ce. He himself was in favor of to have a provision in the constiurt might be ineligible after their ly free from all influence of any

the gentleman from Allegheny of the judges of the supreme e political influences which we other day. If it was known ed, that they were only to hold s, and that they cannot be reapnnot be operated upon. This he of the judiciary for the benefit of cut off the life tenure which had man serves that time, if you again him a life officer, and then indeed very influence in their power to nor and senate. Then will you vernor and senate, and then may that improper influences may be judges of your country. He were in favor of abolishing life of office at fifteen years for the resident judges of county courts. ent of the gentleman from Allewent to secure the independence ed.

dment now stood, it would go to ealth one of the greatest of those much by gentlemen on both sides g the superior court of this comill be one of the most vacillating

f principle in the supreme court, convenience to the people of the place upon a change of officers of es in that court are calculated to h all the inferior courts are conto see such an amendment as this too who knew so well what the to see an amendment introduced officers of the highest and most just when they became scholars cations with distinguished ability, ch for a new set of men. The aviour in office is entirely taken an is appointed for a term of years me motive for conducting himself marge the duties of his office with the officer is told when he is nduct may be, no matter, he may

discharge the duties of his office faithfully, and no matter what pains he takes in qualifying himself to discharge the duties of that office, still he was not to look to re appointment, because it was expressly forbidden. This was a most extraordinary amendment considering the quarter from whence it came.

We have been told by certain gentlemen that in order to get the best men in the state to fill the offices of judges of our courts, we should hold out the tenure of good behaviour, or a very long period of years as an inducement, but this was entirely taken away by this amendment, and the whole of gentlemen's arguments on this subject entirely destroyed by it. He undertook to say that no man who had a good practice at the bar would take the office of judge of the supreme court, if he knew at the time that he would have to go back to the bar at the end of fifteen years. He had no idea that his opinions would be looked upon as of as much weight in the committee, as the opinions of those who had proposed and advocated this amendment, but he must say that he should consider it as one of the greatest curses which could be inflicted upon the judiciary of the state.

Mr. STEVENS, of Adams, said it seemed to him that those who believed that the independence and impartiality of the judges of our courts, depended upon the tenure for good behaviour, could not consistently with their own opinions, vote against this proposition. Entertaining that opinion himself, he felt bound to vote for it, because it removed the judges from all possibility of being improperly influenced by the appointing power; and he could not see how those who were in favor of so short a tenure as had been advocated by the reformers on this floor, could vote against it either. How can we who hold that the tenure of good behaviour makes the officers more impartial, than the judge who is depending for his appointment on the governor, vote against this amendment? We hold that appointing men for a term of years, takes away the impartiality of the judge, because it tempts him to depart from the rules of justice, and from that upright conduct which is so essential to a good judge, to subserve the interest of the individual who appoints him for the purpose of obtaining a re-appointment. This was the reason why they opposed a tenure for a term of years, and why they held to the tenure of good behaviour.

If then the term of years be fifteen, and the officers be re-eligible, the same objections lay against it as if it were ten years; but, if the amendment of the gentleman from Allegheny prevailed, we would have independent judges, because they would have no motive for bowing to the ruling party, or the ruling demagogues, for the purpose of securing their re-appointment.

We, therefore, have but one alternative left now, if there be, as there certainly is, a majority in this convention, determined upon destroying the tenure of good behaviour, and that alternative which was calculated to secure the independence of the judiciary, was the amendment of the gentleman from Allegheny; and when gentlemen say that, by adopting this, we are depriving the people of the benefit of the experience of the old judges, we say we counterbalance that by removing them from the deplorable consequences, which would inevitably attend the expiration of the commissions of these judges at a time when they would be using

a re-appointment. But why do , object to this. They object to erm of years, for the purpose of they give them a term of years cers. He could not see the dis's as they were termed, and those , unless it is this. That if you rm is to be renewed so long as present tenure of good behaviour the eyes of the dominant party, and senate, which are in power. could see, between the two cases, ge, would be to give the governor its as would suit best his political how those who were conservative ges, could go against this amendapartiality with the tenure for good good behaviour for fifteen years; That time, except such violations of ge, and there would be no sinister n the other hand, he could not see mure, and who believed the people times less disposition to revenge, ividual or any selected body, could er, that he thought the proposition ent; and he would ask the gentlenot be better to withdraw it, until ng. There were some other things ettled now, and he would submit sembarrass the question, and allow sted as it stands.

d that this proposition would not ers of the committee at present, as question shall have been tested, he tending, however, to offer it again,

en rose and addressed the chair

Fore the committee is of peculiar and is justly receiving, the most hich should be settled by the fairest e least possible influence from any decision of it depends, in some and perhaps the security or stability feelings, which now exist in the long ere the effect of this decision or ill.

be narrowed down to a point of It should be regarded, as it is, as one bear, now and hereafter, upon all

parts of the state, and upon all the citizens of the state. The local interest, or the personal feeling, which may come into this question, will be lost in oblivion, before the principles to be settled here shall have had their full operation, either for good or ill.

It is not a question of speculation or experiment, but it is one of prac tical wisdom, in which it behooves us to take our departure upon sound principles, and commit ourselves to the guidance of the best lights of reason and experience. I do not know that I can aid the convention, by any argument of mine, in forming its judgment; but, I will endeavour to put before them, in as brief a space as possible, the fruits of years and of some study and reflection. I will not tax the patience of the committee for a longer time than may be indispensibly necessary; because the state of my health, and my habits of discussion, alike forbid me going over a large defence.

The wisdom which marks the distribution of the powers of our govern ment is denied by no one. It forms an essential feature in this plan of distribution, that the different branches or departments, to which the powers are allotted, are co-ordinate and independent. If this were not so, it is evident, that the distribution would be a senseless form.

It may be useful, in the discussion, to consider the practical operation or bearing of these different departments upon the people. For, although I assent to the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people, and to the theory, that they are the source of power; yet the exercise of the powers which they bring into existence for government, is upon themselves.

It is a truth worthy of careful observation, that the judicial department is the most felt by the people. Nay, it may be said to be the only one, which is felt directly by the people. The executive exercises no powers which bear with any general force upon the mass of the people. The legislative by its action affects them as little. The judicial is felt, and felt directly, by individuals, by many individuals, either as a protection from wrong, or a vindication of rights, and this very uniformly, to the satisfaction of one party and the grief of another. Hence it is, that a spirit of hostility towards the judiciary is engendered, which is never produced towards either of the two other departments.

It is the part of wisdom to regard this state of things; and, keeping this peculiar fact as to this department always in view, to make due pro vision for it. The desideratum is, so to frame our constitutional provision, that it shall be best calculated to attain the great object in view; and that object is, or should be, a pure and enlightened administration of the laws for the purpopse of justice; and I take it that this is one great aim, which every man looking to the interests of the commonwealth, is solicitous to accomplish.

How shall this object be best secured by the provisions of our constitution?

The great, the important office of the judiciary, in these commonwealth of ours, is, to administer the law between man and man, to deal with private and individual rights and wrongs.

We have no royalty, against whose prerogative, power, and influence, it is necessary to guard.

We have no state policy, from which we need protection.

all matters of private controsonal rights; and we want of

this desirable end?

egarded in the settlement of this

1 to secure the services of the

and able, when placed in office? hat, for the judiciary, you want that can be got in the republic ere is no difference among us. anxious to preserve men in a o exercise that diligence which dge, and to the enlightened disning unimpaired, as well their ibunal over which they preside. hese points will be likely to be

whole assembly, perhaps with a ch we denominate independence, ity, is to be regarded as essential as to the best means of securing ing it.

ndence?

of dependence upon the will of those who differ from me state notion of the ancients. Justice

She should know no man, no urt the influence, nor fear the unal, all, all, may look for justice. ception, any qualification, do you w any external influence, or any o operate upon the judge, do yon ent on his administration? If you fice, if you put before him a stand-lain, that you are preparing imped

mited tenure do it upon a single nire with great care; because if will be seen to be without support. department, like the other departpeople. The argument, and the out, so as to make the judiciary of the people.

the sanction of Mr. Jefferson and