noises. The effect of the engine noises on the diaphragm was therefore balanced and it failed to respond to any sound waves coming from a distance and only when the lips were placed. directly in front of the diaphragm and the sound waves of the voice were thus concentrated on one side, did the diaphragm respond and was speech transmitted. With the sound proof helmets and the special anti-noise microphones, it was not only possible but easy to carry on a conversation, in spite of the 48 cylinders which were roaring continuously only a few feet away. Before the NC-3 descended near the Azores, the question of landing was fully discussed over the telephone by the two pilots. and the navigator. The opportunity of a conference in the air can not be appreciated until after one has been placed in such a position as was the crew of the seaplane, lost in a fog with only a limited supply of gasoline.

a

The transmitter on which the greater reliance was placed was kilowatt wind driven spark set mounted on a strut under one of the engines, where it was exposed to the passing air. All the circuits, except the field switch and the variometer, were mounted behind the generator, in the hollow shell required to make the generator "stream-lined" or adapted to air resistance. The spark gap and closed and open oscillating circuits were so arranged that the various leads passed back from one circuit to another until the high tension current, ready for the antenna, was picked off from a clip connection in the tip end of the tail. The complete set weighed but 44 pounds and yet was heard 1200 miles. The two-blade propeller was designed to deliver full power when the seaplane was flying at its slowest flying speed, 65 miles per hour, and as this air speed is approximately the speed of the air behind one of the propellers of an engine when run while the plane was on the water, the same radio set could be used as an emergency set, provided that the engines could be run. But when the NC-3 landed on the water and the set was thus mounted, the forward motion given to the plane by the pull of the engine caused heavy strains on the already weakened hull, which jumped over and dived into the waves instead of drifting over them. For this reason, grimly as the need was felt, it was considered too dangerous to try to use the set.

The other transmitter, known as the emergency set, is shown mounted on the radio desk. The high voltage required for this

set was obtained from a dynamotor driven by a storage battery, which battery also furnished directly the low voltage current. This little transmitter was capable of radiating .8 of an ampere, which under normal conditions would give a range of 75 miles. The transmitter proper weighed but 8 pounds and with the dynamotor weighed only 26 pounds. It paid for its weight when the NC-3 landed 40 miles from Halifax. Communication was established with the tender, the U. S. S. Baltimore, within 50 seconds. The tender was informed of the location of the plane, the trouble encountered, and the fact that no assistance would be required. This set, because of its 26 pounds of weight, was removed at Trepassey Bay.

Some unit of the radio apparatus above described was in use practically every moment from the time the planes left Rockaway Beach until they reached their several destinations. The radio operator was constantly either sending a message, or listening to the radio compass signals or copying a message from the destroyers. Just as the planes were off Chatham, on Cape Cod, the noon time signal from Washington was received in the planes and the chronometers given another check. Secretary Roosevelt in Washington desired to send a message to one of the planes and to receive a reply. So quickly was the communication carried out that (1) the message was forwarded to a shore radio station, (2) the plane was called and the message delivered to the plane, (3) it was referred to the commanding officer by telephone, (4) the reply was given to the operator, (5) the shore radio station was called and the reply sent to the station, (6) the reply was forwarded to Washington and (7) before three minutes had elapsed, Secretary Roosevelt received the reply.

In contrast to this efficient service of the radio equipment was the urgent need of communication by the NC-3 floundering about in the heavy seas off the Azores, unable to send any message at all because the apparatus designed for such a crisis was left behind on account of its weight. Only the receiving equipment could be used, which told of the plans of search and the "Estimate of the Situation." Later, as we were drifting into port, the apparatus did its final bit: we intercepted-" NC-3 sighted on water seven miles from breakwater Ponta Delgada under her own power."

[COPYRIGHTED]

U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE, ANNAPOLIS, MD.

POLICY-ITS RELATION TO WAR AND ITS BEARING UPON PREPARATION FOR WAR

By COMMANDER C. C. GILL, U. S. Navy

Policy, broadly speaking, maps the destiny of a state in the fulfillment of national aspirations as seen and interpreted by those in governmental control.

When national policies conflict, as they continually do and must, diplomacy, backed by potential power, attempts to negotiate a settlement by the medium of official notes and interchanges. These do not always succeed. Then, if the difference is justiciable, susceptible of decision by the application of principles of law and equity, joint appeal may be made to some international court such as that of the Hague; or, if the dispute is purely political and non-justiciable in nature, the nations involved may, by special agreement, resort to a tribunal of arbitration in the hope of arriving at a satisfactory compromise or other suitable arrange

ment.

But sometimes all attempts at peaceful adjustment fail. Then, if the issue affects the vital interests, the independence, or the honor of the disputants, it has been the experience of history that war usually results and each belligerent strives by force of arms. to sustain its avowed policy. Active war is a continuation of policy by violent means.

"UNLIMITED WAR AND "LIMITED WAR"

It follows that wars are of various kinds according to the policies they are called upon to support. If the object is of great national importance, a matter of self-preservation in which the peoples of the belligerent countries are deeply aroused, and if the two contestants are evenly matched nations or combinations of nations of the first rank, then each side will institute extreme

military measures, the utmost resources of the countries engaged will be under contribution-in such a struggle entire nations are in arms and the course of the civilization of the world may be in the balance. In so far as the chief participants were concerned, the World War of 1914-1918 is an example of this class known as "Unlimited War."

On the other hand, if the matter under dispute is of minor importance, a question relating to a distant possession, an issue toward which the people at large are indifferent, or a contention wherein the parties concerned are of unequal strength, then the objective may not be worth any great military effort, or the weaker belligerent may be incapable of offering significant opposition; in any such case, the point in policy under controversy will be conceded by one side or the other without extensive military operations. Wars of this class may prove of great importance in their ultimate influence on the history of the world, but they are decided without a wide disruption of society or far reaching derangement of the usual pursuits of peace. The Boer War in the Transvaal and the Spanish American War may be cited as familiar examples belonging to this second class called "Limited War."

Policy, therefore, controls the declaration of war, determines its nature and extent and is its master. The statesmen must instruct the strategists as to the political object of the war, and the extent of effort the nation is willing to make to attain it, before the latter can draw plans for its prosecution. In illustration, it is at once seen how the war plans drawn by the strategists of Brazil to govern her participation in the World War were, for political reasons, limited in demanding expenditure of national effort, as compared to the war plans which governed the participation of France.

Policy dictates grand strategy, which, in turn, determines the mutual relations and respective functions of its two branches, maritime strategy and land strategy. The line distinguishing policy from grand strategy is not sharply drawn; to wage war successfully politicians and strategists must meet on common ground and evolve a general plan of campaign to guide and coordinate major operations both ashore and afloat.