was every other campaign of Napoleon's that so utterly bewildered his unimaginative enemies? What else was that superb plan of invading England with its alternative plan that culminated at Ulm and Austerlitz?

What else was Nelson's suddenly conceived and executed plan near Cape St. Vincent? What else caused Washington's crossing of the Delaware? What else caused Washington's sudden move to Yorktown?

Moltke's wars against Denmark, Austria and France in 1864, 1866 and 1870 may be put forward in rebuttal as wars directed, not by invention, but by plodding; directed by a laborious, unimaginative work of detail, carried on for many years. That there was much laborious and unimaginative work carried on for many years is doubtless true. But just that kind of work was carried on in perfecting the steam engine, the printing press and every other great invention; just that kind of work was carried on in developing every great idea in government, commerce and religion. As to literature, it is well known that Byron worked days and nights, sometimes, over a single line of poetry, and that Gray spent nearly his whole life in writing his " Elegy in a Country Churchyard."

The detail work of developing Moltke's idea into concrete plans of campaign was tremendous; but there was an idea existing before it was developed, and that idea was conceived by the imagination of Moltke. The idea was smaller in size than the "little grain of mustard seed" and of immeasurably less material weight; but it has been developed into a system that has spread over all the civilized world, and that will carry the name of Moltke in history long after Bismarck and William I have been forgotten.

Civilization was started by invention; its progress has been based on invention ever since, and it is based on invention now. The most important single agency in maintaining civilization has been war: for it was by war that wild beasts were subdued; it has been by war that the opposing forces of barbarism have been kept down, and it is by war that they must be continually kept down; otherwise, the forces of barbarism will prevail, as they did prevail for a time, when they destroyed the civilization of Rome.

Other agencies than invention and war have, of course, been at work as well; such agencies as religion, morality, industry,

study, etc., that bind civilized communities together, and enable them to act in concert. Yet in each one of these agencies, we see invention as the initiating force. For every religion, every system of morality, every branch of study had to be invented and produced, before it could exist.

If invention has been the initiating factor in the progress of civilization, by being the initiating factor in all the various agencies that have produced it, and if war has been the principal single agency in maintaining it, then invention and war have been the most important constructive factors of history.

That this fact has not been clearly recognized is true. The reason probably is that it is only within the last hundred years that invention has been recognized as an important factor in life, and that the material of warfare has grown so enormously in complexity and bulk, that the details have shut out our view of warfare as a whole.

Every man is confronted in his own life with the necessity for attending to details. Every officer in his own career is confronted continuously with that necessity, especially in his youth. Details must be attended to. The accuracy with which details are attended to makes the difference ofttimes between hitting the target and missing it-between failure and success.

Now there are two different kinds of mentality needed for grasping and handling general principles on the one hand and details on the other hand. Few men possess both kinds of mentality in any high degree: the man who seems to have shown the most capacity in both lines was Napoleon; with the possible exception of Julius Cæsar.

Some people become a little irritated when one speaks of these men, or of great geniuses in general, and declare that it is foolish. to hold up such impossible examples for us to follow. The writer is willing to admit it is a little trying to one's self-esteem to note what such men accomplished, and that it sometimes has a depressing effect on one. But if it does have such an effect on any one of us, is not that a sign that his ego is getting a little too big, and that he had better take a primary course in humility? No one of us is expected to be a genius, every one of us knows that he is not a genius, and also knows that all his friends are distinctly aware of the fact. So why should we be disturbed if we cannot perform the feats of Cæsar?

But if we cannot perform his feats, we can modestly follow his line of effort. We can, for instance, try to master details to a sufficient degree to do the duties with which we are immediately charged, and try, at the same time not to forget the general principles which we have been taught, and even to apply those principles whenever we see an opportunity to make some improve

ment.

Of course, the primary use of our efforts must be to keep in order and to operate the parts of the naval machine with which each of us is entrusted: for instance, a gun, a turret, a destroyer, or a ship, and to do this according to the instructions which have been given us. But if everybody did this and no more, we should never improve in any way, and the navy would never keep up with the progress of the world in mechanisms or in methods. If all the officers of the navy had done no more (many did no more) during the years between 1881 and 1920, we should now have only ships like the Constellation and Hartford to cruise in, the Bureau System would still dominate the Navy Department, and the War College would not exist. It was because Moltke did much more than this that the Prussian Army overwhelmed the Austrian and French almost with one blow, and that the name of Moltke is the last on the list of the super-great strategists of history.

While we toil on, therefore, doing our allotted tasks according to the orders that we receive, let us raise our eyes from time to time, and try to get a general view of what the Navy as a whole is trying to do, and see if there is not a chance to invent something that will help. This is what Moltke did; and this was why he was able so to utilize the possibilities of railroads and telegraphs, that he got his army into France before Bazaine and McMahon could. unite, and whipped each one in turn.

(CONCLUDED)

By CARROLL STORRS ALDEN, PH. D.,

Professor of English, U. S. Naval Academy

PART II. OPERATIONS OF THE AMERICAN SUBMARINE PATROL

(CONCLUDED)

3. THE PATROL OFF THE BRITISH ISLES

It was the seven L-boats of the Fifth Division, American Submarine Force, operating from Bantry Bay, Ireland, that had the actual war experience. Their personnel may not have been superior to that of the others, but they had the opportunity, so eagerly coveted, of operating in waters about the British Isles, where the Germans were constantly active. In their patrol of seven or eight months they made 21 contacts with the enemy.

To go back somewhat in our narrative, the Bushnell, one tug, and six of her brood of submarines-the L-9 as narrated had put back to Boston-having reformed at the Azores, set out on 19 January, 1918, for Ireland. That very evening they ran into a gale which partially scattered the Division; and for several days it was another trying ordeal of heaving to, running at slow speed, again heaving to, losing towing hawsers, and getting under way again. After eight days the expedition, lacking two submarines, reached Queenstown. One of these, having become separated on the first day out, had returned according to instructions to Pontal Delgada. The other, the L-10, Lieutenant J. C. Van de Carr, U. S. N., losing touch with the Division, proceeded to the rendezvous appointed, and finding only thick weather with nothing in sight then laid her course to the ultimate destination, Berehaven, Bantry Bay.

During the voyage, Lieutenant F. J. Cunneen, U. S. N., of the L-II met with a painful accident. While he was standing on the bridge, a wave sweeping over caught him off his guard and dropped him on his back across the rail of the bridge. He was badly bruised, and for a while it was feared he had sustained serious internal injuries. Because of the gale, it was 36 hours before he could be transferred to the Bushnell for medical attention; and during all this time, the pain becoming unbearable whenever he attempted to lie down, he stood, holding on to a rod above his head. From the same ship, the chief machinist's mate had to be trans

ferred to the tender for chlorine gas poisoning, and a seaman for infected finger. The L-3 and the L-10 each had the sad experience of losing a man overboard. The record of the latter is as follows:

From the War Diary of the L-10

24 January, 1918.—At 12.30 p. m., R. A. Leese, gunner's mate, Ist class, fell overboard and was lost before the boat could return to the spot. We were running on both engines at the time. He fell heavily, hitting the side of the boat, which probably stunned him. He may have been struck by the port screw. He was seen lying in the water motionless-the sea was moderate-but after we had turned and were heading for him he disappeared when we were about two boat lengths away. He wore rubber boots and heavy clothing. After circling the spot for one hour, I gave the order to proceed.

Next day Van de Carr reached Bantry Bay, and had the satisfaction of beating by two days the others, who put in to Queens

town.

25 January.-Arrived at rendezvous "A" at 7.00 a. m. Nothing in sight. Weather thick. Decided to proceed to Bantry Bay.

At 11.30 a. m. sighted land, which proved to be Black Ball Head, Bantry Bay. The land fall was rather remarkable, considering that for two days we had had no sight. Arrived off Berehaven at 4.00 p. m., and a trawler piloted us in and alongside the British submarine tender H. M. S. Ambrose. Reported to Captain Nasmith, R. N., Senior Officer Present Afloat, who cordially welcomed us and made us very comfortable. We reported the L-10 ready for service.

Passed a German submarine on the way in.

The rest of the division spent a week and a half in Queenstown in refueling and making minor repairs. A common trouble, due to the pounding of heavy seas, was the buckling of torpedo shutters, and these had to be straightened. Then they went to Berehaven, where they found the L-10 and two American destroyers, together with some British warships, including submarines. When on 21 February they were joined by the two boats that had started with them from Newport, but had turned back, Division Five was complete.

Repair work is never a thrilling tale, and the story of the Bushnell, like that of many another devoted mother, is lacking in adventure and brilliant achievement. Yet without the Bushnell, Division Five would have done little. There is an old rule in submarine work, that for every man afloat one is needed at the base. This is but an approximation; in order that 210 men on