Some cases allow interest from date of injury, other cases allow interest from the date of report. In some cases interest was allowed on account of delay.

In an action for damages for injury to property, caused by changing the grade of a street, it was held that interest was properly allowed from the time the injury was done, down to the trial. Hampton v. Kansas City, 74 Mo. App. 129. The court said: "There is a class of cases which allow interest when the land has been taken from the owner, and assign as a reason that the party taking the land has had the use of it. But that reason is not the only one which would suggest the allowance of interest. The injury to the other party must be compensated. The injury to the property is based on an estimate at time of injury. If he is deprived of the sum thus estimated, he is deprived of complete compensation unless he receives interest."

And in an action for damages for changing the grade of a street, where there was long neglect to compensate, it was held that the damages were properly measured by the condition of the property immediately after the change of grade, and compensation should be made by interest also. Cincinnati v. Whetstone, 47 Ohio St. 196, 24 N. E. 409.

In Kimball v. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah, 253, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 483, 125 Am. St. Rep. 859, 90 Pac. 395, it was held that interest should be allowed from the time of completion of the work. Utah Rev. Stat. 1898, § 282, provided that cities shall be liable for consequential damages to property in case the established grade is changed. The court said: "We have had occasion to pass upon the subject of when interest is to be allowed on claims for unliquidated damages at this term in the case of FELL V. UNION P. R. Co., and this case clearly falls within the principles announced in that case."

On an appeal from an assessment of benefits and damages resulting from a change of grade in a highway, it was held that the landowner could not recover interest from any date prior to that of filing the committee's report, as they should take into consideration the allowance in the nature of interest from the period when the damages were liquidated to the time of judgment. New Haven Steam Saw Mill Co. v. New Haven, 72 Conn. 276, 44 Atl. 229, 609.

Where a plaintiff failed in his suit for damages for raising the grade of the street, and then brought another action, it was held that the jury could consider the lapse of time caused by the failure of the first suit, in assessment of damages. Peabody v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. 187 Mass. 489, 73 N. E. 649. The court said: "The principal sum to be ascertained would be the damages directly resulting from the acts of the defendant, assessed as of the time of the completion of the act, or series of acts, which caused the injury; and if the jury found that this method of assessment would not give the plaintiff full compensation be.

cause of the delay to which he had been subjected, they might allow such additional sum, computed as interest at the legal or any reasonable rate, they found proper and necessary for this purpose, and these sums combined would make the amount of damages assessed by them."

In an action for damages caused by change of grade of a street abutting on plaintiff's ball ground, it was held that damages in lieu of interest for detention of payment should not be allowed, where the owner caused delay by an unreasonable demand. Philadelphia Ball Club v. Philadelphia, 192 Pa. 632, 46 L.R.A. 724, 73 Am. St. Rep. 835, 44 Atl. 265.

In an action by a property owner for dam ages for change of grade, it was held that interest, as such, could not be allowed by the jury upon the amount of the damages. Leavenworth v. Duffy, 10 Kan. App. 124, 62 Pac. 433.

The rule that a demand which was in its nature uncertain and unliquidated did not draw interest until the amount was fixed by a court or jury was held to apply to damages from a change of grade. Tyson v. Milwaukee, 50 Wis. 78, 5 N. W. 914.

In the following cases it was held that interest should be allowed:

Injury to property by fire from a locomotive. Regan v. New York & N. E. R. Co. 60 Conn. 124, 25 Am. St. Rep. 306, 22 Atl. 503. The court said: "It has been sometimes said that interest is not to be allowed on unliquidated demands. There are actions, such, for instance, as assault and battery or slander, to which the rule is applicable. But where the demand is for property that has a market value susceptible of easy proof, there is no propriety in such a rule. A loss of property having a definite money value is practically the same as the loss of so much money; the loss of the use of the property is practically the same as the loss of the use (or interest) of so much money. We think, therefore, a just indemnity to the plaintiff required the addition to the value of the goods at the time of their destruction, of the interest from that time to the date of judgment."

Destruction of an ice house by fire. Parrott v. Housatonic R. Co. 47 Conn. 575. The court said: "In cases of trover, where

property has been taken, the rule is that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the actual value of the property at the time of its conversion by the defendant, with interest on the amount to the day of the judgn.ent. It is only thus that the plaintiff can be made whole. The interest thus allowed is not technically interest, but an addition to the damages of a sum equal to interest. In trespass for taking property, if the case be one where no exemplary damages ought to be assessed, as is the case here, the rule should be the same. If the plaintiff's property is taken or destroyed, the rule as to damages should be the same, whatever the form of action may be."

Destruction of property by fire through negligence of a railroad. Jacksonville, T. & K. W. R. Co. v. Peninsular Land, Transp. & Mfg. Co. 27 Fla. 1, 17 L.R.A. 33, 9 So. 661. In this case it was held that there should be no distinction between the cases of trespass and trover, and damages for negligence and replevin, and that just compensation means the interest on the value of the property destroyed.

Injuring timber by fire from a locomotive. Burdick v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 87 Iowa, 384, 54 N. W. 439.

Injury to plaintiff's wheat stored in an elevator. Arthur v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 61 Iowa, 648, 17 N. W. 24. The court said: "But notwithstanding it is unliquidated, we think the court did not err in allowing interest. Indeed, we can see no difference between this case and the case of Mote v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 27 Iowa, 22, 1 Am. Rep. 212. That was a case where, by reason of the negligence of the defendant, the plaintiff's baggage was stolen from the warehouse of the defendant, and it was held that interest on the value of the stolen property was properly allowed."

Hay burned by fire caused by a railroad engine. Johnson v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 77 Iowa, 666, 45 N. W. 512. The court said: "The plaintiff was deprived of his property by the fire. He was entitled at that moment to recover its value. He ought to have the legal interest for the time compensation was withheld from him. When personal property is destroyed, the measure of damages is fixed by this rule. See Field, Damages, p. 619, § 781, and note. Brent ner v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 68 Iowa, 530, 23 N. W. 245, 27 N. W. 605, is not in conflict with our conclusion on this branch of the case. The statute under which that action was prosecuted fixed the measure of damages. It was therefore rightly held that these damages could not be increased by adding interest thereto."

Destruction of property through negli gence by fire. Lucas v. Wattles, 49 Mich. 380, 13 N. W. 782. The court said: "Interest was certainly not demandable of right, but it was admissible and just to give it."

Destruction of a sawmill by fire, in the operation of a private logging railroad. Kendrick v. Towle, 60 Mich. 363, 1 Am. St. Rep. 526, 27 N. W. 567. The court said

that unless the addition of interest would increase the damages unduly, so as to be unjust, no objection could be made to the allowance of interest.

Action against a railroad company for destroying property by fire. Union P. R. Co. v. Ray, 46 Neb. 750, 65 N. W. 773. The court said: "Finally, it is contended that the court erred in directing the jury if it found for the plaintiff, to allow interest on the value of the hay from the time of its destruction; but this rule of damages was precisely that stated in Fremont, E. & M. Valley R. Co. v. Marley, 25 Neb. 138, 13 Am. St. Rep. 482, 40 N. W. 948, to wit: 'Where property is destroyed by the negli gence of another, the owner will be entitled to interest on the value of such property from the time of its destruction.'”

Injury to fruit trees by fire. Whitbeck v. New York C. R. Co. 36 Barb. 644.

Negligently burning a house. Pacific Exp. Co. v. Lasker Real Estate Asso. 81 Tex. 84, 16 S. W. 792.

Injury to property from fire from railroad trains. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Shepherd (Tex. Civ. App.) 76 S. W. 800; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Jagoe (Tex. Civ. App.) 32 S. W. 717; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Cusenberry, 5 Tex. Civ. App. 119, 23 S. W. 851; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Day (Tex. Civ. App.) 22 S. W. 772; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Horne, 69 Tex. 643, 9 S. W. 440. The court said: "The rule in such cases is the same as in an action for trespass; namely, the value of the property, with interest from the date it was lost to him."

Cotton stored in a warehouse. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Tankersley, 63 Tex. 57. This was on the ground that, in cases of tort, the owner was entitled to the value of his property in money at the time it was destroyed.

Destruction of property by fire. Chapman v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 26 Wis. 295, 7 Am. Rep. 81. The value was held to be merely a matter of compensation.

The following cases hold that interest may be allowed, within the discretion of the jury:

Destroying hay by a

locomotive fire. Eddy v. Lafayette, 1 C. C. A. 441, 4 U. S. App. 247, 49 Fed. 807. The court said: "We entertain no doubt that interest may be allowed as damages in cases where property has been destroyed through the culpable negligence of another, as well as when it has been wrongfully converted; but the usual, and perhaps the better, practice, is to leave such allowance to the discretion of the jury."

Goods stored in a warehouse. King v. Southern P. Co. 109 Cal. 96, 29 L.R.A. 755, 41 Pac. 786. The court said: "Section 3288 of the Civil Code provides: 'In an action for the breach of an obligation arising from contract, and in every case of oppression, fraud, or malice, interest may be given, in the discretion of the jury.'

Action against a railroad for damages by fire. Albany & N. R. Co. v. Wheeler, 6 Ga. App. 270, 64 S. E. 1114.

Action for damages occasioned by fire.

Injuries cause by locomotive fire. Brush v. Long Island R. Co. 10 App. Div. 535, 42 N. Y. Supp. 103, affirmed in 158 N. Y. 742, 53 N. E. 1123; Jamieson v. New York & R. B. R. Co. 11 App. Div. 50, 42 N. Y. Supp. 915, affirmed in 162 N. Y. 630, 57 N. E. 1113; Hinds v. Barton, 25 N. Y. 544; Garrett v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 36 Iowa, 121. Action by an insurance company subrogated for the insured, against a railroad company, for loss by fire. Home Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 11 Hun, 182.

Destruction of trees by fire, under Dak. Comp. Laws, § 4578, providing that the giving of interest was discretionary with the jury. Bailey v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 3 S. D. 531, 19 L.R.A. 653, 54 N. W. 596; Uhe v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 3 S. D. 563, 54 N. W. 601, s. c. subsequent appeal 4 S. D. 505, 57 N. W. 484.

So, for injuries to property, caused by fire from a railroad. Johnson v. Northern P. R. Co. 1 N. D. 354, 48 N. W. 227.

In actions for injury caused by re of a locomotive, no statutory provision allowing interest for such damages appeared to exist and it was denied. It was held that the statute allowing interest for wrongful conversion did not apply. Kenney v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. 63 Mo. 99; Atkinson v. Atlantic & P. R. Co. 63 Mo. 367; De Steiger v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. 73 Mo. 33; Flannery v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. 44 Mo. App. 396; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ayers, 56 Kan. 176, 42 Pac. 722. The court said: "A recovery of damages for simple negligence of a party to whom no benefit could accrue by reason of the injury inflicted does not include interest as such. Neither the act of 1885 nor chapter 51, Gen. Stat. 1889, relating to interest, in terms authorizes it; and, in the absence of a statute, we think interest is not allowable any more for damages by fire than for the kill. ing of cattle."

Where the defendant offered to pay more than the amount recovered in a suit for damages by fire, although no formal tender was

In the following cases it was held that the jury could consider interest in making up the damages, but it was to be as damages, and not as interest:

Thus, in an action for damages caused by defendant's wall, after a fire, falling on plaintiff's property for lack of support, it was held that the proper instruction would be, that, in assessing damages of this kind, the plaintiff was not to be awarded interest as interest, but that, in ascertaining the damages at the date of the verdict, the jury should take into account the lapse of time, and put the plaintiff in as good a position in reference to the injury as if the damages directly resulting from it had been paid immediately. Ainsworth v. Lakin, 180 Mass. 397, 57 L.R.A. 132, 91 Am. St. Rep. 314, 62 N. E. 746. This would authorize the jury to fix the damages at the date of their verdict by adding interest at the legal rate on the amount of damages at the time of the injury, but it would not require them to do so. And in an action for damages caused by fire from an engine, it was held that the court could not add interest to the verdict, although the jury might have included interest in their amount of damages. Garrett v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. supra.

And in an action against a railroad for injury to property by fire, it was held that the damages were unliquidated, and plaintiff was not entitled, as a matter of law, to interest; but, in estimating the unliquidated damages, the jury might take into account interest on the sum found necessary to compensate the plaintiff for the injury suffered at the time of the loss, on the theory that such interest was a part of his damages. Black v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. 122 Iowa, 32, 96 N. W. 984.

Interest was denied in Missouri and in

entitled to interest. Thompson v. Boston & M. R. Co. 58 N. H. 524. The court said: "The reason for allowing the jury to add interest is more satisfactory in cases of liquidated than unliquidated damages. In the first, it is for the detention of money due, while in the latter it is the theory of the law that nothing is due till the damages are liquidated. Still an analogy exists between the two in this: that the right to recover unliquidated damages accrues at the time the injury is done, and the damages are assessed for the injury as then received; and if the wrongdoer causes long and vexatious delay, and the jury cannot add interest as damages for the delay, as is done in cases of liquidated damages, injustice is the result."

b. Injury to stock.

In some cases, interest was held recoverable in actions for injuries to stock from the operation of railroads, and interest was held to be properly allowed in the following cases:

Loss of a cow, killed by negligence of a railroad. Georgia P. R. Co. v. Fullerton, 79 Ala. 298.

Injuries to live stock. Alabama G. So. R. Co. v. McAlpine, 75 Ala. 113.

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Negligently killing stock. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Biggs, 50 Ark. 169, 6 S. W. 724 (the court said that the old rule was that interest was not recoverable on liquidated damages; but the modern rule of allowing interest in such cases has been adopted by this court); Wabash R. Co. v. Williamson, 3 Ind. App. 190, 29 N. E. 455; Varco v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 30 Minn. 18, 13 N. W. 921.

Injuries to stock by a railroad train. Chicago & N. R. Co. v. Shultz, 55 Ill. 421. The court said: "The object in allowing a

recovery for injuries sustained is that the party wronged may be compensated for the loss; and to allow interest from the date of the injury, on the value of the property, would only give appellee compensation." Horses killed by a railroad train. Woodland v. Union P. R. Co. 27 Utah, 543, 26 Pac. 298. The court said: "The authori ties are not in harmony, but the weight of them is to the effect, as we think, that in terest may be given as damages, where the plaintiff has been deprived of his property by the wrongful act or neglect of the defendant, and the latter delays payment. Some of the authorities hold that interest should be computed on the value of the property, and added from the time of its destruction; others, from the time of instituting the suit. Fremont, E. & M. Valley R. Co. v. Marley, 25 Neb. 138, 13 Am. St. Rep. 482, 40 N. W. 948; Whitney v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 27 Wis. 327; Chapman v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 26 Wis. 295, 7 Am. Rep. 81; Parrott v. Knickerbocker Ice Co. 46 N. Y. 361; 1 Sutherland, Damages, p. 473."

In Dean v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 43 Wis. 305, the court told the jury they should allow interest on the immediate damages from the time the stock was killed by a railroad train. It was held that there was no exception sufficient to require the court on appeal to consider this question. It was said that in a prior case a direction to the jury to allow interest from the commencement of the action was upheld.

Under W. Va. Code, chap. 131, § 18, providing that a judgment shall bear interest from date, and § 14, providing that the jury shall find the aggregate of the principal and interest due at the time of the trial, and judgment shall be entered thereon, with interest from date of judgment, it was held that a judgment for interest on damages found by the jury prior to the day the judgment was entered, in an action for negligence, was erroneous. Hawker v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 15 W. Va. 629, 36 Am. Rep. 825. On a verdict for $800 for killing stock by a railroad company, on the affidavit of the jurymen that the $800 did not include interest, but was only the value, and that the foreman had been instructed to add $168 interest, it was held that the court erred in amending the verdict, as the remedy was a motion for a new trial. Parker v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 93 Mich. 607, 53 N. W. 834.

In the following cases interest was held to be discretionary with the jury:

Hodge v.

Injury to cattle by railroad. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. 27 Hun, 394. Injury to horses. Schulte v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 128 Ky. 627, 108 S. W. 941.

In an action against a railroad for killing stock on the track, the finding by the referee, allowing interest on the value of the property destroyed, was held not erroneous. Lackin v. Delaware & H. Canal Co. 22 Hun, 309.

In the following cases interest was held allowable, but only as part of the damages:

Where there is a basis of calculation of value in an action for killing stock by a railroad, interest is not recoverable eo nomine, but the jury may consider the length of time, the character of the tort, the conduct of the defendant, and to that extent increase the damages. Central R. Co. v. Hall, 124 Ga. 322, 4 L.R.A. (N.S.) 898, 110 Am. St. Rep. 170, 52 S. E. 679, 4 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 128 (the court said: “Where the damages found are discretionary or punitive, this rule does not apply. Western & A. R. Co. v. Young, 81 Ga. 397, 12 Am. St. Rep. 320, 7 S. E. 912; Ratteree v. Chapman, 79 Ga. 574, 4 S. E. 684"); Western & A. R. Co. v. McCauley, 68 Ga. 818.

And in an action for killing cattle, it was held that the finding of interest, as such, was contrary to law. Chattanooga, R. & C. R. Co. v. Palmer, 89 Ga. 161, 15 S. E. 34. The court said: "The verdict is contrary to law in finding interest, the action being one ex delicto; and if interest was found at all, it should be added into the principal sum of the verdict."

In an action for negligently killing stock, it was held that unliquidated demands arising ex delicto did not bear interest, and the jury could not find a given amount for principal, with an additional amount as interest; but it was held that the jury might add to the value of the property destroyed, a sum equal to the interest on such value, but such sum should be found and returned as damages, and not as interest. Western & A. R. Co. v. Brown, 102 Ga. 13, 29 S. E. 130.

And in an action for damages against a railroad for killing stock, the whole amount awarded by the verdict was held to be the damages, although it might include interest added to the value; but if the amount thus found exceeded the amount claimed, the verdict should be set aside, or the excess struck off. Georgia R. & Bkg. Co. v. Crawley, 87 Ga. 191, 13 S. E. 508.

In a suit for damages for negligently killing stock, it was held error to charge the jury that after ascertaining the market value, they should add interest from the time of the judgment of the court below to the time of the verdict. Western & A. R. Co. v. Calhoun, 104 Ga. 384, 30 S. E. 868. The court said: "While in cases of this character the jury are authorized to increase the damages found by the addition of interest from the time that the property was damaged or destroyed, they are not compelled to do so."

In an action for negligence for frightening a horse by operation of a railroad, it was held that the jury should not have been instructed to allow interest. Pittsburgh Southern R. Co. v. Taylor, 104 Pa. 306, 49 Am. Rep. 580.

In Missouri, in cases of this kind, interest is not allowed.

Frightening a horse, causing a runaway. Damhorst v. Missouri P. R. Co. 32 Mo. App. 350.

Killing stock at a public crossing. Kimes v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. 85 Mo. 611. Injury to stock by operation of a railroad

c. Personal injuries and death.

In Goodman v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. 71 Mo. App. 460, it was said that in this state there are cases where interest is recoverable as a matter of right, and others where the jury may or may not allow interest, as they see fit (State ex rel. Roberts v. Hope, 121 Mo. 34, 25 S. W. 893); and others, where interest is not allowed, as for killing stock or setting out fires.

In Toledo, P. & W. R. Co. v. Johnston, 74 Ill. 83, an action for damages for killing stock by a railroad company, it was held that the plaintiff was not entitled to interest on the value from the time of the killing. Tex. Rev. Stat. 1895, art. 4528, giving a right to recover for stock killed by a railroad train, was held not to include the right to interest. International & G. N. R. Co v. Barton, 93 Tex. 63, 53 S. W. 1117, s. c. (Tex. Civ. App.) 54 S. W. 797; St. Louis Southern R. Co. v. Chambliss, 93 Tex. 62, 53 S. W. 343; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Vaughan (Tex. Civ. App.) 54 S. W. 1055. This statute was the same as act 1860, Paschal's Dig. art. 4926. The court said that this was the ruling in Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Muldrow, 54 Tex. 233, and that would have to be followed, although no good reason is shown why the owner should not have damages commensurate, with interest for the detention.

Under Tex. Rev. Stat. art. 4245, providing that railroads shall be liable for the value of stock killed by their trains, it was held that interest could not be recovered. Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Muldrow, supra. The court said that this decision was not intended to conflict with those cases of trespass or conversion of goods where interest was discretionary with the jury.

And under Ind. Rev. Stat. 1894, § 5312, providing that a railroad is liable for stock killed or injured, and § 5316, providing that the court or jury should give judgment to the plaintiff for the value of the animal killed or injured, it was held that interest should not be allowed. New York, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Zumbaugh, 12 Ind. App. 272, 39 N. E. 1058. In this case the court said that interest in addition to the value of property is ordinarily held to afford the fair measure of damages; but our statute "does not allow any discretion in the assessment of damages in excess of the value of the aminals killed."

And in an action under Kan. Laws 1874, chap. 94, providing that a railroad company shall be liable to pay the owner of stock full value for each animal killed, and damage to each animal wounded, in the

1. Personal injuries.

The general rule is that interest will not be allowed on damages for personal injuries. There seems to be a conflict as to whether a verdict will bear interest. In some Federal cases, interest on the verdict was allowed, to give jurisdiction on appeal.

In Quebec S. S. Co. v. Merchant, 133 U. S. 375, 33 L. ed. 656, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 397, where a stewardess was injured on a steamer and the judgment was reversed on appeal, because of the fellow-servant doctrine, where the verdict was for $5,000, and the judgment was for that amount, and $306 interest between the verdict and judgment, it was held that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction on appeal.

In Griffith v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 44 Fed. 574, where there was a verdict of $5,000 for damages against a railroad company for personal injuries, the defendant demanded that interest should be added to the verdict in order to give the Supreme Court jurisdiction. The court said: "I have conferred with the circuit judge upon this question, and the conclusions in which we concur are as follows: That it is proper to allow interest on the verdict from the date of its rendition up to the entry of judgment. This was done below in Quebec S. S. Co. v. Merchant, 133 U. S. 376, 33 L. ed. 658, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 397, and the Supreme Court sanctioned it, and entertained jurisdiction. It does not appear that the practice was rested upon any New York statute."

In an action against a railroad for negligence in causing injury to an employee, it was held that interest was discretionary with the jury. Ell v. Northern P. R. Co. 1 N. D. 336, 12 L.R.A. 97, 26 Am. St. Rep. 621, 48 N. W. 222. This was under Dak. Comp. Laws, § 4578, providing that in an action for breach of an obligation not rising from contract, interest may be given in the discretion of the jury.

In an action against a railroad company for personal injuries caused by negligence, it was held that the jury could allow in their verdict, by way of damages, interest on the sums expended by the plaintiff on account of the injury to his wife. Washington & G. R. Co. v. Hickey, 12 App. D. C. 269. It was said: "It is true that, in actions of tort, at least in this jurisdiction, interest is not allowable upon the judgment recovered. Washington & G. R. Co. v. Har mon (Washington & G. R. Co. v. Tobriner) 147 U. S. 571, 37 L. ed. 284, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 557. But that is quite a different question from that here presented. Whether a judgment bears interest or not is purely a legal question, that can only be decided by the court. But in actions of tort, interest can only be allowed as damages, and