stock while in transit, states the general rule as to the measure of damages in the following language: "It is well settled as a general rule that the measure of damages | in the case of a common carrier is the value of the goods intrusted to it for transportation, with interest from the time when they ought to have been delivered,"-citing, among other authorities, Hutchinson on Carriers, 2d ed. § 771, and 1 Sutherland on Damages, 629. And the court then proceeds further: "But when the matter appears to have been regulated by statute in the state, and the statute has been interpreted by its highest court, the regulation of the statute will be followed in the courts of the United States." This was done in that case, and interest was not allowed only because the terest from that time. Hunt v. Nevers, 15 Pick. 500, 26 Am. Dec. 616.

But in an action against a stakeholder for refusing to pay over money held under a bet, it was held that, in the absence of an agreement, no interest could be recovered, except in the cases provided for by statute, which authorizes interest where money is withheld by an unreasonable and vexatious delay. It was held that mere delay on the part of the defendant to pay the money on demand was not sufficient to authorize in terest under this clause. Corson v. Neatheny, 9 Colo. 212, 11 Pac. 82.

In an action against a cold storage plant for injury to fruit, the amount of the claim must be ascertainable by mere computation in order to recover interest. Shafer Fruit & Cold Storage Co. v. E. M. Upton Cold Storage Co. 133 App. Div. 796, 118 N. Y. Supp. 8. The court said: "We appreciate that there has been a departure from the former rule that interest is not allowable on an unliquidated demand."

In an action against a consignee on account of a consignment, interest will not be allowed on an unliquidated balance that is disputed. M'Connico V. Curzen, 2 Call (Va.) 358, 1 Am. Dec. 540.

III. Admiralty and collision.

The general rule in admiralty and collision cases is that interest will be allowed on the damages from the date of collision. In some cases this is said to be within the discretion of the court or jury. In cases depending on a stipulation bond there seems to be a difference in the cases, owing to the terms of the stipulation.

In a libel for a collision between steamboats, where damages for detention were al lowed, interest was allowed thereon from the time of filing the libel. The Natchez, 24 C. C. A. 49, 41 U. S. App. 708, 78 Fed. 183. The court said: "It has been held by this court in New Orleans & C. R. Co. v. Schneider, 8 C. C. A. 571, 13 U. S. App. 655, 60 Fed. 210, that a verdict assessing unliquidated damages and allowing interest from judicial demand is sufficiently specific, where it

supreme court of Missouri, under the statute of that state, held that interest is not permitted in case of unliquidated damages, except in special cases. The rule is also stated by the same court, in the case of Mobile & M. R. Co. v. Jurey, 111 U. S. 584, 28 L. ed. 527, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 566, where, in the syllabus, it is said: "The measure of damages in an action against a common carrier for loss of goods in transit is their value at the point of destination, with legal interest."

In the case of Wilson v. Troy, 135 N. Y. 96, 18 L.R.A. 449, 31 Am. St. Rep. 817, 32 N. E. 44, the court of appeals of New York, in discussing the question now under consideration, at page 104 of 135 N. Y., says: "It is difficult to perceive any sound appears clear such interest is allowed as part of the damages." Interest on the damages for two days' detention was in the nature of, and was intended as, damages.

And where goods were lost or destroyed on the high sea by reason of the fault of those in charge of the vessel, the damages were the value of the goods at the place of shipment, with charges for lading, insurance, and transportation, and interest. The Scotland (National Steam Nav. Co. v. Dyer) 105 U. S. 24, 26 L. ed. 1001.

In 118 U. S. 507, 30 L. ed. 153, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1174, on a subsequent trial, the court said: "The allowance of interest on damages is not an abs-lute right. Whether it ought or ought not to be allowed depends upon the circumstances of each case, and rests very much in the discretion of the tribunal which has to pass upon the subject, whether it be a court or jury."

And in an action for a cargo lost by a collision, the libellant was allowed the value at the time and place of shipment, with interest from the time of collision. The Mary J. Vaughan, 2 Ben. 47, Fed. Cas. No. 9,217.

And in an action for damages by collision, where the libellant, the owner of one vessel, obtained damages, he was entitled to interest from the date of collision. The Morning Star, 4 Biss. 62, Fed. Cas. No. 9,817.

In admiralty, on a libel for collision, interest was allowed on the demurrage. Paul v. The M. Kalbfleisch, 59 Fed. 198.

In a libel in admiralty for a collision, it was held that, in computing the damages, the commissioner would take, as those suffered by the libellant, the value of the vessel and the net pending freight, with interest, both to be computed by the rule given in Marsden on Collisions, 3d ed. p. 111. The Rabboni, 53 Fed. 952.

In an action for damages for sinking a canal boat by collision, the measure of damages was held to be the value of the use, and interest on the costs of repairs. Whitehall Transp. Co. v. New Jersey S. B. Co. 51 N. Y. 369.

So, in an action for damages for collision by a steamer, interest was allowed on the value

distinction between a case where the defendant converts or carries away the plaintiff's horse and a case where, through negligence on his part, the horse is injured so as to be valueless. There is no reason apparent for a different rule of damages in the one case than in the other." Quite true that, notwithstanding the court here clearly points out that there can be no distinction in reason, the courts of New York, in deference to early decisions, still cling to the old theory that in certain cases it is for the jury to say whether interest shall be allowed or not. The question, however, is not relegated to the jury in cases like the one at bar, even in New York, as is manifest from the case of Dana v. Fied

of the property destroyed. Parrott v. Knickerbocker Ice Co. 46 N. Y. 361. The court said: "In cases of trover, replevin, and trespass interest on the value of property unlawfully taken or converted is allowed by way of damages, for the purpose of complete indemnity of the party injured; and it is difficult to see why, on the same principle, interest on the value of property lost or destroyed by the wrongful or negligent act of another may not be included in the damages."

And in an action for damages resulting from collision of vessels, the cost of repairs, and rental value, and interest on the same, were allowed as damages. Mailler v. Express Propeller Line, 61 N. Y. 312.

Where a horse was injured in a collision of canal boats, plaintiff was allowed interest on the value of his horse. Edwards v. Beebe, 48 Barb. 106. The court said: "It is questionable whether the referee was technically right in saying that the law gives interest in such cases, as he seems to say in his report. But it is usual, and may be permitted, to give interest by way of damages in such a case, although I think it rests in the discretion of the jury or referee."

In libel in rem for damages in collision, interest was allowed in Balano v. The Illinois, 84 Fed. 697. This was not on the ground of strict interest (which would be due only for the withholding of a debt), but because the compensation for the permanent injury to the vessel was due as of the time when it was inflicted; and the addition of what is called interest was justly added for withholding it.

It was also allowed in The Bulgaria, 83 Fed. 312.

In an action in admiralty for a collision, it was held that the claimant was entitled to the amount claimed for demurrage, with interest. New Haven S. B. Co. v. The Mayor, 36 Fed. 716.

And in an action for a collision and damages caused to a boat, the damages allowed were such sum as the plaintiff paid for raising and repairing his boat, with interest thereon to the time of the verdict. Atchison v. The Dr. Franklin, 14 Mo. 63.

ler, 12 N. Y. 40-50, 62 Am. Dec. 130. The following cases are all cases of injury to or destruction of personal property or live stock while in transit, and in all of them the measure of damages is stated to be the amount of loss, with legal interest from the time of delivery or loss: Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. McCarty, 82 Tex. 608, 18 S. W. 716; Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Jackson, 62 Tex. 209; Southern P. R. Co. v. Anderson, 26 Tex. Civ. App. 518, 63 S. W. 1023; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Truskett, supra; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Phelps, 46 Ark. 485; Jacksonville, T. & K. W. R. Co. v. Peninsular Land Transp. & Mfg. Co. 27 Fla. 1, 157, 17 L.R.A. 33, 9 So. 661; Erie R. Co. v. Lockwood, 28 Ohio St. 358; Illi

Where both vessels were in fault, and the loss of one, with interest from the date of collision to the date of decree, exceeded the loss of the other, with like interest, by a sum one half of which was greater than the amount of the bond given to answer the decree, with interest from the date of the decree, it was held proper to award to the first as damages the amount of the bond, with interest. The Manitoba (Beatty v. Hanna) 122 U. S. 97, 30 L. ed. 1095, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1158. The rule applied was that the damages done to both vessels should be added together in one sum and equally divided, and a decree be pronounced in favor of the owner of the vessel which suffered most, against those of the vessel which suffered least, for one half of the difference between the amounts of their respective losses.

In The Wanata, 95 U. S. 600, 24 L. ed. 461, a collision case, on appeal to the circuit court, a decree was rendered on the stipulation bond for value, which was $16,000, and costs, with interest to the date of the decree in the district court, amounting to $323, and costs in the circuit court, including interest to date on damages awarded in the district court, amounting to $1,085,in all, $17,407. This was held proper, as the amount of the stipulation for value was decreed to be paid libellants for losses, and the stipulation for costs was decreed to be paid libellants in part discharge of costs, and the balance of the costs and the, accrued interest from the decree of the district court to the date of the decree of the circuit court was to be paid by the sureties in the appeal bond.

This was on the ground that costs and interest were to be given in such a case, not as indemnity for the loss set forth in the libel, but for the reason that the loss ascertained in the decree of the district court was not paid at the proper time (following The Northumbria, L. R. 3 Adm. & Eccl. 6; Ives v. Merchants' Bank, 12 How. 159, 13 L. ed. 936; The Diana, 3 Wheat. 58, 4 L. ed. 333; Sneed v. Wister, 8 Wheat. 690, 5 L. ed. 717; 5 Stat. at L. 518).

But in The Ann Caroline, 2 Wall. 538, 17 L. ed. 833, where a stipulation was made to obtain the release of a vessel attached un

If we assume the case at bar to be one commonly called a case of pure tort for injury to or destruction of personal property through ordinary negligence, still the respondent was entitled to interest according to the great weight of authority. In 22 Cyc. Law & Proc. p. 1500, the following is stated to be the law upon the subject of allowing interest for torts to property: "While it has been laid down in many cases that interest will not be allowed on damages recovered for torts to property unless defendant has derived some benefit from his tort, or has been guilty of gross negligence, the

der a libel for collision, it was held that the; libellant was not entitled to interest as against the stipulators for value.

In The Belle, 5 Ben. 57, Fed. Cas. No. 1,270, it was held that in the case of The Ann Caroline, supra, the court failed to notice that the stipulation was also under rule

71.

In an action for damages for a collision, interest was allowed only from the date of decree, in Kerr v. The José E. More, 37 Fed. 123.

Where a libel was filed and a stipulation given for the discharge of a vessel, fixing the value at $1,750, and the stipulation was entered into pursuant to the rule and practice of the court, and a decree was entered against the vessel for $3,767, it was held that the libellant was entitled to recover interest for the $1,750 from the date of the stipulation, under district court rule 71. The Belle, 5 Ben. 57, Fed. Cas. No. 1,270.

In admiralty, where a bond was taken for the appraised value of the vessel, under admiralty rule 54, it was held that the court could require that the bond should provide for interest. Re Harris, 6 C. C. A. 320, 14 U. S. App. 506, 57 Fed. 243.

In Re Harris, supra, it was said: "Appellants contend that the district court erred in requiring a stipulation for interest from the date of the bond upon the appraised value of ship and freight, and insist that, in proceedings under the act of 1851, interest upon | such value can be exacted only from the date of the final decree. Several cases are cited in support of this contention (The Ann Caroline; The Wanata; The Manitoba; and Kerr v. The José E. More,-supra); but they are not controlling, because in no one of them did the bond provide for interest, and the obligors in a bond conditioned only to pay the stipulation value upon decree could not be liable for interest until the decree fixed their liability."

And in admiralty, where the owners were entitled to a discharge on turning over the vessel, or paying her value into court, it was held that they should provide for the pay ment of interest on her value until such time as the money is paid. if they prefer to give bond, instead of paying it at present. The Battler, 58 Fed. 704.

of authority, is that, in cases of torts to property, interest on the damages may be allowed as a part of the damages and as an approximately uniform measure of compensation." This text is amply sustained by the following authorities: Woodland v. Union P. R. Co. 27 Utah, 543, 26 Pac. 298; Rhemke v. Clinton, 2 Utah, 230; Varco v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 30 Minn. 18, 13 N. W. 921; Sabine & E. T. R. Co. v. Joachimi, 58 Tex. 456; Fremont, E. & M. Valley R. Co. v. Marley, 25 Neb. 138, 13 Am. St. Rep. 482, 40 N. W. 948; Union P. R. Co. v. Ray, 46 Neb. 750, 65 N. W. 773; Kendrick v. Towle, 60 Mich.

In a libel on a bottomry bond it was held that the libellants were entitled to ordinary interest on the amount loaned, at least, from the commencement of the suit. The Grapeshot, 2 Woods, 42, Fed. Cas. No. 5,703. The court said: "But according to the American authorities, interest will be allowed after a demand of payment, even of an unsettled claim, for goods sold and delivered or services rendered, from the time of the demand; and the presentment of an account or commencement of a suit is sufficient demand on which to found and from which to date a claim of interest."

And in a suit in personam in admiralty for a box of gold sovereigns that was abandoned with the vessel to the custody of wreckers, damages were allowed on the value at Key West, where part of the cargo was saved, with interest on the value from the time when proceedings for salvage were instituted at Key West. King v. Shepherd, 3 Story, 349, Fed. Cas. No. 7,804.

Where a vessel was seized as trading contrary to the nonintercourse act of Feb. 27, 1800, it was held that the claimant was entitled to the return of the vessel and damages, and that the commissioner should be instructed to take the actual prime cost of the cargo and vessel, with interest thereon, including insurance. Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch, 64, 2 L. ed. 208.

In Pacific Ins. Co. v. Conard, Baldw. 138, Fed. Cas. No. 10,647, it was said that in marine trespass the Supreme Court laid down the following rule of damages in Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch, 124, 2 L. ed. 228: the prime cost of the cargo, interest, insurance, and expenses; in The Anna Maria, 2 Wheat. 335, 4 L. ed. 253: the prime cost of the cargo, all charges, insurance, and interest: in The Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheat. 560, 4 L. ed. 459: the prime cost or value of the property at the time of loss, or the diminution of the value, with interest; in The Lively, 1 Gall. 315, Fed. Cas. No. 8,403: the prime cost and interest; in The Apollon, 9 Wheat. 376, 6 L. ed. 111: where the vessel and cargo were lost, their actual value, with interest from the trespass.

And where a vessel was wrongfully seized, it was held that the value of the property