principle set forth in these cases was very properly applied to the facts of this case. Here there was some evidence of rust, but it was not intimated that this amounted to corrosion, or that it weakened the steel of which the pin was composed. The witness who observed the condition of the pin when oiling the plunger evidently regarded it as good; otherwise he would have changed the pin, or reported the need of a change. The only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidence is that the accident resulted from the disappearance of the cotter pin. [2] Evidence as to the general condition of the crane was therefore properly excluded as irrelevant. Nor did it appear that the cotter pin was missing for any appreciable time before the accident. The craneman had seen it in place less than three hours before. We agree with the court below that there was not sufficient evidence of any negligence upon the part of the defendant to justify the submission of the case to the jury. The judgment is affirmed. (234 Pa. 300) Andrew Mulholland, the plaintiff's father. The statement of the case is practically this: Andrew Mulholland died intestate on the 6th day of September, 1884, leaving to survive him a widow, Margaret Mulholland, and one daughter, Mary E. George, the plaintiff, whose husband is still living. The widow and daughter renounced their right to administer the estate, and administration was granted to strangers. The administrators obtained proper authority to sell the lots in question at public sale for the payment of decedent's debts, and they were purchased by the widow on August 29, 1885, and the deed to her was acknowledged by the administrators in open court on November 14, 1885. The widow and her daughter resided continuously in one of these houses from the death of Andrew Mulholland on September 6, 1884, down to March 12, 1895, when the widow died. The widow devised the property in question to her executors in trust for various purposes, among which was the payment to the plaintiff of $20 per month during her natural life, and in addition thereto $100 annually for clothing, with authority in their discretion to increase the GEORGE v. SAFE DEPOSIT & TRUST CO. amount of the monthly payments. The will OF PITTSBURGH et al. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Jan. 2, 1912.) EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS (§ 386*)SALES BY EXECUTOR ESTOPPEL TO DENY VALIDITY. Where a widow buys lands of her deceased husband at a sale by his administrator for the payment of his debts, and her daughter saw her purchase the property and pay the purchase money, acquiesced in the mother's ownership for 10 years till the mother's death, accepted an annuity from the property under her mother's will for 10 years, and never offered to reimburse her mother for money paid on the purchase of the property nor to return to her mother's estate the annuity received, she cannot claim an interest in the land as the heir at law of her father. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Executors and Administrators, Cent. Dig. § 1570; Dec. Dig. § 386.*] likewise directs the trustees to pay to decedent's brother, Joseph Sawyer, $25 per month during his natural life. The will also provides that the whole estate shall go to any child or children of the plaintiff surviving her, subject to the provision made for the brother. In case of the death of the daughter without a child or children surviving, the testatrix provides for the disposition of her estate in a manner unnecessary here to relate. "The plaintiff contends that, on the death of Andrew Mulholland intestate, she and her mother became cotenants in common of the land described in the writ, and that when the widow purchased the same at an orphans' court sale for the payment of debts that relation of ownership previously ex Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Al-isting was not thereby changed, and that legheny County. Ejectment by Mary E. George against the Safe Deposit & Trust Company of Pittsburgh, trustee, and others for land in the Fifth Ward of the City of Pittsburgh. From a judgment for defendant non obstante veredicto, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. the widow could not by her will dispose of the interest of her cotenant, the plaintiff. "The contention on the part of the defense is that the plaintiff accepted the provision made for her in her mother's will, and has regularly and without complaint received her monthly and annual payments for some The following opinion was filed by Hay- ten years, and that having elected to so take maker, J., in the court below: "This is an action in ejectment for two lots of ground in the Fifth ward of the city of Pittsburgh, being numbered 20 and 21 in block 11 of the Plan of Lots of Elizabeth F. Denny, recorded in this county in Plan Book, vol. 6, p. 178, on which are erected seven brick dwelling houses. On the trial of the case we directed a verdict for the plaintiff. she is now estopped to question her mother's title to the property. The plaintiff's answer to the allegation of estoppel is that she was under the disability of coverture, and the doctrine of estoppel or election does not apply to her. "The defense relies on the following undisputed facts: That the administrators of Andrew Mulholland presented their petition to the orphans' court for leave to sell de"The common source of title was that of cedent's real estate for payment of debts rights as a legatee in and out of court, down to the time of bringing this suit, having received $3,516.01, and now without proof of reimbursement for money paid by her mother on the purchase of the property, and without the slightest offer to return to the estate the amount of the legacy she has been regularly receiving for 10 years under her mother's will, she now claims the land as the heir at law of Andrew Mulholland, and that her unequivocal acts as legatee under her mother's will are not binding upon her by reason of coverture. "We cannot agree with plaintiff in her contention, and are of the opinion that under the undisputed facts of the case the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, and that judgment should be entered for the defendant non obstante veredicto. aggregating over $19,000, and a citation was of that will for 10 years. She enforced her issued to the plaintiff, then of full age; the purchase of the property by the widow and the confirmation of the sale by the court; the exercise of entire ownership by the widow from the date of her deed of November 14, 1885, to the time of her death on March 12, 1896; the probating of her mother's will on March 15, 1895, whereby she disposes of the property in question; the acceptance by the plaintiff of legacies given her by her mother's will, payable monthly and annually, which the plaintiff received for a period of ten years; the payment by the trustees under the will, for the same length of time, the sum of $25 per month to decedent's brother, with knowledge on the part of plaintiff; plaintiff's participation in the distribution of balance in hands of executors on filing of their first account; the first and final account of the trustees under the will of plaintiff's mother, showing the payment of $3.516.01 to the plaintiff from February 5, 1897, to March 19, 1906, being the annuity provided for her in said will, and likewise showing payment of $3,102.50 to the other annuitant, of which plaintiff had knowledge, and the presentation of a joint petition to the orphans' court by the plaintiff and Joseph Sawyer, legatees under the will of plaintiff's mother, to enforce payments due them under the provisions of said will, and the obtaining of the order and the enforcement of payment. "The evidence is uncontradicted that the plaintiff not only accepted the annuity payable to her under her mother's will, for many years, and on one occasion employed counsel and enforced the provisions of the will in her favor in the orphans' court. She not only received her own annuities without protest, but had full knowledge of the payment of an annuity to her uncle during the same period of time. For all these years she recognized her mother's title to and ownership of the land in question, and this down to the time of bringing this action of ejectment. It also appears that her mother purchased the property for $2,350, subject to certain mortgages against the same, and that plaintiff in no way endeavored to or did reimburse her mother in the purchase. There was an attempt on the part of the plaintiff to show that her mother made certain declarations to the effect that the plaintiff and her husband had contributed to the purchase of the property, but his evidence was so indefinite as not to be worthy of consideration. The plaintiff saw her mother purchase this property at a public sale, and pay the purchase price; she saw her from the time of her purchase to the day of her death-some 10 years-exercising every right of ownership over it; she saw her dispose of it by will, and she became a beneficiary thereunder, and enjoyed the fruits "And now, July 10, 1911, the rule for judgment non obstante veredicto is made absolute, and judgment is now entered for defendants on payment of verdict fee. The motion for a new trial is refused." Argued before FELL, C. J., and BROWN, MESTREZAT, POTTER, ELKIN, STEWART, and MOSCHZISKER, JJ. Morton Hunter, for appellant. W. H. S. Thomson, Smith H. Shannon, Ache & Wassell, and J. B. Eichenauer, for appellee. PER CURIAM. The judgment is affirmed on the opinion of the learned judge of the common pleas, entering judgment for the appellee non obstante veredicto. (234 Pa. 478) STEVENSON v. HENDERSON et al. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS (§ 103*)— After the passage of Act May 18, 1911 (P. L. 309), known as the "School Code," school boards in levying school taxes for the ance with the School Code, and not with the year 1911 were bound to levy them in accordlaw as it existed prior to the approval of such Code. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Schools and Dec. Dig. § 103.*1 School Districts, Cent. Dig. §§ 240-245, 252; Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County. Bill by John Stevenson against J. R. Henderson and others. From a decree dismissing the bill, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. Shafer, J., filed the following opinion in the court below: "In this case an answer has been filed and the case set down upon bill and answer. The bill is by a taxpayer against the school directors and tax collector of the borough of Dormont, praying for an injunction to restrain them from levying and collecting an occupation tax in excess of $1, and from re "The school directors of the borough of Dormont, having levied a tax at a time required by the old law, and, so far as appears, having levied the tax by a vote of the majority of all the members of the board, but levied upon the subjects of taxation provided by the new law, seems to us to have done what the law requires, and the bill is therefore dismissed; costs to be paid by the plaintiff.” Argued before FELL, C. J., and BROWN, MESTREZAT, POTTER, ELKIN, STEWART, and MOSCHZISKER, JJ. quiring the payment of school taxes without the former law was that it should be the allowing a discount of 5 per cent. The ques- votes of not less than a majority of the memtion raised by the case is whether the amount bers of the board. This method is slightly of school taxes which may be assessed is changed in the new law, which provides that governed by the act of May 18, 1911 (P. L. the tax shall be levied by the vote of a ma309), commonly called the 'School Code,' or jority of all members of the board, with a is to be regulated by the laws theretofore in record of how each member voted. force. The act of May 18th expressly provides that it is to go into effect immediately upon its passage. This act expressly repeals the act of July 22, 1897 (P. L. 305), authorizing the levy of a per capita tax of not more than $1, and, in effect, repeals the act of June 25, 1885 (P. L. 187), which allows the tax collector to allow a discount of 5 per cent. on taxes paid within 60 days. The School Code provides in section 2812 for the transition from the old system to that provided by the Code, and directs that "all school directors shall levy the school taxes at the time or times and in the manner heretofore fixed by law." and shall continue to serve until their successors have been duly elected and appointed under the Code, the time fixed for this change being, in districts of the fourth class, the first Monday of December, 1911. The act also provides that the first school year and the first fiscal year in districts of the fourth class, of which the borough in question is one, shall begin on the first Monday of July, 1911. "As the School Code is in force since the time of its passage, it follows that all proceedings in regard to school matters are to be carried on under its provisions, and any exception to that rule must distinctly appear in the act. It is claimed by the plaintiff that the direction to the school directors now in office to levy the school taxes 'at the time or times and in the manner heretofore fixed by law' is a direction to them to levy such amount of tax as was theretofore authorized by law and to order the collection of the tax by the collector in the manner theretofore authorized. The contention of the defendants is that the clause in question has no reference to the amount of the tax or the subjects of taxation, or the manner of collecting the same, but only authorizes the directors in office at the time of the passage of the act to levy the taxes required by law i. e., those required by the Code-at the time and in the manner theretofore in use. In other words, the question is: What is meant by the expression in the manner heretofore fixed by law'? We are clearly of the opinion that these words do not authorize existing school boards, in levying the taxes for the current year, as they are directed by the act to do, to determine the amount and incidence of the tax according to acts which have been repealed. but only authorized them to levy a tax under the provisions of the new law in the time and way provided for in the old law. The time is not in question, but the manner of levying the tax according to John A. Metz, for appellant. Hugh M. Stilley, for appellees. PER CURIAM. The decree is affirmed on the opinion of Judge Shafer, (234 Pa. 339) DONNELLY et al. v. BYERS. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Jan. 2, 1912.) 1. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS (8 138*) - SALES OF REAL PROPERTY CONFIRMATION. On the sale of real estate by executors for the payment of debts without order of court, the orphans' court may confirm the sale under Act April 13, 1854 (P. L. 368), providing that, in all cases wherein any of the courts might have authorized any sale or conveyance, such a sale or conveyance made without order of court may be ratified and confirmed; such confined to sales under the Price Act (Act provision being applicable generally and not April 8, 1853 [P. L. 503]). [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Executors and Administrators, Cent. Dig. 88 560-566, 575; Dec. Dig. § 138.*] 2. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS (§ 148*) -SALES OF REALTY-RIGHTS OF PURCHASER, Where the same persons were appointed executors and trustees and given authority as trustees to sell real estate, and made a sale without order of court, but subsequently a petition was filed in the orphans' court for ratification thereof, all parties in interest waiving issue of citation or being served therewith, and citation being served on all creditors of the decedent who had filed suits to preserve the lien of their debts, and subsequently the fund raised by the sale was distributed and a dividend paid to the creditors, the purchaser could not, in an action on the bond given by him for the price, question the validity of the sale. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Executors and Administrators, Cent. Dig. §§ 595-601; Dec. Dig. § 148.*] Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County. Assumpsit by Alice R. Donnelly and others, executors and trustees of Charles Donnelly, deceased, for use of the Commonwealth Trust Company of Pittsburgh, administrator d. b. n. c. t. a., against Eben M. Argued before FELL, C. J., and BROWN, Byers on a bond to secure a balance of pur- |ance or letting, to approve, ratify and conchase money for land. From an order mak- firm the sale, with the same effect as if ing absolute rule for judgment for want of a such decree had preceded the sale, conveysufficient affidavit of defense, defendant ap- ance or letting." We do not agree with the peals. Affirmed. learned counsel for the appellant that the authority conferred by this section of the act applies only to sales made under the Price Act (Act April 8, 1853 [P. L. 503]). It is true that the act of 1854 is a supplement to the Price Act, but, as suggested by appellee's counsel, the other two sections of the act expressly limit their application to sales made under the Price Act. Not so with As will be the third section of the act. observed, the section confers jurisdiction on the court to ratify and confirm a sale, "in all cases wherein any of the courts of this commonwealth might have authorized any * * and such sale, sale or conveyance, conveyance or letting, may have been made without leave of such court." The section is of general application, and its authority may be invoked wherever the court could have previously authorized a sale or conveyance of real estate. This is the uniform construction placed by the lower courts on the section wherever the question has arisen, and the language is amply broad enough to sustain the construction. MESTREZAT, J. We see no merit in this appeal. When it was ascertained that the real estate devised by the testator in trust for his children was required for the payment of his debts, it was the duty of his personal representatives to sell it and apply the proceeds to that purpose. This they did by presenting a petition in proper form to the orphans' court, setting forth all the necessary jurisdictional facts, and praying for the ratification and confirmation of the sale, made to Byers, for the payment of the debts of the decedent. The widow and all of the children of the decedent and the Commonwealth Trust Company, sole trustee under the will of the decedent, being all the parties in interest either under the will of the decedent or as his heirs at law, except Charles Donnelly, Jr., waived the issuing of a citation and notice of the presentation of the petition to the court and joined with the petitioner in the prayer that a citation on Charles Donnelly, Jr., and on all the creditors of the decedent who had filed suits to preserve the lien of their debts, the statutory period of two years from the death of the decedent having then expired, to show cause why the court should not confirm and ratify the sale formerly made to Byers as a sale for the payment of debts. The citation refers to the petition, and recites that it prays "for confirmation of sale of certain real estate fully described in petition for the payment of debts to Eben M. Byers," and was served upon Charles Donnelly, Jr., and upon all of the creditors who had filed suits against the decedent's estate. The court entered a decree ratifying and confirming the sale theretofore made to the defendant Byers as a sale for the payment of debts "as if the said sale had been previously ordered and directed and * free from any lien whatever of the debts of said decedent." [1] We have no doubt of the power of the court to ratify and confirm the sale made by the executors to Byers as a sale made for the payment of debts. The third section of the Act of April 13. 1854 (P. L. 369; 4 Purdon's Dig. [13th Ed.] p. 4030), provides that "in all cases wherein any of the courts of this commonwealth might have authorized any sale or conveyance, or letting on groundrent or otherwise, and such sale, conveyance or letting may have been made without leave of such court, it shall be lawful for such [2] The agreement to sell the real estate to Byers was executed by the executors, and not by the trustees, of the decedent. The deed made in pursuance of the agreement was signed by the parties as executors and trustees. By his will, the decedent gave his trustees power and authority to manage and control all of the trust property, including the power to buy and sell real and personal estate and change realty into personalty and personalty into realty. The trustees, who were also the executors, therefore had full authority to make the sale to Byers, the proceeds of which by the terms of the will and by the law were first applicable to the payment of debts. That the sale was made by virtue of this authority did not prevent the orphans' court from subsequently ratifying it as a sale for the payment of debts. So long as the unsecured debts of the decedent remained unpaid, the executors and trustees could not sell for the purposes of the trust so as to discharge the land from the payment of debts. But the sale having been made, and it subsequently appearing that the proceeds were necessary for the payment of debts, the act of 1854 conferred power on the orphans' court to ratify and confirm the sale as a private sale made for the payment of debts. Prior to the sale to Byers made under the power in the will, the executors could have made a private sale of the real estate for the payment of debts, which the court, under the Act of May 9, 1889 (P. L. 182), was authorized to decree and approve. It is conceded that the price agreed to be paid by Byers was the full value of the real estate. It further appears, as suggested will or as heirs at law who could be affected | estate for the payment of the decedent's inby the sale had notice of the application debtedness. We are of the opinion that unmade by the administrator d. b. n. c. t. a. der the circumstances the acceptance by the for the ratification of the sale as a private creditors of the dividend on their indebtedsale made for the payment of debts. All ness paid out of the proceeds of the fund the facts necessary to give the orphans' court produced by the sale of the real estate to jurisdiction are averred in the petition. No the defendant is a ratification of the sale objection to the confirmation of the sale has and estops the creditors from pursuing the been made by any of the heirs, devisees, land for the balance of their claim. legatees, creditors, or other parties legally interested. We are therefore at a loss to see any substantial reason why the sale should be declared invalid at the instance of the purchaser. In the language of Judge Stowe in Siebert v. Zinkand, 26 Pittsb. Leg. J. 137, a similar case: "The property having thus by legal intent been sold for its full value, and the money representing the value of the land having gone into the orphans' court and there distributed, what real difference does it make to plaintiff (here, the purchaser) that the sale was made by her (here, the executors and trustees) as devisees (here, as executors and trustees) under the will, instead of being by her as executrix under order of the orphans' court?" Our attention has not been called to any act of assembly, and we know of none, which requires notice to creditors by the executors of the intended application to the court for an order to sell real estate for the payment of debts or for the confirmation of a private sale made for that purpose. When a personal representative files his account, the Act of March 15, 1832 (P. L. 135), requires the register to give notice by publication and posting for four weeks that the account has been settled in his office and that it will be presented to the orphans' court for confirmation. Personal or actual notice is not required. Priestley's Appeal, 127 Pa. 420, 17 Atl. 1084, 4 L. R. A. 503. It is not alleged that the proper legal notice of filing of the account and presenting it to the court for confirmation was not given prior to the audit and settlement of the account and the distribution of the fund in the hands of the administrator. It was the duty of creditors to present their claims to the court for allowance. If Sarah Dawson Speer, as executrix of Charles E. Speer, deceased, late guardian of the three Donnelly children, had any claim against Donnelly's estate or the fund for distribution, it was her duty to present it at the proper time for allowance, and we must assume that she would have done so. The same is true of P. J. Brennan. That neither of these parties presented a claim or participated in the distribution of the fund in court is fully explained by the admitted facts. The three Donnelly children for whom Mr. Speer had been guardian were of age at the time of the application to the orphans' court, and joined in the prayer of the petition for the confirmation of the sale of this land to Byers as a sale made for the payment of debts. This was a release by them of the land from any claim they, as heirs, devisees, or creditors, might have against it. The fact that they joined in the application to sell as devisees and heirs and not as creditors is of no moment. The sale being for the payment of debts and approved by the court at their request, and they, having legal notice that an account had been filed by the administrator, accounting for the fund produced by the sale, were required to present their claims, if any they had, to The executors received from Byers $20,000 in cash and the bond on which this suit was brought. They filed an account in which they charged themselves with the cash and the bond, and turned them over to the Commonwealth Trust Company, administrator, the plaintiff in this action. Subsequently the administrator filed its first and partial account charging itself with the cash received from the executors. A decree for distribution was made of the balance shown in the administrator's hands by this account, and a dividend was paid to all of the creditors of the estate except Sarah Dawson Speer, executrix of Charles E. Speer, who was guardian of Mary R. Donnelly, Louise Donnelly, and Allen G. Donnelly, and P. J. Brennan, who had brought suit for a small sum. The acceptance of the dividend by the creditors was a ratification of the sale made by the executors. They cannot receive the money and at the same time deny the authority of the executors to make the sale which produced the fund out of which the dividends were paid. The creditors were fully advised that the sale was for the payment of debts. The citation served on them to show cause why the sale should not be confirmed distinctly disclosed the fact that the petition presented to the court asked "for the confirmation of sale of certain real estate fully described in petition for the payment of debts to Eben M. Byers." They were further advised as to the character of the fund out of which they received their dividends, and how it was produced, by the account the orphans' court for payment out of the filed by the executors. It is idle, we think, to contend that the creditors who received and receipted for the dividends were not fully aware that the fund out of which they fund for distribution. The affidavit of defense does not aver that Mrs. Speer, as executrix, has a claim against the estate which is a lien on the land nor that the wards of |