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Board of, see “Customs Duties," 2.


See “Shipping," $ 2.


See "Indictment and Information."


of public lands, see "Public Lands.”


In civil actions, see “Appeal and Error," $ 9.


See “Municipal Corporations," $ 1.
Accidents at railroad crossings, see "Railroads," $ 2.


Exemptions of bankrupt, see "Bankruptcy," 88 5, 7.
Judicial notice in criminal prosecution of regulations as to homestead entries

of public land, see “Criminal Law," $ 5.
Legality of contract to enter land under homestead law, see “Contracts," $ 1,
Regulations of land office respecting homestead entries as documentary evi-

dence, see "Criminal Law," $ 8.


See “Divorce."

§ 1. Community property.

Defendant entered into a contract with one having a preferential right
to purchase tide lots from the state of Washington, and who had applied
for such purchase, by which the right to purchase a portion of the lots
was assigned to him, and he made a payment therefor. Subsequently,
the state commissioners granted the application to purchase as to certain
of the lots, but denied it as to others, and in consequence the contract
was abandoned. Defendant married, and shortly afterward, the amount
he had paid on the contract not having been returned, a new agreement
was made, by which he was given a quitclaim deed to certain of the lots
in consideration of such payment, and acquired title thereto from the
state; the payments being made in part with money of his wife and in
part with community funds. Held, that under the law of the state that
land acquired after marriage by a deed expressing a money consideration
is presumptively community property, and that it requires clear and
convincing proof to overcome the presumption, such facts were not suffi-
cient to establish the individual ownership of defendant, nor to support

a decree for the specific performance by him of a contract for the sale of
one of the lots in which his wife did not join, as required by the law of
the state, to make a valid contract for a sale of community property.
-Davidson v. Woodward, 156 Fed. 915.

..84 C. C. A. 493


Of witness, see "Witnesses," $ 3.


Duties, see “Customs Duties."


For collection of taxes, see “Taxation," $ 1.


See "Master and Servant," $ 6.


For particular offenses.
See “Conspiracy," $ 1; "Contempt," $ 1; “Perjury,” $ 2.
§ 1. Joinder of parties, offenses, and counts, duplicity, and election.

An indictment under Rev. St. § 3893, as amended by Act Sept. 26,
1888, c. 1039, § 2, 25 Stat. 496 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 2658), charging
the defendant with having mailed a letter giving information where and
how, and of whom and by what means, articles and things designed and
intended “for the prevention of conception and for the procuring of
abortion" might be obtained, does not charge two offenses.
-Lee v. United States, 156 Fed. 948.....

...84 C. C. A. 448
$ 2. Motion to quash or dismiss, and demurrer.

Objections to the sufficiency of an indictment cannot be raised by ob-
jecting to the introduction of any evidence thereunder.

-Nurnberger v. United States, 156 Fed. 721.. .84 C. C. A. 377


Criminal accusation, see "Indictment and Information.”


Of copyright, see “Copyrights," § 2.
Of patent, see “Patents,” $8 5, 6.


Jurisdiction of United States court to enjoin enforcement of municipal ordi-

nance, see "Courts," $ 2.
Restraining use of property for railroad purposes, see "Eminent Domain," $ 1.
Restraining waste, see "Waste."

§ 1. Preliminary and interlocutory injunctions.

A preliminary injunction, restraining the enforcement of a state grain
inspection law in respect to interstate shipments pending a final hear-
ing as to its constitutionality, held not improvidently granted upon the
facts shown, and sustained, without consideration of the case on its

-Andrew v. Globe Elevator Co., 156 Fed. 664........84 C. C. A. 376

ģ 2. Violation and punishment.

The fact that a defendant's first name was stated incorrectly in the
pleadings, decree, and an injunction order does not relieve him from lia-
bility for contempt for violation of such order, where he was in fact
served with process or appeared, and the circumstances were such that
he could not have been misled as to the person intended.
-Aaron v. United States, 155 Fed. 833.

.84 C. O. A. 67
A petition or motion for the attachment of a defendant for contempt
in violating an injunction, which is entitled as in the original suit, and
refers to the order of injunction granted therein by its date, and sets out
in detail the alleged acts of violation, is sufficient, and need not set out
the order in terms.
-Aaron v. United States, 155 Fed. 833...

.84 C. C. A. 67


Estoppel, see “Estoppel," § 1.

See "Bankruptcy.”
Of corporation, see "Corporations," $ 2.


in civil actions, see "Trial," $8 1, 2.
In criminal prosecutions, see “Criminal Law," 11.


Computation of limitations in action by insurance company to recover amount

paid on policy, see “Limitation of Actions," & 1.
Judicial notice in criminal prosecution of regulations of general land office,

see "Criminal Law," § 5.
Pleading release in action on policy, see “Release,” 8 2.

§ 1. Control and regulation in general.

Where a life insurance company incorporated under the laws of one
state has subjected itself to suit in another state in which it does business,
has agreed in accordance with its laws that service of process may be
made upon the insurance commissioner of such state, and has issued poli-
cies to its citizens, such a policy holder has the right to maintain a suit
against it in his own state in either the state or federal courts for a con-
struction of his policy and a determination of his rights thereunder and
the legality of acts of the company as bearing thereon, and such right may
not be denied on the ground that such a suit is an interference with the
internal management of a foreign corporation.
-Castagnino v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 157 Fed. 29.

84 C. C. A, 533

§ 2. Extent of loss and liability of insurer.

In a marine policy insuring a tug against legal liability for loss or dam-
age caused to its tows or other vessels through collision or stranding, the
usual "sue and labor" clause has reference only to the subject-matter of
the insurance, and has no application to expenses incurred in defending
the tug itself against an unsuccessful suit to establish its liability.

-Munson v. Standard Marine Ins. Co., 156 Fed. 44..84 C. C. A. 210
A marine policy insuring a tug merely against legal liability for loss or
damage caused to its tows by collision or stranding creates no liability on
the part of the insurer for the expense of successfully defending the tug
against a suit to recover for the stranding of tows.

-Munson v. Standard Marine Ins. Co., 156 Fed. 44. .84 C. C. A. 210
§ 3. Actions on policies.

Evidence considered in a suit of interpleader between the widow and a
former partner of a decedent to determine the right to the proceeds of a
policy of insurance on his life, which was by its terms payable to his
estate, but by an agreement between the partners was to be held for
the benefit of the partnership, and held to sustain the claim of the widow
that the partnership had been dissolved some months prior to her hus-
band's death, and all matters between the partners settled.
-Osius v. Davis, 156 Fed. 569....

..84 C. C. A. 335


See “Injunction," § 1.


Appealability, see "Appeal and Error," $ 1.


The United States cannot maintain an action of debt for the recovery
of stamp taxes owing on a deed of conveyance under War Revenue Act
June 13, 1898, c. 448, $ 25, Schedule A, 30 Stat. 457 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901,
p. 2299), by reason of the failure to atfix the required stamps thereto.
There being no express authority in the statute for such a proceeding,
the means of enforcing payment of the tax are limited to the penal pro-
visions contained therein.

-United States v. Chamberlin, 156 Fed. 881........84 C. C. A. 461
Where the government made an assessment against a distiller of the
tax on spirits made from material used and not reported, and a portion
of such spirits were found seized and sold, and the tax on such part paid
from the proceeds, the surety on the distiller's bond, when charged with
liability for the assessment, is entitled to credit for the part of the tax
so paid, but not for the remainder of the proceeds of the sale.

-United States v. National Surety Co., 157 Fed. 174. .84 C. C. A. 622
Rev. St. $ 3221, as amended by Act March 1, 1879, c. 125, § 6, 20 Stat.
341 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 2087), which provides that when any dis-
tilled spirits deposited in warehouse are destroyed by accidental fire
or other casualty without fraud, collusion, or negligence of the owner
thereof no taxes shall be collected on such spirits, confers on such own-
er a legal right which is enforceable in the courts, and is not dependent
on the discretionary action of the Secretary of the Treasury, and such
destruction of spirits in a warehouse by accidental fire may be set up
as a defense to an action by the government on a distiller's bond to re-
cover the taxes thereon.

-Freeman v. United States, 157 Fed. 195... ..84 O. O. A. 643


See "Treatieg."


Regulation, wee "Carriers," $ 1; “Commerce."


Distillers' bonds under revenue laws, see "Internal Revenue."


See “Patents."


Presented for review on appeal, see “Appeal and Error," $ 2.


Former jeopardy bar to prosecution, see "Criminal Law," § 3.


Of causes of action, see "Action," § 1.


Requirements of statute of frauds affecting agreement for joint venture, see

“Frauds, Statute of," § 1.

See “Courts."
Mandamus to judge, see "Mandamus," § 1.


Decisions of courts in general, see “Courts," $ 1.
On appeal or writ of error, see “Appeal and Error," $ 10.
Review, see “Appeal and Error.”

§ 1. Amendment, correction, and review in same court.

It is within the power of a court to amend its record of a judgment at
a subsequent term to prevent injustice through a mistake or inadvertence
of the judge or counsel or the clerk, as by correcting the wording of an
order of dismissal which by mistake did not conform to the motion on
which it was based.

-Bernard v. Abel, 156 Fed. 619; In re Bernard, Id...84 C. C. A. 361
It is not a fatal objection to a nunc pro tunc order correcting a judg-
ment on the ground of mistake that the motion therefor was not served

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