them. And the provisions of the act, so far as it relates to punishing the fraudulent debtor, do not apply to justices courts. This is a subject of great and general complaint, and although the separate amount of those claims are small, yet the aggregate amount are far from being too small for legislation.

If a suit has been commenced in a court of record, by the provisions of the present law, an application may be made for a warrant either before or after judgment. Should the plaintiff succeed in making out a case, what has he yet done to obtain the payment of his demand? Nothing. He has made out to the satisfaction of the court that the defendant fraudulently contracted the debt respecting which the suit was brought; or that he has money, rights in action, or evidences of debt which he unjustly refuses to apply towards the payment of any judgment or decree which shall have been rendered against him. The defendant then gives to the plaintiff a bond, conditioned that he will not remove any property which he then has out of the jurisdiction of the court in which the suit is brought, with the intent to defraud his creditors, and that he will not assign or dispose of such property with the like intent, or to give a preference to any creditor, for any debt antecedent to such assignment or disposition, until the demand of the plaintiff, with the costs, shall be satisfied, or until the expiration of three months after a final judgment shall be rendered against him. Now if the property of the defendant consists of notes or other choses in action, let the amount be ever so large, after the plaintiff has obtained a judgment, he cannot take them; he has given a bond that he will not remove them out of the jurisdiction of a court, that has no control over them. This provision is entirely inoperative, should the property of the defendant be of that description. Whether he removes it or does not, it is the same thing to the plaintiff, as far as this law is concerned. Should the property of the defendant be tangible, and liable to be levied upon by an execution, there is so many ways that the ingenuity of the party can contrive to dispose of it, that the instrument is generally entirely worthless, and does not provide any security for the party. The plaintiff finds after having incurred considerable expense in endeavoring to collect an honest demand, that he has been pursuing a bubble that bursts as soon as it is within his reach.

It is now proposed to extend all the provisions of the law to justices courts as well as courts of record: this is not establishing

a new principle; it is merely compelling a party to be just in small accounts and demands as well as large ones. A poor man may suffer as much by being cheated out of a small sum, as others would of larger; the amount itself does not constitute the fraud, but the act itself.

It is also proposed, that when a judgment shall have been obtained against a person, to compel him to answer under oath as to his property or available means; and also whenever a plaintiff shall show reasonable cause that the defendant after judgment shall be compelled to appropriate whatever property he has, whether it consists of choses in action or tangible property, to the payment of the plaintiff's demand; and if the plaintiff has not obtained a judgment, that upon his showing the like cause, the property of the defendant shall be retained or secured to apply to the payment of the judgment when obtained; and also, that the plaintiff, before he obtains a warrant, shall give the defendant a bond, conditioned to pay him all his damages and costs in case the plaintiff should fail in making out his allegation, or should not hereafter obtain a judgment against him. This will prevent the plaintiff from improper motives, endeavoring to enforce this proceeding; should he not have good grounds for them, he must be the sufferer himself.

The remedy by attachment in justices courts, it is also proposed to extend, giving it in most cases where the party would be entitled to a warrant. This has been a subject of general complaint, and we believe the provisions inserted will meet with public approbation.

The committee, following the example of the committee of the last Legislature, recommend that the whole act may be re-enacted, and thus published entire, and saving, as was by them stated, the perplexity of searching through several volumes to know what the law is.

In conformity with these views, the committee have prepared a bill, which they ask leave to introduce.

No. 120.

IN ASSEMBLY,

January 29, 1836.

REPORT

Of the select committee, on the petition of the supervisors of Washington county.

Mr. Robertson, from the select committee to whom was referred the petition of the supervisors of Washington county, for an act to authorize them to raise fifteen hundred dollars by tax, for the purpose of erecting a fire-proof clerk's office,

REPORTED:

That your committee have examined said petition and a certified copy of resolutions passed by the board of supervisors of said county, at their adjourned meeting, held at Salem, December 8th, 1835; from which it appears that said board did resolve to petition the Legislature for the passage of an act authorizing them to raise, by tax levied on the taxable inhabitants of said county, fifteen hundred dollars, for the purpose of erecting a new fire-proof clerk's office in Argyle in said county; and as it satisfactorialy appears to your committee, that the requisite notice of said application hast been given, they are unanimously of the opinion that the prayer of the petitioners ought to be granted, and have accordingly prepared a bill, which they respectfully ask leave to introduce.