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Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, $ 600, 30 Stat. 562 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3445), as amended by Act Feb. 5, 1903, c. 487, § 13, 32 Stat. 799 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1905, p. 689), the bankrupt must not only have been insolvent when the payment was made, but must have intended it as a preference, and, if in fact made in the ordinary course of business, without thought of injuring other creditors and in the belief in his ability to pay them all, the creditor receiving it cannot be cbarged with reasonable cause to believe that a preference was intended. -In re First Nat. Bank of Louisville, Ky., 155 Fed. 100; First Nat. Bank of Louisville, Ky., v. Holt, Id..
.84 C. C. A. 16 The making of a present loan is a sufficient consideration for a transfer of collateral to secure not only such loan, but also a prior indebtedness, and, where such a transfer was made in good faith when the debtor was solvent, the right of the creditor to the securities attached at that time and collections subsequently made by it thereon and applied on the prior debt after the debtor became insolvent and within four months prior to its bankruptcy do not constitute voidable preferences. -In re First Nat. Bank of Louisville, Ky., 155 Fed. 100; First Nat. Bank of Louisville, Ky., v. Holt, fa..
..84 C. C. A. 16 Although the rights of a trustee in bankruptcy and those of an assignee in insolvency under a state statute are defined in similar language, yet a state statute making a certain transfer void as against an assignee eo nomine does not make it void as against a trustee in bankruptcy. -In re Loveland, 155 Fed. 838; In re Littlefield, Id.; Putnam v. Loveland, Id......
...84 C. C. A. 72 A mortgagor, after having paid a part of a mortgage debt, borrowed further sums from the mortgagee, and indorsements were made upon the mortgage note, to the effect that such sums should be added to the amount previously remaining due thereon. Held, that the mortgage was a valid lien in equity for the full amount of the debt as so increased as against the mortgagor's trustee in bankruptcy, whether tested by the statutes of Massachusetts as construed by its Supreme Judicial Court or by the provisions of the bankruptcy act. -In re Loveland, 155 Fed. 838; In re Littlefield, Id.; Putnam v. Loveland, Id......
....84 C. C. A. 72 A court of bankruptcy may by summary process require those who assert title to, or an interest in, property which has rightfully come into its possession and control as part of the bankrupt's estate, to present their claims to that court, and, the notice being reasonable, may proceed to adjudicate the merits of such claims. In re Epstein, 156 Fed. 42....
.84 C. 0. A. 208 While property in the course of dministration under the bankruptcy act is not exempted from taxation, or freed from tax liens or claims theretofore fastened upon it, it is nevertheless in custodia legis, and a preexisting tax lien or claim cannot be converted into a full title by the procurement of a tax deed without the court's sanction. -In re Epstein, 156 Fed. 42....
.84 C. C. A. 208 A surety or indorser for a bankrupt is a creditor within the meaning of Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 50 Stat. 544 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3418). -Kobusch v. Hand, 156 Fed. 660....
...84 C. C. A. 372 Where the president of a corporation was an indorser on its notes given to a bank, and with knowledge of its insolvency and within four months prior to its bankruptcy caused it to pay the notes with intent to relieve himself from liability and to secure an advantage over other creditors, a preference was given which may be recovered from him by the trustee under Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 60b, 30 Stat. 562 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3445), as amended by Act Feb. 5, 1903, c. 487, § 13, 32 Stat. 799 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1907, p. 1031). -Kobusch v. Hand, 156 Fed. 660...
.84 C. C. A, 372 84 C.C.A.-44
There exists no special trust relation between a bankrupt, and his creditors during the four months preceding the bankruptcy which entitles his trustee to avoid his transactions during that time on grounds other than those specified in the bankruptcy act. -In re Letson, 157 Fed. 78......
.84 C. C. A. 582 3.
Administration of estate. A court of bankruptcy has jurisdiction to order a sale of property of a bankrupt upon which a lien is asserted free from such lien, and without first determining either its validity or amount. -In re Loveland, 155 Fed. 838; In re Littlefield, Id.; Putnam v. Loveland, Id...
.84 C. C. A. 72 § 4.
Claims against and distribution of estate. That a claim arises as a consequence of bankruptcy is sufficient to render it provable as a fixed liability absolutely owing at the date of the filing of the petition, within the meaning of Pankr. Act 1898, § 63a (1), c. 541, 30 Stat. 562 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3447]. -In re Nefr, 157 Fed, 57.......
.84 C. C. A. 561 Bankruptcy is such an anticipatory breach of a contract to take and pay for stock of a corporation at a stated price and time, which time was subsequent to the bankruptcy, that a claim for damages for the breach is a provable debt. -In re Neff, 157 Fed. 57.....
.....84 C. C. A. 561 A bankrupt who conducted a private bank gave permission to the president of a national bank who had no account with the bankrupt to draw checks on his bank to the amount of $25,000. These checks, by an arrangement between the two banks, were cleared through the clearing house by the national bank, which charged them to the bankrupt and credited them to the account of its president. Later the bankrupt gave his note for the amount and the president of the national bank gave to the bankrupt a corresponding note. Held, on the evidence, that the transaction was one for the accommodation of the president of the national bank individually, and not of his bank, and the latter was therefore entitled to prove its note against the bankrupt estate. -Merchants' & Manufacturers' Nat. Bank of Columbus, Ohio, v. Galbraith, 157 Fed. 208.
..84 C. C. A. 650
§ 5. Rights, remedies, and discharge of bankrupt.
In the absence of a local rule to the contrary, the mere use by an insolvent of nonexempt funds or assets in acquiring a homestead does not make it subject to the claims of his creditors in bankruptcy. -In re Letson, 157 Fed. 78......
...84 C. C. A. 582
$ 6. Appeal and revision of proceedings-Superintendence and revision.
The decision of a district court reversing that of a referee finding that a bankrupt was guilty of fraud in a transaction does not necessarily involve a question of law so as to be reviewable on a petition to revise, where, so far as shown by the record, there may have been a contlict of testimony as to the facts. -In re Letson, 157 Fed. 78.......
.84 C. C. A. 582 § 7. - Appeal.
An order made by a court of bankruptcy allirming an order of a referee setting aside an allowance of a secured claim, and requiring the creditor to pay to the trustee the amount of an unl:wful preference, is one made in the bankruptcy proceedings proper, and is reviewable on petition for review, under Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 341, $ 245, 30 Stat. JJ3 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3432). -In re First Nat. Bank of Louisville, Ky., 155 Fed. 100; First Nat. Bank of Louisville, Ky., v. IIolt, Id.....
.84 C. C. A. 16 Where an appeal taken in a bankruptcy proceeding under Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, $ 23a, 30 Stat. 553 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3432], involves only a question of law, it may be treated by the appellate court as à petition to revise. -In re Williams' Estate, 156 Fed. 934; Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v. Harrison, Id.....
.84. C. C. A. 434 The fact that a bankrupt accepted the benefit of an order of a referee, allowing him certain personal property exemptions, does not preclude him from appealing from a part of the same order relating to his homestead exemption. -In re Letson, 157 Fed. 78...
.84 0. C. A. 582 The 10 days allowed by Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 25a, 30 Stat. 553 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3432], for taking an appeal from a judgment allowing or rejecting a claim, cannot be extended by the filing of a petition for rehearing, after such time has expired, nor will an appeal lie from the ruling on such a petition which is addressed to the discretion of the court. - Morgan v. Benedum, 157 Fed. 232.
.....84 C. C. A. 675 § 8. Costs and fees.
eds of property of a bankrupt, covered by valid liens and sold by the court of bankruptcy by request or consent of the lien holders, who subsequently filed their claims in such court, which were allowed as secured claims in an amount in excess of such proceeds, are properly chargeable with the costs of such court appropriate to the enforcement of the liens, but not with general costs of the administration of the estate, such as the general fees of the trustee and his attorney, or for the services of a receiver in carrying on the business of the bankrupt and his attorney, or for the expenses and losses of such business. -In re Williams' Estate, 156 Fed. 934; Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v. Harrison, Id.....
.84 C. C. A. 434
BANKS AND BANKING.
Following trust funds deposited in bank, see “Trusts," $ 2.
§ 1. Functions and dealings.
A bank is not chargeable with notice of fraud in the inception of a note which it discounted merely because its president had knowledge of the facts, which was gained by him in his capacity as an officer of another corporation, where he had nothing to do with the discounting of the note, and had no knowledge of it at the time.
-McCalmont v. Lanning, 154 Fed. 353...... ..84 C. C. A. 138 In such case the banker cannot be held to account for a sum originally advanced by the principal to the agent to be used for the purposes of the agency, and so deposited by the agent to his own credit, but which was afterwards treated by the principal as a loan to the agent, and for which his note was taken, nor for a sum lent by the banker to the agent personally, and which, having been used for agency purposes, was repaid by the principal with knowledge of the facts. -Harris & Co. v. Chipman, 156 Fed. 929; Chipman v. Harris & Co., Id......
...84 C. C. A. 429 A banker, who knowingly permitted an agent to deposit money of his principal to his own account and mingle the same with his own funds in violation of his contract, which required the deposit to be in the name of his principal, if for that reason chargeable with liability to the principal, in the absence of fraud or conspiracy, is accountable only for losses resulting directly from such wrongful deposit, such as for sums applied by the agent to his own use, and not for losses resulting from the use of the money by the agent as contemplated by the contract of agency. -Harris & Co. v. Chipman, 156 Fed. 929; Chipman v. Harris & Co., Id....
.84 C. C. A. 429
Of action by former adjudication, see "Judgment,” & 3.
See "Disorderly House."
Acceptance of, as grounds of estoppel, see "Estoppel," § 1.
BILL OF REVIEW.
See “Equity," $ 4.
BILLS AND NOTES.
Discounting of note by bank, see "Banks and Banking,” $ 1.
Of general appraisers, see "Customs Duties," 2.
BONA FIDE PURCHASERS.
Of municipal bonds, see "Municipal Corporations,” s 2.
County bonds, see "Counties," & 2.
BREACH. Of contract, see "Contracts,” & 3.
$ 1. Compensation and lien.
Where a broker, although acting as agent for both the seller and purchaser of property, is given no discretionary power to negotiate the sale, but his employment is merely to bring the principals together and to keep them informed as to the condition of the property, the dual employment is not inconsistent nor contrary to public policy, and he may receive pay. ment from both principals. - McLure v. Luke, 154 Fed. 617.....
.84 C. C. A. 1
§ 2. Actions for compensation.
Defendant entered into a written contract with plaintiff's intestate by which he agreed, in case he should purchase certain mining property at a stated price with the assistance of plaintiff's intestate, to pay the latter a commission. Three days after the death of the decedent a contract was executed by which defendant purchased the property with other property for slightly more than the price named. A witness also testified that on the day before the decedent's death defendant told him of the contemplated purchase, and asked him to ascertain if the decedent would not accept a sum in cash in lieu of an interest in the property which he was to receive under the commission contract. Held, that the contract of sale and such testimony were sufficient, prima facie, to establish that the decedent had performed the service that entitled him to the commission. -McLure v. Luke, 154 Fed. 647.....
...84 C. C. A. 1
BURDEN OF PROOF.
In civil actions, see "Evidence," § 1.
CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENTS.
See "Quieting Title."
$ 1. Right of action and defenses.
An unmarried man 77 years old, and in feeble health, deeded his farm to his nephew on the expressed consideration of $1 and other considerations, the deed reserving to the grantor a life estate. It was also orally agreed that the grantee should furnish support to the grantor at the grantee's own home, which he did so long as the grantor remained with him. and also paid the interest on a mortgage on the farm. Subsequently the grantor returned to the farm and commenced suit for cancellation of the deed. He was shown to have been mentally competent, and there was no evidence to establish coercion or undue influence. Held, that the fact that the deed did not impose a positive obligation on the grantee for the grantor's care and support did not authorize the court to set it aside as improvident and unconscionable.
-McElroy V. Masterson, 156 Fed. 36. ....... .84 C. C. A. 202
Conspiracy to induce giving or receiving of rebates, see "Conspiracy," $ 1. Evidence of acts and declarations of conspirators, in prosecution for accept
ing rebates, see “Criminal Law," $ 7. Evidence of other offenses in prosecution for accepting rebates, see "Criminal
Law," $ 6.
$1. Control and regulation of common carriers.
The special saving clause in section 10 of the Hepburn act (Act June 29, 1906, c. 3391, 34 Stat. 59.5), does not mention the particular subject of the general saving clause in Rev. St. § 13 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 6]. namely, the effect upon existing penalties, forfeitures, and liabilities of a repealing act, and can be accorded reasonable operation, consistently with the true intendment of its language and with the undisturbed operation of the general saring clause, by treating it as saving causes then pending in the courts of the United States from what, in its absence, and in the presence of the general saving clause, would be the effect upon them