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he argues that the idea or sense of a God is so manifest from the visible marks of wisdom and power in creation, that no rational crenture could, on reflection, miss the discovery of a Deity. In the second book, Locke follows up this principle or position by tracing the origin of our ideas, simple and complex, which lie derives from sensation and reflction. His reasonings on the latter is somewhat indefinite.Duration is certainly no mode of thinking, yet the idea of duration is reckoned by Locke among those with which we are surnished by reflection. The same may perhaps be said as to his account of several other ideas, which cannot be deduced from external sensation, nor yet can be reckone | modifications or operations of the soul itself; such as number, power, existence' (Hallam) The third book of the Essay is on language and signs as instruments of truth; and the fourth book is intended to determine the nature, validity, and limits of the understanding. Of the importance of this great work in diffusing a just mode of thinking and inquiry, it is unnecessary to speak. Some passages may appear contradictory, but any person reading the Essay carefully through will,' says Mr. Lewes, find all clear and coherent.

The style of the work is simple, pure, and expressive; and, as it was designed for general perusal, there is a frequent employment of colloquial phraseology. Locke hated scholastic jargon, and wrote in language intelligible to every man of common sense.

No one,' says his pupil, Shattesbury, has done more towards the recalling of phi. losophy from barbarity, into the use and practice of the world, and into the company of the better and politer sort, who might well be ashamed of it in its other dress.'

In 1690, Locke published two ‘Treatises on Civil Government,' in defence of the principles of the Revolution against the Tories; or, as he expresses himself, to establish the throne of our great restorer, our present King William ; to make good his title in the consent of the people, which, being the only one of all lawful governments, he las more fully and clearly than any prince in Christendom; and to justity to the world the people of England, whose love of their just and natural rights, with their resolution to preserve them, silved the nation when it was on the very brink of slavery and ruin.' The chief of his other productions are- Thoughts concerning Filucation' (1693), * The Reasonableness of Christianity' (1695), two `Vindications of that work (1696), and an admirable tract. On the Conduct of the Understanding,' printed after the author's death. A theological controversy in which he engaged with Stillingfleet, bishop of Worcester, has already been mentioned in our account of that prclate. Many letters and miscellaneous pieces of Locke have been published, partly in the beginning of lilst century, and partly by Lord King in his Life of the pbilosopher (1829).

In reference to the writings of Locke, Sir James Mackintosh observes, that justly to understand their cbaracter, it is necessary to

take a deliberate survey of the circumstances in which the writer was placed. Etlucated among the English dissenters, during the short period of their political ascendency, he early imbibed that deep piery and ardent spirit of liberty which actuated that body of m'n, ani he probably imbibe also in their schools the disposition to metaphysic:il inquiries which has everywhere accompanied the Calvinistic theology. Sects founded in the right of privaie judgmeat, naturally tend.to purity themselves from intolerance, and in time learn to respect in others the freedom of thought to the exercise of which they owe their own existence. By the Independent divines who were his instructors, our philosopher was tauglit those principles of religious liberty which they were the first to disclose to the world. When free inquiry led him io milder dogmas, he retained the severe morality which was their honourable singularity, and which continues to distinguish their successors in the se cominunities which have abandoned their rigorous opinions. Ilis prote:sional pursuits afterwards en: giged him in the study of the phiysical sciences, at the moment when ihe spirit of experimentandobservation was in its youthfulfervour, and when a repurnance to scholastic subtleties was the ruling pussion of the scientific world. Ata more mature age, he was admitted into the society of great wits and ambitious politicians. During the remainder of his lito he was often a min of business, and always a man of the world, without much undisturbed leisure, and probably with thatabaied relish for mercly abstract speculation which is the inevitable re:ult of converse will society and experience in affairs. But his political connectionsagreeing with his early birls, made him a zealous advocate of liberiy in opinion and in government; and he gradually limited his zeal and activity to the illustrations of such general principies as are the guirdians of these great interests of human society. Almost all liis writings, even his Essay itself, were occasional, and intended directly to counteract the enemies of reason and freedom in his own age. The first Letter on Toleration, the most original perhaps of his works, was composed in Illand, in a retirement where he was forced to conceal himself from the tyranny which pursued him into a foreign land; and it was published in England in the year of the Revolution, to vindicate the Toleration Act, of which the author lamented the imperfection. On the continent, the principal works of Locke became extensively known through the medium of translation.

Imme:liately after the Revolution, employment in the diplomatic service was offered to Locke, who declined it on the ground of illhealth. In 1695, having aided government with his advice on the subject of the coinage, he was appointed a member of the Board of Trade, which office, however, the state of his health also obliged him to resign. The last years of his existeice were spent at Oates, in Essex, the seat of Sir Francis Masham, who liad invited him to make that mansion his home. Lady Masbam, a daughter of Dr. Cudworth, and to whop Locke was attached by strong tics of friendship, soothed by

ler att ntion the infirmities of his declining years. The death of this excellent man took place October 28, 1704, i len he had attained the age of seventy-two.

Causcs of teakness in Men's Understandings. There is, it is vis:ble, great variety in mon's understandings, and their antaral constitutions put fo wid. ad fierenea betwen some men in this respect, ihat art nod industry would never be able to master; and their very nature sceiul to want a fourdation to rais? ou it that which other men razily attaiu unto. Amongst ned of equal educat.on, therji aurat in quality of parts. And th: woodl3f Ainericit, as wel as the schools of At!.03, produce men of several abilities in the sunne bilirl. Though this b:fo, yet I inaan most men con viry short of what they might attain unto in their sex, raldgrins, by an glect of their und rsiind uge. Afw rules of logic are ilionght suflici nt in this case for ihose who pretend to the highest inprovinent; wher, as I think there are a great many nataral defects in the understanding capable of amendment, which are overlooked and wholly neglectes. And it is ea-ytoj creivthat men and guilty of a great many faults in the exercise and improviment ot this faculty of the mind, which binder them in their progress, and keep them in ignorance and error all their lives. Some of them I shall take votice of, and endeavour to point out proper remedies for, in the following discourse,

Bisid:s the want of deterniinca ideas, and of sig city and <Ircise in liuding ont and laying in order intermediate icleas, there are three miscarriag's that men are guilty of in referunec to their rason, whereby this faculty is hiudered in them from That service it might do an: 129 design d for. And he that reflects npon the actions and discourses of mankind, will find their defects in this kiud very frequent and very olservable.

1. Th: first iz of those who seldonz reason at all, but do and think according to the example of others, wheth'r parents, neighbours, ministers, or who else they are pleased to mrke choice of to live en implicit faith in, for the saving of themselves ibe pains and trouble of thinking and esiunining for themselves.

2. The second is of those wild put passion in the place of reason, and being resolved that shall govern their actions and urgim nt, neither use their owl, nor hearked to other peopl:'s ria on, any further turn it suits their huuonr, interest, or party; and these, one my observe iommonly content themselves with words which have no distinct ideas to idem, thonghi, in oth rmutt is, that they come with an une bius d indiferoxy to, they want not abilities to talk and hear reason, where they have no sucret inclinition that hiud rs them from b.ing unironable to it.

3. The third sort is of those who readily and sincer ly follow reason, bat for rent of huving ulat which on! ingy call larga, souvil roul-about sen82, have not a fail viow of al that relates to th: question, and my bf monent to decide it. veure all short-sihtel, and y_ry often see but one side of a matter; onr views are not so t nd d to all that has a connectio: with it. From this duteet, I twink, 110 man is fres. Te sue but in part, and w: kuow but in part, and therfor, it is no wonderire conchudo not rigii from our partial views. This might instract the proucleat esteemner of Liz own parts Low u-ciul it is to talk and consult with others, ev: u ruch as carne chort wiili timu in capacity.guckness, and p-vetration ; for, since 10 one fe & all, and wgenerally lav: difternt prospecta cf the same thing, according to our disserent, as I inny fuy. positionstoit, it is not incongruous to think, nor beneath any inan to try, whether ano. Tuy not have notions of things which havo escaped him, and whichi his rasou woud nak'tc of if they came into his mind. The faculty of reasoning geldom or in yr deceive those who trust to it; its consequenc s from what it builds on ar: evid nt and certain; but that which it oftenest, if not only, misleads us in, is, that the principles from which te conclude, the ground upon which we bottom our reasoning, eru but a part; something is left out which should go into the reckoning to maku it just aud csact

Practice and Habit We are born with faculties and powers capable alio t of anything, such at least as would carry is further than can be easily imagined; but it is only the exercise of those powers wbich gives us ability and skill in anything, and leads us towards per {cclon.

A middle-aged plonghman will scarce ever be brou zht to the carrings and language of a gentleman, though his body be as well proportion d, and his joints as supple, and bis natural parts uot any way inferior. The legs of a dancing-master, and the fingin of a mas.ciun, full, as it wor, naturaliy without thought or paius iuto regulur and admirable motions. Bid them change their parts, and they will in vain eudeltour to produce like notions in the members not us. d to them, and it will require Ingth of tiine and loug practic: to attain but some di gret's vi a like ability. lihat incredible and astonishing actions do w: find rope-ducts and tumblers biing their bodies to! not but that sundry in almost all manual arts are as woude riul; but I Dame those which the world takt's notice of for such, because, on that very account, they give money to see them. All these uduired not one, beyond the rech, and aluost the conception of uupractised xpectators, are nothing but the mere eff cts of us? and industry in men, wliose bodies have nothing peculiar in them from those of the amazed lookers-on.

As it is in the body, so it is in the mind; practice makes it what it is; and most eren of those excellences which are looked on as natural cudowments, will be found, when examined into more narrowly, tu be the product of exercise, and to be raisen to that pitch only by repeated actions. Some men are remarked for pleasantuess in Taille ry, others für apologues and apposite diverting stories. This is apt to be taken for the effect of pure nature, and that the rather, bucause it is not got ny rules, and those who excel in either of them, never purposely sct themselves to the study of it as an art to be learnt. But yet it is true, that at first come lucky hit which took with eomebody, and gained him commendation, encouraged him to try again, inclined his thoughts and endeavours that way, till at last he insensibly got a facility in it without p reiving how; and that is attributed wholly to nature, which was much more tho effect of use and practice. I do not deny that natural disposition may often give the first ride to it; but that never carries a in:11 far without use and exercise, and it is practice alone that brings the powers of the mind as well as those of the body to their prfection. Muny a good po tic vein is buried under a trade, and never produe s anything for want of improvement. Wesee the ways of discourse and rea-oning are very diffrent, even conc ruing the same matter, at court and in the university. And he that will go but from Westminster Hull to the Exchange, will find a diferent genius and turn in their ways of talking; and one cannot think that all whose lut il in the city were born with different parts from those who were bred at the university or imix of court.

To what purpose all this, but to show that the difference, so observable in men's understandings and parts. does not arise so much from the natural faculties, as acquired babits? lle would be laughed at that should go about to make a tine dancer out of a country hedger at past titty. And he will not have much better succees who shall endeavou: at that age to make a man reason well, or speak handsomely, who has never been used to it, though you should lay before him a collection of all th3 bát precepts of logic or oratory. "Nobody is inside anything by hearing of rules, or having them up in his meinory; practice inust settle the läbit of doing without reficting on the rule; and you may as well hope to make a good painter or musician, extempore, by a lucture and instruction in the arts of music and painting, as a coberent thinker, or strict reasoner, by a set of rules, shewing him wherein right reasoning consists.

This being so, that defects and weakness in men's understandinga, as well as other faculties, coin: irom want of a right use of their own minds. I am apt to think the fuult is generally iislaid upon nature, and there is often a complaint of want of parts. when the fault lies in want of a due improvement of them. We se men frequently dexterous and sharp enough in making a bargain, who, if you reason with them about matters of religion, appear perfectly stupid.

Prejudices. Every one is forward to complain of the prejudices that mislead other men or parties, as if he were frec, and had none of his own. This being objected on all sides, it is agreed that it is a fult, and a binderance to kuowk de What, now, is tbecire? No other but this--that every man should let alone others' prejudices, and esannine his own. Nobody is convinced of his by the accusation of another: he rocrimin.ites by th: sunne rulc, and is clear. The only way to remove this gruat causa

of ignorance and error out of the world, is for every one impartially to examine himBali. If others will not deal fairly with their owu minds, cos that make my errors truihs, or ought it to make me m love with them, and willing to impose on mysei? If oihers low cataract on their eyes, should thai hindrine from couching of mine as soon as I coul? Every one delures igiitist blindness, and yet who almost is unt; fond of thitisch dims in wicht, and ke pe th: ck ar light ou of Iris mind, which should leand humanto truth and knowledge? False or donbiul positions, reli

da as wan'stionabl, mixim-, kerp those in the dark trom truth who build on thein. Such are in the prejudice imbib'd froin education, party, rever. 1!ce, fashion, inters, de, 'ldi: isine dobe which every on' Wes in his broiher's ere, but n ver re rards the hunu his own. For who is there, almost, that is ever brougilt fairly to examin: bisown principis, ami se with r they are such its will bear the trial 2 But yet this should by one of the first thougs every one should set alvout, and he scrupulous in, who would rightly couduct his understanding in the search of truth and knowlerle

To those who are willing to get rid of this great hinderance of knowledge--for to such only I write-to thon? Who wond shake of this great ani dungerous impostor Prejudice, wino dr.518 tp tai hood in the likeness of truth, and so dextrously hooria winks men's minds, as to kerp them in the dars, with a belief that they are more in the light then my that do not be with their eyes, I shall offer this one inark whereby priuilice may be known. Il that is ftrongly of nuy opinion, must suppose -unlessa fieb9f-comemperlihat his prrsna-ion is bailt upon good grounds, and that his aset in no greater than what the crickuce of the truth he holds forces hiin to; and tht they arsarsunents, and not inclination or fancy, that make bim so contid nt and postiv in his tenets. Now if, after all his profession, he cannot bear any opposition to his opinion. if he emnot so much as given patient Inaring, mach less examinan kejad the arguments on the other side, does he not plainly confess it is prejudice verus him? And it is not evidence of truth, but some lazy anticipation, some b loved presumption, that he desir. s to rest nudisturbed in. For if what he holde hus he gives out, will fence with evidence, and he sees it to be true, what need be far to put it to the proof? If his opinion be settled upon a firm foondation, if the argument that support it, and have olfained his assent, be ckar. good, and convincin, why should li:be sliy to have it tried whether they be proof or not? He whose arent goes beyond bis evidence, oves this excess of his asheri'nce only to prejudice, and do e in effect own it when he refuses. hear what is off r dazuillet it; declaring thereby, that it is not evidnce he peeks, but the quiet enjoyment of the opmion he is fond of, with a forward condemnation of all that may stund in opposia tion to it, undcard and unexamined.

Injudicious laste in Study. The eagerness and strong bent of the mind after knowledge, if not warily regulated, is often a hinderance to it. It still presses into further discoveries and new objects, and catches at the variety of knowledge, and ther fore often stays not long enough on what is before it, to look into it as it should, for huste to pursue what is yet out of sight. Heihat rid's post through a conntry may be able, from the transient view, to tell in general how the parts lie, and may be able to give fome loose description of here a mountain and there a pluin, her a morues and there a river; woodland in one part, and savannahs in another. Such superficial idens and observations as these be may collect in galloping over it; but the more useful observations of the mil. plants, nuimals, and inhabitants, with their several sorts and properties, inust nec marily caps him; and it is seldom men ever discover the rich mines without some dirving Nature commonly lodg's her treasures and jewels in rochy ground. If this mattr be knotty, and the sense lies deep, the mind must stop and buckle to it, and stick upon it with labour and thought, and close contemplationi, anch not leave it miilit lius matand the dininiy and got possession of truth. Dit here care most be taken to avoid the other extrano: amun must not stick at every usless uicity, and exp et mysteries of science in every trivial question or scruple ibat he inay ruise. Heilat will stand to pick up and examine every pebble that comes in his way, is as unlikely to returu enriched and laden with jewels, as the other that truvelled full speed. Truths are not the better uor the worse for their obviousnese

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