year's consideration is made. Another instance a few years ago was the agreement between Argentine and Chili that they would not go to war for five years over boundary disputes that were about to lead to a clash of arms. They kept their agreement. Eradication of the vital causes, however, we may well question coming, except by the long, gradual, but sure process of political evolution. Stricter regulations may be made and enforced through international law and agreement, backed by the "League to Enforce Peace." But, like the "Balance of Power," to which it is similar, this cannot be permanent, in itself—it can serve only for a time. Yet, it is true that the coming peace is fraught with great possibilities in this direction, while revulsion at the present horrors leads many to "faintly trust the larger hope” of permanent peace hereafter. Do not such persons forget, however, that the whole process of civilization has been a development through continuous conflict toward comparative peace? This condition has been brought about by a slow process of education of the minds and conscience of men; and this we must realize in its final consummation before there can be lasting peace for mankind. That the present tragedy of nations may lend impetus to and hasten the day of peace is the reasonable hope of most men, though many doubt its realization in the near future.

The Europe of 1920 will little resemble that of 1914, just as the Europe of 1914, little resembled that of a century earlier. Greece was the first in the nineteenth century to recover her national life; and now she is recovering it anew. Belgium was separated in 1830 from her unnatural incorporation with Holland; now, she must be resurrected to a newer, greater life, and guaranteed a free existence and development. Hungary received a constitution of her own, in the dual monarchy in 1848, if she did not gain the independence the patriot Kossuth dreamed for her; she must now be given an even freer hand, if not complete independence. Bohemia at that time struggled for self government; she

must be given complete "home rule," if not more this time. The Bohemians have already raised their voice in a menacing way toward German Austria. Poland more than once rose in revolt against those who destroyed her independence. As President Wilson so timely pointed out in his war message, last year, the Poles must once more breathe as an independent people. The great crime of partitioning in the eighteenth century must be atoned for, and the penalty paid and loss sustained, by her despoilers. The peoples of the world,—with friendly help and oversight in some instances of course, must be left to work out their destinies and "the world must be made safe for democracy." The influence of the Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs must be made as harmless as that of the Hanovarians in England today, or like them, must turn their influence into the current of democracy.

War, we have said, assumes the survival of the fittest, the most apt, the best. But, the best for what? The fittest for what? That is the capital question now. It is not easy for one people to modify the wish, the interests, and still less the national characteristics of another. The failure at many efforts at it has helped to bring on this colossal war. Once it could be done by war and the conqueror after the war; but in so far as this transformation is possible today, it is not by war and force that it is to be accomplished. Free intercourse between nations, social and commercial, is perhaps the most powerful pacifying influence. When nations and races come to mingle with each other more vitally, like individuals they will come to understand and appreciate one another better, and will at last learn to heed that most costly and precious lesson, that peace, and not war, is to be the true and only rational basis of civilized human society.

CHAPTER VI

THE IMMEDIATE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR IN EUROPE

10 a considerable extent the conditions that brought

about the great European conflict in 1914, of the present century, can be traced to the work of the Congress of Vienna, at the end of the Napoleonic era, a century before. The present decade, consequently, has often been compared and contrasted with the Napoleonic period, a little over a century ago. And in no other respect, perhaps, has the contrast been so sharply drawn as in the difference of motive that actuated Prince Metternich and his autocratic congress of princes and their minions, on the one hand, and the motives which have been the impelling force in the liberal nations in the World War of 1914-1918, on the other; and the contrast continues in the spirit and work of the peace conference at Versailles.

Since the above is true, in our brief review of the immediate background of the great World War we cannot stop short of the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815) and its immediate outgrowth, the Holy Alliance, a hundred years agone. There were two cardinal principles of this notorious Vienna congress that were responsible in so large a degree for the terrible woes of the present time, namely (1), the bargaining about of territories and nationalities as if they were "mere chattels and pawns in a game," and (2), the restoration of oppressive and autocratic kings upon their thrones, against the flame of democracy enkindled by the French Revolution, and the repression of all democratic aspiration of the people of the nations. One needs but to examine the history of the first half of the nineteenth century and recall

the origin of our Monroe Doctrine to satisfy himself as to this fact.

Despite the strength of the peoples' revolutions of 1830 and 1848, which came so near overthrowing once for all this medieval tyranny, enough of it remained on the continent of Europe to make possible the next great step in violation of the rights of man, the crime of Bismarck and the Prussian war-lords in their wars for the union of the German peoples in a great empire. This story is too well known to warrant its repetition here. But what was the consequence of this type of unification? That is what is all-pertinent to our subject in hand. It was simply this: Bismarck's imperialistic and "blood and iron" policy soon arrayed a group of nations in bitter, distrustful and hostile feeling against himself, his sovereign and the new German Empire. To meet this menace to his dream of a "Deutschland über Alles" the greater part of the remaining years of his life were spent. The astute Imperial Chancellor sought constantly an alliance to meet this growing hostility with another threat, or application, of "blood and iron.” He would sow discord (divide et impera),—as has frequently been practiced by Germany since, and bring in jealous rivalry, if possible, his threatening opponents, while he would seek an alliance with one or more of them. And this alliance would safeguard the interests of Germany in the future. Thus arose the Triple Alliance, Bismarck's famous "Dreibund" of Germany, Austria and Italy, in 1881. Italy, contrary to her natural interests and past experience, was induced to join in this "unholy" alliance with the Teutonic powers because of France's aggressive movements at this time in Algeria, northern Africa,-which territory was coveted by Italy and was adjacent to Tunis, which had already been appropriated by France and which in turn adjoined Tripoli which the Italians in 1911 fought with Turkey for. The Italian people, however, soon became aware that their age-long enemies, Austria and Germany,

were more of a menace to them than was France. Hence, at an early date Italy showed that she could not be depended upon in an offensive war as a partner of the Teutonic countries, as many German writers pointed out years before the fateful outbreak of war in 1914.

And now, to go back for another thread of our narrative. After the humiliation of France in 1871 Bismarck had hoped that his neighbor to the west had been so completely crushed that she could never again be a real obstacle to the ambitions of Germany. He was therefore astonished, and not a little alarmed, to witness the rapid recovery of France from her losses in this war. By 1875 he was planning another war with France, one of the "sperlos versenkt" kind. But he had already sown the dragon's teeth. Great Britain and Russia both called a halt upon him. He was constrained to forego this war; but he must make up for this failure in some way. Then followed his constant effort until he secured the Triple Alliance referred to above.

But before the "Dreibund" was accomplished the warcloud had lowered over the Balkans, and in this both Germany and Austria were deeply interested. The Balkan provinces (as we bring out in Chapter VII of this work), stung to madness by the "Bulgarian Massacres" and other atrocities, led by Bulgaria, were planning a revolution and war to drive the abominable Turk out of Europe. And they looked to Russia for aid. The Czar was more than willing, since he had his heart set on Constantinople and the Mediterranean trade. Upon the pretext of interfering in behalf of persecuted Christians he joined the Balkans, marched upon the Turk, and soon won a complete victory over the Sultan. In this Russo-Turkish war of 1878 the Ottoman rule in Europe would have ended, but for the jealous intervention of the other great powers of Europe, led by Austria and Great Britain. This time they feared that Russia, rather than Germany (and Germany was with them, strongly seconding Austria) would break the "balance of