"The outcome cannot be anything but a general European war of the most terrible kind." (See Victor Berard, "The Balkan Question," Villari volume, with Introduction by James Bryce.) Italy's interest and part in the Balkan question in this period was summed up by an Italian as follows:-"Italy has every interest in preventing the influence of Austria and Russia in Macedonia from extending and being gradually converted into a more or less effective dominion.”—(By an Italian deputy.) This feeling and interest explains the tenacity with which the Italian delegates to the peace conference cling to their shadowy claim to Albania and the southern Adriatic coast. While studying the Balkan situation just previous to the First Balkan war in 1911 the author of the present volume made this statement: "The idea prevails in Europe that the time has come for the solution of this most perplexing problem. England seems most anxious that this be speedily accomplished. According to Mr. Bryce there are two solutions. One is the absorbing of the existing nationalities into the great dominions and great nations which border upon Turkey. The other is the growth of these nationalities, or some of them, into nations and states. The latter, I think is the more satisfactory solution, and will prove the more likely, providing the great powers do not injustly intervene. Mr. Bryce concludes his chapter ('Introduction to the Eastern Question') with these words: 'He who, looking above and beyond the dust of current politics, will try to fix his eyes, as Mr. Gladstone did, upon the heights of a more distant landscape, will find reason to think that the development of these nationalities has in it more promise for the future than the extension of the sway of one or two huge military empires, and will believe that to encourage and help them to grow into nations is an aim to which such great and enlightened peoples as those of England, France and Italy may fitly direct their efforts.'" This is ample evidence to the writer's mind, of Great Britain's more liberal policy in international politics in recent years, under the wise tutelage and leadership of such men as Gladstone and Lord Bryce. And as a sequel to this statement that I made eight years ago, let me say that the present Jugo-Slav movement has been made acceptable to the Allied nations through such earlier championship as that mentioned in the above quotation. It is not a new movement, born of the War, but is now, because of the World War, realizable beyond the fondest hopes of its early champions. We have omitted at this point of our study of the causes of war in recent years, any separate treatment of the causes of the Turko-Italian war of 1911, because we gave rather a detailed statement of the underlying cause and the meaning of this war in our chapter in which we treated wars of nationality of which this one between Italy and Turkey is (on Italy's part) the most prominent one of the twentieth century, previous to the World War. We may add in passing, however, that there was a good deal of sentiment, the vision and memory of the glories of ancient Rome and her sway over the land of the Carthagenians,—in the zeal with which the Italians fought the Turks and their subjects in northern Africa. Then too, this war meant one of the final steps in the unification of Italy, as the Italians conceived a united Italy to be, the same thing that led them to enter the World War against Austria, for the provinces of the Trentino and Trieste. CHAPTER IX CAUSES OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR (1904) HE cause of the war for Japan was mostly economic TH increase in Japan's population, the growth of her industries and commerce, and on the other hand to the inadequateness of her agriculture to supply a living for her growing population or to produce sufficient raw material for her manufactures. For these very reasons, Japan has felt that she could not allow any other nation to secure a controlling influence in any part of the Chinese Empire, much less in Korea.2 With Russia, the cause was primarily political rather than economic. It was therefore less vital than that of Japan. Economically, Russia had no such reason for bringing on such a conflict as had Japan. She is able to take care of herself for a long time to come, in that respect. Russia's great political aim, as Professor Hershey states, was to gain access to the sea in four directions, viz.: Black Sea and Mediterranean, Baltic Sea, Persian Gulf, Pacific Ocean.3 This has been her vision and ambition ever since the time of Peter the Great. She is still actively striving for all but the northern one of these. (And in passing it may be observed that this desire to secure such outlets helps to explain, to a considerable degree, many of the nineteenth century wars in these regions and is no small contributory cause to those conflicts.) 'Hershey, "Int. Law and Diplomacy of Russo-Japanese War," p. 2. "The Japanese people have grown to such numbers that they need an outlet beyond the sea and cannot resign into strong hands their nearest field for colonization and expansion"; Lawrence, p. 2. Hershey, p. 3. Expansion in the direction of the Pacific has seemed to Russia to involve the least resistance as well as being of immense importance to her in Oriental politics and commercial influence. Her great efforts of recent years have been directed toward securing an ice-free port on the Pacific. This was directly her reason for the occupation of Korea. While the relations of Russia with the Far East go back to the conquest of Siberia and even farther, we are particularly concerned here only with her advances in the latter part of the 19th century.* In 1867 Russia got a strong hold on the island of Saghalien. She exercised joint sovereignty with Japan over the island. In 1875 she found means to oust Japan and appropriated the whole island to herself. This is an excellent example of Russian unscruplousness that was bound, sooner or later, to be met by the desperate revenge of the Japanese. Such action of Russia only helped on the Europeanizing of Japan to meet her hated rival in the Far East. The events which finally brought Russia and Japan into collision, arose from Russia's construction of the TransThe history of Russian politics in Manchuria may be divided into four periods: (1) From the beginning (three centuries back) to the "Cassini Convention," 1896, which conceded to her first privileges in the North of this province,-principally the right to build the Trans-Siberian Railway across the Chinese territory to Vladivostock. (2) From 1896 to the Boxer Uprising, 1900. During this period (3) From 1900 to the agreement for the evacuation of Manchuria, Siberian Railway to the Pacific, with the end in view (her long cherished hope) of securing an ice-free port on the Pacific. Railroads in the Far East have been the forerunners and occasions of war. Russia was trying to grasp a port that was not hers. She under-estimated the fatal consequences of such an action. If Russia had confined her aggressive movements to Manchuria alone, the present history of the Far East would doubtless have been far different. But, to secure her ends, she made similar encroachments in Korea, particularly in interfering in this peninsula after the China-Japanese War.5 Korea had been tributary to both China and Japan for centuries. She claimed independence at various times. In 1875, the Koreans fired upon a Japanese man-of-war and in redress were forced to open trade with Japan and receive a Japanese minister at the Korean Court. China unwillingly gave up her suzerainty over Korea, 1875-85. She now agreed with Japan that if events should necessitate Chinese or Japanese troops in Korea and either sent troops, the other should be notified. In 1894 on the abduction and assassination of a Korean rebel, Chinese and Japanese troops were sent. Reforms in the Korean government were now urged by Japan. China refused to consent to these reforms. Japan gave her ultimatum, following up with the capture of the Korean capital and king. Both empires then prepared for war and in July, 1894, the con 5 6 6 See Hershey, "Int. Law & Dip. of Rus.-Jap. War, p. 36. In 1868 Japan, making up from feudalism to the modern type of government determined to reassert her former claims upon Korea. The Koreans insolently refused this vassalage. Japan recognized Korea's independence in 1876 but new ports were opened to Japanese trade in 1880. 'It was Korea's opposition to the "open door" policy which led to the intervention of Japan and China and the stationing of Chinese and Japanese troops in Korea. Another insurrection in Korea in 1894, brought Chinese and Japanese troops face to face again and was followed by the Chino-Jap. War in 1895. |