Am. Rep. 212. This is on the ground that to repair a sawmill, it was held that the value can be ascertained, and when this jury, in their discretion, might add interhas been done, the owner is as plainly en-est to the damages. Hinckley v. Beckwith, titled to interest as he would be if a like 13 Wis. 31. sum had been payable in money." In an action on an insurance policy for a loss of cargo, upon the question whether interest was allowable on the account, the court said: "The general rule is that in terest is not to be recovered on unliquidated damages, or for an uncertain demand. Jurors have, in many cases, a discretion to allow interest, by way of damages, according to the circumstances of the case; and this is a case in which that discretion may be exercised." Anonymous, 1 Johns. 315. In Tifton, T. & G. R. Co. v. Butler, 4 Ga. App. 191, 60 S. E. 1087, an action for unliquidated damages for breach of a contract, it was held that interest was not recoverable as such, but that the jury might increase the amount of damages by allowance of interest; but they should not add interest eo nomine, but should find a gross sum. A navigation company agreed to purchase 2,000 coupon trolley tickets daily, and deposited $5,000 as a guaranty; subsequently there was a breach by the trolley company, and the navigation company sued for the deposit; as there was no proof of demand, interest was excluded, except from the date of the commencement of the action. Kirkland v. Niagara Gorge R. Co. 109 App. Div. 201, 95 N. Y. Supp. 657. In an action for breach of contract to deliver a cargo of tea at certain prices and of a certain quality, and the tea was inferior, it was held that, as to interest, this was a question generally in the discretion of the jury; but that it was not agreeable to legal principles to allow interest on unliquidated contested claims sounding in damages. Gilpins v. Consequa, Pet. C. C. 85, Fed. Cas. No. 5,452; Willings v. Consequa, Pet. C. C. 172, Fed. Cas. No. 17,766. În Wisconsin a late and well-considered case (Laycock v. Parker, 103 Wis. 161, 79 N. W. 327) reviews the cases in that state, both in actions for services and actions on contracts; and in an action on a contract for building, under the supervision of an architect, it was held that if there is a reasonably certain standard of measurement, by the correct application of which one can ascertain the amount he owes, he will be liable for interest from the time of demand. In Gallun v. Seymour, 76 Wis. 251, 45 N. W. 115, which was an action for damages for breach of contract to deliver bark, where the market value was disputed, it was held that interest on the damages from the commencement of the suit was proper. And where the damages were unliquidated, and the cause of action arose on a contract for the recovery of money only, and the petition was verified, it was held that the clerk could enter judgment for the amount and interest if there was a default. Whereatt v. Ellis, 68 Wis. 61, 31 N. W. 762. And in an action for breach of contract In Hewitt v. John Week Lumber Co. 77 Wis. 548, 46 N. W. 822, damages allowed upon a counterclaim for breach of contract were held to bear interest from the time the answer was served. The court said that "if he had instituted a suit on his counterclaim earlier, he would have been entitled to interest from an earlier date." In an action on a claim against the state, it was held that until the report awarding damages had been made, the damages for breach of contract were unliquidated and uncertain, and would not bear interest. Martin v. State, 51 Wis. 407, 8 N. W. 248. This case was distinguished in Laycock v. Parker, supra, as exceptional and differing from the Wisconsin cases, in that it was an action for general damages, such as loss of profits. In the following cases, where it was held that interest should not be allowed, it seems that the damages were uncertain, and not easily ascertained. Where damages are to be made up from unascertained profits, they are so doubtful in amount as to prevent the application of the general rule giving interest. In an action to recover on a contract to pay $500 a day for each day of thirty saved in completing a building, and for damages for not having a foundation ready on time, it was held that the plaintiff could not recover interest where the claims were unliquidated, contested, and uncertain. Mansfield v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. 114 N. Y. 331, 4 L.R.A. 566, 21 N. E. 735, 1037. The court said that in actions for breach of contract "whether interest is recoverable does not rest in the discretion of the jury, but it is a question of law for the court; while in actions sounding in tort, when the recovery of interest is permissible, it is, with some exceptions, a question for the jury." In Mansfield v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. supra, the case of McMahon v. New York & E. R. Co. 20 N. Y. 463, was distinguished, as there interest was allowable on the ground that the defendant was in default for not having taken steps to ascertain the amount of the debts. In McCollum v. Seward, 62 N. Y. 316, and Mercer v. Vose, 67 N. Y. 56, which were actions for services, interest was allowed from the commencement of the actions, on the ground that when the debtor was in default for not paying pursuant to his contract, the creditor was entitled to interest, as the amount could be computed approximately; but that in cases where this could not be done, interest would not be allowed. Interest was not allowed from the commencement of an action for breach of contract against the state, in McMaster v. State, 108 N. Y. 542, 13 N. Y. S. R. 674, 15 N. E. 417. The court said: "The claim is in every sense unliquidated. There was no possible way for the state to adjust the same and ascertain the amount which it was liable to pay, and hence, within the decision of White v. Miller, 71 N. Y. 118, 27 Am. Rep. 13, s. c. subsequent appeal 78 N. Y. 393, 34 Am. Rep. 544, it was not liable for interest. The law in reference to the allowance of interest is not in a very satisfactory condition, but it is believed that no decision in this court has yet gone the length of allowing interest in such a case. It is scarcely claimed in this case that there could be any allowance of interest for the period of time prior to the filing of the petition, which may be regarded as equivalent to the commencement of an action; and in the case cited it was held that where the claim was such that it could not draw interest before the commencement of an action, that event would not set the interest running." In an action for damages for breach of contract to do marble work, it was held that interest could not be recovered where the damages were unliquidated. Stannard v. Robert H. Reid & Co. 118 App. Div. 304, 103 N. Y. Supp. 521. The court said: "It is true that there was a market price for the various items of material, but it can not be said that there was a market price for the entire contract work, which involved the furnishing of material and the perform ance of labor. The plaintiff did not know even approximately what it would cost him to have the work done. He was obliged to receive bids, which differed in amount, and he selected the lowest, and did not even then assume to fix his damages on that basis or notify the defendant. Nor did he recover the amount of damages which he alleged in the complaint." In an action to enforce a mechanics' lien, it was held that the unliquidated amount for extra work would not carry interest, in John Weber & Co. v. Hearn, 49 App. Div. 213, 63 N. Y. Supp. 41. The Court said: "We think the authorities sustain the principle that interest upon an unliquidated claim, even though on contract, should not be awarded unless, with reasonable certainty, the amount was or could be fixed. In other words, the theory upon which interest can be allowed as damages is that a person owes a debt, the amount of which is fixed, or which, by reference to market values or to other sources of information, is susceptible of being definitely determined." And where the lessor agreed to pay the market value of the improvements on the expiration of the lease, and refused to appoint appraisers, it was held that the les see was not entitled to interest on the award of the appraisers appointed by him. Holliday v. Marshall, 7 Johns. 211. The court said: "The value of the improvements or amount of damages was uncertain and unliquidated. Although the covenant provided for an appraisement of the improvements, in case the land was not sold to the plaintiff, yet the defendant was not a party to the appraisement. He refused to unite in it, and there is nothing in the covenant making an ex parte appraisement binding on the defendant. The value of the improvements was open to inquiry at the trial; the plaintiff's claim is therefore to be considered as resting in unliquidated damages, upon which interest is not recoverable." And where plaintiff conveyed lands to a railroad on consideration that they would lay a track to his property, and bring cattle to his place, which they failed to do, it was held that he could recover the value of the land conveyed, but, as the damages were unliquidated, he could not recover interest. Day v. New York C. R. Co. 22 Hun, 412. In an action by a contractor, where the municipal board had a right to cancel the contract and pay for work done, it was held that plaintiff was not entitled to interest, as the amount due was not a matter of computation. Coates v. Nyack, 127 App. Div. 153, 111 N. Y. Supp. 476. And in an action by a lessee because a mill was not rebuilt by the lessor after a fire, according to agreement, it was held that, as plaintiff's claim was unliquidated, it was not proper to allow interest on the damages. Chamberlain v. Dunlop, 28 N. Y. S. R. 375, 8 N. Y. Supp. 125. In an action for damages for breach of contract to build a body on an automobile chassis, where the work was insufficient and imperfect, it was held that, as the damages were unliquidated, no interest was recoverable. Anthony v. Moore & M. Co. 135 App. Div. 203, 120 N. Y. Supp. 402. And in an action on a contract under which cattle were received, kept, and sold, it was held that the claim was an uncertain and unliquidated demand, and the amount due could not be ascertained from the face of the contract, and that interest by, that name could not be allowed. Brady v. Wilcoxson, 44 Cal. 239. In an action for a breach of contract where there was not a market price to estimate the damages without a verdict from the jury, it was held that interest would not be allowed. Brownell Improv. Co. v. Critchfield, 96 Ill. App. 84, affirmed in 197 Ill. 61, 64 N. E. 332. This was a subcontract for paving. And in an action for broker's commission on a contract to lease land at a certain rate, with the privilege of purchase, it was held by the trial court that this was an agreement to convey an undivided one-third interest in some land, so indefinite in description as to render the contract incapable of specific performance, and the value of the property in money was not known, and interest should not be allowed on the damages. This was affirmed. Harvey v. Hamilton, 155 Ill. 377, 40 N. E. 592. In an action for damages for breach of an executory contract to furnish a vessel for a cargo of wheat, it was held no interest could be allowed. Kelderhouse v. Saveland, 1 Ill. App. 65. The right to recover on money counts was held to be the test, in applying the rule to unliquidated damages. In Buckmaster v. Grundy, 8 Ill. 626, it | son, 110 Cal. 311, 42 Pac. 811. The court was held that where damages were assessed said that Sec. 3287, giving interest to every for breach of a contract, interest would person who is entitled to recover, damages not be allowed. capable of being made certain by calculation, where the right of recovery was vested in him on a particular day, did not apply. In Wilson v. Means, 25 Kan. 83, which was an action for money advanced for a joint purchase of hogs and for one half of the profits, it was held that for the jury to omit the rate of interest in a verdict as sessing damages rendered any attempted calculation of interest uncertain, and left the court with no other alternative than to reject interest in the rendition of the judgment. In an action by a builder to recover for breach of contract, where the defendant changed his plans and let his contract to other parties, it was held that the builder was not entitled to interest upon his profits until they were determined by the verdict. Swanson v. Andrus, 83 Minn. 505, 86 N W. 465. The court said: "Whatever is, or may have been, the rule in other jurisdictions as to allowing interest by way of damages, this court has so allowed it as a matter of law, even in cases where the demand was unliquidated, provided its pecuniary amount did not depend upon any contingencies, and was ascertainable by computation, or by reference to generally recog nized standards, such as market value. . On the other hand, interest has not been allowed where the damages claimed were not only unliquidated, but could not be ascertained by reference to any generally recognized standard, or were, or any part of them, prospective or contingent, or the amount thereof depended in whole or in part upon the discretion of the jury. Actions for personal injuries, seduction, libel, slander, and false imprisonment fall within this classification." Where the balance due on a contract was uncertain, interest was not allowed. Vietti v. Nesbitt, 22 Nev. 390, 41 Pac. 151. In the following cases, interest was held not recoverable under the circumstances of the case: For cutting down work on a construction contract, it was held that the plaintiff was not entitled to interest where the alterations in the contract were authorized. Clark v. New York, 1 Keyes, 9. And under an agreement to pay an attorney a certain per cent of an award, it was held that the attorney was not entitled to a share of interest, as the interest upon the amount was not a part of the award, but merely compensation for the use of the property. Re Bassford, 36 Misc. 732, 74 N. Y. Supp. 397. In Allison v. Juniata County, 50 Pa. 351; and Dyer v. Covington Twp. 19 Pa. 200, interest was held not allowable on county warrants, as an action would not lie on such paper, but on the original claim. In an action on a note payable in sugar in Guadaloupe, no interest was allowed as damages, because at that place such notes did not carry interest, but from judgment or registration. Courtois v. Carpentier, 1 Wash. C. C. 376, Fed. Cas. No. 3,286. VII. Trover and conversion. a. Generally. that the measure of damages will be the The general rule in actions of trover is value of the property at the time and place of conversion, with interest from that time. In Kentucky and North Carolina, interest was held to be within the discretion of the jury. In Montana, interest was denied. Federal cases. The general rule stated above was applied in an action by the United States for wrongfully cutting and removing timber from reservations. United States v. Pine River Logging Co. 32 C. C. A. 406, 61 U. S. App. 69, 89 Fed. 907. And where a cargo of flour capsized, and the carrier sold the cargo at auction without informing the owner, it was held a conversion, and the owners were held entitled to recover the value at the port of delivery, with interest. The Joshua Barker, Abb. Adm. 215, Fed. Cas. No 7,547. And in an action of trover for a flatboat and a cargo of wheat, it was held that the jury, in the exercise of their discretion, could include interest on the value of the property from the time of conversion, as a part of the damages. Matthews v. Menedger, 2 McLean, 145, Fed. Cas. No. 9,289. And in an action for conversion of a whale in the Okhotsk sea, where the only market was in New Bedford, it was held that the damages would be the value at New Bedford of the oil and bone which might have been made, less the expense, with interest on the sum thus arrived at. Bourne v. Ashley, 1 Low. Dec. 27, Fed. Cas. No. 1,699. And in an action for wrongful conversion of a lot of shoes, it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to the value at the time of demand, deducting storage charges, with interest from the time of demand. Edmunds v. Nolan, 86 Fed. 564. Where the defendant converted ore and received royalties thereon from his lessee, and knew the amount, as shown by his books, it was held that he was liable for interest. New Dunderberg Min. Co. v. Old, Where a lessor was to pay, on termina- | 38 C. C. A. 89, 97 Fed. 150. The court tion of the lease, two thirds of the appraised value of a building, it was held that, under Cal. Civ. Code, § 1917, the sum bore interest only from the day of its judicial ascertainment. Easterbrook v. Farquhar said: "It is a general and just rule that, where interest is reserved in a contract, or is implied from the nature of the promise, it is recoverable of right; and that, when property or money has been wrongfully appropriated or converted by a defendant, interest should be given as damages to compensate the complainant for the loss of the use of the proceeds of his property or of his funds. În cases of the latter class its allowance is sometimes a matter of discretion; but generally, whenever one has wrongfully detained or misappropriated the money of another, he ought to pay and must pay interest at the legal rate from the date of the misappropriation, or from the beginning of the detention." In a suit in equity against the director of a bank for fraudulently diverting its funds, it was held that no statute was necessary to give a court of equity power to allow interest, and that when money has been misappropriated or converted, interest should be given as damages to compensate the plaintiff for the loss of the use of his funds. Cooper v. Hill, 36 C. C. A. 402, 94 Fed. 582. The court said: "When interest is reserved in a contract, or is implied from the nature of the promise, it becomes a part of the debt, and is recoverable as of right. When money has been misappropriated or converted to his own use by a defendant, interest is given as damages to compensate the complainant for the loss of the use of his funds." Alabama. In Milner & K. Co. v. DeLoach Mill Mfg. Co. 139 Ala. 645, 101 Am. St. Rep. 63, 36 So. 765; Ewing v. Blount, 20 Ala. 694, interest was allowed from the date of the conversion until the trial. And in an action for conversion of logs or trees, the rule was held to be to allow the value immediately after severance, with interest. White v. Yawkey, 108 Ala. 270, 32 L.R.A. 199, 54 Am. St. Rep. 159, 19 So. 360. that the plaintiff was entitled to a verdict for the injury done by the temporary conversion of the slave, with interest upon such sum up to trial; but that the defendant was not liable for the value of the slave, where he died after his return, before administration. Williams v. Crum, 27 Ala. 468. And where in trover the plaintiff recov ered the value of a woman slave, and then brought a subsequent action to recover in trover her issue, not included in the first action, it was said: "In either of these cases, the value of the property at the time of the conversion, with interest, or, at most, the enhanced value at a subsequent period, is all that the law deems necessary to adequate redress." White v. Martin, 1 Port. (Ala.) 215, 26 Am. Dec. 365. In an action for conversion of personal property, it was held that, under Cal. Civ. Code, § 3336, providing that the measure of damages was, first, the value of the property at the time of conversion, with interest from that time; or, where the action has market value at any time between the conbeen prosecuted with diligence, the highest version and the verdict, with interest, at the option of the injured party; and where the plaintiff did not exercise his option, the court could award damages under either rule. Barrante v. Garratt, 50 Cal. 112. In an action for conversion of warrants, it was held that when the property converted had a fixed value, the measure of damages was that value, with legal interest from the time of conversion; that when the value was fluctuating, the plaintiff might recover the highest value at the wards. Douglass v. Kraft, 9 Cal. 562; Hatime of conversion, or at any time aftermer v. Hathaway, 33 Cal. 117. And in an action for conversion of wood wrongfully cut by the tenant from leased premises, the measure of the damages was held to be the value of the wood from the time of the conversion of the trees into cord wood, with interest to the time of trial. Brooks v. Rogers, 101 Ala. 111, 13 So. 386. In an action for conversion, it was held that the value of the property at the time of conversion, with interest thereon to the judgment, was the measure of the damages generally. Lee v. Mathews, 10 Ala. 682, 44 In an action for conversion, it was held Am. Dec. 498. The court said: "There that damages were properly allowed for are cases where the jury would be justified the detention of property, which was equivin finding the value at a subsequent period, alent to legal interest on its value from the instead of the value at the time of conver-date of conversion. Updegraff v. Lesem, 15 sion, with interest." In an action for conversion of slaves, it was held that the measure of damages, where the thing converted had a fixed value, was that value at the time of conversion; and the jury might give interest upon it. Jenkins v. McConico, 26 Ala. 213. In an action for conversion of a slave, where the defendant had hired him from a widow and returned him before administra tion, and the widow was entitled to the custody until administration, it was held Colorado. Colo. App. 297, 62 Pac. 342. The court said: "The rule in this state is that damages are allowable for the detention equal to the legal interest on the value of the chattels converted from the time of the conversion to the time of judgment." And in an action for mining ore and converting the same to the use of the defendant, it was held that the court should instruct the jury to add interest to the amount found as the value of the ore, as further damages, a sum equal to the legal interest on the same from the time of the | lowing rules were laid down: "In actions conversion. Omaha & G. Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Tabor, 13 Colo. 41, 5 L.R.A. 236, 16 Am. St. Rep. 185, 21 Pac. 925. of trover and trespass, for property taken and converted by the defendant, where there is no malicious motive on the part of the defendant, but he takes the property under a claim of right, and the real dispute is as to the title, the rule of damages is the value of the property at the time of the conversion or taking, and interest on that sum to the time of judgment. If, however, the suit is brought by a bailee or specialproperty man, against the general owner, then, the plaintiff can recover the value of ris special property only; but if the writ is against a stranger, then he recovers the value of the property and interest, according to the general rule; and holds the balance beyond his own interest, in trust for In Greeley, S. L. & P. R. Co. v. Yount, 7 Colo. App. 189, 42 Pac. 1023, it was said: "In the case of the wrongful taking or detention of personal property, it has been held that interest on its value is a proper measure of the damages for the detention, where they cannot readily be fixed otherwise. But the recovery was allowed as damages, and not as interest, and the legal rate of interest was used as their measure, because the character of the property was such that there was no other practicable method of ascertaining their amount. Machette v. Wanless, 2 Colo. 169; Hanauer v. Bartels, 2 Colo. 514; Omaha & G. Smelt the general owner." ing & Ref. Co. v. Tabor, 13 Colo. 41, 5 And the general rule was applied in OvL.R.A. 236, 16 Am. St. Rep. 185, 21 Pac.iatt v. Pond, 29 Conn. 479; Clark v. Whit925." In an action for conversion of a stock of merchandise, it was held the measure of damages was the value of the property at the time of the taking, with legal interest thereon from the date of taking to the date of rendering the verdict. Sutton v. Dana, 15 Colo. 98, 25 Pac. 90. In an action by a mortgagee for conversion of property, it was held: "It is now the established rule in Colorado that while, as interest, damages may not be recovered for the detention of the money, or the money value of property taken and converted, yet damages equal to the legal interest upon the value of the chattels converted may be al lowed, and included in the verdict which the jury may render. Omaha & G. Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Tabor, supra. Under the law as established in that case, the plaintiffs were entitled to recover, and have included in the verdict of the jury, a sum of money as damages for the detention of the property, which would have been the exact equivalent of the interest which the jury computed and included in the verdict, and which the court told them the plaintiffs had a right to recover. In form the charge was undoubtedly erroneous, though in substance it was a correct expression of the law. But, as committed in this case, it is not an error for which the cause will be reversed and sent back for a new trial." Perkins v. Marrs, 15 Colo. 262, 25 Pac. 168. The measure of damages in trover was held to be the value of the property converted, at the time of its conversion, with legal interest upon the amount from such time. Sylvester v. Craig, 18 Colo. 44, 31 Pac. 387. Connecticut. In this state the general rule was held applicable. Lewis v. Morse, 20 Conn. 211. In this case the time of conversion was not shown, and therefore the plaintiff was required to take only the value of the property. In White v. Webb, 15 Conn. 302, the fol aker, 19 Conn. 319, 48 Am. Dec. 160; Curtis v. Ward, 20 Conn. 204; Cook v. Loomis, 26 Conn. 483. The same was held in Hurd v. Hubbell, 26 Conn. 389, the court saying: "We have always understood that the rule of damages in this kind of action is the value of the property at the time of conversion, and interest. It has been so from the first, in our courts, and in the English courts, with a slight qualification in the case of sales of chattels where the price is paid in advance, and in that of contracts for the delivery of stock." And the general rule was applied in Morey v. Hoyt, 62 Conn. 542, 19 Am. Rep. 611, 26 Atl. 127. The court said: "It is to be observed with regard to this class of property that the plaintiffs were not seeking to recover its value, but simply the damage they had suffered by reason of the taking and detention; and that the property was of that class, so far as we can see, that has no value for use. It was useful only for sale or for consumption." Delaware. The general rule was followed in Vaughan v. Webster, Harr. (Del.) 256. Florida. The general rule was followed in Moody v. Caulk, 14 Fla. 50. In an action of conversion for a quantity of logs, where trees had been cut on plaintiff's ground, it was held that the conversion was complete only when the logs were removed; and plaintiff was entitled to recover the value at the time and place of removal, with interest. Skinner v. Pinney, 19 Fla. 42, 45 Am. Rep. 1. Georgia. Under Ga. Code, § 3506, requiring the plaintiff in an action of trover to elect whether he will accept a verdict for the property, or its value, or whether he will demand a verdict for the damages alone, or for the property alone, and its hire, if any, where the plaintiff elected to take a verdict |