Membership Dues U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE SECRETARY'S NOTES Life, regular and associate membership, 5298 New members: II. Resignations: 3. The annual dues ($3.00) for the year 1920 are now payable. Regular and associate members of the U. S. Naval Institute are subjected to the payment of the annual dues until the date of the receipt of their resignation. Discussions Discussion of articles published in the PROCEEDINGS is cordially invited. Discussions accepted for publication are paid at one-half the rate for original articles, or about $2.25 a page. Address of Members All members are urged to keep the Secretary and Treasurer informed of the address to which PROCEEDINGS are to be sent, and thus insure their receipt. Members and subscribers are urged to notify the Secretary and Treasurer promptly of the non-receipt of PROCEEDINGS, in order that tracers may be started. The issue is completed by the 15th of each month. 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Original photographs of objects and events which may be of interest to our readers are also desired, and members who have opportunities to obtain such photographs are requested to secure them for the Institute. Whole Nos. 6, 7, 10, 13, 14, 15, 17, 144, 145, 146, 147, Notice 149, 155, 167 and 173 of the PROCEEDINGS are exhausted; there are so many calls for single copies of these numbers that the Institute offers to pay for copies thereof returned in good condition at the rate of 75 cents per copy. PROFESSIONAL NOTES PREPARED BY LIEUT. COMMANDER H. W. UNDERWOOD, U. S. Navy LESSONS OF THE WAR.-A French Admiral's Views.'-In presenting Admiral Daveluy's opinions in a condensed form I have tried to lose as little as possible of their meaning and value. One or two purely French problems, which, it is thought, are of no interest to foreigners, have not been reviewed. Beyond a few prefatory remarks I have abstained from criticising, after the manner of newspaper experts, the work of a wellknown officer. Probably some of the author's conclusions will be challenged by students of naval warfare. The book is obviously more a popular work, designed to instruct public opinion, than a treatise on strategy, and it is admittedly a book of generalizations; but it is rare to find a naval officer voicing his opinions in public print, and they become all the more interesting when stated dispassionately by a discerning foreigner. (British translation.) Character of the War.-The war was of a disconcerting character. Material which had been prepared at huge cost was not used, and new material had to be created—a situation unprecedented in history. Germany least of all had had real confidence in submarines, yet it was submarines that reversed the order of things. Battleships had to play a preventive róle only; history was repeated in the arming of merchant ships and the lining of the shores of France with small forts. The weapons of warfare had changed but not the principles. The sea is first and foremost a line of communication, to be wrestled for by belligerents. Up to the first months of 1915 the war was one of commerce; unbroken save by a few minor operations undertaken to give satisfaction to public demands. The Allies were clearing the seas of German commerce and commerce destroyers, and the Germans were trying to cut lines of communication. The second phase saw Germany, her cruisers sunk, resort to increased use of submarines, while the Allies replied by barricading their main harbors and launching a swarm of small craft. The second phase was unfavorable to the Allies because it took them a long time to find weapons with which to combat the submarine employed in an inhuman manner. The total tonnage sunk by submarines was fourteen millions, and we cannot be said, although the newspapers affirmed it, to have had complete Les Enseignements Maritimes de la Guerre Anti-Germanique," ContreAmiral Daveluy, Paris, 1919. sovereignty of the seas while the submarine menace was at its worst. Nevertheless, it was when the menace was strongest that the American armies and their entire equipment crossed the sea in security. It is curious to note that the general public only began to realize the value of our navies when the latter had received some checks. How might we have drawn greater benefits from our maritime superiority, and what shall France's future naval forces be? There are those who say that the submarine was the most successful engine of the war and that it should be the sole man-of-war of the future; but the surface vessel won the war, not the submarine. The nation which has an all-submarine navy will doubtless be able to inflict huge commerce losses, but will not herself possess the right of way of the sea. Why did the submarine fail to gain liberty at sea for Germany? Because its power is so very limited. It has the one great quality of invisibility, and but little more. It is slow, vulnerable on the surface, and requires selected conditions for its attack. How many times have ships passed safely by submarines because they were not in a favorable position for attacking? It is useless for commerce protection. The fleet of the future must comprise surface craft and submarines, and, by examining the behavior of all kinds of surface craft and submarines, we can gain an idea as to which types should survive. The Future of the Battleship.-What was expected of battleships? They were expected to keep the sea and finally to overcome, at the least by numerical superiority, the enemy's battle fleet. They were unable to keep the sea. Mines and submarines restricted thm to short and carefully planned cruises. Had there been a force of capital ships able to keep the sea, the great submarine campaign would never have begun, because a close blockade of German ports by our myriad small craft, backed by immediate support, would have nipped it in the bud. Yet the Grand Fleet, even when lying at its base, made its power felt. It enabled England to surround her coasts with anti-submarine patrols which the Germans could not dislodge with submarines, and dared not attack with surface craft. The Grand Fleet, ever vigilant, was the great covering force of Allied commerce all over the world. The German battle fleet even less fulfilled its mission than did those of the Allies. Held in check, it of itself could not oppose any of our operations, and, even after a tactical success, was obliged to run for harbor. Germany's position would have been better had she had no battle fleet, but had invested a corresponding sum of money in submarines. We may conclude, therefore, that a nation which intends to dispute the control of the seas must have a force of surface capital ships, while a nation which foresees a defensive campaign will do well to place all her resources in submarines. A new type of battleship is required. The presentday dreadnoughts, direct descendants of three-deckers, are entirely built for the purpose of delivering and withstanding attack by gun-fire. Their vitals are at the mercy of mines and torpedoes, and they have no weapon with which to reach a submerged attacking vessel. Their present security above the water-line must to some degree be sacrificed to greater protection below. Their great draught renders it extremely difficult to localize the effect of an under-water penetration. It is probable that the future type will be heavily armored, but the real problem, and it is a very difficult one, is the reduction of draught. Enormous ships are the outcome of rivalry between the first-class maritime powers, and it remains to be seen whether England and the United States will engage in a competition to outbuild each other. But it is not yet proven that a mammoth ship is better than two or three moderate ones. We may be quite sure that the modern capital ship will be furnished with weapons against submerged approach, possibly in the shape of a number of light howitzers to throw plunging shells. Controlled from a kite-balloon (which every big ship will tow in the future), these howitzers would, on the detection of submerged approach, cover the sea in all directions with a rain of shells. As for dreadnoughts, their day is done. The Necessity of Light Cruisers.-Light cruisers and submarines took the most active part in the war. The former were in great demand and had to fulfil many rôles. Even England, who possessed many, was nevertheless better off for battleships than light cruisers, and, had she been able to exchange some of her dreadnoughts for light cruisers, would still have found unceasing work for them; Germany felt the need of light cruisers; Italy, on her entry into the conflict, was careful to ask England for the services of four; as for France, she had none, and could not, therefore, assist to clear the seas of commerce destroyers. How did France come to "commit the gross blunder" of leaving herself without light cruisers? By the close of the nineteenth century French naval experts had made a close study of scouting, which, they considered, was the whole and sole duty of a cruiser. Basing their opinions on fleet maneuvers, they came to the conclusion that the future naval action would take place in the following manner: The opposing battle fleets would put to sea in search of each other preceded by their respective cruiser arcs. When the arcs met, a cruiser action would ensue. The side with the more heavily armed cruisers would win and these would then be able to push on and gain exact knowledge of the enemy's battle-fleet strength and disposition. France accordingly invented and built the armored cruiser. Other nations for a time imitated her, but soon abandoned this type of vessel. Not so France; with maternal pride she clung to her armored cruisers, maintaining that a vessel must be of at least 8,000 tons displacement if she is to keep her speed in all weathers. In other words, the light cruiser was condemned out of hand because it falls short of that absolute perfection which is beyond human attainment. In vain did a section of French officers, of whom the author was one, protest that war differs from maneuvers; that the varying circumstances of the one demand a flexibility which cannot be deduced from the formal pitched battles of the other; and that the supreme virtues of a cruiser force are adroit handling and a right use of high speed. Apart from its functions with the battle fleet, the light cruiser can perform many others for which an armored cruiser is unfitted. Their warning fell on deaf ears, and the war found France using, in place of light cruisers, vessels which came to be called by their crews target ships." Light cruisers were no more immune than battleships from losses due to submarines and mines, but they had to keep to the sea. No better proof can be found of the value of this type of vessel. They too must be transformed to meet submerged attacks, and it is desirable that their draught be reduced; perhaps we shall see a radical change in this direction. During the war destroyers were compelled to undertake work proper to light cruisers. There must be more light cruisers, many more; there will always be plenty of work for them, both those of 4,000 to 5,000 tons and the smaller types. The Disappearance of the Surface Torpedo Craft.-By the end of hostilities the total number of torpedo craft engaged had become enormous, and all were hard worked. Thus it comes about that there are some impressionable people, even seamen, who think that more attention should be paid to the development of destroyer flotillas. Yet the destroyer was employed upon every service into which it could be pressed evcept that for which it was designed; how much more efficiently could it have dealt with the submarine menace had it been originally furnished with the weapons and endurance to do so. It was not until Jutland that destroyers ever had a chance to perform their grand rôle, and then they were baulked; Jutland was a play without a second act. Destroyers will be replaced by vessels in which the torpedo will only be a secondary arm. Instead of carrying six, eight, or even ten tubes they will only carry two; they will have two or three 6-inch guns, and a special depth-charge armament. By reducing their speed to that of the flotilla leaders (Arethusa class), which always supported them in fleet movements, they may be given increased endurance and seaworthiness. The |