ple, but that Affembly must be free and independent; for if the Majority of the Affembly have such a Dependence upon any one Man, or Set of Men, as to be directed by them in all their Proceedings, the fupreme and abfolute Power of the Society is not then lodged in the People, but in that Man, or Set of Men who have the Direction of the Affembly: Therefore, the Government ceafes to be a free Government, and, notwithstanding its outward Appearance, becomes either an abfolute Monarchy, or an abfolute Ariftocracy: The People ceafe to be a free People, and become the Slaves of an abfolute Monarchy, or an abfolute Set of Nobles or Magiftrates; which Slavery will be fixt upon them beyond Redemption, if they do not foon take Care to free their Affembly from that Dependence, which it was, perhaps, at first artfully led into.

F

From hence it will appear, that in every Government where there is an Affembly of the People, either by themselves or their Reprefentatives, it must have at least the Appearance of a free Government, and the People muft at leaft feem to be a free People; but this, Sir, is not of itself fufficient to make them really and effectually fo. Before we can properly bestow upon any Go- G vernment the honourable Title of being a free Government, there must

not only be an Affembly of the Peo

which affumes the generous Name
of Friendship; a Term which in
private Life deferves the highest Re-
fpect, but when it is made the Mo-
tive in any Affair of a publick Na-
ture, it is always weak, and often
criminal; for furely the firft Duty A
of Friendship, is that which we
owe to our Country. The third

C

fo prevalent as Fear, yet it is fufficient to overturn any free Government; because it may prevail with a free People to grant fo great Power to fome one General or Magiftrate, as will enable him afterwards to bring under that Sort of Dependence. I have called Fear, all those whom he may find he cannot bring under a Dependence by any other Method; for if Julius Cæfar had not, by Bribery, and other Sorts of Dependency, prevailed on the People of Rome to give him the Command over the Cifalpine as well as Tranfalpine Gaul, and to continue him fo long in that Command, to allow him to raise Legions at his own Expence, and to appoint all the commanding Officers in those Legions; to naturalize the Tranfal pine or Gallick Legion, which he had raised by his own fole Authority; to allow him to make publick Diftributions among the People, which was a Crime of fo heinous a Nature, that in the virtuous Times of the Commonwealth, Sp. Caffius, and afterwards Sp. Melius, loft their Lives for being guilty of it: I fay, if Julius Cæfar had not, by Bribery, and other Sorts of Dependency, prevailed on the Roman People to connive at, or confent to thefe and a great many other fuch Steps, he would never have been able to deftroy the Liberties of his Country; for till he made himself Master of the City of Rome, he never had it in his Power to create that Sort of Dependency which I have called Fear: Nay, even after he had made himself Mafter of his Country, he had a Soul too generous to feek for fuch a Dependence: It is a Sort of Dependence which is the last a wife Man will aim at," and seldom any but Fools have OcG cafion for; but after the Liberties of a free People are once deftroyed, it foon becomes neceffary; for the Succeffors of those who ufurp the

Sort is, when a Man obeys the
Dictates, or affents to the Opinion
of another, not because he thinks
it reasonable or right, but becaufe
of fome great Favours he has before B
received; which affumes the awful
Name of Gratitude; a Term which
in private Life likewife deferves the
highest Veneration, but when it is
made the Motive in any Affair of a
publick Nature, like the former, it
is always weak, and often crimi-
nal; for in all Cafes we ought to
fhew our Gratitude at our own Ex-
pence, and not at the Expence of
any other Perfon, much lefs at the
Expence of our Country. The fourth
Sort of Dependency is, when a Man
obeys the Dictates, or affents to the D
Opinion of another, not because he
thinks it right or reafonable, but
because he is afraid he may be
made to fuffer, if he fhould difobey
or difagree: This, with regard to
those who are under it, may be
called Fear, and may relate to a E
Man's Eftate or Revenue, as well
as to his Perfon; for the Fear of
lofing an Estate, a lucrative Poft, or
a good Penfion, is with many Men
more prevalent than the Fear of
Death itself. And the fifth Sort of
Dependency which is dangerous to F
a free Government is, when a Man
obeys the Dictates, or affents to the
Opinion of another, not because he
thinks it reasonable or right, but
because of fome Profit or Advan-
tage he then inftantly receives, or
expects afterwards to receive.

This laft Sort of Dependency, Sir, is what is properly called Bribery or Corruption; and tho' it may not be

So

A

Sovereignty, are feldom endued with much Wisdom, and whilst the People retain any Notions of their former Happiness, they will be every now and then attempting to regain their loft Liberties: A Ray of Virtue fometimes breaks forth, or is made to break forth, by the weak Management of that Power which overfhadows it; and in fuch a Cafe, the Managers must neceffarily make ufe of thofe Means for creating Fear, which the Corruption of fome preceding Age has put into their B Hands.

Of thefe five Sorts of Dependency, Sir, the firft is the leaft pernicious; because, tho' it may direct or influ ence the Judgment, it never directs or influences the Will. When I have a great Opinion of a Man's C Wifdom and Integrity, that Opinion may make me believe, that what he proposes is right, without farther Examination; but it can never make me do what he defires, or approve of what he propofes, if I am convinced that it is incon- D fiftent with the Good, or dangerous to the Liberties of my Country; Whereas the other four Sorts of Dependency may not only bias the Judgment, but direct the Will: That is to fay, they may direct or influence Men to do what another E defires, or approve of what another proposes, notwithstanding their being convinced that it is abfolutely inconfiftent with, or dangerous to, nay, deftructive of the Liberties of their Country. These four Sorts of Dependency therefore, muft be dan- F gerous not only to the Liberties, but to the Virtue and Morals of the People: They muft in Time root out from the Minds of the People, all Regard for the publick Good; and muft propagate fuch a selfish Spirit, that no Man will think of getting into the Magiftracy, but in order to have an Opportunity to plunder the People; nor will any

G

Man appear at, or endeavour to get into, the fupreme Affembly of the People, but in order to fupport fome private Confpiracy amongft his Friends, for acquiring or continuing an absolute and tyrannical Domination over their Country. When fuch a Spirit begins to prevail, the Liberties of the People muft foon be destroyed, nay, it is a Misfortune for them to have any Appearance of Liberty left; for it ferves only to corrupt their Morals, and to render them as great Knaves to one another, as they are to their Country.

This, Sir, was the State of the Roman People, when Julius Cæfar first appeared upon the Stage of Life; but fo great Care had their Ancestors taken to inculcate the

Principles of Virtue, and a glorious Difdain of being obliged to fubmit to a Master, that it required no lefs a Man than a Julius Cæfar to fubvert the Liberties of that brave People. They fell, but let us confider by whom they fell. They fell by Julius Cæfar, who was a fine Gentleman; a Man of Gallantry, a Man of Wit, a Man of Courage, and a Man of Learning; a most confummate and fuccefsful General, a most eloquent Orator, and notwithstanding his Ambition, endued with a molt benign and generous Spirit. His extraordinary Qualities were fome Excufe for those that followed him, and added to the Glory of those that fell by oppofing him; but if the Roman Armies had, for the fame Purpose, followed, either in the Field or Senate, a Craffus, a Lepidus, or any Man that had nothing to recommend him but the Bribes he had to bestow, how infamous would those Armies have now appeared? What a mean Opinion must we have had of a People, whofe Liberties were overturned by fuch an infamous Army?

From what I have faid, Sir, it muft appear, that a virtuous and

free

free People can never be too careful
in preventing the four laft Sorts of
Dependency I have mentioned, from
getting a Footing in any of their
Affemblies; and therefore, I fhall
just mention the chief Methods for
obviating this Danger; which are:
To allow no fuperior Magiftrate or
Officer to continue long in Office:
To have no more Magistrates or Of-
ficers than what are abfolutely ne-
ceffary for the Adminiftration of
Government: To allow but small
Salaries or Perquifites to any Magi- B
ftrate or Officer, that People may
be prompted by their Ambition,
and not by their Avarice, to serve
the Commonwealth: Not to fuffer
any Penfions or Gratuities, exceed- By thefe Methods, Sir, the four
ing the common Bounds of Charity, moft pernicious Sorts of Dependency
to be given by Magiftrates or pri- C may be pretty effectually prevented;
vate Men; nor any Reward for pub- but as for the firft Sort, there is no
lick Service, but what is given by preventing it, in Governments that
an Affembly of the People: To are abfolutely free, I mean, where
take Care not to have too many pe-
the People have reserved in their
mal Laws, especially fuch as any
own Hands the Whole of the fu-
Magiftrate or Officer may difpenfe preme and abfolute Power of the
with or mitigate: And laftly, to D Society: Nay, in fuch Governments,
have the Conduct of fuperior Magi-
when a Man of real Wisdom and
ftrates and Officers often and freely Integrity gains a general Authority,
inquired into by the fupreme Af this Sort of Dependence is beneficial
fembly of the People; and parti- to the Society; but the Danger is
cularly, to call every Man to a when an artful and ambitious Man
Atrict Account, who has by his Of- gets a great Authority among the
fice the Difpofal of publick Money. E People, especially when the People
This laft, Sir, is the peculiar Pre- are numerous, and their Dominions
Fogative of a free People: It is a extenfive; for in fuch States the
Prerogative Sine qua non; for unless publick Good is often fo remote and
the People reserve to themfelves this obfcure, and fo little connected with
Prerogative, no other Prerogative the immediate Intereft of each In-
can fignify much towards the Pre- dividual, that few are capable of
fervation of a free Government. F understanding it thoroughly, and
What fignifies the Power of making much fewer give themselves the
Laws, or taking Refolutions, if the Trouble to inquire into it; which
Magiftrates or Officers can execute renders it easy for an artful Magi-
them in what Manner they pleafe, or ftrate or General, that has once got
declare that to be Law which fuits an Authority among the People, to
beft with their private Views? What perfuade them that thofe Measures
fignifies the Power of granting Mo- Gare for the Benefit of the Publick,
ney for publick Service, if those which ferve only, or chiefly, to
who are intrufted with it, can lay promote his fecret Defigns upon
it out as they have a Mind? If their Liberties. This renders it ex-

the People do not referve to them-
felves this Prerogative, and often,
and freely make ufe of it, their
Magiftrates and Officers, or fome
Chief among them, will foon fall
upon Ways and Means to make
A what Laws, and to grant what Sums
of Money, and for what Purposes
he may think fit to prescribe. A
fevere Controul over Magistrates and
Officers is, therefore, what a free
People ought never to part with;
and if in this Respect their fupreme
Affembly fhould ever be brought
under a Dependence upon any Ma-
giftrate or Officer, it will foon be
brought under the fame Dependence
in every other.

tremely

tremely difficult in fuch States, to
guard against the ambitious Designs
of popular Magiftrates or fuccefsful
Generals; and this Difficulty be-
'comes the greater, because in fuch
States the other Sorts of Depen-
dency may more eafily be acquired, A
than in States whofe Dominions are
inconfiderable; fo that the People
feldom become fenfible of their
Danger, till the Enemy of their
Liberties has paffed the Rubicon, and
then it is paft Time for them to
provide for their Defence.

Thus the Seven United Provinces of the Netherlands may be faid to have a Dependence upon each other, becaufe nothing can be done by the States General without the Confent of every one of the Seven ; and yet with regard to thofe Sorts of Dependencies which are of dangerous Confequence to Liberty, they may truly be faid to be independent of each other, and the People in each Province may be faid to be free; but if any one of the Provinces, for ExB ample, Holland, fhould by Authority, Fear, Bribery, or other Means, get the abfolute Direction of the other fix, the other Provinces would then be all dependent upon the States of Holland, and the People in each of them would be Slaves to the Province of Holland; and if any one Man or Set of Men fhould then, by Bribery or otherwife, get the abfolute Direction of the States of Holland, the People of the Seven Provinces, would, in that Cafe, be Slaves to that Man or Set of Men.

For this Reafon it has been found neceffary, in all free States or Societies, whofe People are numerous and Dominions extenfive, to establish a Sort of mixt Government, that is to fay, to reserve but a Part of the fupreme Power in the Hands of the C People, and to put the Refidue of it into the Hands of a King or Nobles, or both; and this leads me to the Confideration of the Form of Government established in this Kingdom: But before I begin, Sir, I muft obferve, that befides the dan- D gerous Sorts of Dependency I have mentioned, there is another Sort of Dependency, which must neceffarily fubfift in every free Society, and that is the Dependence which the feveral Perfons of fuch a Society, or the feveral Members or Branches E of fuch a Government, have upon one another, with regard to all those Affairs which must be agreed to by the Whole or by a Majority of them. This is what an ingenious and great Author has called a Conftitutional Dependency; and therefore I fhall take the Liberty to call the other Sorts of Dependency I have before mentioned, Anticonstitutional Dependencies. Thus every Member of any free or equal Society, private or publick, may be faid to have a Dependence upon one another, because nothing can be done, in the Name of the Society, without the Confent of the Majority at leaft.

2

In the fame Manner, Sir, the Three Branches of our Legislature in this Kingdom, may be faid to be dependent upon each other, because no Law can be paffed, nor Tax impofed, without the joint Confent of the Three: Yet with regard to those Sorts of Dependencies which are inconfiftent with Liberty, they may, I hope, be as yet truly faid to be independent, and our People may as yet be properly faid to be free; because by Means of an independent House of Commons, they still reptain in their own Hands a great Share of the fupreme and abfolute Power of the Society: But if that House should, by any anticonftitutional Sort of Dependency, be brought intirely under the Direction of the Crown, and Houfe of Peers, which was too much the Cafe from the Conqueft to the Reign of Henry VII. our People could no longer be faid to be free, they would be the

G

Slaves