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of the amendments provided for in that act. Consequently it does not by
84 C. C. A. 93
84 C. C. A. 93 Private tracks built by the owner of a packing plant on its own property, extending from a connection with the tracks of a belt line railroad company to and around its buildings, and used in loading cars for shipment, are not a part of the railroad system, but plant facilities, and the refunding by a railroad company, which made and published a schedule of through rates, including the belt line charge, of $1 per car to such packing company on shipments made by it and paid for at the schedule rate, on the ground that it was a payment for the use of such private tracks, thus making the rate charged $1 per car less than that published and charged to shippers generally from the same point, constituted the giving of a rebate, in violation of section 1 of Elkins Act February 19, 1903, c. 708, 32 Stat. 847 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1907, p. 880). -Chicago & A. Ry. Co. v. United States, 156 Fed. 558; Faithorn v. Same, Id.; Wann v. Same, Id.....
..84 C. C. A. 324
$ 2. Carriage of passengers.
In an action for death of a passenger by the alleged negligence of a carrier's servants, evidence that plaintiff was a passenger, and that her death resulted from an accident to the train, was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of the carrier's negligence.
-Hopper v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 155 Fed. 273. .....84 C. C. A. 21 Three young men traveling together were passengers on a railroad train which approached Knoxville, Tenn., which was their destination, after dark. The trainmen had announced that the next station would be Knoxville, as required by the state statute, but had not called the station, when the train stopped on a narrow trestle in order to make use of a Y in turning before entering the city. The next morning the bodies of the young men were found near together under the trestle. Upon the trial of a consolidated action against the railroad company to recover for their deaths, there was evidence that they left the car together, while on the trestle, and tending to show that they fell over the edge as they stepped off. Held, that neither the announcement of the name of the next station nor the stopping of the train thereafter before it was reached was negligence, nor was either an invitation to passengers to alight before the station was called, which imposed on defendant the duty of warning them or rendered it liable for the deaths of plaintiffs' intestates. -Diggs v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 150 Fed. 564; Duunaway v. Same, Id......
...84 C. C. A. 330
CAUSE OF ACTION.
To jury in civil actions, see "Trial," 88 1, 2.
See “Shipping," $ 1.
See "False Pretenses"; "Fraud."
Liability for death of, caused by operation of railroad, see "Railroads," $ 3.
Criminal jurisdiction of United States court for China, see "Criminal Law,"
CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS.
See "Courts," $ 2.
See “Municipal Corporations."
Citizenship ground of jurisdiction of United States courts, see "Courts," $ 2; "Removal of Causes," $ 1.
Against estate of bankrupt, see “Bankruptcy," && 2, 4.
CLOUD ON TITLE.
See "Quieting Title.”
COLLECTION. Of taxes, see "Taxation," § 1.
COLLISION. § 1. Steam vessels meeting or crossing.
Libelant's tug Patton, coming up the Delaware river at night with a tow on her starboard side, came into collision with the tug Cahill, passing down with a similar tow. The master of the Patton testified that shortly before the collision he saw the white towing lights of a vessel a half mile ahead of him, but seeing no side lights he was unable to tell which way it was going. He gave a signal of one whistle and ported his helm, and receiving no answer be signaled again and again, ported and still received no answer, and shortly afterwards the Patton was struck on the port bow by the tow of the Cabill. Held, on the evidence, that the lights seen by the Patton were not those of the Cahill, but of another tug going up the river with a car float which passed on the starboard side of the Cahill and was between her and the Patton until the latter ported; that the Patton was in fault and responsible for the collision in violating rule 3 of the Inland Navigation Rules, Act June 7, 1897, c. 4, 30 Stat. 100 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 2882), which requires a vessel when approaching another whose course she fails to understand to signify such fact by several blasts, or rule 8, which prohibits an overtaking vessel from passing without the consent of the vessel overtaken. -Gring v. Boyer, 157 Fed. 220....
.84 C. C. A. 668 § 2. Lights, signals, and lookouts.
A schooner held in fault for a collision with a steamer in Chesapeake Bay in the night, on the ground that, while becalmed, she had been drifted around by the tide so that the steamer was an overtaking vessel, and could not see her side lights, and she failed to exhibit any white light or flare-up astern as required by the rules, although the steamer was seen approaching for a considerable time before the collision. -The Baltimore, 155 Fed. 405....
.84 C. C. A. 84
COLOR OF TITLE.
To sustain adverse possession, see "Adverse Possession."
Carriage of goods and passengers, see "Carriers"; "Shipping."
junction," $ 1.
8 1. Power to regulate in general.
Every corporation empowered by the state of its creation to engage in interstate commerce may carry on that commerce in sound and recog. nized articles of commerce in every other state in the Union. Every prohibition, obstruction, or burden which the other states attempt to impose upon such business is unconstitutional and void. -Butler Bros. Shoe Co. v. United States Rubber Co., 156 Fed. 1....
84 C. C. A. 167 Interstate commerce in sound and well-recognized articles of commerce must be free, and any prohibition, obstruction, or burden of it by a state by any method is unconstitutional. Such commerce may not be regulated by state at all. The exclusive power to regulate commerce among the states is vested in the Congress. -Butler Bros. Shoe Co. v. United States Rubber Co., 136 Fed. 1..
84 C. C. A. 167 § 2. Subjects of regulation.
Where a manufacturing corporation of New Jersey made annual factorage contracts with a corporation in Colorado, which latter corporation received, stored, and sold the merchandise at its expense, in consideration of the factorage secured by it, the making of the contracts and their performance by the New Jersey corporation were transactions of interstate commerce, which could not be probibited or trammeled by the Legislature of the state of Colorado. -Butler Bros. Shoe Co. v. United States Rubber Co., 156 Fed. 1....
84 C. C. A. 167 Every corporation of every state which is in the employ of the United States, has the right to exercise the necessary corporate powers and to transact the requisite business to discharge the duties of that employment in every other state in the Union, without let or hindrance from the latter. -Putler Bros. Shoe Co. v. United States Rubber Co., 156 Fed. 1....
84 C. C. A. 167 § 3. Means and methods of regulation.
Where a corporation of one state is engaged in both interstate and intrastate commerce in any other state, the prohibition or the conditioning by the latter state of its exercise of its right to do business witbin its borders, without discriminating between that which constitutes interstate commerce and that which constitutes intrastate commerce, is unconstitutional and void, so far as it relates to the former. -Butler Bros. Shoe Co. v. United States Rubber Co., 156 Fed. 1....
84 C. C. A. 167
Or broker, see “Brokers," $ 1.
Right to literary property, see “Literary Property."
See "Husband and Wife," & 1.
Of attorney, see "Attorney and Client," $ 2.
Of witnesses in general, see “Witnesses," 88 1, 2.
Unfair competition, see “Trade Marks and Trade-Names," $ 2.
In civil actions, see "Pleading." $ 2.
COMPROMISE AND SETTLEMENT.
Of period of limitation, see “Limitation of Actions," $ 1.
Taking property for public use, see “Eminent Domain."
See "Sales," § 3.
Conditional delivery of deed, see “Escrows."
In contracts and conveyances.
Disclosure of communications, see "Witnesses," $ 2.
Power to regulate interstate commerce, see "Commerce," $ 1.
Of contract in general, see “Contracts," s 1.
Of actions, see “Action," § 1.
Commencement of period of limitations, see "Criminal Law," $ 2. Evidence of acts and declarations of conspirators, see “Criminal Law," $ 7.
8 1. Criminal responsibility.
In Rev. St. 8 5440 IC. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3676), relating to conspiracies, the words "offenses against the United States' have the same meaning as the words “offenses against the laws of the United States" in the original act of March 2, 1867 (14 Stat. 484, c. 169), the change being merely one of phraseology made by the revision commission, and such section