the duty of one man to make no

* Law of Nations, Preliminaries. § 10.

inconsiderable sacrifices to relieve the necessities of others. Such instances will readily occur, and must be left to every man's conscience.

It may be said, that general utility, the general happiness of the whole human race is an object too vast for the limited faculties of man; that if it be considered as a general rule, and that all our actions are to be directed to its attainment, the rule is of too general a nature to be applied to immediate action in any case. It is true that a general, is never the immediate rule of action, nor is general utility the primary, if I may use the distinction, but the ultimate end to be kept in view. Such is the constitution of our nature, that the primary end in view is the immediate utility of the agent himself; and thence extending to his family and connexions of kindred and society, until it embraces the community of which he is a member, and thence the whole human race. The interests of all these he identifies with his own, or participates in them according to their estimated importance in securing and perpetuating his own happiness. Now in any community the happiness of the whole consists in the happiness of all its parts. It has its commencement with individuals; it depends on the exertion and actions of individuals, and the general direction of those actions. To give a proper direction and tendency of all to the same end, some general rule or rules are necessary to be observed.

The first rule for the attainment of this end, is that rule of the civil law," so use your own right, that you injure not the rights of others." This is not only a rule of the civil law, but is a general rule of the law of nature, subordinate to the more general rule, which requires that all the actions of individuals be so directed as to promote the good of the whole. Each individual is supposed best to understand what will contribute to his own interest and happiness, and the individuals of any society, what will most contribute to the interest and prosperity of their society, and they will pursue their own interest with more alacrity as well as knowledge. All have an equal right to the pursuit, and to make use of the proper means; but if no limits are set to the manner of pursuit, some may usurp or monopolize the means to the deprivation of others. They may,

temporarily, increase their own enjoyments, but are constantly exposed to the same deprivation by a more powerful usurper.

The law of nature furnishes a remedy for this state of things, in the application and observance of the general rule above mentioned," so use your own right, that you injure not the rights of others". A general observance of this rule affords to every one the liberty of pursuing, by all just means, his own interest, in the way he judges most suitable to his situation, and in that peace and security which constitutes no inconsiderable portion of individual happiness. It is, however, a mere rule of forbearance, and embraces only that prudence, which is required by the municipal law. But to fulfil the plan of nature something further is necessary, and that is benevolence, which augments and gives a and gives a peculiar zest to social and individual happiness. To unite benevolence with prudence, which is the consummation of the law of nature, that all the actions of man be directed in their tendency to general utility, or in other words, to promote the happiness of his species, becomes indispensable; and, as the happiness of the whole, consists in the happiness of all its parts, this rule is emphatically expressed in that command,-" Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." It was said that the rule of forbearance, above mentioned, is a subordinate part of this more general rule; and it may be added that it is preparatory to it, as the forbearance of injuries, in the order of things, precedes acts of benevolence.

It was, indeed, before observed that general rules, although very important in forming a system of ethics, do not come in immediate contact with human action. To explain this more clearly, it is a rule that every man be holden to perform his agreements with others; it is also a rule that he shall make reparation for injuries. These may be called specific rules of immediate application; and although they tend to the same end, the general utility; yet a man, in fulfilling his agreement, or making a reparation for injuries, may have no regard to the general utility, nor respect for the common good; but may yield to compulsion, or act solely from a regard to his own private interest, under present circumstances. But although general rules are not the immediate rules of action, yet they are inten

ded to have an important and extensive influence on human conduct. This we will endeavor to illustrate in the present instance, and to show how, by the operation of this general rule upon the mind, the whole course of action, and conduct of the agent, is influenced and directed to the promotion of the general happiness. By a frequent contemplation of the rule, and the excellence of the end to which it directs, a benevolent disposition is acquired; the mind becomes habitually disposed to do good to all, which is, to promote general happiness. This benevolent disposition fixed in the mind of any one is a constant desire to do good to every human being within the sphere of his action and the reach of his power; the only way of accomplishing the great end permitted to his limited capacity.

Although in the common concerns of life, the interest of the agent and his connexions, more or less remote, is the primary and immediate motive to action, yet this benevolent disposition, become habitual, is a constant bias upon his mind, inclining it to beneficence, gives the ultimate direction to his every action, and stamps his whole conduct with the character of benevolence. What renders this principle dear to the benevolent man is, that with a consciousness of acting agreeable to the laws of his nature, he derives from his benevolent acts, a more exalted happiness than he is capable of communicating, and which strongly attaches him to the objects of his beneficence, the occasions of that happiness. It needs hardly to be suggested, that in proportion as this disposition to benevolence is embraced generally by the members of any community, will the happiness of that community be extended; and in proportion as it is embraced by mankind in general, will the happiness of the whole human race be promoted.

Although the municipal law must be satisfied with the prudence of the subjects in obeying, because it cannot scrutinize the conscience or the disposition of the heart; yet it is only where this benevolence of disposition prevails generally in a state, that not only the ordinary laws, but all just and necessary requisitions are cheerfully obeyed, with a sense of duty, and a zeal in its service, that gives facility to its enterprises, success to its measures, and insures the general prosperity, as far as any thing can be insured under human institutions. Under the