is freely permitted the use of arms, coins, money, may enter into treaties, or pacts, with foreign powers, and is publicly acknowledged by the United Provinces, as an independent nation. This is surely better than being a remote, oppressed colony of Spain; when thus restored to the enjoyment of these essential rights, any subjection imposed by the United Provinces, must be of a very short duration. Possessing twice the physical strength, with the mountains as a barrier, it is utterly impossible that a state of subjection would long exist. It is much more probable that Chili, with the advantages she now enjoys, with a population more homogeneous and compact, with funds and means much less precarious, would be able to dictate to the other republics. Even now, according to some, she is thought to be more powerful than the United Provinces; her naval force is, unquestionably, superior, and even the honor of the late victory of Maipu, has been awarded to her by some writers.* Humanly speaking, merely, for I pretend to no supernatural insight into the secrets, sinister policy, wayward faults and mismanagements of the leading men in those countries, I regard it as a happy circumstance that Chili and the United Provinces, have combined

* Mr. Bland, in his report, gives the honor of this victory entirely to the Chilians: "the royalists charged fiercely, the negro troops flinched, but the Chilians, the militia no less than the rest, animated by an invincible fervor of patriotism, with the shouts of viva la patria, carried all before them, sword in hand, or at the point of the bayonet." P. 98. "Even in the battle of Chacabuco, the business was done by the Chilians." P. 97. If this be correct, it is not a little surprising, that they should be held in subjection by a handful of black troops from Buenos Ayres, in their own country, and with a mountain between them.

their strength in the common cause, by which it has been rendered sure, at least, if not "doubly sure."

It was frequently suggested by the friends of Carrera, that the Carrera party was friendly to the United States, while that of O'Higgins is inclined to the British. I regarded this merely as a bait, for the purpose of catching our national feelings, or, at least, for the purpose of enlisting the republican party of the United States. It cannot be supposed, that on account of their excessive love to us, the Carreras would neglect any thing that might conduce to the interest of their own country. It is very plainly the interest of both parties to cultivate a good understanding with the British, and to derive from them all the assistance they can; it would be folly in either to reject it. If the people of Chili, in general, are friendly to us, and I firmly believe they are so, of what importance is the private opinion of a few individuals? We should desire the friendship and affection of the people of Chili, and not of San Martin or O'Higgins; unless, indeed, these were princes and the people nothing. I am at a loss to conceive what motive could actuate any government set up in those countries, in rejecting our proffered good will and friendship, or any thing else that our situations would permit us to offer.

But these are selfish ideas, narrow and contemptible. If there be persons in this country, as has been asserted in our public papers, and not contradicted, who might expect personal favors and advantages from the Carrera party, that is a different matter; but I can tell those gentlemen, that if they think to enlist our national feelings in order to subserve their private purposes, they are greatly mistaken. What effect

were also introduced to us; they had come here to seek their fortunes, but from their conversations, I discovered they had been somewhat disappointed in their expectations, which were not very moderate or rational. One of them had made up his mind to return to France; "this will be a fine country," said he, "quand nous serons bien sous terre, when we shall be well under ground." They complain of there being a good deal of jealousy on the part of the native officers, at seeing foreigners among them, at which I was not at all surprised. The Irish officers are better received than any others; but in general, those who enter the service, must calculate on meeting with a great many mortifications; the government is sufficiently disposed to be liberal, but they are not so well received in the army. It is highly probable that some cause for this has been given, by their indiscretion in betraying their feelings of superiority, whether real or false, and by their setting up pretensions they have not been able to realize. They do not reflect, that during this protracted war, many valuable officers have been found among the natives, and that the people of these countries, have a greater inclination to the profession of arms, than for any other pursuit.

I found with some regret, that the most unfavorable representations as to the state of things in this country, were made by some of our own countrymen; my observation is, however, by no means general. From these, I had expected something different; I had expected to find them,

"To their virtues very kind,

To their faults a little blind;"

but whether owing to the habit of indulging in party

spirit at home, or the circumstance of being accidentally connected with some of the factious, which are always virulent in proportion to the smallness of their numbers, and to their weakness; certain it is, that some of them were very desirous of producing unfavorable impressions on our minds. On the superficial, on those already disposed to be biassed, and on the warm hearted and generous, whose opportunities did not enable them to judge for themselves, these persons were sure to fasten, and too generally succeeded in exciting prejudices. These persons immediately surrounded us, and were extremely anxious to be closeted, in order to disclose damning secrets against the men now in power, as if it were the business of the mission to set in judgment on the political conduct and motives of those who had the management of the government, like the visitadores under the Spanish system. As the secretary of the mission, I was particularly exposed to this kind of importunity, from a supposition that I would be a convenient channel; and through curiosity, I sometimes attended to what they had to say; but I was well aware, that errors come, generally, unbidden, while truth must be sought for with diligence. I found it necessary to institute an inquiry into the characters and situations of these individuals, in order to ascertain the degree of credit which they deserved. To extract information that might be depended upon, from this dross, required every variety of test; I found few among them possessing enlarged and liberal views, independently of their being linked in with some petty interest. Some who were connected with, or were friendly to the privateering interest, seemed to be very bitter against

the administration, and had lately made a discovery that Artigas was the true patriot and friend of his country.* I had no great difficulty in discovering, that this arose from their impatience for a war with Portugal, whose commerce could be preyed upon to much more advantage than that of Spain, now almost driven from the sea. The independence of South America, with these foreigners, chiefly American and English, was only a secondary object; no one can doubt that, with them, the primary motive for entering the service, was to advance their fortunes. It was now whispered about, that as the government of Buenos Ayres, could not be urged into a war with Portugal, the privateers would enlist under the banners of Artigas; that is, they would send over commissions to the Banda Oriental, to be signed by him in blank. This design, however, was studiously concealed, as otherwise, it might be prevented by the government, and, at all events, be disapproved of by the public. The inveterate enemies of the administration among the native citizens, would naturally coalesce with those who agreed with them in this particular, however they might otherwise dislike each other. From our experience in politics and parties, we know that in such things there is nothing wonderful. About the time of our arrival, it was also hinted, that a revolution, as they called it, was about to take place; having for its principal object, to make war against Portugal. But in conversing with the sober and rational part of the community, I could learn, that however

* It is not more than a year or eighteen months ago, since we knew any thing about Artigas in this country.