her withdrawal from the remainder of the province, however, April 8, 1903, she was still in full occupancy and it was evident that not even a nominal withdrawal was intended."18 Russia's persistent failure in the face of repeated promises to withdraw her troops from China after the Boxer uprising led directly, we may say, to the outbreak of hostilities with Japan.19 "The inspiring force which moved some 40,000 men gladly to lay down their lives on the hills around Port Arthur was the feeling that they were helping to hurl back in the face of Russia, the gauntlet which she had there so insolently flung down as to an inferior race."20 Russia's demands of China in 1903, among other things, included the closing of Manchuria against the economic enterprises of all foreigners except Russians and the opening of no new treaty-ports without Russia's consent.21 After The final year of negotiation (1904) had come. three successive overtures of the Japanese government to Russia, the views of the two governments were apparently as irreconcilable as ever. Japan made still a fourth attempt to obtain a favorable reply from Russia, and its provisions were as follows: 1. Suppression of the clause (in Article 5) requiring Japan not to use any part of Korea for strategical purposes. 2. Suppression of the whole Article (6) concerning the establishment of a neutral zone. 3. Recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its littoral as being outside her sphere of interest, provided that Russia will engage (a) to respect the territorial integrity of China and Manchuria, (b) to recognize the treaty rights, including those of the settlement of Japan and other Powers 18 Hershey, Int. Law & Dip. of Russo-Jap. War, pp. 33-4. 19 See Rose, pp. 318-19. 20 Rose, p. 319. * Idem, p. 35. in Manchuria, (c) to recognize Korea and its littoral as being outside her sphere of interest. 4. Recognition by Japan of Russia's special interests in Manchuria, and of the right of Russia to take measures necessary for the protection of those interests. The Russian reply to this last proposal of Japan was not returned until Feb. 7, 1904, the day after diplomatic relations between the two countries had ceased. Thus we see that Russia's persistent delay in withdrawing her troops from Chinese territory in the year after the Boxer uprising led to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war. Japan "had expended much blood and treasure in order to secure a predominating interest in the Korean peninsula. . . . The rapid growth of Russian power in the Pacific coasts, the enforced cession of Saghalien in 1875, and of the Liaotung Peninsula with the hard-won Port Arthur 20 years later, had aroused profound distrust of Russian policies in the minds of Japanese statesmen.” 22 Without attempting to give all the factors that bore upon the outbreak of hostilities between Russia and Japan, we may reduce the fundamental causes of the war to two, viz.: (1) Russia's determination to secure if possible, an ice-free port on the Pacific, with Russian control of Manchuria and Korea-mainly a political interest; (2) Japan's equal determination that this should not be accomplished—mainly an economic interest and question of ultimate self-preservation. 22 C. M. Hist., XII, p. 577. CHAPTER X THE CAUSES OF THE BRITISH-BOER WAR HE American press and people in general have been inclined to lay the blame of this war almost entirely on the British.1 They have done this more or less blindly, 1 British occupation of South Africa began in 1806, when Cape Town was surrendered to the English. In the London Convention of 1814, the Dutch surrendered to the English Crown their claims to Cape Colony and some other adjacent territory, for a consideration of £6,000,000 sterling. British immigration to South Africa began about the year 1819. In 1825 an Executive Council was appointed to assist the Governor of the colony. In 1828 the Hottentots received equal rights in the law (courts) with the Europeans. In the years 1833-5 the abolition of slavery was accomplished. This was accompanied by disturbances that assumed serious proportions. Discontent with the British rule had not been wholly lacking before; as a result of the liberties given them in 1828, the Hottentots had broken loose from several restraints imposed upon them formerly, by the English administration; there had been considerable friction before the Dutch were ready to surrender Cape Colony, in 1814; but these were as nothing compared with the storm that arose in 1834. "The great wrong which stirred the Dutch to the depths was the abolition of slavery by Great Britain in 1834." Green: "Causes of South African War," p. 5. And Doyle, who has written perhaps the best account of the causes and events leading up to the final war, says: "The emancipation of slaves in 1834 fanned the smouldering discontents into a flame." Doyle: "The War in South Africa," p. 5. There were two reasons for this outburst, (1) A very inadequate sum was appropriated for the slave-owners in return for the loss of their slaves. (2) The money was paid over in London, and because of this fact, the colonists received but little of it. This worked a real hardship to the Boer farmers. It meant beggary to a number of them. The war of 1834-5, waged by the British against the Kaffirs, was very unjust to the latter, and they were almost immediately restored to their former homes. Many of the Boer farmers now determined to leave the colony, and migrate farther inland, away from the domination of the British. The first trek was in 1836. The long journey, with its perils and hardships, broke up all local self-government and the science of cooking, etc., and put these Boers back into their medieval ancestral type of government and individual liberty. This backward step in civilization is no small factor in explaining the failure of the British to conciliate the Boers, and the gradual growth of a hostile spirit that was to culminate in war of the two races. In 1848 Sir Harry Smith was sent out as Governor of the Colony. He through prejudice, or without a sufficient knowledge of the facts. There are not lacking, however, in this country as well as in England, eminent authorities who justify for the most part, if not altogether, England's action and policy in South Africa. Indeed, opinion seems to be pretty evenly divided, among those who are in a position to judge wisely and impartially. Green, in his "Causes of the War in South Africa," is decidedly favorable to Great Britain. He contends and rightly, that the rule of Great Britain was a distinct advance and uplift for the Boers as well as the natives; that the Boer and not the English administration was the oppressor of the natives, and that it was liberty only for himself that the Boer sought; Doyle,2 who can hardly be denied the merit of making a studied attempt to be fair and unprejudiced in his account, feels that it is his duty as well as his right, to defend his country against much of the abuse that has been heaped upon it, and to vindicate for the most part, her policy. Among other things he says: "That to no one of the British states has she ever had a more declared the area between the Orange and Vaal rivers British Territory. This led to war. England was victorious, but had to give up the Orange River Sovereignty, because the Home government did not sufficiently support the Governor. Sir Geo. Grey was the next governor, 1854-9. His was a wise rule. The franchise was made liberal and representative government was established. Meanwhile, the Boer government in the Transvaal had become very chaotic. Finances were in a deplorable condition. The people were oppressively taxed. However, in 1857 the Transvaal Republic was launched. This was followed by civil war, which dragged on for some time. In 1871 the discovery of diamonds and the foundation of Kimberly opened a new era for this troublesome and disputed territory. The year 1872 marks the beginning of responsible government in the original Cape Colony of South Africa. Ĉecil Rhodes came over in 1871. . Diamond region (around Kimberly) was claimed by (1) Orange Free State; (2) Transvaal Republic; (3) an individual, named Waterboer. Waterboer placed himself under the British government, which presently erected the country into a crown colony (in 1871). Later investigations found that Waterboer had never enjoyed any right to the territory. The British government, claiming that a strong power was necessary to preserve the peace and govern the people offered the Free State £90,000 sterling for its claim to the colony. This was accepted, and the controversy was closed, although a sense of unjustice continued to rankle in the breasts of many of its citizens. Bryce, pp. 148-49. 'Doyle, A. C.: "The War in South Africa." incontestible right," than to this, both by the right of conquest and the right of purchase; that England had the same kind of a problem the United States would have had if the Dutch of Pennsylvania had moved West and set up a different form of government from that of the United States, and United States had come in contact with this foreign government in her westward expansion. Mr. James Bryce, whose opinion always carries weight and merits the greatest consideration, while admitting on the one hand evils of the English rule, her many mistakes and blunders, on the other hand in the general policy and administration of the English rule, justifies his government. He states that the Boers had gone backward in civilization; were separated for two centuries from European culture and political systems; that they would not work the gold when they found it, had an aversion for commerce, industrial pursuits, and finance, and absolute incapacity for such pursuits; that into this condition it was that there came the swarm of gold-seekers after 1884. Sanderson, another English author, while excusing his country still less than Bryce, still cannot lay the blame of the war upon his government, although he does hold Cecil Rhodes somewhat responsible. On the other hand, there are both moderate and violent partisans of the Boers' cause and actions. Of the former class the French author Despagnet is a good example. He dismisses from the very first any of the alleged grievances of the British as real causes of the war. On what he considers as the fundamental cause, he comments as follows: "It is in the general schemes of English politics for several years that we are to seek the true motives of the war and this war itself is only one manifestation, the most grave it is true, of the end pursued by Great Britain since she has become dominated by aspirations of quasi-universal supremacy disguised under the name of imperialism.” This very expression is used by another Frenchman (Peyronnard) in his "Des Causes de la Gueire, quoted fr. R. G. C. I, |