additional proposition here that, accord-, (30 Stat. at L. 495, chap. 517, § 21; 31 ing to the custom of the Seminole Na- Stat. at L. 861, chap. 676, §§ 3, 28; and tion, the blood of the mother determined 32 Stat. at L. 500, chap. 1323, §§ 7-9), the tribe to which her offspring belonged, their being excluded from an inheritand the fact that the children, plain- ance which they did not attempt to tiffs here, were not enrolled as Seminole claim for a dozen years after the death citizens, was not due to any neglect of of Cox does not present a degree of the parents of the said children or the hardship calling for a strained interpreCommission to have said children en- tation of a plain statutory provision rolled on the Seminole roll, but the law limiting inheritances to enrolled Semiand custom of the Seminole Tribe were nole citizens, so that it may include not that the children were of the blood of only persons not so enrolled, but persons the mother, and members of that tribe who were actually enrolled as Creek to which the mother belonged. While citizens. we do not find it necessary to pass upon this proposition, and will leave it, as far as this opinion is concerned, an open question, yet we will say that as far as our investigation has led us, we are of the opinion that this last proposition is a correct statement of the law so far as it applies to facts as presented in the case at bar." In Hughes Land Co. v. Bailey, 30 Okla. 194, 120 Pac. 290, the same court, in discussing the rights of two daughters born of the marriage of a Creek man to a Seminole woman, said (p. 196): "By virtue of the citizenship of their mother they (the daughters) were enrolled as citizens of the Seminole Nation." And it may be noted that this custom prevails with the Seminole Indians of Florida, from whom those of Oklahoma are derived. Annual Report, Bureau of American Ethnology, 1883-4, p. 508. But the most persuasive evidence of this custom is, that the Federal Commissioners, with, as we have seen, all of the facts as to parentage before them and considered, enrolled the daughters of Cox in the Creek Tribe of their mother, and not in the Seminole Tribe of their father. The Commissioners, in making up the rolls which were to be "final," were given authority to consult tribal records and rolls [177] and "to adopt any other means deemed necessary to enable them to make up the rolls" (30 Stat. at L. 495, chap. 517, § 21), and in their conclusion, arrived at after many years of experience and painstaking investigation, may well be found a cogent and impelling reason for accepting the terms of the statutory agreement as they are plainly written, and for refusing to enlarge them by interpretation. The conclusion we are announcing is consonant with prior holdings of this court under similar statutes. Thus, in Washington v. Miller, 235 U. S. 422, 59 L. ed. 295, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 119, under the proviso in the Supplemental Creek Agreement of June 30, 1902 (32 Stat. at L. 500, chap. 1323), that "only citizens of the Creek Nation, male and female, shall inherit lands of the Creek Nation," a judgment was affirmed, holding the grantee of a Creek mother entitled, as against the claims of a Seminole father, to lands inherited from the child of their marriage, enrolled as a Creek, when, if the father had been an enrolled Creek, he and the mother would have shared the land equally. And in McDougal v. McKay, 237 U. S. 372, 59 L. ed. 1001, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 605, again under the Supplemental Creek Agreement, it was decided that the Creek father of a child born of his marriage with a non-Creek mother inherited the entire estate of the child, [178] which died intestate, although his wife would have taken equally with him had she been an enrolled Creek. All statutes of descent and distribution are arbitrary expressions of the purpose of the lawmaking power, and that the provisions of such a statute do not happen to meet the notions of justice of a court is not sufficient reason for indulging in an interpretation which modifies their plain and unambiguous terms. Especially is this true of these Indian statutes, which are a progressive development, embodying concessions to tribal custom and tradition necessary to be made in order to accomplish a practical, though perhaps not an ideal, dissolution of the tribal relation and distribution of the tribal property. The rights of this Creek mother cannot rise higher than those of her daughters. On its surface this case is typical of those hard cases which proverbially make bad law; but in reality, since the widow and children of Cox, as enrolled It results that the judgment of the SuCreeks, were entitled each to an allot-preme Court of Oklahoma must be rement in the Creek lands and property versed and the case remanded for fur ther proceedings not inconsistent with CLEVELAND-CLIFFS IRON COMPANY et al. ARCTIC IRON COMPANY. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 178–181.) Cases certified cate facts. sufficiency of certifi 1. A certificate from a circuit court of appeals must be dismissed where the statements declared therein to be findings of Mr. C. C. Daniels also argued the cause and filed a brief for the Arctic Iron Company. Mr. Chief Justice White delivered the opinion of the court: The certificate upon which this case is before us contains what are denominated findings of fact grouped under eighteen paragraphs, covering eight pages of the record. Upon these findings we are asked to instruct as to six propositions of law, really amounting to twelve, since each is twofold; that is, stated in the alternative. But we are of opinion that we may not instruct as to these propositions for the following reasons: In the first place, because we think it mixed with questions of law, so interblend- is clear that the statements which are ed the one with the other as to make it declared in the certificate to be findings impossible to conclude as to either the law of fact are in no true sense entitled to or the facts without a separation of the that characterization, since the statetwo, and where, even if this fault be over-ments amount but to a narrative of facts looked, the recitals, in and of themselves, fail to distinguish between facts which are merely evidential and those which ultimate, and which for that reason would be susceptible of furnishing support for the legal propositions as to which instructions are asked. fact amount but to a narrative of facts are [For other cases, see Cases Certified, V. in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Cases certified cate insufficiency of certifidiscretion to require sending up of entire record. 2. The exercise by the Federal Supreme Court of its discretionary power when questions are certified from a circuit court of appeals to direct the sending up of the whole record is not called for in a case in which the certificate is inadequate to sustain the right to answer the questions certified. [For other cases, see Cases Certified, V. in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] N A CERTIFICATE from the United ON States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit as to accountability for profits derived by a corporation out of a secret bargain made through a person who was at the time a director and officer of another corporation. Dismissed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. A. C. Dustin and Horace Andrews argued the cause, and, with Mr. W. P. Belden, filed a brief for the Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Company. Mr. S. W. Shaull argued the cause, and, with A. C. Angell, filed a brief for the Arctic Iron Company. mixed with questions of law, so interblended, the one with the other, as to cause it to be impossible to conclude as to either the law or the facts without a separation of the two, a duty which we may not be called upon to perform in giving instructions upon questions of law propounded under the statute controlling that subject. In the second place, because even if the admixture of law and fact which inheres in the recitals in the certificate be overlooked, the recitals nevertheless, in and of themselves, fail to distinguish between facts which are merely evidential and those which are ultimate, and which for that reason would be susceptible of furnishing support [180] for the legal propositions as to which instructions are asked. It is true, indeed, that the statute gives us the discretion, when a case is certified, to direct the sending up of the whole record, but obviously the exercise called for by a case where the certificate of that discretionary power is not is of such a character as not to be embraced by the statute. It must be, therefore, that this case affords no ground for directing the sending up of the whole record, since here the certificate is inadequate to sustain the right to answer the questions stated. To hold to the contrary would be to cause a mistaken exercise of the right to certify specific questions to become the instrument by which the division of powers made by the statute would be disregarded. The views which we have stated are in accord with the settled rules con cerning the power to certify which have, prevailed from the beginning. See Dillon v. Strathearn S. S. Co. this day decided [248 U. S. 182, infra, 199, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 83], and the authorities therein cited. It follows that the certificate must be and is dismissed. Mr. Justice Clarke, dissenting: I greatly regret that I cannot concur in the conclusion of the court just announced. That the certificate of the circuit court of appeals is longer and more detailed than is usual is sufficiently explained by the unusual character of the facts in the case and of the questions of law involved. The certificate concludes with this statement: A certificate from a circuit court of appeals must be dismissed where the facts upon which the questions of law certified from the records and briefs of the case in for decision arise can only be ascertained that court. [For other cases, see Cases Certified, V. in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] "However, we consider that No. 5 presents a question of law which is, in the view most favorable to plaintiff, the ultimate one; and we desire that this question be answered, without prejudice from the inclusion of others in this certificate, if it shall be thought that the inclusion Argued and submitted November 5, 1918. of the [181] others is not in accordance with the practice of the Supreme Court in this respect." [No. 361.] Decided December 23, 1918. N A CERTIFICATE United Question No. 5 viz.: "5a. When it appeared that the Cliffs had interests and desires pertaining to the new lease which might conflict with the course Kaufman and Breitung desired the Arctic to take, did the Cliffs and Mather perform every duty which by law rested upon him as director of the Arctic and through him upon the Cliffs when Mather withdrew from any further participation in the matter and notified Kaufman and Breitung that they could go ahead and make for the Arctic a contract satisfactory to them, and that the Cliffs and Mather would acquiesce therein? or "5b. Was it the duty of Mather as director in the Arctic, either to disclose to Kaufman and Breitung what he had done and the knowledge he had acquired as an officer of the Cliffs and on behalf of the Cliffs, or else to resign as a director in the Arctic?" While these two questions run into each other and could, perhaps, have been written as one, nevertheless, in my judgment, each presents a question of law, arising upon recited facts, and each is stated with sufficient precision to bring it within the terms of § 239 of the Judicial Code [36 Stat. at L. 1157, chap. 231, Comp. Stat. 1916, § 1216] and Rule 37 of this court, and I therefore think that these two questions, at least, should the Fifth Circuit presenting questions as to the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Seaman's Act. Dismissed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. W. J. Waguespack and Silas Blake Axtell argued the cause and filed a brief for John Dillon. Assistant Attorney General Brown argued the cause and, with Mr. Robert Szold, filed a brief for the United States as amicus curiæ. Mr. Ralph James M. Bullowa submitted the cause for the Strathearn Steamship Company. Messrs. Frederic R. Coudert and Howard Thayer Kingsbury filed a brief as amici curiæ. Mr. Justice Day delivered the opinion of the court: John Dillon, a British subject, filed a libel in admiralty in the United States district court for the northern [183] district of Florida in which he claimed the sum of $125, alleged to be due him for wages as a carpenter on the steamship "Strathearn." The district court dismissed the libel (239 Fed. 583). An appeal was taken to the circuit court of appeals for the fifth circuit. The libel was filed under the provisions of 8 4 of the Seaman's Act of 1915 (38 Stat. The circuit court of appeals certifies two questions to this court: First. Is § 4530 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, as the same was amended by § 4 of the act of Congress, approved March 4, 1915, entitled, "An Act to Promote the Welfare of American Seamen in the Merchant Marine of the United States; to Abolish Arrest and Imprisonment as a Penalty for Desertion, and to Secure the Abrogation of Treaty Provisions in Relation Thereto; and to Promote Safety at Sea," violative of the Constitution of the United States? at L. 1165, 1168, chap. 153, Comp. Stat. | where payments were to be made under 1916, § 8322).1 the contract, or what advancements, if any, were to be made during the voyage. The certificate concludes: "For information as to the facts of the case, copies of the transcripts and briefs are herewith transmitted." Counsel argue the case by reference to the transcript of the record in the circuit court of appeals, and it is apparent that a proper consideration of the case requires such reference. This transcript is no part of our record. This court alone has authority to have it sent up. The briefs in the circuit court of appeals are no part of the record here. The certificate is required to state the pertinent facts in order that this court may answer the questions of law certified with reference to such facts, and not by searching the records and briefs of the circuit court of appeals itself. Second. Is § 4530 of the Revised Statutes of the [184] United States, as the same was amended by the last-mentioned act of Congress approved March 4, 1915, violative of the Constitution of the United States in so far as it provides "that this section shall apply to seamen on foreign vessels while in harbors of the United States, and the courts of the United States shall be open to such seamen for its enforcement?" The The certificate therefore fails to comply with our rule, [185] and, in accordance with the established practice, must be dismissed. Cincinnati, H. & D. R. Co. v. McKeen, 149 U. S. 259, 261, 37 L. ed. 725, 726, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 840; Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 231 U. S. 399, 422, 58 L. ed. 285, 295, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 136, and cases cited. Dismissed. The certificate is made under § 239 of the Judicial Code [36 Stat. at L. 1157, chap. 231, Comp. Stat. 1916, § 1216], which makes provision for the certification of questions of law to this court from a circuit court of appeals. section provides that this court may give instruction on the questions certified, or it may order the whole record sent up for consideration and decision. Rule 37 of this court provides that in such cases the certificate shall contain a prop- JOHN MCDONALD, Claimant of the Brit er statement of the facts on which the questions of law arise. The certificate in this case fails to comply with this rule of court. It contains a partial statement of Dillon's contract with the ship. It states that no part of the sum sued for was due under the shipping articles signed by Dillon. It does not state the terms of payment agreed upon, when or 1 "Sec. 4. That section forty-five hundred and thirty of the Revised Statutes of the United States be, and is hereby, amended to read as follows: "Sec. 4530. Every seaman on a vessel of the United States shall be entitled to receive on demand from the master of the vessel to which he belongs one-half part of the wages which he shall have then earned at every port where such vessel, after the voyage has been commenced, shall load or deliver cargo before the voyage is ended and all stipulations in the contract to the contrary shall be void: Provided, Such a demand shall not be made before the expiration of, nor oftener than once in ERIK SANDBERG, Carl Jannson, S. K. Benjaminsen, and John Peranen, Peti. tioners, ish Ship "Talus." (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 185-205.) Seamen wages advance payments. Contracts of foreign seamen shipping in a foreign vessel in a foreign port were not invalidated, so far as advance payments of wages which the local law sanctions are concerned, by the Seaman's Act of March | five days. Any failure on the part of the master to comply with this demand shall release the seaman from his contract and he shall be entitled to full payment of wages earned. And when the voyage is ended every such seaman shall be entitled to the remainder of the wages which shall then be due him, as provided in section fortyfive hundred and twenty-nine of the Revised Statutes: And provided further, That this section shall apply to seamen on foreign vessels while in harbors of the United States, and the courts of the United States shall be open to such seamen for its enforcement.'' 4, 1915 (38 Stat. at L. 1168, chap. 153,, down; or rather, should be so limited Comp. Stat. 1916, § 8323), which in § 11 by a consideration of the application of makes it unlawful to pay a seaman's wages the criminal provision as to give it the same field of operation, whereas the reverse is true. in advance of the time when he has actually earned them, and declares that such advancements shall not absolve the master from full payment after the wages are earned, and that such section shall apply as well to foreign vessels while in the waters of the United States as to vessels of the United States, and renders the master, owner, consignee, or agent of any foreign vessel who violates its provisions liable to the same penalty as are like persons in case of vessels of the United States, although the act also provides for the abrogation of inconsistent treaty provisions. [For other cases, see Seamen, IV. in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] [No. 392.] United States v. 25 Packages of Panama Hats, 231 U. S. 358, 58 L. ed. 267, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 63. Mr. W. J. Waguespack also argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners: A guide to the meaning of a statute is found in the evil which it is designed to remedy, as gathered from contempo raneous events. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 36 L. ed. 226, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 511. The construction placed upon the Argued November 5, 1918. Decided Decem- statute by the court of appeals, which ber 23, 1918. 821. eliminates the criminal penalty, which Assuming that no special policy against the making of advances to foreign seamen in a foreign port can be deduced from the language of the statute, still a public policy against making said advances everywhere can be deduced from the fact that it would operate injuriously against the general interest and policy of our own citizens. The learned court below not only overlooks the remedy which the act has provided, and the purposes to be accomplished by it, but has hit upon a Bank of United States v. Owens, 2 theory of construction which is supported by no recognized legal rule of Pet. 527-538, 7 L. ed. 508-512; Woodinterpretation of statutes. In the first ward v. Roane, 23 Ark. 523; Marshall place, it fails to give to the clear lan-V_Sherman, 148 N. Y. 9, 34 L.R.A. guage of the act, which is unambiguous, its ordinary meaning. Bernier v. Bernier, 147 U. S. 246, 37 L. ed. 154, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 244; Washington Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U. S. 115, 25 L. ed. 783. 419; Hill v. Spear, 50 N. H. 253, 9 Am. 757, 51 Am. St. Rep. 654, 42 N. E. Rep. 205; The Kensington, 183 U. S. 263, 46 L. ed. 190, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 102. Mr. Palmer Pillans argued the cause, and, with Mr. J. N. McAleer, filed a brief for respondent: In the second place it holds that where an act contains both a criminal and a civil provision, the civil provi- The statutes of the United States, sion should be limited by the applica- condemning and penalizing advances to tion of the criminal, and if the remedy seamen, and declaring that such adsought to be furnished by the punish-vances shall not be charged against a ment of the crime should fail, for rea- seaman, but that he may recover full sons of questionable constitutionality, wages just as though such advances the civil remedy should also be struck had not been made, have no application |