terest; although the general rule undoubtedly is the value of the goods and interest."

Rhode Island.

In an action of trover against two, where one had made partial satisfaction, it was held that the measure of damages against the other was the value of the goods, with interest from the time of conversion, subject to the credit received. Heyer Bros. V. Carr, 6 R. I. 45.

South Carolina.

The general rule was held applicable in Banks v. Hatton, 1 Nott. & M'C. 221.

In an action for the conversion of a slave, the measure of damages was held to be the value of the slave at the time of conversion, with interest from then until the trial, or hire until his death. Burney v. Pledger, 3 Rich. L. 191, following Kid v. Mitchell, 1 Nott & M'C. 334, 9 Am. Dec. 702; Hatton

v. Banks, 1 Nott & M'C. 223, note.

Where the thing converted was reduced to money by the defendant, the smallest measure of damages is always the amount received from the conversion, with interest from the time of conversion. Ewart v. Kerr, 2 McMull. L. 141.

But in Daub v. Martin, 2 Bay, 193, it was

held that, in an action of debt on a judg;

ment in trover, it was not the usage and practice to allow interest on damages.

Texas.

In some cases the general rule was held applicable. Muse v. Burns, 3 Tex. App. Civ. Cas. (Willson) 99; Smith v. Bates (Tex. Civ. App.) 27 S. W. 1044; Harris v. Finberg, 46 Tex. 80; Wallace v. Finberg, 46 Tex. 48; Anderson v. Larremore, 1 Tex. App. Civ. Cas. (White & W.) 532; Daugherty v. Lady (Tex. Civ. App.) 73 S. W. 837; Hatcher v. Pelham, 31 Tex. 201; Carter v. Roland, 53 Tex. 540; Grimes v. Watkins, 59 Tex. 133; First Nat. Bank v. Cleveland, 36 Tex. Civ. App. 478, 82 S. W. 337; Texarkana Water Co. v. Kizer (Tex. Civ. App.) $3 S. W. 913. In order to recover interest in an action for conversion, it should be demanded in the complaint. Texarkana Water Co. v. Kizer,

supra.

der the evidence, the verdict would not have been different. Close v. Fields, 13 Tex. 623.

The measure of damages in an action for the conversion of money was held to be the Commercial & Agri. Bank v. Jones, 18 Tex. legal interest from the time of conversion.

811. It was said that the rule was differ

ent in conversion of other personal prop. be in the discretion of the jury; “but in a erty; there the question of interest would suit for the conversion of money, if damages are allowed at all, it must be in the form of interest."

In Moore v. King, 4 Tex. Civ. App. 397, 23 S. W. 484, it was held that interest was not always adequate compensation for the damages sustained.

Vermont.

The general rule was held applicable in Crumb v. Oakes, 38 Vt. 566; Thrall v. La

throp, 30 Vt. 307, 73 Am. Dec. 306; Grant v. King, 14 Vt. 367.

And where defendant applied plaintiff's personal property and the income from land to his own use, instead of to the discharge of a recognizance, it was held to be a fraudulent misappropriation of the funds, and he

was held liable for interest on the value from the time that plaintiff had paid the amount due on the recognizance. Crane v. Thayer, 18 Vt. 162, 46 Am. Dec. 142.

But where the real damage for wrongful detention of personal property was the val

ue of the use, it was held that this rule

would be applied instead of interest. Williams v. Phelps, 16 Wis. 81.

In Ingram v. Rankin, 47 Wis. 406, 32 Am. Rep. 762, 2 N. W. 755, it was said: "The rule fixing the measure of damages in actions for breaches of contract for the delivery of chattels, and in all actions for In Pridgin v. Strickland, 8 Tex. 427, 58 the wrongful and unlawful taking of chatAm. Dec. 124, it was said: "And there can tels, whether such as would formerly have be no doubt that it may safely be assumed been denominated trespass de bonis or trothat the old rule in the action of trover, that ver, at the value of the chattels at the time the value of the thing at the time of converwhen delivery ought to have been made, or sion, and interest thereon up to the judg at the taking or conversion, with interest, ment, if not entirely abolished, has been is certainly founded upon principle. It harsubjected to so many exceptions as to leave monizes with the rule which restricts the it not worth preservation, and the amount plaintiff to compensation for his loss, and of the damage will vary according to the is as just and equitable as any other genparticular property to which it may be ap-eral rule which the courts have been able plied."

In an action against an agent for not pay ing money collected by him, it was held that interest co nomine was not to be recovered, but as damages. The court should have left the question of interest to the discretion of the jury. But it was held that, un

to prescribe, and has greatly the advantage of certainty over all others."

b. Wrongful levy.

In actions for damages for wrongful levy on plaintiff's property, and for converting

a subsequent trial, it was held that the of right. Wehle v. Haviland, 42 How. Pr. measure of damages, allowing all rights of exemption, could not exceed the sum of $250, with interest from the return of the property replevied, and could not reach that, unless the property levied on was worth that.

In an action of trespass for levying execution on plaintiff's property he bought in, it was held the measure of damages was the amount bid at the sale, with interest there

The general rule was followed in Murphy on. McInroy v. Dyer, 47 Pa. 118. v. Sherman, 25 Minn. 196.

of the property at the time of injury, with | interest. Hopple v. Higbee, 23 N. J. L. 342; Plumb v. Ives, 39 Conn. 120; Wehle v. Haviland, 69 N. Y. 448. This is the general rule. The cases follow the rule in trover and conversion.

And where there are no special or exemplary damages. Felton v. Fuller, 35 N. H. 226; Bradley v. Geiselman, 22 Ill. 494.

Co. 36 Ga. 377. This was under Ga. act Feb. 21, 1850, providing that if any negro slave shall escape on any railroad car, the owner may recover the value and expenses incurred from the railroad company.

And in Shepherd v. McQuilkin, 2 W. Va. 90, it was held that the jury were properly instructed that the damages were the value of the property taken, with interest on such value from the time of taking, under Vir. ginia Code 1860, p. 732, § 14, providing that the jury may allow interest on the sum found by the verdict.

Va. Code 1849, chap. 177, § 14, p. 673, provides that in an action on contract, the jury may allow interest; and for any cause arising thereafter, whether from contract or tort, the jury may allow interest on the sum found by the verdict, and if a verdict does not allow interest, the sum found shall bear

In trespass for taking three cows, it was held that the measure of damages was the value of the property at the time of injury, with interest thereon. Brannin v. Johnson, 19 Me. 361. The court said: "The judge instructed the jury that they should give the plaintiff the value of the cows at the time they were taken. To this value, interest might be added, as a part of the indemnity to which the plaintiff was justly entitled. If the damage for detention could be so understood, the instruction might be justi-interest from its date. This was held to apfied. But as the term "interest" was not used, and probably not intended, as the limit of damages for detention, the jury were at liberty to go into an estimate of the probable or speculative loss the plaintiff might have sustained, upon this ground. In our judgment the instruction was too vague and loose, and had a tendency to mislead the jury."

ply to a verdict on a tort for taking personal property. Lewis v. Arnold, 13 Gratt. 454.

In an action against a master for injuries to plaintiff's cattle by reason of the master's negro and dog,-"the negro and dog of defendant, one heifer of the plaintiff then and there did bite, beat, wound, and kill,"—it was held that interest on uncertain damages could not be recovered. Speer v. Vanorden, 3 N. J. L. 652.

b. Realty.

In an action of trespass for cutting timber and converting the same, it was held that the measure of damages was the value of ties at the time and place they were converted, with interest from date of conversion. Central Coal & Coke Co. v. John The general rule is that the plaintiff is Henry Shoe Co. 69 Ark. 302, 63 S. W. 49. entitled to interest from the time of injury. In an action for trespass in cutting staves In Pennsylvania this is not allowed as interand cord wood on plaintiff's land, it was est, but is discretionary with the jury, and held that the plaintiff was not entitled un- if allowed is part of the damages; or, in der any circumstances to a judgment and in- other words, the jury may consider the lapse terest on the value from the 22d of Decem- of time in paying damages in estimating the ber, where the staves were not taken until amount. În this state, the cases allowing the 24th of December. Winchester v. Bry-interest on damages caused by mobs were ant, 65 Ark. 116, 44 S. W. 1124. overruled.

And in an action of trespass to recover the value of whisky, it was held that interest was properly allowed. Beals v. Guernsey, 8 Johns. 446, 5 Am. Dec. 348. The court said: "The interest which was allowed by way of damages was just. The plaintiff ought not to be deprived of his property for years, without compensation for the loss of the use of it, and the jury had a discretion to allow interest in this case, as damages. It has been allowed in actions of trover, and the same rule applies in trespass when brought for the recovery of property."

And in an action of trespass for destroying property, it was held that the jury, in their discretion, might give interest on the value of the property converted or taken away or destroyed, from the time of the injury. Rippey v. Miller, 46 N. C. (1 Jones, L.) 479, 62 Am. Dec. 177.

And in an action of trespass for carrying away a slave, it was held the measure of damages was not only the hire of the slave from the time of his absence, with interest, but such expenses as were incurred in reclaiming him. Brown v. Southwestern R.

So, where the owner of land taken by a railroad company without condemnation brought an action of trespass, he was held entitled to interest from the time the land was taken. Bellingham Bay & B. C. R. Co. v. Strand, 14 Wash. 144, 44 Pac. 140, 46 Pac. 238. In this case a corporation had taken possession of land and had the use, and had not paid the damages.

In Clark v. Wabash R. Co. 132 Iowa, 11, 109 N. W. 309, where the purchaser of land brought suit against a railroad for trespass, and the railroad had been occupying the land before the purchase, and the purchaser recovered interest with his damages, the court on appeal was divided and the case was therefore affirmed. The court said: "The judgment will be affirmed on condition that interest on the damages assessed prior to October 29, 1900, be remitted within thirty days from the filing of this opinion, otherwise reversed." October 29 was the day that plaintiff acquired title.

In an action for injury to property by the construction of a railroad, it was held that while such a claim was not one which, under

the statute, bore interest, if compensation was delayed for a long time, the injured party could not be made whole unless the damages awarded included compensation in the nature of damages. Lawrence R. Co. v. Cobb, 35 Ohio St. 94.

In an action by remaindermen for damages to their land taken by a railroad, it was held that the value of the contingent remainder should be ascertained as of the time when the construction of the railroad began, with interest from such date. Charleston & W. C. R. Co. v. Reynolds, 69 S. C. 481, 48 S. E. 476.

Where stock were infected by trespassing cattle which were diseased, it was held that interest as part of the damages should be allowed. Clarendon Land, Invest. & Agency Co. v. McClelland (Tex. Civ. App.) 31 S. W. 1088. In this case it was said that the reasons for allowing interest in conversion and unliquidated damages like this case were as cogent in one case as in the other.

In Rhemke v. Clinton, 2 Utah, 230, interest was held to be a question of law, and not of fact, and the plaintiff in an action of trespass for the destruction of property was held entitled to interest eo nomine.

This was on the ground that where damages are easily ascertained and the value of the property fixed, the later doctrine is that the jury should be instructed to give interest.

And in an action against a mortgagee, where he had released the mortgage after he had assigned it, it was held that the measure of damages was the value of the property destroyed, with 7 per cent from the time of injury until judgment. San-' born v. Webster, 2 Minn. 323, Gil. 277.

Where a successor company retained possession of a right of way for which compensation had not been made, in an injunction suit by the owner, it was held that the defendant was liable only for interest from the time of its occupancy. Adams v. St. Johnsbury & L. C. & L. Valley R. Co. 57 Vt. 240. Where the owner of land sued for trespass, instead of demanding condemnation proceedings, it was held that the jury, in their discretion, in finding the damages for trespass, could add to the value of the material taken, interest thereon, without finding that there was an unreasonable delay of payment. Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & C. R. Co. v. Swinney, 97 Ind. 586. It was claimed that the only remedy was to demand new condemnation proceedings. The court said: "The cases of Victory v. Fitzpatrick, 8 Ind. 281, McCormack v. Terre Haute & R. R. Co. Interest is generally awarded from the 9 Ind. 283, and Indiana C. R. Co. v. Oakes, time of injury, but is held discretionary in 20 Ind. 9, are relied upon as maintaining some states, and in some cases is to be althat construction of the law as it then ex-lowed, if at all, as part of the damages. isted. But these cases have all been either expressly or impliedly overruled, and are hence no longer followed as precedents."

In an action for damages to land for the removal of coal, the petition prayed for interest. After the verdict the court added interest to the verdict. On rehearing the court said: "The court instructed that the measure of the plaintiff's damages was the difference between the value of the premises immediately before the defendant commenced to mine and remove the coal, and such value immediately thereafter; and the time covered by the witnesses in their estimate of such damages was limited generally to the 1st of January, 1905. The time of the injury being thus definitely fixed, plaintiff was entitled to interest on the actual amount of damage found; and, unless it can be said that the jury allowed interest in fixing the amount of its verdict, there was no error in adding it to the verdict. It was then merely a matter of computation, and the court could do that as well as the jury." Collins v. Gleason Coal Co. 140 Iowa, 114, 18 L.R.A. (N.S.) 736, 115 N W. 497, 118 N. W. 36.

And in an action for injuries to grass from trespassing stock, it was held that the measure of damages was the value of the grass at the time of its consumption, with interest to the time of trial. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Jones, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 372. 21 S. W. 145. This was on the theory of compensation.

On an award of damages for taking the water from a brook, it was held that it would be presumed that interest was included to the first day of the term. Bridgeman v. Hardwick, 67 Vt. 653, 32 Atl. 502. It was held that plaintiff's were entitled to interest from the date of taking.

In an action for mining coal under plaintiff's land, injuring her property, it was held that the lapse of time could be considered by the jury in fixing the damages, but it was error to instruct the jury to find interest. Emerson v. Schoonmaker, 135 Pa. 437, 19 Atl. 1025.

And in an action of trespass for an explosion of gas, it was held that interest, as such, was not recoverable, but might enter into the computation of damages. Richards v. Citizens' Natural Gas Co. 130 Pa. 37, 18 Atl. 600. The court said: "Into these cases the element of time may enter as an important factor, and the plaintiff will not be fully compensated unless he receive not only the value of his property, but receive it, as nearly as may be, as of the date of his loss. Hence it is that the jury may allow additional damages, in the nature of interest, for the lapse of time. It is never interest as such, nor as a matter of right, but compensation for the delay, of which the rate of interest affords the fair legal measure."

And where property was destroyed by reason of a city allowing its wharf to be used by other parties who removed piling and left débris thereon, causing plaintiff's raft to be injured, it was held that the city was liable for interest as part of the damages. Allegheny v. Campbell, 107 Pa. 530, 52 Am. Rep. 478. The court said: "Without the addition of interest on the value of the property from the time it was destroyed, the