privilege to be sued in Lamar county, Tex., to which appellees answered that the contract was to be performed in Frio county, and, further, that appellant is a private corporation and can be sued in any county in which a contract is made by itself or its agents, and that the contract in question was made in Pearsall, Frio county, Tex. The court overruled the plea of privilege. The evidence in this case shows that appellees ordered, through the agents of appellant, 10,000 crates to be used in shipping onions by appellees. The crates were to be delivered in Frio county. The changes suggested to be made in the contract by appelant were accepted by appellees. The contract was made in Frio county by appellant, A private corporation, through its agents dealing with appellees. The agents were July accredited and had authority to sell the crates. In the twenty-fourth exception to article 1830, Revised Statutes, which provides that no inhabitant of Texas shall be sued out of the county of his domicile, it is provided that: "Suits against any private corporation, association or joint-stock company may be commenced in any county in which the cause of action, or a part thereof, arose, or in which such corporation, association or company has an agency or representative, or in which its principal office is situated." It is admitted by appellant that it is a private corporation and that Flory & Albers were its agents and made the contract with appellees. In addition, the cause of action arose in Frio county. The cause comes clearly within the purview of the statute and the venue was in Frio county, as held by the trial court. Electric Co. v. Troell, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 200, 70 S. W. 324; Oil Co. v. Texas Refining Company, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 81, 118 S. W. 194. The order in this case for the crates was executed in Frio county, and is signed by appellee and Flory & Albers, the salesmen of appellant. It contained no reference to any confirmation by the principal and must be taken at its face value in connection with the question of venue. The contract having been made in Frio county, there is much authority for the proposition that by reason of that fact venue could be laid in that county. As said in the case of Mangum v. Lane City Rice Milling Co., 95 S. W. 605: "A cause of action consists of the right of the plaintiff, as well as of the injury to that right, and when the right arises from or is based upon a contract, such right comes into existence at the time and place of the making of the contract, and it necessarily follows that a cause of action growing out of a breach of contract arises, or comes into existence, in part, at the place at which the contract was made." In the case of Railway v. Hill, 63 Tex. 384, 51 Am. Rep. 642, a plea of privilege was dismissed and the court held: "This court has held that a cause of action consists as well of the right of the plaintiff as Tex. 127. The right of the plaintiff in this of the injury to that right. Phillio v. Blythe, 12 cause accrued by reason of his contract with the defendant, which was made in Galveston county. The injury arose from a breach of that in part' performed in that county, and was contract, and as the contract itself was to be wholly broken, a cause of action arose there, and the suit was properly instituted in Galveston county." In the case now before this court the contract was made in Frio county, and the crates were to be shipped there and payment was to be made, in part at least, there. Again, in the case of Rhome Milling Co. v. Cunningham, 171 S. W. 1081, the Court of Civil Appeals of the Second District held: "The undisputed facts show that Williams bought the goods in question in the town of Comanche from the traveling salesman and agent of appellant, and that payment for the same was to be made at that place at the Farmers' & Merchants' National Bank by taking up drafts for shipments which were to be made f. o. b. Comanche, Tex., and that the its drafts, upon the payment by Williams, was Comanche bank, to whom appellant was to send to remit the proceeds to appellant. It thus appears that the cause of action, at least in part, arose in Comanche county." The same rule was laid down by that court in Kell Milling Co. v. Bank, 155 S. W. 325. To the same effect are Seley v. Williams, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 405, 50 S. W. 399; Houston Rice Milling Co. v. Wilcox, 45 Tex. Civ. App. 303, 100 S. W. 204; Planters' Oil Co. v. Whitesboro Cotton Oil Co., 146 S. W. 225; and Western Wool Co. v. Hart (Sup.) 20 S. W. 131. If it should be held that the agents of appellant could not complete the contract, but that it had to be sent to appellant to be ratified, still the contract was made in Frio county. As said by this court in the Troell Case, hereinbefore cited: "The contract having been made and entered into between the parties in Guadalupe county (for its approval by an executive officer of time and place it was made, and was only a the company in Pennsylvania related to the ratification of it), we must hold, under the authorities cited, that a part thereof accrued or arose in that county, and that appellant's plea of privilege of being sued in the county of the residence of its agent was properly overruled." Appellees desire that this court pass on the question as to whether the trial should have proceeded on the merits after the plea of privilege had been overruled, or should have been postponed until this appeal was decided. That presents an interesting question, but no good end would be subserved by deciding it in this case, because such decision would not expedite a trial on the merits, and the question is therefore merely academic. It will be decided when it becomes necessary, but its decision would be useless in this case. The judgment is affirmed, (199 Mo. App. 404) days, to his damage, as he says, in the sum STATE ex rel. DOUGLAS v. TUNE et al. of $50,000. It is further averred that in (No. 16181.) that action it was necessary for the relator, (St. Louis Court of Appeals. Missouri. May as plaintiff therein, to accurately set forth Rehearing Denied May 22, 1918.) 7, 1918. the language used in the letter, which he contends is libelous; that through his attor WITNESSES 216-PRIVILEGE-COMMUNICA- ney he called upon the defendants, as memTIONS TO PUBLIC OFFICERS. The complaint board of the city of St. Louis, under Charter, art. 14, § 2, authorizing it to hear and examine complaints against any officers or employés of the city, is justified in refusing to produce a letter complaining against an employé, which he makes basis of action for libel against the sender, since it is contrary to public policy so to hamper the proceedings of the board designed to improve the service of the municipal government, which must largely depend on written complaints, which would seldom be made, were they open to the public, and therefore the board could not be compelled to produce such letter, which was highly confidential and privileged. Allen, J., dissenting. Original petition for writ of mandamus by the State, on the relation of Samuel J. Douglas, against Lewis T. Tune and others. Alternative writ quashed, and permanent writ denied. See, also, 191 S. W. 1078; 200 S. W. 1062. Douglas W. Robert, of St. Louis, for relator. Charles H. Dause and Everett Paul Griffin, both of St. Louis, for respondents. REYNOLDS, P. J. It is set out in the petition for a writ of mandamus now before us, that by section 2, of article 14, of the Charter of the city of St. Louis, a Complaint Board, consisting of three members, was created, with power in that board to employ a secretary. Setting out the section, it is averred that the respondents Tune, Walbridge and Cassidy, are such board, and the respondent Marsh, its secretary, and that relator is an employé of the city of St. Louis in its streets and sewers department, and that one Lawrence McDaniel and one George E. Thomas, on November 29th, 1916, wrote a certain letter, addressed to the Complaint Board, and filed the same with that board, and that thereby that letter became a public document and part of the records of the city of St. Louis. Averring that the relator could not set forth accurately the language of the letter, relator sets out what he avers is the substance of it. It is further averred that the relator, on December 29th, 1916, filed in the circuit court of the city of St. Louis, his action for libel against McDaniel and Thomas, in which he charged that the letter was written by them and that by reason of the writing of the letter, the Complaint Board, or some one acting for it, or under it, or pursuant to its direction, caused a police officer to arrest the plaintiff and he was taken to the City Dispensary by a police officer and thence to the City Hospital, in the city of St. Louis, where he was confined for a period of three bers of the Complaint Board, and demanded that he be permitted to inspect and make a copy of the letter; that the Complaint Board, not only by its several officers, but also acting at a meeting thereof, refused to permit the relator to make or have a copy of the letter; that thereupon the relator, plaintiff in the above mentioned action against McDaniel and Thomas, gave due notice of his intention to take depositions, and applied to the division of the circuit court of the city of St. Louis, in which the cause was pending, for a subpoena duces tecum, commanding said Marsh, as secretary of the board, to appear at the taking of these depositions and bring with him the letter referred to; that Marsh duly appeared before the commissioner theretofore appointed to take depositions in the case but refused to produce the letter; that thereupon the commissioner duly reported to the court the refusal of the witness and asked that he be held in contempt until the letter was produced; that Marsh, by his attorney, acting under the direction of the Complaint Board, filed a motion to quash the subpoena on the ground that the circuit court had no authority to issue the same, which motion the circuit court sustained, as it is said in the petition, "on the authority of State ex rel. McCulloch v. Taylor, 268 Mo. 312, 187 S. W. 1181." Averring that a copy of the letter is necessary for the relator in the preparation of his action against McDaniel and Thomas, and will be necessary evidence at the trial of the case, and that there is liability that the letter may be lost between this time and the time the cause is set for trial, and that in that letter, the relator, an employé of the city of St. Louis, is charged with certain offenses, and for that reason is entitled to have an inspection and copy of the letter, and that the letter is a part of the public records of the city of St. Louis and for that reason the relator is entitled to have an inspection and make a copy, and that without a copy of the letter and the letter itself at the proper time, relator cannot prepare or try his action against McDaniel and Thomas, and that the relator is remediless in the premises by or through ordinary process or proceedings, he prays our court to award its writ of mandamus against respondents Tune, Walbridge, Cassidy and Marsh, commanding them to permit him, his agent, or attorney, to inspect or make a copy of the letter. On presentation of this petition, an alternative writ of mandamus was issued. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes Respondents, in their return, after admitting the allegations as to proceedings in the circuit court to obtain the production or inspection of the letter referred to, and averring that the Complaint Board was created by the terms and provisions of the Charter of the city of St. Louis in the interests of the city of St. Louis and for the betterment and improvement of the public service in the various departments of the government of the city of St. Louis, and that it would be against public policy and against the public interest for the Complaint Board, or its members, to disclose the contents of a letter or letters of disclose the contents of a letter or letters of the character described in the relator's petition, or to disclose the name or names of the writer or writers thereof, because such disclosure would deter people from making complaints which might be beneficial to the public interests and the public service, set up with great particularity why they should not be required to permit relator or others to inspect or make copies of complaints filed with them, and denying the power of the court to make the order, or grant the relief asked; also claiming that if relator is entitled to any order for the production of any letter, his remedy is in the circuit court. On this return being filed, relator moved for judgment and the cause has been duly submitted and argued. This is the second time that this same case has been presented to us and writ prayed for as now. Considering it involved a matter beyond our jurisdiction, that is, construction of the Constitution of the State, and was ancillary to a suit for $50,000, which amount also placed the cause beyond our jurisdiction, we transferred it to the Supreme Court. See under this same title, 191 S. W. 1078, a decision not to be officially reported. It seems that counsel for relator, to avoid delay, dismissed that case in the Supreme Court and there commenced an original proceeding on the like petition. The Supreme Court issued its alternative writ, to which respondents made return, and on the cause being presented, the court vacated the alternative writ and dismissed the cause, holding that there was nothing disclosed by the record why the proceeding should not be brought in our court, saying of our court, in an opinion filed, 200 S. W. 1062, but not yet officially reported: Relator thereupon instituted the present proceeding in our court, we issuing an alternative writ of mandamus. Article 14, of the present Charter of the city of St. Louis, adopted by vote of the people June 30th, 1914, is headed, "Public Welfare Boards." Under the first section provision is made for the administration of the Mullanphy Fund. The second section is as follows: "Sec. 2. There is hereby established a complaint board to consist of three members to Said members serve without compensation. shall be appointed by the mayor for terms of one, two and three years, respectively. Each year thereafter the mayor shall appoint one member for a term of three years. Members Said board shall employ a secretary, and may shall hold office until their successors qualify. appoint such other employés as may be provided by ordinance. It shall receive complaints against any department, board, division, officer, or employé of the city, or against any public utility corporation, and examine the same. It shall recommend to the proper city or state authorities any action deemed advisable." The third section makes provision for other boards and institutions. The respondents are the members and secretary of the Complaint Board. Asssuming that the board has in its possession a letter such as described in the petition and alternative writ, and said to be described in the petition in the action in which the relator here is plaintiff and Lawrence McDaniel and George E. Thomas are defendants, lodging some sort of complaint against relator as a city employé, the sole question for our consideration is, whether in this proceeding, we can compel the respondents to permit the relator or his attorney to examine and make a copy of that letter. Our conclusion is that he is not entitled to any such order. The learned counsel for the relator suggests that the question here involved is a matter of privilege which cannot be set up by the respondents; that such a defense belongs solely to the defendants in the libel suit and that the libel action is not now being tried. Concede the latter. The very gist of the case, however, is whether these respondents, the Complaint Board and its secretary, officers of the city of St. Louis, can be compelled to furnish a copy of a letter said to have been lodged with them, making "That court has, under section 12, of article charges against a city employé. It is they, 6, of the Constitution, the same authority to as public officers, who claim the privilege, issue writs of mandamus that this court has and properly so. As we understand the prounder section 3 of the same article, unless otherwise limited by other provisions of the visions of section 2, of article 14, of the Constitution. That there is no such limita- Charter of the city of St. Louis, the Comtion in this case there can be no question, for plaint Board was established for the very the reason that neither the subject-matter of the libel suit mentioned nor the amount in- purpose of promoting efficiency in the pubvolved therein is involved in this case. This lic service. That board is authorized to reis a collateral proceeding to that action, mere- ceive complaints against any department, ly involving the right of the relator to compel board, officer, or employé, of the city and the Board of Complaint to produce the letter It has no power to mentioned for his inspection and use as evi- examine into the same. In Gray v. Pentland, 2 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 23, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that accusations preferred to the Governor of the state against a person in office are, so far of the nature of judicial proceedings, that the accuser is not held to prove the truth of them; that it is excused if they did not originate in malice and without probable cause, and that parol evidence cannot be given of the contents of a libelous deposition sent to the Governor containing charges against an officer of his appointment in an action for libel, though the court has refused a subpoena duces tecum, and that the Governor, to whom such a deposition is addressed, must exercise his own judgment with respect to the propriety of the production of the writing. This same principle was subsequently recognized as sound by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Yoter v. Sanno, 6 Watts (Pa.) 164, loc. cit. 166. In Worthington v. Scribner, 109 Mass. 487, 488 (12 Am. Rep. 736), Judge Gray, afterwards Mr. Justice Gray of the Supreme Court of the United States, held: after investigation and inquiry, consists of, to which, without repeating or reproducing, is, to recommend to the proper city or state we refer. There the case of Boske v. Cominauthorities any action deemed advisable as gore, 177 U. S. 459, 20 Sup. Ct. 701, 44 L. to city employés and officers or public serv- Ed. 846, is referred to and quoted at length ice corporations. They serve without com- as sustaining the confidential character of pensation. In the very highest sense, they such communications. are the confidential servants of the city and of its officers, for the purpose of advising those officers as to the character, fitness, ability and suitability of the various employés of the city, as well as of the acts of public utility corporations. We can conceive of no higher, more important, and useful branch of public administration than the duties thrown upon this Complaint Board. It is almost a necessary implication, when we consider the creation and objects and scope of this board, that communications from citizens, complaints from citizens, are the main source for putting the powers of inquiry of the board into play. Surely this provision of the Charter does not contemplate that the members of the board, who are serving without compensation, are to go around, of their own initiation, and investigate into and inquire as to all of the several officers and employés of the city, consisting of thousands of individuals. They must rely almost entirely upon information voluntarily given to them by citizens, who may have knowledge of the conduct and character and fitness of city employés. The creation of the board, in itself and in a measure, invites complaints from citizens of their officers and of public employés. If every citizen who knows of the unfitness of an officer or employé, or of facts he thinks require an investigation, believes it his duty to lodge information before the board, he will hesitate a long while before doing so if he knows his complaint is to be made public and become of the public records, so that any one may have access to it and he subjected to action for a possible libel. It is not to be expected, if that is so, that very many will come forward and lodge a complaint. We think that if it was understood that the complaints lodged by citizens against these employés were to become public property, without the consent of the party filing them, that the very object for which this board is created would be defeated. It may be that in sealing the records, so far as relates to these complaints, from public inspection, some individual will be hurt, but the right of that individual must yield to the right and to the benefit of the public at large. In our opinion these communications by citizens to the Complaint Board, covering the conduct of public officers and employés, are to be considered as highly confidential, and as records to which public policy would forbid the confidence to be violated. Such is said to be the law where the question has been very fully considered in a recent work on evidence, namely, Jones' Commentaries on the Law of Evidence in Civil Cases, vol. 4, sec. 762, p. 576, "It is the duty of every citizen to communicate to his government any information which he has of the commission of an offense against its laws. To encourage him in performing this duty without fear of consequences, the law holds such information to be among the sefar and under what circumstances the names crets of state, and leaves the question how of the informers and the channel of communication shall be suffered to be known, to the absolute discretion of the government, to be interests of the public require. exercised according to its views of what the Courts of justice therefore will not compel or allow the discovery of such information, either by the informer himself, or by any other person, withsubordinate officer to whom it is given, by the out the permission of the government. evidence is excluded, not for the protection of the witness or of the party in the particular icy, because of the confidential nature of such case, but upon general grounds of public pol communications." The While we have no decision of our courts that directly meets this proposition, we have its spirit applied in Smart v. Kansas City, 208 Mo. 162, 105 S. W. 709, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 365, 123 Am. St. Rep. 415, 13 Ann. Cas. 932. There it was held that a hospital physician who attends a patient at the hospital not only cannot testify as to what he learned of the patient's condition while so attending her, but that the official hospital record, into which has been copied the diagnosis of the case, is privileged and not admissible in evidence. It is further there held that the fact that the city ordinances require such records to be kept does not furnish any reason why the statute against disclosure of privileged communications should be violated. That opinion is not altogether germane to the case before us but is illustrative of the rule as to privileged communications. In line with this decision of our Supreme Court is that of Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Trustees of Michigan Asylum for the Insane, 178 Mich. 193, 144 N. W. 538, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 22, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 146.. Our conclusion is that the respondents here were justified in their refusal to permit relator to have an inspection of the letter, assuming such letter was in their control, and in refusing to allow the relator to make a copy of it. That is as far as we go in this case, except to say that neither our court nor the circuit court in which the action for libel is pending can compel the production of the letter for the purposes sought by relator. Whether the circuit court, in which the action for libel is pending, can proceed with the case, in the absence of the original letter and allow parol testimony to be given as to its contents, is a question which is not now before us and which we do not decide. The alternative writ heretofore issued is quashed and a permanent writ denied. Action by Willie Buskie against George Buskie. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed. Robert L. McLaran, of St. Louis, for appellant. John B. Edwards, of St. Louis, for respondent. ALLEN, J. This is an action by a wife for support and maintenance, for herself and two minor children born of the marriage between her and the defendant, under the provisions of section 8295, Revised Statutes 1909. The decree below was for plaintiff, awarding her the sum of $125 per month for her support and maintenance and that of the children, and adjudging also that defendant pay necessary medical, dental, surgical, and hospital bills for the children, and pay plaintiff the sum of $150 for the purchase of household effects. The decree awards the custody of the children to plaintiff, giving defendant the right to have them at certain times, and requires that defendant, who is in the railroad business, "procure and furnish transportation on a railroad allowing free transportation to defendant and members of his family, for plaintiff and said ALLEN, J., dis- children to and from some suitable place, to BUSKIE v. BUSKIE. (No. 15590.) (St. Louis Court of Appeals. Missouri. May 7, 1918.) 1. HUSBAND AND WIFE 297-SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE. In a wife's action for support and maintenance of herself and her two children, evidence held to entitle her to decree in her favor, showing that her husband abandoned her, and refused and neglected to provide for her, within Rev. St. 1909, § 8295. 2. HUSBAND AND WIFE 300 SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE-FINDING OF FACTS. A so-called finding of facts in a wife's suit against her husband for support and maintenance performs no function whatever in the case, and the Court of Appeals, as to disposition of the appeal, looks to the decree alone. 3. HUSBAND AND WIFE 300-SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE-REVIEW OF EVIDENCE. On appeal in a wife's suit against her husband for support and maintenance of herself and children, the Court of Appeals reviews the evidence in the record before it, and passes judgment on the facts as in equity. 4. HUSBAND AND WIFE 298(1, 2) - SUP PORT AND MAINTENANCE-CHILDREN-PAYMENT OF MEDICAL BILLS. Decree, in a wife's suit for support and maintenance of herself and children pursuant to Rev. St. 1909, § 8295, properly required that the husband pay, in addition to a monthly allowance, necessary medical and dental bills for the children, the requirement being nothing more than the husband's legal duty as a father; such feature of the decree not making the husband chargeable with the wife's debts contracted after judgment for support and maintenance in violation of the statute. be selected by her on such railroad, furnishing free transportation, away from the city of St. Louis, and that they be allowed to remain at such place for the month of August each year." From this decree the defendant prosecutes the appeal before us. The evidence discloses that plaintiff and defendant were married in Lexington, Ky., where plaintiff then resided, on June 8, 1910. Defendant was then employed as a railroad accountant at Cincinnati, Ohio, where plaintiff and defendant took up their residence and where they remained until the latter part of March or early in April, 1911, when, with defendant's approval and because plaintiff expected to give birth to a child, plaintiff went to the home of her parents in Lexington. The child, a boy, was born on May 5, 1911. It appears that for some time the child required much medical attention, and that plaintiff, with defendant's consent, remained at the home of her parents until September, 1911. In the meantime defendant had ac& Texas Railway Company, in the city of cepted a position with the Missouri, Kansas St. Louis, and in September, 1911, defendant brought his wife and child to St. Louis, where the family boarded in private boarding houses until March, 1912, when plaintiff again visited her parents in Lexington, Ky., where she remained until June of that year, when she returned to St. Louis. Defendant then established his family in a furnished apartment in that city, where the parties resided until August, 1912, when plaintiff went to Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court; visit defendant's mother at Waterford, N. Y., Thos. C. Hennings, Judge. "Not to be officially published." where she remained until some time in October of that year, when defendant went to |