UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plff. in prohibit such transportation even into a

Err.,

state which permits it.

[For other cases, see Commerce, I. c; III. b, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.]

5. Congress could, as it did by the Act of March 3, 1917 (39 Stat. at L. 1069, chap. 162, Comp. Stat. -, § 8739a), forbid a person to bring any intoxicating liquor upon his person, intended for his personal consumption, into a state which forbids the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes, although the state law expressly permits such action on his part.

[For other cases, see Commerce, I. c; III. b, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.]

[No. 357.]

January 13, 1919.

N ERROR to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of West Virginia to review a judgment sustaining a demurrer to, and quashing, an indictment for transporting intoxicating liquors into a dry state. Reversed.

chap. 162, Comp. Stat., § 8739a), against Argued November 5 and 6, 1918. Decided the transportation of intoxicating liquors in interstate commerce into any state which has forbidden the manufacture or sale of intoxicants for beverage purposes, extends IN to the bringing into such state of a quart of such liquor, intended for personal consumption by the person carrying it, even though the law of the state expressly permits any person to bring that quantity of liquor into the state for his personal use. [For other cases, see Commerce, I. c; III. b, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Commerce exclusiveness of Federal authority state public policy.

Note. On the power of Congress to regulate commerce-see notes to State ex rel. Corwin v. Indiana & O. Oil, Gas & Min. Co. 61 L.R.A. 579; Bullard v. Northern P. R. Co. 11 L.R.A. 246; Re Wilson, 12 L.R.A. 624; Gibbons v. Ogden, 6 L. ed. U. S. 23; Brown v. Maryland, 6 L. ed. U. S. 678; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 29 L. ed. U. S. 158; Ratterman v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 32 L. ed. U. S. 229; Harmon v. Chicago, 37 L. ed. U. S. 216; and Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 38 L. ed. U. S.

1041.

On power to prohibit the use of intoxicating liquors, irrespective of any intention to traffic in them-see note to State ex rel. Frances v. Moran, 2 A.L.R. 1085.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Assistant Attorney General Frierson argued the cause, and, with Mr. Charies S. Coffey, filed a brief for plaintiff in

error:

Congress has the power to forbid altogether, or to any extent it deems wise, the interstate movement of intoxicating liquors.

Western

Clark Distilling Co. V. Maryland R. Co. 242 U. S. 311, 325, 326, 61 L. ed. 326, 338, 339, L.R.A.1917B, 1218, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 180, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 845.

The Webb-Kenyon Act forbids interstate transportation of liquor to be received or used in violation of state laws. The Reed Amendment does not affect the transportation of liquor for scientific, sacramental, medicinal, or mechanical purposes. Such transportation is, therefore, lawful or unlawful, according as it complies or does not comply with the state law. But the Reed Amendment covers the whole field of the transportation into dry states of liquor for beverage purposes, and, establishing its own rule, supersedes the law of West Virginia, permitting the personal bringing in for one's own use.

Ibid.; Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Horton, 233 U. S. 492, 58 L. ed. 1062, L.R.A.1915C, 1, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 635,

In this case, the liquor was carried on the person of one who was being carried by an interstate common carrier, and hence it, as well as the person, were

Ann. Cas. 1915B, 475, 8 N. C. C. A. 834; | of intoxicating liquors for beverage purMissouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Wulf, 226 poses from one state into a dry state. U. S. 570, 57 L. ed. 355, 33 Sup. Ct. Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308, Rep. 135, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 134; Michi- 323, 57 L. ed. 523, 527, 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) gan C. R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 906, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 281, Ann. Cas. 59, 57 L. ed. 417, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 192, 1913E, 905; Hipolite Egg Co. v. United Ann. Cas. 1914C, 176; St. Louis, I. M. States, 220 U. S. 45, 57, 55 L. ed. 364, & S. R. Co. v. Hesterly, 228 U. S. 702. 368, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 330. 57 L. ed. 1031, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 702; St. Louis, S. F. & T. R. Co. v. Seale, 229 U. S. 156, 57 L. ed. 1129, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 651, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 156; Minnesota Rate Cases (Simpson v. Shep-in interstate commerce. ard) 230 U. S. 352, 57 L. ed. 1511, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1151, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 729, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 18; Taylor v. Taylor, 232 U. S. 363, 58 L. ed. 638, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 350, 6 N. C. C. A. 436; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Devine, 239 U. S. 52, 60 L. ed. 140, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 27.

The transportation of passengers or property from state to state, by whatever means or by whomsoever accomplished, is itself, and without more interstate commerce.

Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat, 1, 188, 6 L. ed. 23, 68; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, 203, 29 L. ed. 158, 161, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 382, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 826; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 446, 6 L. ed. 678, 688; Second Employers' Liability Cases, (Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.) 223 U. S. 1, 46, 56 L. ed. 327, 38 L.R.A.(N.S.) 44, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 169, 1 N. C. C. A. 875; International Textbook Co v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91, 107, 54 L. ed. 678, 685, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 493, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 481, 18 Ann. Cas. 1103; Butler Bros. Shoe Co. v. United States Rubber Co. 84 C. C. A. 167, 156 Fed. 17; Lottery Case (Champion v. Ames) 188 U. S. 321, 345, 47 L. ed. 492, 496, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 321, 13 Am. Crim. Rep. 361; Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Husen. 95 U. S. 465, 469, 470, 24 L. ed. 527, 529, 530; Kirmeyer v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 568, 572, 59 L. ed. 721, 724, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 419; Kelly v. Rhodes, 188 U. S. 1, 47 L. ed. 359, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 259; Pipe Line Cases (United States v. Ohio Oil Co.) 234 U. S. 548, 58 L. ed. 1459, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 956; Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U. S. 507, 512, 51 L. ed. 295, 297, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 159; Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, 29 L. ed. 715, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 475.

United States v. Chavez, 228 U. S. 525, 57 L. ed. 950, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 595. No brief was filed for defendant in

error.

Mr. Justice Day delivered the opinion. of the court:

This is a writ of error bringing in review under the Criminal Appeals Act the judgment of the district court of the United States for the southern district of West Virginia, sustaining a demurrer and motion to quash an indictment against one Dan Hill. The indictment charged that Hill, on the 20th of November, 1917, being in the state of Kentucky, there intended to go and be carried by means of a common carrier, engaged in interstate commerce, from the state of Kentucky into the state of West Virginia, and intended to carry upon his person, as a beverage, for his personal use, a quantity of intoxicating liquor, to wit, one quart thereof, into the state of West [422] Virginia, and did in the state of Kentucky purchase and procure a quantity of intoxicating liquor, to wit, one quart thereof, contained in bottles, and did then and there board a certain trolley car, being operated by a common carrier corporation engaged in interstate commerce, and by means thereof did cause himself and the said intoxicating liquor, then upon his person, to be carried and transported in interstate commerce into the state of West Virginia. It is charged that Hill violated the Act of Congress approved March 3, 1917, commonly known as the Reed Amendment, by thus carrying in interstate commerce from Kentucky to West Virginia a quantity of intoxicating liquor as a beverage for his personal use, the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes being then prohibited by the laws of the state of West Virginia. Further, that the intoxicating liquor was not ordered, purchased, or caused to be transported for scientific, sacramental, medicinal, or mechanical

The expression in the Reed Amendment, "in interstate commerce," is merely the short equivalent of "from one state to another state," and the prohibition is, therefore, against all movement' purposes.

The Reed Amendment is a part of § 5 | prohibit interstate transportation of of the Postoffice Appropriation Act ap- such liquors not intended to be used for proved March 3, 1917 (39 Stat. at L. commercial purposes. We are of opin1058, 1069, chap. 162, Comp. Stat. § 8739a), and reads as follows:

Whoever shall order, purchase, or cause intoxicating liquors to be transported in interstate commerce, except for scientific, sacramental, medicinal, and mechanical purposes, into any state or territory the laws of which state or territory prohibit the manufacture or sale therein of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes shall be punished as aforesaid: Provided, That nothing herein shall authorize the shipment of liquor into any state contrary to the laws of such state.

ion that this is a too narrow construction of the Reed Amendment.

The Constitution confers upon Congress the power to regulate commerce among the states. From an early day such commerce has been held to include the transportation of persons and property no less than the purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 188, 6 L. ed. 23, 68: Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, 203, 29 L. ed. 158, 161, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 382, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 826. "Importation into one state from another [424] is the indispensable element-the The ground of decision, as appears by test-of interstate commerce." Internathe opinion of the district court, was that tional Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91, the phrase, "transported in interstate 107, 54 L. ed. 678, 685, 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) commerce,' as used in the act, was in- 493, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 481, 18 Ann. Cas. tended to mean and apply only to liquor 1103; The Lottery Case (Champion v. transported for commercial purposes. Ames) 188 U. S. 321, 345, 47 L. ed. 492, This conclusion was reached from a 496, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 321, 13 Am. Crim. [423] construction of the act when Rep. 561. The transportation of one's read in the light of other legislation of own goods from state to state is interCongress upon the subject of inter-state commerce, and, as such, subject to state transportation of liquor. At the regulatory power of Congress. Pipe tention was called to the terms of Line Cases (United States v. Ohio Oil the Wilson Act of August 8, 1890 Co.) 234 U. S. 548, 560, 58 L. ed. 1459, (26 Stat. at L. 313, chap. 728, Comp. 1470, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 956. The transStat. 1916, § 8738), providing that intoxi-portation of liquor upon the person of cating liquors transported into any state or territory, or remaining therein for use, consumption, sale, or storage, shall be subject on the arrival therein to the operation of the laws of the state or territory enacted in the exercise of the police power. Reference was also made to the subsequent legislation known as the Webb-Kenyon Act March 1, 1913 (37 Stat. at L. 699, chap. 90, Comp. Stat. 1916, § 8739), prohibiting the shipment and transportation of intoxicating liquor from one state into another state when such liquor is intended to be received, possessed, sold, or used in violation of the laws of such state. Advertence was made to the fact that the provisions of both the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts apply broadly to the interstate transportation of liquors, whether for commercial use or otherwise. It was concluded that Congress, in the enactment of the Reed Amendment, intended to aid the local law of the state by preventing shipment of intoxicating liquors in interstate commerce when intended for commercial purposes; and as the law of West Virginia permits any person to bring into the state not more than one quart of liquor, in any period of thirty days, for personal use, Congress did not intend to

one being carried in interstate commerce is within the well-established meaning of the words, "interstate commerce United States v. Chavez, 228 U. S. 525, 532, 57 L. ed. 950, 952, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 595.

In

Congress, in the passage of the Reed Amendment, must be presumed to have had, and in our opinion undoubtedly did have, in mind this well-known and often declared meaning of interstate commerce. It had already provided in the Wilson Act for state control over liquor after its delivery to the consignee in interstate commerce. In the Webb-Kenyon Act it had prohibited the shipment of liquor in interstate commerce where the same was to be used in violation of the law of the state into which it was transported. the passage of the Reed Amendment it was intended to take another step in legislation under the authority of the commerce clause. The meaning of the act must be found in the language in which it is expressed, when, as here, there is no ambiguity in the terms of the law. The order, purchase, or transportation in interstate commerce, save for certain excepted purposes, is forbidden. The exceptions are specific and are those for scientific, sacramental, medicinal, or

mechanical purposes; and in the proviso it is set forth that nothing contained in the act shall authorize interstate commerce shipments into a state contrary to its laws.

523, 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 906, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 281, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 905; Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 61 L. ed. 442, L.R.A.1917F, 502, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 192, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 1168; Clark West Virginia is a state in which the Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. manufacture and sale of intoxicating Co. 242 U. S. 311, 61 L. ed. 326, L.R.A. liquors for beverage purposes is prohib- 1917B, 1218, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 180, Ann. ited. If the act is within the constitu- Cas. 1917B, 845; Hammer v. Dagenhart, tional authority of Congress, it follows 247 U. S. 251, 270, 271, 62 L. ed. 1101, that the indictment charged an offense 1105, 3 A.L.R. 649, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 529. within the terms of the law. That Con- [426] That Congress has this augress possesses [425] supreme authori- thority over the transportation of lity to regulate interstate commerce, quor in interstate commerce, we entersubject only to the limitations of tain no doubt. In the recent case the Constitution, is too well estab- of Clark Distilling Co. v. Western lished to require the citation of the Maryland R. Co. 242 U. S. 311, 61 numerous cases in this court which L. ed. 326, L.R.A.1917B, 1218, 37 Sup. have so held. Congress may exercise this Ct. Rep. 180, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 845, this authority in aid of the policy of the subject was given full consideration. state, if it sees fit to do so. It is equally That case involved the constitutionality clear that the policy of Congress, acting of the Webb-Kenyon Law, prohibiting independently of the states, may induce the shipment of liquors into states, to legislation without reference to the par- be used therein in violation of the local ticular policy or law of any given state. law. While such was the particular case Acting within the authority conferred before the court, the authority of Conby the Constitution, it is for Congress to gress to make regulations of its own was determine what legislation will attain directly involved, and its authority over its purposes. The control of Congress interstate commerce in intoxicating liqover interstate commerce is not to be uors was clearly stated and definitely limited by state laws. Congress, and recognized. After discussing the power not the states, is given the authority to of Congress over such shipment in interregulate interstate commerce. When state commerce, and affirming the ample Congress acts, keeping within the au- power possessed by Congress over the thority committed to it, its laws become subject-matter, in view of its characterby the terms of the Constitution itself istics, this court said: the supreme laws of the land. "This is not to say that the nation may deal with the internal concerns of the state, as such, but that the execution by Congress of its constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce is not limited by the fact that intrastate transactions may have become so interwoven therewith that the effective government of the former incidentally controls the latter. This conclusion necessarily results from the supremacy of the national power within its appointed sphere." Minnesota Rate Cases (Simpson v. Shepard) 230 U. S. 352, 399, 57 L. ed. 1511, 1541, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1151, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 729, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 18, and previous decisions of this court therein cited.

The power of Congress, it is true, is to regulate commerce, which is ordinarily accomplished by prescribing rules for its conduct. That regulation may take the character of prohibition, in proper cases, is well established by the decisions of this court. Lottery Case, supra; Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U. S. 45, 55 L. ed. 364, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 364; Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308, 57 L. ed.

'

"We can see no reason for saying that although Congress, in view of the nature and character of intoxicants, had a power to forbid their movement in interstate commerce, it had not the authority to so deal with the subject as to establish a regulation (which is what was done by the Webb-Kenyon Law) making it impossible for one state to violate the prohibitions of the laws of another through the channels of interstate commerce. Indeed, we can see no escape from the conclusion that if we accepted the proposition urged, we would be obliged to announce the contradiction in terms that because Congress had exerted a regulation lesser in power than it was authorized to exert, therefore its action was void for excess of power. Or, in other words, stating the necessary result of the argument from a concrete consideration of the particular subject here involved, that because Congress, in adopting a regulation, had considered the nature and character of our dual system of government, state and nation, and instead of absolutely prohibiting, had so conformed its regulation as to produce

co-operation between [427] the local intoxicants, the Reed Amendment in no and national forces of the government | proper sense regulates interstate comto the end of preserving the rights of merce, but is a direct intermeddling with all, it had thereby transcended the com- the state's internal affairs. Whether replete and perfect power of regulation garded as reward or punishment for conferred by the Constitution." wisdom or folly in enacting limited prohibition, the amendment so construed, I think, goes beyond Federal power; and to hold otherwise opens possibilities for partial and sectional legislation which may destroy proper control of their own affairs by the several states.