the seamen's pay in the amount of the advancements made at Liverpool? The district court held that these advancements could not be deducted (242 Fed. 954). The circuit court of appeals reached the opposite conclusion (248 Fed. 670). The pertinent section of the act for consideration reads:

"Sec. 10. (a) That it shall be, and is hereby, made unlawful in any case to pay any seaman wages in advance of the time when he has actually earned the same, or to pay such advance wages, or to make any order, or note, or other evidence of indebtedness therefor to any other person, or to pay any person, for the shipment of seamen when payment is deducted or to be deducted from a seaman's wages. Any person violating any of the foregoing provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be punished by a fine of not less than $25 nor more than $100, and may also be imprisoned for a period of not exceeding six months, at the discretion of the court. The payment of such advance wages or allotment shall in no case except as herein provided absolve the vessel or the master or the [193] owner thereof from the full payment of wages after the same shall have been actually earned, and shall be no defense to a libel suit or action for the recovery of such wages. If any person shall demand or receive, either directly or indirectly, from any seaman or other person seeking employment as seaman, or from any person on his behalf, any remuneration whatever for providing him with employment, he shall for every such offense be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be imprisoned not more than six months or fined not more than $500.

"(e) That this section shall apply as well to foreign vessels while in waters of the United States, as to vessels of the United States, and any master, owner, consignee, or agent of any foreign vessel who has violated its provisions shall be liable to the same penalty that the master, owner, or agent of a vessel of the United

States would be for a similar violation.

"The master, owner, consignee, or agent of any vessel of the United States, or of any foreign vessel seeking clearance from a port of the United States, shall present his shipping articles at the office of clearance, and no clearance shall be granted any such vessel unless the provisions of this section have been complied with."

The genesis and history of this legis

lation is found in U. S. Comp. Stat. 1916, § 8323.

The Dingley Act of 1884 (23 Stat. at L. 55, 56, chap. 121), which is the origin of this section, contains terms much like those found in this act. That statute, as the present one, in the aspect now before us, was intended to prevent the evils arising from advanced payments to seamen, and to protect them against a class of persons who took advantage of their necessities, and through whom vessels were obliged to provide themselves with seamen. These persons obtained assignments of the advanced wages of sailors. In many instances this was accomplished with [194] little or no service to the men who were obliged to obtain employment through such agencies. In the Dingley Act it was made unlawful to pay a seaman's wages before leaving the port at which he was engaged. In the present act it is made unlawful to pay a seaman's wages in advance of the time when he has actually earned the same. The Act of 1884 by its terms applied as well to foreign vessels as to the vessels of the United States, and masters of foreign vessels violating the law were refused clearance from any port of the United States. The present statute is made to apply as well to foreign vessels while in the waters of the United States as to vessels of the United States.

In the present statute, in the section from which we have just quoted, masters, owners, consignees, or owners of foreign vessels are made liable to the same penalties as are the like persons in case of vessels of the United States. Such persons, in case the vessels are those of the United States, or foreign vessels seeking clearance in ports of the United States, are required to present their shipping articles at the office of clearance, and no clearance is permitted unless the provisions of the statute are complied with.

The Act of 1884 came before the United

States district court for the southern district of New York in the case of The

on

and well-reasoned opinion by Judge AdState of Maine, 22 Fed. 734. In a clear dison Brown the law was held not to apply to the shipment of seamen American vessels in foreign ports. After some amendments in 1898, not important to consider in this connection, the matter came before this court in the case of Patterson v. The Eudora, 190 U. S. 169, 47 L. ed. 1002, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 821, and it was held to apply to a British vessel shipping seamen at an American port, and, furthermore, that the act, as thus

[195] While the Seaman's Act of 1915 contains many provisions for the amelioration of conditions as to employment and care of seamen, in the aspect now involved we have called attention to the state of legislation and judicial decision when that act was passed. Did Congress intend to make invalid the contracts of foreign seamen so far as advance payments of wages is concerned, when the contract and payment were made in a foreign country where the law sanctioned such contract and payment? Conceding for the present purpose that Congress might have legislated to annul such contracts as a condition upon which foreign vessels might enter the ports of the United States, it is to be noted that such sweeping and important requirement is not found specifically made in the statute. Had Congress intended to make void such contracts and payments a few words would have stated that intention, not leaving such an important regulation to be gathered from implication. There is nothing to indicate an intention, so far as the language of the statute is concerned, to control such matters otherwise than in the ports of the United States. The statute makes the payment of advance wages unlawful, and affixes penalties for its violation, and provides that such advancements shall in no cases, except as in the act provided, absolve the master from full payment after the wages are earned, and shall be no defense to a libel or suit for wages. How far was this intended to apply to foreign vessels? We find the answer if we look to the language of the act itself. It reads that this section shall apply to foreign vessels "while in the waters of the United States."

Legislation is presumptively territorial and confined to limits over which the lawmaking power has jurisdiction. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. 213 U. S. 347, 357, 53 L. ed. 826, 832, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 511, 16 Ann. Cas. 1047. In Patterson v. The Eudora, supra, this court declared such legislation as to foreign vessels in United States ports to be constitutional. We think that [196] there is nothing in this section to show that Congress intended to take over the control of such contracts and payments as to foreign vessels

ex

cept while they were in our ports. Congress could not prevent the making of such contracts in other jurisdictions. If they saw fit to do so, foreign countries would continue to permit

In the same section, which thus applies the law to foreign vessels while in waters of the United States, it is provided that the master, owner, consignee, or agent of any such vessel, who violates the provision of the act, shall be liable to the same penalty as would be persons of like character in respect to a vessel of the United States. This provision seems to us of great importance as evidencing the legislative intent to deal civilly and criminally with matters in our own jurisdiction. Congress certainly did not intend to punish criminally acts done within a foreign jurisdiction, a purpose so wholly futile is not to be attributed to Congress. United States v. Freeman, 239 U. S. 117, 120, 60 L. ed. 172, 174, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 32. The criminal provision strengthens the presumption that Congress intended to deal only with acts committed within the jurisdiction of the United States.

It is true the act provides for the abrogation of inconsistent treaty provisions, but this provision has ample application treating the statute to mean what we have here held to be its proper construction. It abolishes the right of arrest for desertion. It gives to the civil courts of the United States jurisdiction over wage controversies arising within our jurisdiction. These considerations amply account for the treaty provision. See Treaties in Force, 1904 ed. index, p. 969.

It is said that the advances in foreign ports are against the policy of the United States, and therefore not to be [197] sanctioned here. As we have construed this section of the statute, no such policy as to foreign contracts, legal where made, is declared.

We have examined the references in the briefs of counsel to the reports and proceedings in Congress during the progress of this legislation so far as the same may have weight in determining the construction of this section of the act. We find nothing in them, so far as entitled to consideration, which requires a different meaning to be given the statute. We may add that the construction now given has the sanction of the Executive Department, as shown in Instructions to Consular Officers, promulgated through the medium of the State Department.

We are of opinion that the Circuit Court of Appeals reached the right conclusion as to the meaning and interpreta

Mr. Justice McKenna, with whom concur Mr. Justice Holmes, Mr. Justice Brandeis, and Mr. Justice Clarke, dissenting:

This is a libel in admiralty under the Seamen's Act of 1915 (38 Stat. at L. 1165-1168, chap. 153, Comp. Stat. 1916, §§ 8322, 8323), especially involving § 11. The libel was filed by petitioners here and others. It was dismissed as to the latter and they have acquiesced in the judgment. The facts are set out in the opinion of the court.

With this case were submitted others that present the act of Congress in different aspects. Among these was No. 361. It was a libel by a seaman who had shipped on a British vessel, and was based on a demand for wages not due at the time of the demand, under the terms of the shipping articles signed by him. Section 4 of the act, infra, was especially involved in consideration, and its constitutionality [198] was attacked by the ship. The circuit court of appeals for the fifth circuit, to which the case had gone, presented the question to this court in two aspects; first, generally, and, second, more particularly that provision which makes the section "apply to seamen on foreign vessels while in the harbors of the United States."

In the present case the ship is also British, and the libellants and petitioners citizens or subjects of nations other than the United States, and the controversy is as to the right of the master to deduct from the wages, of which the law authorizes the demand, advances made to the seamen in Liverpool, England. To make such advances was a practice usual and customary, and not forbidden by English law. It would seem, therefore, that the constitutional question is as much involved in one case as in the other. But under the court's construction of the act, that question can be pretermitted. Under our construction it would seem to be not only of ultimate but of first insistence. The court, however, is of opinion that the question of the constitutionality of the act was not certified in such manner as to be subject to its consideration. From that conclusion we are not disposed to dissent, and shall assume, as the court does, that the legislation is valid, and pass to its consideration.

The instant case, the facts not being in dispute, is brought to the question of the right of the master to deduct the Liverpool advances, the ship asserting the

solution of the question necessarily depends upon the construction of the act; or, more precisely, its application. It is conceded, yielding to the authority of Patterson v. The Eudora, 190 U. S. 169, 47 L. ed. 1002, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 821, that the act applies to American seamen shipping in an American port upon foreign vessels, but it is contended from that case and other cases that it ought to seem plain on principle and authority that the advancement statute has no effect except upon advancements [199] made to seamen within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. And, indeed, it is insisted that Congress "ex industria in terms confined the application to the waters of the United States." The conclusions are deduced from the cases which are reviewed and the language of the act is quoted. We give the quotation, as it amplifies the contentions:

"That this section shall apply as well to foreign vessels while in waters of the United States [counsel's emphasis], as to vessels of the United States, and any master, owner, consignee, or agent of any foreign vessel who has violated its provisions shall be liable to the same penalty that the master, owner, or agent of a vessel of the United States would be for similar violation.

"The master, owner, consignee, or agent of any vessel of the United States, or of any foreign vessel seeking clearance in a port of the United States, shall present his shipping articles at the office of clearance, and no clearance shall be granted any such vessel unless the provisions of this section have been complied with."

The quotation is but a part of § 11.1 It is preceded by [200] the explicit declaration that it is "unlawful in any case to pay any seaman wages in advance of the time when he has actually earned the same, or to pay such advance wages." There is no limitation of place or circumstances, and the universality of the declaration is given emphasis, and any implication of exception is precluded with tautological care by the provision that "the payment of such advance wages or

1 Section 11 was an amendment of § 24 of the Act of December 21, 1898 [30 Stat. at L. 763, chap. 28, Comp. Stat. 1916, § 8323], and § 24 was an amendment of § 10 of the Laws of 1884 [23 Stat. at L. 55, chap. 121], as amended in 1886 [24 Stat. at L. 80, chap. 421], and, as it now stands, as far as

pertinent, is as follows:

"Section 10. (a) That it shall be, and is hereby, made unlawful in any case to pay any seaman wages in advance of the time

allotment shall in no case except as herein provided absolve the vessel or the master or the owner thereof from the full payment of wages after the same shall have been actually earned, and shall be no defense to a libel suit or action for the recovery of such wages." To qualify these provisions or not to take them for what they say, would, in our opinion, ascribe to the act an unusual improvidence of expression. And § 4 should be considered in connection. It is hence important that we give it in full. And it may be said that it is an amendment to § 4530, Rev. Stat. Comp. Stat. 1916, § 8322. It is as follows:

"Sec. 4530. Every seaman on a vessel of the United States shall be entitled to receive on demand from the master of the vessel to which he belongs one-half part of the wages which he shall have then earned at every port where such vessel, after the voyage has been commenced, shall load or deliver cargo before the voyage is ended, and all stipulations in the contract to the contrary shall be void. Provided, such a demand shall not be made before the expiration of nor oftener than once in five days. Any failure on the part of the master to comply with this demand shall release the seaman from his contract and [201] he shall be entitled to full payment of wages earned. And when the voyage is ended every such seaman shall be entitled to the remainder of the wages which shall then be due him, as provided in section fortyfive hundred and twenty-nine of the Revised Statutes: And provided further, that this section shall apply to seamen on foreign vessels while in harbors of the United States, and the courts of the United States shall be open to such seamen for its enforcement." "

This section and the others we have quoted express something more than particular relations of ship and seaman,they express the policy of the United States, which no private conventions, no matter where their locality of execution, when he has actually earned the same, or to pay such advance wages, or to make any order, or note, or other evidence of indebtedness therefor to any other person, or to pay any person, for the shipment of seamen when payment is deducted or to be deducted from a seaman's wages. Any person violating any of the foregoing provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be punished by a fine of not less than $25 nor more than $100, and may also be imprisoned for a period of not exceeding six months, at the discretion of the court. The payment of such advance wages or allot

can be adduced to contravene. The Kensington, 183 U. S. 263, 46 L. ed. 190, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 102; United States v. Chavez, 228 Ū. S. 525, 57 L. ed. 950, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 595; United States v. Freeman, 239 Ū. S. 117, 60 L. ed. 172, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 32. Nor are we called upon to assign the genesis of the policy or trace the evolution of its remedy to the act in controversy; and besides, it has been done elsewhere. It is enough to say that the act itself demonstrates that it is intended as a means in the development of the merchant marine, and it hardly needs to be added, to quote counsel for the government, "that the welfare of the seaman is remarkably interrelated with that of the merchant marine." This certainly was the conception of Congress and answers the contentions based on contrary opinion and deductions. It is manifest also from the title of the act, which declares its purpose to be "to promote the welfare of American seamen in the merchant marine of the United States; to abolish arrest and imprisonment as a penalty for desertion, and to secure the abrogation of treaty provisions in relation thereto; and to promote safety at sea." Its efficacy as a means or the policy of the means is not submitted to our judg ment. Ours is the simple service of interpretation, and there is no reason to hesitate in its exercise because of supposed consequences. The policy [202] of the act was so insistent that Congress did not hesitate to abrogate opposing treaties. Certainly, therefore, we cannot give a controlling force to the suggestion that to construe the act as the ship construes it, and others, supporting the ship, construe it, is to "impose our conception of the rights of seamen upon the whole world, in violation of the comity of nations." The reply is immediate: It was for Congress to estimate this and other results and to consider how far they were counterpoised or overcome by other considerations. If the section was ambiguous, the asserted rement shall in no case except as herein provided absolve the vessel or the master or the owner thereof from the full payment of wages after the same shall have been actually earned, and shall be no defense to a libel suit or action for the recovery of such wages. If any person shall demand or receive, either directly or indirectly, from any seaman, or from any person on his behalf, any remuneration whatever for providing him with employment, he shall for every such offense be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be imprisoned not more than six months or fined not more than $500."