from gaining the positions in which they were to strike at the trade between England and Norway; there were no contacts with British forces during the enterprise.

On the night of 26-27 October Flotillas III and IX and the Flanders Half Flotilla made a successful raid into the Channel. On 5 November the Fourth Half Flotilla, the Moltke and Battle Squadron III were sent out to attempt to save the U-20, which had run aground off the Danish coast; in this operation the Grosser Kurfurst and Kronprinz were torpedoed by a British. submarine. When Scheer was reprimanded by the Kaiser for thus risking valuable ships to save a submarine, he stated in reply: The dangers which threaten our U-boats on these expeditions are so great that they are justified in demanding the utmost support that the fleet can give them in time of need. On no account must the feeling be engendered amongst the crews that they will be left to their fate if they get into difficulties. Fear of loss or damage must not lead us to curb the initiative in naval warfare, which so far has lain mainly in our hands. To us every U-boat is of such importance that it is worth risking the whole available fleet to give it assistance and support.

It is hoped that this brief account will help to clear up to some extent the mystery with which the tactics of the Germans at the Battle of Jutland has been so long surrounded and to show the relation of this battle to the German naval operations of 1916.

[COPYRIGHTED]

U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE, ANNAPOLIS, MD.

THE ROLE OF THE LINE

By LIEUT. COMMANDER F. S. CRAVEN, U. S. Navy

1. The activities of the navy are many, but they all should proceed with but a single end in view-to prepare for war. In general, then, these activities should consist in determining what constitutes preparedness and in putting it into practice.

2. The first process is generally described as planning; the second is administration. Planning lays the foundation for administration. In the routine of peace times and in the conduct of routine activities during war planning must always look ahead because it must determine the aims, consider the means, and lay down the processes-that is, prescribe the organization and its routine. But in the crisis of battle, planning and administration for the purpose of tactics and strategy, become so closely related that they practically constitute a single process which depends on the instantaneous development of the action. Thus we have:

(a) Planning as a separate process.

(b) Administration as distinct from planning, and
(c) Command in war, which combines the two.

3. Planning requires a distinct mental attitude and specific mental equipment. The necessary mental equipment includes intelligence, originality, analytic ability, mental energy, and receptivity, and there must be temperamental qualifications, including open mindedness, fairness, modesty, carefulness, thoroughness, and the ability to collaborate with others. In addition to this equipment the individual who engages in planning functions should have special training, for although it is probably true that an untrained man having proper mental equipment could learn rapidly while he attacks his problems, it certainly is true that time would be saved and mistakes would be avoided were he trained. The intrinsic excellence of his work from the beginning certainly

would be improved by preliminary training. This training must fit him as an expert in lines as follows:

In the general activities of the naval profession.

In the detailed functions of the branch to which he is assigned.

In the methods of scientific problem solving.

In the habit of acquiring exact information.

4. It appears almost superfluous to state that men who plan for the navy must be equipped as thoroughly as possible for their work. They must first be selected, then trained for just this work. In the earlier stages of their development it is inevitable that they will be more versed in the special functions of a selected branch than in the naval profession as a whole, because the one is a part, and thorough knowledge of the whole can only be gained through experience with all parts. Obviously the men who plan should be selected early in their careers so that they may have constant practice, because planning, to be successful, must deal largely with general principles. The ability to distinguish general principles is in itself difficult. To apply them properly to administrative purposes is an art.

5. Pure administration is the course of action required to interpret and to execute plans. In the navy an administrator is called an executive. To interpret plans an executive should possess in some degree the attributes also required for planning. A certain amount of planning experience would therefore be advantageous to him if obtainable without interfering with his administrative training. Opportunity is presented to the young officers who serve as heads of departments of small vessels to gain both types of experience at once. They should be assisted and directed by a well considered course of supervision and instruction by squadron or flotilla staffs.

6. To execute plans there are required attributes of rather a different order. The executive must be:

Possessed of initiative.

Quick to act.

Possessed of good judgment.

Forceful.

Possessed of personality in order to handle men.
Self-controlled.

Of high moral character.

Finally, the executive also requires training to fit him to perform his work, which, however, he must derive largely from experience.

7. When we attempt to define the characteristics for the great leaders who must command our fleets, administer our naval bases, direct the activities of the several elementary functions of the Navy Department, co-ordinate the efforts of the whole-then we must recognize several things. First, that these men must possess all of these characteristics in marked degree. Such men are rare. They can be but the cream of the many who possess the attributes for the one or the other class of work. They must be selected and by a process which shall be as certain as possible in its results. Such selection obviously cannot be made at an early period in their careers. Second, that no man can possess within himself the capacity for both planning and administration necessary to handle alone the activities of a great subdivision of the navy. He can only direct the performance of such activities by trained men. In a word, he requires a staff of trained men. In time of peace these men must work together to prepare that subdivision for war. Detailed plans must be made for war activities, and must be tested by application and trial so that they may be correctly matured. Thus these two branches of the staff must work toward a common end, each aiding the other, yet working independently. For planning requires time for research, for experiment, for weighing this against that, for the intense study of the effect of small details on general principles; whereas administration requires instant decisions and quick action so that the numerous demands of a routine may not produce an accumulation of matters unattended to, which spells inefficiency and invites defeat.

8. So it is with the great co-ordinator-the Chief of Naval Operations. He requires by far the most numerous and best trained staff because to direct operations he must have the assistance of men who are themselves the counterparts in experience and ability of the heads of the primary subdivisions. Each of these men requires the assistance of younger men, of both types, so that the volume of work may be handled. Thus we must have a central planning section of superlative excellence which shall investigate and define the basic principles governing the activities of the whole. They must prepare plans so general in nature that they will coordinate and develop the activities of subdivisions without restricting their proper freedom of action. They must work in close