be adopted the Island of Attu would provide an excellent site for this future station. In the evolution of this radio circuit the St. Paul radio station exercised a considerable influence. Several years ago St. Paul found little difficulty in copying Otchishi, Anadyr, and Petropavlovsk. The Japanese government desired to exchange daily weather reports through St. Paul. Several tests were arranged between the Japanese station at Otchishi and St. Paul. Although these tests were unsuccessful in the days when St. Paul had only a 5 kw. spark set it was hoped that the installation of the new 30 kw. arc would overcome the difficulty. So far the hoped for success has not been completely attained. Another possible trans-pacific circuit has been outlined by the Officer in Charge, Washington-Alaska Military Cable and Telegraph System. His plan is to make use of the present Army Cable Telegraph and Radio System as far as Nome and from there route traffic to the Russian radio station at Anadyr, about 450 miles away. While this plan does not appear practicable, especially at the present time, still it is an interesting possibility. In the above discussion it may appear that the importance of the submarine cable has been somewhat exaggerated at the expense of radio. In the development of these two means of trans-oceanic communication neither should be developed independently of the other. They should go forward hand in hand. Any advance made by one is certain to help the other. These two systems are so dissimilar that it is very improbable that both would be placed out of commission by the same catastrophe. In the south the radio system was built to parallel the cable. In the north these conditions will be reversed. Any cable that is laid there in the future will have its route influenced by the radio circuit that is at present in course of evolution. DISCUSSION Accuracy of Fire at Long Ranges Reference: (a) “Retrospect upon Japan-Russia War," Mahan, 1906 CAPTAIN W. P. CRONAN, U. S. Navy.-Captain Chase has done more than set forth with clarity an interesting essay on gunnery-he has again laid before us the N square law, which is refreshing to the mind and therefore thought provoking. His ultimate deductions pertain to ordnance questions, but his train of thought has properly proceeded from tactics first, to gunnery, thence, logically to decisions on ordnance design. Somewhat like this: First. What do we want to do? Second. How are we going to do it? Third. What can we do it with? Now I propose, using this essay of Captain Chase's as material, to work back the other way and see if we can derive a strategic lesson from the arguments before us. Well, accepting his deductions, and disregarding intermediate reasoning, we are confronted with his premises, which are tactical and based on the "N square law," which we may accept on the authority of Captain Chase, corroborated as it is by independent English research. It may here be conveniently re-stated as follows: “Advantage is measured, not by the ratio of the number of the opposing ships actually engaged, but by the square of this ratio." This assumes opposing ships to have equal hitting power. In tactics we deal with the disposition of a fleet approaching to battle, and, in so far as gunnery is concerned, actually in battle. In strategy we deal with the disposition of a fleet before battle, and in preparation therefor. It appears to be true, other things being equal, that the N square law, as potential force, obtains here as well as in tactical contact, in gunnery. Assuming this to be true, let us examine the available potential strength of one fleet, in the light of the law, which, strategically applied, points clearly to the necessity for concentration, in order that N may have its greatest value. From an examination of the Navy Directory, August 1, 1920, we find that we have available for use in the main body of a fleet, vessels of the first line (excluding South Carolina and Michigan) to the number of sixteen (16) (including Tennessee, not yet ready). In conformity with the N square law, the potential strength of these sixteen (16) ships, as a main body, may be expressed numerically for comparative purposes as the square of 16, or, 256. This is true only when these 16 ships are concentrated in one body. War is a business of positions," said Napoleon; by that he did not mean geographical position, but concentration of force, which Mahan (ref. a) defines as "being itself a choice of position, viz.: that the various corps, or ships, shall not be some in one place, and some in others, but all in one place." Mahan goes on to point out the terrible price paid by Russia in the war with Japan, for failure to observe this fundamental of strategy-since then we have seen the British Fleet assembled under one command by an able and far-seeing First Sea Lord, with opposite results. On further examination of our Navy Directory we find that our capital ships are divided into two main bodies, in two fleets, one in the Atlantic and one in the Pacific. There are eight capital ships in each fleet (assuming Tennessee in the Pacific). The potential strength of each main body may be expressed as the square of 8, or 64, following our previous assumption. If these two main bodies were combined, the resultant strength would not be double that of each of the original main bodies, but, following the N square law, would be an increase in the ratio of 64 to 256, or four times greater than the strength of each of the smaller separated main bodies. This principle applies to other types as well. With 16 ships in the main body of one fleet, periodic overhaul and repair of one division at a time is possible without undue weakening of the fleet; for, on reduction to 12 units, the resultant strength, as compared with the present main bodies of 8 each (full strength) in 2 fleets, would be increased from (n=8)'=64 to (n=12)2 = 144. This principle also applies to other types. Other factors, of course, enter into the disposition of the fleet, but following the cogent reasoning of Mahan (ref. a) in which he warns us of the danger in violating the principle of concentration (and this he does in capital letters), and the further consideration of the principle of unity of command with resulting unity of doctrine, it will be seen that the purely mathematical reasons for concentration are augmented by strategic principles. With these, however, I am not concerned; on the mathematical analysis I rest my case. MINUTES OF ANNUAL MEETING, 1920 U. S. NAVAL ACADEMY, ANNAPOLIS, MD., In accordance with Article V, Section I of the Constitution, two weeks' notice having been given, the annual meeting was held in the Board Room of the Officers' Mess. Captain W. T. Cluverius, U. S. Navy, Chairman of the Board of Control, presided. The minutes of the last meeting were read and approved. The first and stated business being the election of officers, the following tellers reported the vote, having been appointed by the Vice-President 10 days previous Commander Abram Claude, U. S. Navy. Lieut. Commander Rufus King, U. S. Navy. The tellers reported the results of the election as follows: |