ment. Such, no doubt, as are proposed by both or either houfes. The former certificates cannot certainly respect bills of any kind, and left of all, money bills. The later affuredly authorifes the certifying all bills, money bills, included, which regularly fpring from the onely proper fource, the parlement.

"The crown then, has the fame power and authority over a money bill, springing by heads of a bill from the commons, as if it were originated in the council. In what then, can the prerogative of the king, or the rights of the crown of England be affected, more by the one, than the other? And how are the restrictive laws recited, violated or contradicted, by the commons afferting their inherent conftitutional right?

"But, furely, my lord, neither of the recited laws, nor any other, does, or can deprive either house of parliament, of the inherent and fundamental right and power of receiving or not receiving, reading or not reading, or rejecting them, agreeable to their own rules and orders, and that for reasons, tacit or expreffed. A flight review of the ftatute of the 3d and 4th of Philip and Mary, quoted by your Excellency, as well as your imitated predeceffor, at the end of paragraph 3. will convince your Excellency, that this invariable and fundamental right of parlement ftands in its priftine force, in these words;

66

But, fuppofe, my lord, it be for the prefent, for argument fake, as for no other purpofe it can, be admitted, that, under the Acts of the 10th of Henry VII. and 3d and 4th of Philip and Mary, while they remane in force, the chief governor and council here, the executive power of this kingdom, may certify what bills they will, even money bills not excepted, to the king and council, that is, to the executive power, in England. Such bills being returned, as the Acts require, may be presented, received, read and paffed, or may be denied reception, and fo rejected, without reading, or after reading, upon debate and confideration by either houfe. This is the order and rule of parlement, fo that the utmost prerogative of the executive power, in both kingdoms, with refpect to the certifying and tranfinitting bills, is exercifed and preferved in the act of certifying and tranfmitting them under the great seal of each crown; whether they take rife in either house of parlement, or in the council here.

February, 1770.

in cafe fuch caufes, tenours, &c. or any "of them, be agreed and refolved upon "by the three eftates of the faid parle"ment, any thing in this prefent act or "in the aforefaid act, made at Drogheda,

to the contrary, notwithstanding." Here, your Excellency muft fee, that either houfe may reject any bill: and affigning the cause of rejection can certainly be no crime.

"Here, alfo, my lord, you must see, the procedings of the commons, in afferting their right of taxation, in rejecting a money bill, dictated by the creatures of prerogative, and giving their reafon for their rejection, intrench not upon the regal prerogative, and ftill lefs upon the rights of the crown of England, as abfurdly as wickedly hauled in here, by your great predeceffor, and that fo far from being contrary, it is perfectly agreeable to every law, thofe particularly recited by your noble protesting predeceffor, and your Excellency.

"That your Excellency's noble predeceffor's afferting, that the procedings of the commons were contrary to the continued practice ever fince the making of the restrictive laws recited, ftands upon the fame fandy foundation, with his pofition, that the fayed proced

L

ings

ings were contrary to the recited acts, as may be collected from what has been juft fayed."

Thus far, agreeable to our plan, we have purfued the argumentative part of this pamphlet, and fhall clofe the whole with the Doctor's recapitulation.

After our author has pointed out feveral other precedents, fhewing the affertion of the right of the commons as to taxation, he fums up the arguments he has been drawing, and lays down the follow ing pofitions.

I. That the constitution of England is the established constitution of Ireland. 66 2. That the power of the three eftates of the legislature here, as in England, is boundless in doing good, but limited in, or abfolutely prohibited to do, wrong, or evil to each, or to any of the parts of the community; by thofe facred, and invariable fundamental laws of the conftitution, made before parliaments were inftituted.

"3. That this facred inftitution is not altered as is contended for, by the act of Philip and Mary, which now ftands in the place of that of the tenth of Henry the feventh. And by this, it evidently appears, the council have no authority to certify, for licence to call a parliament, any other than fuch caufes, confiderations and articles of fuch acts, provifions and ordinances as fhould induce the crown to call a parlement. And that afterwards, they are impowered to certify bills, provifions and ordinances, taking rife in one or both houses of parlement, and that fuch alone, agreed and refolved upon by the three eftates, may or can be paffed into laws. And of this, no loyal fubject of this kingdom complains; as this guards, but does not violate, the conftitution.

66 4. That the procedings of the houfes of commons, in the parlements of William the third and of George the third, cenfured and prorogued, by Lord Sydney and your Excellency; did in no fort contradict the true fenfe and fpirit of this law; but were perfectly agreeable to this and every other law and the conftitution of this kingdom.

"And from thefe, I infer, that the chief governor and council have no more authority to interfere with the peculiar rights of parlement, fince the paffing this law, than before it was enacted. And that even the power, which has hitherto

been exercised with impunity, by the council, of stopping the progrefs of bills, between either houfe of parlement and the throne, is a dangerous and destructive ufurpation, not warranted by the recited laws, or any others, in their juft and original conftruction, and confequently tending to overturn the conftitution.

The Doctor, in a postscript, pays a particular compliment to the author of the Conftitution of Ireland and Poynings' Laws explained; by a Friend to his Country; whom he calls a Friend indeed, because a Friend in need. An Extract from this pamphlet appeared in our last. Of the able writers that have appeared in the late great Queftion, The Right of Election; a genius of the highest eminence in literature (Dr. J--bn--n) has at length appeared, and rambled into the field of Politics; and has gratefully drawn his pen in support of that government, by which he is himself fo generously fupported.

The False Alarm. (Price one filling. Given entire.)

ONE

NE of the chief advantages derived by the prefent generation from the improvement and diffusion of philofophy, is deliverance from unneceflary terrours, and exemption from falfe alarms. The unufual appearances, whether regular or accidental, which once fpread confternation over ages of ignorance, are now the recreations of inquifitive fecurity. The fun is no more lamented when it is eclipfed, than when it fets; and meteors play their corufcations without prognostick or prediction.

The advancement of political knowledge may be expected to produce in time the like effects. Causeless difcontent and feditious violence will grow lefs frequent, and lefs formidable as the fcience of government is better afcertained by a diligent study of the theory of man.

It is not indeed to be expected, that phyfical and political truth fhould meet with equal acceptance, or gain ground upon the world with equal facility. The notions of the naturalift find mankind in a ftate of neutrality, or at worst have nothing to encounter but prejudice and vanity; prejudice without malignity, and vanity without intereft. But the politician's improvements are oppofed by every paffion that can exclude conviction or fup

prefs

rights of the people, and the title of the king.

This exemption from the authority of other courts was, I think, first established in favour of the five members in the long parliament. It is not to be confidered as an ufurpation, for it is implied in the principles of government. If legiflative powers are not co-ordinate, they ceafe in part to be legislative, and if they be co-ordinate they are unaccountable, for to whom mult that power account, which has no fuperior?

The House of Commons is indeed diffoluble by the King, as the nation has of late been very clamorously told; but while it fubfifts it is co-ordinate with the other powers, and this co-ordination ceafes only when the House by diffolution ceases to fubfift.

As the particular representatives of the people, are in their public character above the controul of the courts of law, they muit be subject to the jurisdiction of the House, and as the Houfe, in the exercise of its authority, can be neither directed nor reftrained, its own refolutions must be its laws, at leaft, if there is no antecedent decifion of the whole legislature.

This privilege, not confirmed by any written law or pofitive compact, but by the refiftlefs power of political neceffity, they have exercised, probably from their first institution, but certainly, as their records inform us, from the 23d of Elizabeth, when they expelled a member for derogating from their privileges.

It may perhaps be doubted, whether it was originally neceffary, that this right of control and punishment, fhould extend beyond offences in the exercife of parliamentary duty, fince all other crimes are cognizable by other courts. But they, who are the only judges of their own rights, have exerted the power of expulfion on other occafions, and when wickednefs arrived at a certain magnitude, have confidered an offence against society as an offence againit the Houle.

They have therefore divetted notorious delinquents of their legislative character, and delivered them up to fhame or punishment, naked and unprotected, that they might not contaminate the dignity of parliament.

It is allowed that a man attainted of felony, is not eligible in parliament. They

probably judged, that not being bound to the forms of law, they might treat these as felons, whofe crimes were in their opinion equivalent to felony; and that as a known felon could not be chofen, a man fo like a felon, that he could not easily be diftinguifhed, ought to be expelled.

The firit laws had no law to enforce them, the firit authority was conftituted by itself. The power exercifed by the Houfe of Commons is of this kind, a power rooted in the principles of government, and branched out by occasional practice, a power which neceffity made juft, and precedents have made legal.

It will occur that authority thus uncontrolable may, in times of heat and conteft, be oppreffively and injuriously exerted, and that he who fuffers injuftice, is without redress, however innocent, however miferable.

The pofition is true but the argument is ufelefs. The Commons must be controlled, or be exempt from control. If they are exempt they may do injury which cannot be redrefied, if they are controlled they are no longer legislative.

If the poffibility of abuse be an argument against authority, no authority ever can be eftablished; if the actual abuse deftroys its legality, there is no legal government now in the world

This power, which the Commons have fo long exercised, they ventured to use once more against Mr. Wilkes, and on the 3d of February, 1769, expelled him the Houfe, for having printed and publighed a feditious libel, and three obfcene and impious libels.

If these imputations were juft, the expulfion was furely feasonable, and that they were juft, the Houfe had reafon to determine, as he had confeffed himself, at the bar, the author of the libel which they term feditious, and was convicted in the King's Bench of both the publications.

But the freeholders of Middlefex were of another opinion. They either thought him innocent, or were not offended by his guilt. When a writ was iffued for the election of a knight for Middlesex, in the room of John Wilkes, Efq; expelled the Houfe, his friends on the fixteenth of February chofe him again.

On the 17th, it was refolved, that John Wilkes, Efq; having been in this feffion

of

of parliament expelled the House, was, and is, incapable of being elected a member to ferve in this prefent parliament.

As there was no other candidate, it was refolved, at the fame time, that the election of the fixteenth was a void election. The freeholders ftill continued to think that no other man was fit to reprefent them, and on the fixteenth of March elected him once more. Their refolution was

now fo well known, that no opponent ventured to appear.

The Commons began to find, that power without materials for operation can produce no effect. They might make the election void for ever, but if no other candidate could be found, their determination could only be negative. They, however, made void the laft election, and ordered a new writ.

On the thirteenth of April was a new election, at which Mr. Lutterel, and others, offered themselves candidates. Every method of intimidation was used, and fome acts of violence were done to hinder Mr. Lutterel from appearing. He was not deterred, and the poll was taken, which exhibited for Mr. Wilkes, 1143

Mr. Lutterel, 296 The sheriff returned Mr. Wilkes, but the Houfe, on April the fifteenth, determined that Mr. Lutterel was lawfully elected.

From this day began the clamour, which has continued till now. Thofe who had undertaken to oppofe the minitry, having no grievance of greater magnitude, endeavoured to fwell this decifion into bulk, and diftort it into deformity, and then held it out to terrify the nation. Every artifice of fedition has been fince practifed to awaken discontent and inflame indignation. The papers of every day have been filled with the exhortations and menaces of faction. The madness has fpread through all ranks and through both fexes; women and children have clamoured for Mr. Wilkes, honeft fimplicity has been cheated into fury, and only the wife have efcaped infection.

The greater part may juftiy be fufpected of not believing their own pofition, and with them it is not neceffary to difpute. They cannot be convinced, who are convinced already, and it is well known that they will not be ashamed.

The decifion, however, by which the fmaller number of votes was preferred to the greater, has perplexed the minds of

fome, whofe opinions it were indecent to defpife, and who by their integrity will deferve to have their doubts appeated.

Every diffufe and complicated question may be examined by different methods, upon different principles, and that truth, which is easily found by one investigator, may be miffed by another, equally honeft and equally diligent.

Thofe who enquire whether a smaller number of legal votes, can elect a reprefentative in oppofition to a greater, must receive from every tongue the fame answer.

The question, therefore, must be, whether a fmaller number of legal votes, shall not prevail against a greater number of votes not legal. It muit be confidered, that thofe votes only are legal which are legally given, and that thofe only are legally given, which are given for a legal

candidate.

It remains then to be difcuffed, whether a man expelled, can be fo difqualified by a vote of the houfe, as that he fhall be no longer eligible by lawful electors.

Here we muft again recur, not to pofitive inftitutions, but to the unwritten law of focial nature, to the great and pregnant principle of political neceflity. All government fuppofes fubjects, all authority implies obedience. To fuppofe in one the right to command what another has the right to refufe is abfurd and contradictory. A ftate fo constituted must rest for ever in motionlefs equipoife, with equal attractions of contrary tendency, with equal weights of power balancing each other.

Laws which cannot be enforced, can neither prevent nor rectify diforders. A fentence which cannot be executed can have no power to warn or to reform. If the Cominons have only the power of difmiffing for a few days the man whom his conftituents can immediately fend back, if they can expel but cannot exclude, they have nothing more than nominal authority, to which perhaps obedience never may be paid.

The reprefentatives of our ancestors had an opinion very different: they fined and imprifoned their members; on great provocation they difabled them for ever, and this power of pronouncing perpetual difability is maintained by Selden himself.

Thefe claims feem to have been made and allowed, when the conftitution of our

govern