[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Boundaries, Cent. Dig. §§ 153-159, 163, 165, 177-183; Dec. Dig. § 35.*] 2. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 1010*) — REVIEW FINDINGS-CONCLUSIVENESS. On an issue as to the location of a true boundary line of land uncertainly described in a deed, the trial court's finding will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by adequate evidence. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3979-3982; Dec. Dig. § 1010.*] Appeal from Superior Court, New London County; Ralph Wheeler, Judge. Action by James V. Luce against the Niantic Menhaden Oil & Guano Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Partly affirmed, and partly modified. Frank L. McGuire, of New London, for appellant. Charles B. Whittlesey, of New London, for appellee. WHEELER, J. This controversy arises over the construction to be given a deed of premises conveyed by the plaintiff to the defendant in 1902, and described as follows: "All that tract of land lying south of the Shore Line Division of the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad and known as Rocky Neck, containing six acres, more or less, except such portion as is occupied by the grantor for his quarry, derrick, engine, and tracks; such reserved land lying east of the private track after leaving the stone dock on hard ground running in a straight line from said track to and at right angles with said track of said New York, New Flaven and Hartford Railroad Company. This sale does not include said stone dock and track on same, but does convey the right of the free use of said dock and track when same is not in use by said grantor for his quarry business to the grantee company of carrying on its business of loading and discharging commodities and materials and for the location of coal bins for the storage of coal and for the storage of other materials necessary for its business. Also conveying to the grantee company the right to locate, maintain and use a railroad track from said New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad track across the premises of the grantor to the buildings of the grantee company hereby conveyed. Said track to be located so as not to unreasonably interfere with the gran The parties tor in his quarry business." agree that the language, "and at right angles to said track of said New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company," used in said deed, was intended to mean and shall be construed to mean a radial line. The plaintiff contends that the western boundary of the land excepted in said deed was along the private track running from the stone dock, where the same struck hard ground as far as the track ran at the time of the conveyance and thence by a radial line therefrom to the track of the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company. The defendant contends that the true boundary line was a radial line drawn from the east side of the private track running from the stone dock at the point where the track met hard ground to the tracks of the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company. The description of the deed admits of either interpretation. The trial court found that the true boundary line was the line drawn from the center line of said private track from the place where it struck hard ground to the end of the private track, and thence by a radial line to the tracks of the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company. [1] To ascertain the proper construction to be given the deed, the trial court sought to discover the intent of the parties to the deed by permitting evidence to be introduced of the situation of the property and the surrounding circumstances at the time of the conveyance, and then looking at the terms of the deed in the light of the situation and surrounding circumstances. This accorded with our rule. Bartholomew v. Muzzy, 61 Conn. 392, 23 Atl. 604, 29 Am. St. Rep. 206; Sweeney v. Landers, Frary & Clark, 80 Conn. 578, 69 Atl. 566; Bryan v. Bradley, 16 Conn. 486; Strong v. Benedict, 5 Conn. 220. Evidence was introduced by the defendant tending to prove that the plaintiff and a representative of the defendant just before the delivery of the deed went upon the premises and located the line in accordance with the claim of the defendant. The plaintiff's contradiction of this was somewhat evasive, and might have led the court to find that the line was laid out as the defendant claimed. But the court undoubtedly weighed this evidence in connection with that tending to prove that the plaintiff was in the occupation of these premises at the time of their conveyance to the defendant; that some of these premises claimed by the defendant were a part of the plaintiff's quarry from which he was then extracting stone to fill an order, upon which stood some of the instrumentalities and buildings used in this business; and that the conveyance of these premises, indispensable as they were to the quarry business, repelled the conclusion that the plaintiff intended to convey the tract. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 11.*] [2] The trial court, upon adequate evi- [ be at all times open to the inspection of the dence, satisfied its judgment as to what the commissioner of the bureau of labor statistics. Held, that such act, in so far as it provided doubtful language of the reservation in the that such information should be open to the indeed, "except such portion as is occupied by spection of the bureau of labor statistics, was the grantor for his quarry, derrick, engine not manifestly beyond the legitimate field of and tracks," meant and its conclusion is legislation as an exercise of the police power for the public welfare. final. The question of intent was one of fact for the trial court, and its finding, based as it was upon evidence of the surrounding circumstances and situation of the property, legally supporting it, cannot be reviewed by us. With the weight of evidence, legally admitting of the conclusion drawn, we have nothing to do. Meriden Savings Bank v. Wellington, Adm'r, et al., 64 Conn. 553, 30 Atl. 774. Of the multitudinous exceptions of the defendant to the finding none are of sufficient materiality to warrant consideration except one. The court has found the disputed boundary line to be from the junction of the stone dock with the hard ground through the center line of the private track to the angle in the track, being its terminus at the delivery of the deed. The plaintiff's claim was confined to the premises east of the west private track. The evidence, as we read it, did not tend to justify a finding of a boundary line in the center of this tract. In this particular the finding should be corrected to conform to the plaintiff's claim, and the judgment modified to conform to this correction. There is error in part. The other Judges concurred. (86 Conn. 141) STATE v. LAY. (Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 48*)—VALIDITY tion. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 46; Dec. Dig. § 48.*] 2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 70*)-STATUTES INVALIDITY-PUBLIC POLICY. Considerations of public policy which ought to appeal to the practical judgment of the legislative body in determining whether a statute should be passed are not relevant to a court's determination as to whether a statute, when passed, is constitutional. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 129 132, 137; Dec.Dig. § 70.*] 3. MASTER AND SERVANT (§ 11*) POLICE POWER-PUBLIC WELFARE EMPLOYÉS' REC ORDS. Acts 1911. e. 163, § 1, provides that no person shall maintain or subscribe to any agency conducted to preserve or furnish information as to the character, skill, acts, or affiliations of any person whereby his reputation, standing in trade, or ability to secure employment may be affected, unless a complete record of such information shall be open to inspection of the person to whom the information relates, and that all records preserved in such agency shall Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; Gardiner Greene, Judge. Charles H. Lay was convicted of violating Public Acts 1911, c. 163, regulating employment reference bureaus, and he appeals. Affirmed. Ralph O. Wells and Clement Scott, both of Hartford, for appellant. Hugh M. Alcorn, State's Atty., for the State. CURTIS, J. The defendant was informed of certain provisions of chapter 163 of the against, tried, and convicted for a violation Public Acts of 1911. This act provides as follows: "Section 1. No person or corporation nor any agent or attorney thereof, nor any association of persons or corporations, shall maintain, subscribe to, belong to, or support any bureau or agency conducted for the purpose of preserving and furnishing to any member thereof or to others information descriptive of the character, skill, acts, or affiliations of any person whereby his reputation, standing in a trade, or ability to secure employment may be affected, unless a complete record of such information shall be open at all reasonable times to the inspection of the person to whom such information relates, or his duly authorized agent or attorney. All items of information pertaining to each person so described shall be recorded, in reasonably clear and unambiguous terms, on a single sheet or card, and all records preserved in any such bureau or agency shall be at all times open to the inspection of the commissioner of the bureau of labor statistics. The name of the person or corporation, together with the names of the officers of any such Corporation, conducting any such bureau or agency, the exact business address of such bureau or agency, and the name of every subscriber thereto or member thereof shall be furnished promptly to the commissioner of the bureau of labor statistics and by him recorded and preserved in a convenient formu for public inspection. "Sec. 2. Any person or corporation, or any officer or employé of any bureau or agency subject to the provisions of this act, who shall violate any of said provisions shall be fined not less than fifty dollars nor more than two hundred dollars for each offense. "Sec. 3. This act shall not apply to religious or charitable institutions maintained solely for humanitarian purposes; nor to agencies maintained solely for the purpose of is not our concern. Considerations of public policy which might and perhaps ought to make their appeal to the practical judgment of the legislative body are not relevant to our determination and must not be permitted to influence our decision." Beach v. Bradstreet, 85 Conn. 344, 82 Atl. 1032. "It is our duty to approach the question with great caution, examine it with infinite care, make every presumption and intendment in its favor and sustain the act, unless its invalidity is in our judgment beyond a reasonable doubt.” Beach v. Bradstreet, supra. vending employment and in which persons peals, and his reasons of appeal are confined seeking such employment duly authorize the to the question of the validity of the said registration of their names and qualifica- public act. tions; nor to companies, agencies, or associ- [1, 2] Courts in passing upon the validity ations conducted solely for the purpose of of a legislative act do not feel justified in preserving records and furnishing reports of declaring a law void unless there is a “clear financial standing and personal or business and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, credit; nor to the private records of em- not a doubtful and argumentative implicaployés kept by any person or corporation to tion." Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dall. (Pa.) 14, 1 be used in accordance with the provisions of L. Ed. 721. "Nor must we be unmindful that chapter 153 of the public acts of 1909." within reasonable limits the legislative deThe accused was the secretary of the Man-partment is the judge of what will constitute ufacturers' Association of Hartford county. a public use, and that the wisdom of its act It was admitted on the trial that "said association maintains a central bureau, conveniently located, for two purposes: First, for the purpose of supplying to members of said association suitable employés when and as needed; and, second, for the purpose of furnishing information to members relative to the health, character, reputation, habits, disposition, efficiency, and capacity as wage earners of persons applying to members for employment as such information may be determined, and reported to said association by the former employer or employers of such persons. In determining the history of ap- [3] The precise question presented by this plicants in this respect, it is customary to record is the validity of this public act in accept as final the report of the foreman so far as it imposes duties upon the supportunder whom said persons may have worked; ers and maintainers of such a bureau as the and the persons affected by the record thus defendant had charge of to grant an inspecobtained concerning them are without any tion of its records and furnish certain inforknowledge or means of knowledge of the con- mation to the commissioner of the bureau of tents of such report, and do not know wheth- labor statistics as prescribed in the act. The er it is or may be used either in favor of or Legislature in this act declares by implicaagainst them when seeking employment else- tion that the public welfare requires that the where." It was admitted that said central voluntary maintenance of such a bureau bureau keeps a record of persons employed should be under such relations to the bureau by most of its members and of persons who of labor statistics as the statute provides. have left the employ of members, which rec-This court cannot find that the Legislature ord contains information as to employés ob- is wrong in this conclusion. What legislation tained as stated above. The defendant was is essential to the general welfare is a matter the agent in charge of said central bureau. peculiarly adapted to legislative decision. Acting under the provisions of section 1 Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 113, of this act, the commissioner of the bureau | 575, 31 Sup. Ct. 299, 55 L. Ed. 341. The proof labor statistics applied to the defendant as secretary of such association in charge of the central bureau of the association for an inspection of the records of said association and for the information, which the act provides shall be promptly furnished to such commissioner, and the defendant refused to permit the inspection or to furnish the information. The defendant demurred to the information brought against him, on the ground that the public act in question was repugnant to the Constitution of the state of Connecticut, and also to that of the United States. The demurrer was overruled, and upon the trial the court was requested to charge the jury that the said public act was invalid. The court refused to do so, and the defendant was found guilty. He now ap-other Judges concurred. visions of this act relating to such duties and rights as pertain to the commissioner of the bureau of labor statistics are not so clearly and manifestly beyond the legitimate field of legislation as to be invalid. The purpose of this legislation in the particulars now under consideration reasonably may have been esteemed by the Legislature of such impor tance to the general welfare for statistical or other lawful purposes of such bureau of labor statistics, under the statute governing it, as to make the provisions relating to the commissioner of the bureau of labor statistics a valid exercise of legislative power. It is unnecessary at this time to consider the validity of the act in any other relation. There is no error. In this opinion the (86 Conn. 109) NEHRING v. CONNECTICUT CO. (Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. Oct. 1, 1912.) Dissenting opinion. see if a car was approaching. The circumstances showed that the deceased did not look for the car after he got within five feet of the track. The car was equipped with a fender, which it was the duty of the motorman to have had in position from two to four inches above the surface of the track. The fender at the time of the accident was a foot above the track. The fender could have been drop For majority opinion, see 84 Atl. 301. GEORGE W. WHEELER, J. The trial court directed a verdict at the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence. The majority of the court have, we think, overlooked or misinter-ped almost instantaneously to position by the preted some of the vital facts in the evidence, quite likely through their understanding that the plaintiff's case in reality rested upon the last clear chance doctrine, and that her claim, though pressed in argument and brief that the issue of contributory negligence was for the jury, was purely perfunctory. For this reason we state some of the facts which the jury had sufficient evidence before themed diagonally to the track, the car, which to have found. The accident occurred in the most prominent business section of Main street in the city of Ansonia. This street was paved with cobblestones. From the east curb to the west rail of the single trolley line running through the center of the street is 19 feet. Nehring, the deceased, was familiar with the street and car service, and he started at a point 5 feet from the east curb, as Hodgdon testified, to go to his wagon on the opposite side of the street to the south. He was then 14 feet from the track. At this time the defendant's single truck car, equipped with a hand brake, was approaching from the north, and was distant about 330 feet. The witnesses testifying as to the speed of the car placed it from 9 to 20 miles an hour. One Willehmy testified it was 15 or 20 miles an hour. The motorman kept no lookout, as McKeon testified. He rang no gong, and gave no warning, and did not reduce the speed, as all witnesses agree. The deceased walked at an ordinary gait from the east curb south to a point on the track 78 feet distant. Two witnesses say he walked in a diagonal direction across the street. One witness says he walked directly across to a point within two feet of the track, when he continued in a straight line within two feet of the track. When about at the street crossing running from the northerly line of Bank street, he stepped upon the track, was struck in the back by the front end of the car, thrown under the wheels, and killed. All of the time the deceased was walking he was facing the north, with his back toward the car. The day was clear; and, although there were teams on the street, the view of the deceased to the north and of the motorman to the south was unobstructed. The deceased could have seen the car, and the motorman the deceased. The deceased was slightly deaf, but could have heard the gong, had the motorman rung it. No direct evidence was offered whether the deceased at or before the time motorman by pressure of the foot. Had the fender been dropped before the deceased was struck, he could not have been dragged under the wheels, and in all probability would not have been killed. At a speed of 15 miles an hour the car could have been stopped in about 30 feet. When the deceased was within 5 feet of the track, if it be found he walk was traveling 15 miles an hour, nearly 4 times as fast as the deceased, was between 75 and 100 feet from the point where deceased was struck. If it be found the deceased walked to within two feet of the track, and thence south at that distance from the track, the car was distant from him at the time he got within 2 feet of the track about 200 feet. On either finding the motorman in the exercise of reasonable care would have known in the one case that he was about to put himself in danger from the car, and in the other that he had put himself in danger from the car and that he was wholly unconscious of his danger, and unless warned, or the car's speed slackened or stopped, he would be struck. After the motorman discovered the peril of the deceased and his unconsciousness of it, he had the opportunity, in the exercise of reasonable care, of avoiding injuring him. So, too, after the motorman discovered the peril to the deceased and his unconsciousness of it, he had the opportunity in the exercise of reasonable care to have dropped the fender, and so have avoided killing the deceased. Two questions contributory negligence and "last clear chance"-are involved. We discuss first the contributory negligence. First. The deceased had a right to cross the street when he did. His duty and that of the railroad company were reciprocal, each to look out for the presence of the other, the one to avoid being injured, the other to avoid inflicting injury. Laufer v. Bridgeport Traction Co., 68 Conn. 475, 37 Atl. 379, 37 L. R. A. 533. The motorman had the right to assume that Nehring would not put himself in a place of danger; and Nehring had the right to assume that the car would be operated in a reasonable manner, at a reasonable rate of speed, in the main business street of this busy city a few minutes before the noon hour, and that the car would be under control, and the motorman keep a reasonable outlook, and give travelers on or near proach. There was no direct evidence that for the jury. Farrell v. Waterbury TracNehring looked to the north, affirmative tion Co., 60 Conn. 239, 21 Atl. 675, 22 Atl. proof of which would be difficult in any event 544. It is only when the application of this to obtain. No evidence and no inference is standard to the facts of a case makes it in the proof of the conduct of the deceased clear that no reasonable mind could reach between the time he left the bake wagon any conclusion except that of contributory and the time he is seen 8 or 10 feet south of negligence that the decision becomes one of the wagon and 5 feet from the curb. He law and for the court. Is this case so plain was only 14 feet from the track. He was that no reasonable conclusion could be reachon his way across the street. It was reason- ed other than that of the deceased's contribable for him to have looked at the beginning | utory negligence; that is, that his negligence of his passage across, and the law presumes was a proximate, efficient cause of the accihe did. Self-preservation would have suggested this. In Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Landrigan, 191 U. S. 461, 24 Sup. Ct. 137, 48 L. Ed. 262, the court relied upon this presumption to find that a traveler used his senses before going upon a railroad crossing. "We know of no more universal instinct than that of self-preservation. There are few presumptions based on human feelings or experience that have surer foundation." Id.; Sullivan v. Railroad Co., 175 Pa. 361, 365, 34 Atl. 798; Connerton v. Delaware, etc., Canal Co., 169 Pa. 339, 32 Atl. 416; 16 Cyc. 1057. This presumption is of a like character with that which enables the traveler to act on the presumption that a highway is reasonably safe for public travel. Lutton v. Vernon, 62 Conn. 11, 23 Atl. 1020, 27 Atl. 589. Of course, this presumption does not excuse the traveler from the use of reasonable care for his own safety, but that is to be measured in the light of this presumption. If, then, the deceased saw the car over 300 feet to the north when he began his passage across the street, starting at a point 14 feet from the track, was it negligent for him to assume that he had time to cross the track, or ought he to have waited until the car passed? Was it negligent for him not to have accurately judged the speed of the oncoming car and perhaps to have decided he had time to cross? Was it negligent for him to have assumed that in the heart of the business street of this populous city, at about the noon hour, the speed of the car would not be unreasonable? Was it negligent for him to assume that the motorman would have the car under control? Was it negligent for him to assume that the motorman would give him timely warning of the car's approach and reduce its speed? Was it negligent for him, at this time, in this place, under these circumstances, not to have stopped, looked, and listened before going so near the track as to be in danger? These were some of the considerations for the jury. We have reiterated that it cannot be said as matter of law a failure to do these things is negligence. O'Connor v. Connecticut Ry. & Ltg. Co., 82 Conn. 170, 72 Atl. 934. Whether the plaintiff's own negligence was a proximate cause of this accident depended on whether he exercised reasonable care under all of the many varying circumstances dent? If so, the direction of the verdict was right, otherwise, it was not. Steinert v. Whitcomb, 84 Conn. 262, 79 Atl. 675. We may estimate the average judgment by the average conduct. What is the conduct of the average person upon our crowded streets? Do not persons generally rely for their safety largely upon the fact that they travel upon the streets under the protection of the law which imposes upon the operators of instrumentalities of danger, such as the trolley car and the automobile, the duty of operation with knowledge of the liability of travelers being upon the street and the consequent necessity for careful outlook, reasonable speed, timely warning, and a car under control? The danger to a pedestrian crossing our streets has immeasurably increased with the use of these instrumentalities, and so has the fulfillment of his duty of using reasonable care. He should be held to his duty, but not in its practical application to a standard of care which is far beyond the conduct of the average man. Penalizing the injured to relieve the injuring traveler decreases the public safety, and in the end must add to the public burden the care of many of the stricken. We think the contributory negligence of the plaintiff's intestate should have been left to the jury. Second. Though Nehring was negligent in going near and upon the track without using his senses to discover the approaching car, his negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident, since the case is one for the application of the “last clear chance" doctrine. This is merely a name for certain forms of actionable negligence. These involve a situation presenting: (1) The negligence of the defendant. (2) The concurrent negligence of the plaintiff. (3) After such negligence of the plaintiff, some intervening negligence of the defendant which becomes the last act in the chain of causation. Our consideration of this doctrine will be aided by holding in mind some fundamental principles of the law of negligence. The negligence which will support a recovery for an injury must be its proximate cause. If one's own negligence be a proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover for the consequences of another's negligence, for the law will not suffer him to recover for the misfortune due in part to his own fault. The negligence of plaintiff and defendant may be |