REPORTS OF THE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, OCTOBER TERM, 1881. WADE v. WALNUT. The court adheres to the decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois declaring that the provision in the existing Constitution of that State entitled "Municipal subscriptions to railroads or private corporations" took effect July 2, 1870. ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois. This was an action brought by Wade against the town of Walnut, upon coupons cut from bonds purporting to be issued by the defendant, under the style of Township of Walnut, in the County of Bureau and State of Illinois. The declaration avers that each of the bonds contains, among other recitals, the following: "This bond is issued under and by virtue of the charter of said Illinois Grand Trunk Railway Company, and amendments thereto, and other laws of the State of Illinois, and in accordance with the vote of the electors of said township, at the special election held August 6th, 1870, in accordance with said charter and amendments and laws." The defendant demurred to the declaration, and judgment was rendered in its favor. It is unnecessary to state the remaining facts, as the only question upon which this court passed was as to whether at the foregoing date there was in force an article of the Constitution of Illinois which is as follows: "No county, city, town, township, or other municipality shall ever become subscriber to the capital stock of any railroad or private corporation, or make donation to, or loan its credit in aid of such corporation: Provided, however, that the adoption of this article shall not be construed as affecting the right of any such municipality to make such subscriptions where the same have been authorized, under existing laws, by a vote of the people of such municipalities prior to such adoption." Wade sued out this writ of error. Mr. Thomas S. McClelland and Mr. George A. Sanders for the plaintiff in error. Mr. William C. Goudy and Mr. Allan C. Story for the defendant in error. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. The only question we have to decide in this case is, whether the section of the Illinois Constitution adopted in 1870, relating to "municipal subscriptions to railroads or private corporations," was in force on the 6th of August, 1870. This question came before the Supreme Court of the State at the January Term, 1872, only eighteen months after the Constitution was adopted, in Schall v. Bowman (62 Ill. 321), and it was then decided that this section took effect on the 2d of July, the day the people voted for its adoption. The opinion in the case was written by Mr. Justice Breese, two justices dissenting. At the September Term in the same year the same questions came again before the court in Richards v. Donagho (66 id. 73), and the opinion was then delivered by Mr. Justice Thornton, in the following words: "The only question presented by this record was, after mature deliberation, settled by the opinion in Schall v. Bowman. . . . Notwithstanding the able and plausible argument made in this case, the majority of the court adhere to the opinion in the case referred to above." Afterwards, at the January Term, 1878, in Wright v. Bishop (88 id. 302), the court said: "Appellants make a very able and ... interesting argument against the rulings in those cases; but we are not convinced they should be overruled." This court has never until now been called on to decide the question, but in numerous cases it has assumed that the section took effect on the day fixed by the Supreme Court of the State. Town of Concord v. Portsmouth Savings Bank, 92 U. S. 625; County of Moultrie v. Rockingham Ten-cent Savings Bank, id. 631; County of Randolph v. Post, 93 id. 502; Fairfield v. County of Gallatin, 100 id. 47; Walnut v. Wade, 103 id, 683; Louisville v. Savings Bank, 104 id. 469. Under these circumstances we are not inclined to consider the question an open one here while the Supreme Court of the State adheres to its present rulings. Judgment affirmed. SWOPE v. LEFFING WELL. This court has jurisdiction to re-examine the judgment of a State court involv ing the right of a national bank to purchase a promissory note secured by a deed of trust upon real estate. A motion to affirm will, however, be granted where that is the only Federal question in the case and the decision below is in recognition of the right. ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri. This was a suit brought in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, Missouri, against Leffingwell and the other defendants, to restrain and enjoin the sale of certain real estate in the city of St. Louis, under a deed of trust executed to secure the payment of a promissory note whereof the Atlas National Bank of Boston became the purchaser. The case was ultimately determined by the Supreme Court of the State reversing the decrees of the subordinate courts, and directing that the bill be dismissed. Swope sued out this writ of error. A motion was made to dismiss the writ for want of jurisdiction, upon the ground that there was no Federal question involved; to which was united a motion to affirm. Mr. Philip Phillips in support of the motions. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. We have jurisdiction of this case. The motion to dismiss is, therefore, denied; but as the only Federal question presented on the merits was decided by the court below in accordance with our rulings in National Bank v. Matthews (98 U. S. 621) and National Bank v. Whitney (103 id. 99), the motion to affirm is Granted. CLARK v. FREDERICKS. 1. A judgment will not be reversed because the court below erred in directing the order in which the evidence was introduced, unless it clearly appears that the complaining party was thereby injured. 2. An objection to matters which was not brought to the attention of the court below will not be considered here. 3. The finding below covering all the issues is conclusive, and where a request for special findings was refused, this court will assume that they were not established by the evidence. ERROR to the Supreme Court of the Territory of Montana. Davis, having obtained a judgment against Wellington A. Fredericks, sued out a writ of attachment, by way of execution, which Clark, the sheriff of Gallatin County, Montana Territory, levied upon some personal chattels alleged to belong to the judgment debtor, but which his wife claimed were her separate property. This suit was, therefore, brought in the District Court of that county, by her, against Clark and Davis, to recover possession of the chattels, or their value in case the delivery of them could not be had. There was a judgment for the plaintiff, which was, on appeal, affirmed by the Supreme Court of the Territory. Clark and Davis sued out this writ. The assignment of errors is set out in the opinion of the court. Mr. Richard T. Merrick and Mr. Martin F. Morris for the plaintiffs in error. Mr. Samuel Shellabarger and Mr. Jeremiah M. Wilson for the defendants in error. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. The errors assigned in this case are: 1. That Mrs. Fredericks, when on the stand as a witness in her own behalf, was not permitted to answer certain questions put to her on cross-examination; 2. That the court did not separate its findings of fact from its conclusions of law; and, 3. That the court did not find the distinct facts requested by the plaintiffs in error. As to the first assignment, it is sufficient to say that no harm could have resulted from the ruling on the cross-examination, as in a subsequent stage of the case, when the questions were clearly proper, the witness testified fully as to all the matters originally inquired about. A judgment will not be reversed because of an error of the court in directing as to the order in which testimony shall be introduced, unless it clearly appears that the complaining party has been injured by what was done. The matter referred to in the second assignment does not seem to have been brought to the attention of either of the courts below, and the objection now made comes too late in this court for the first time. If the defect complained of had been specifically pointed out to the District Court when the findings were filed, it would no doubt have been corrected. There is nothing in all this very confused record to indicate that the point was ever made until the brief for the plaintiffs in error was filed here. The findings are conclusive as to the facts, and they cover all the issues. Whether the distinct facts set forth in the requests for findings presented by the plaintiffs in error were proved or not we need not inquire. As the court declined to find them, we must assume they were not established by the evidence. This record is so confused as to be almost unintelligible. If counsel here had been less careful in the presentation of the questions raised for our re-examination, we should have declined to consider the case on this account. Judgment affirmed. |