Source: Orange Administrative Committees, Lemon Administrative Committee, Desert Grapefruit Administrative Committee, California Crop & Livestock Reporting Service, Canadian exports estimated by Sunkist. Sources: USDA, FAS; Citrus, FCF 4-64, August 1964; FCF 1-67, January 1967; FCF 4-67, December 1967; FCF 4-68, December 1968; FCF 1-70, January 1970. 46-127-70-pt. 15-16 MARKET ORGANIZATION MEASURES UNDER THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY (MAY 1969) 1 The only measure affecting imports of rice into nonproducing countries (Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and, Luxembourg). 2 A supplementary levy may be applied on the basis of the guide prices. Intervention is at the discretion of the Commission. • Intervention on the cheese market affects parmesan only. Subsidies are paid to consumers of butter and cheese in Germany and the Netherlands only. A countervailing charge may be applied on the basis of the reference prices. Source: USDA:FAS. XX The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Heron, for bringing your very fine statement to the committee. Are there any questions? Mr. CONABLE. I notice you mentioned the Mediterranean Basin as an independently important source for citrus fruit. Are we getting any Jaffa oranges in this country? I know I have noticed them in the stores. Mr. HERON. I do not have specific figures available. I will be happy to obtain them and furnish them to the committee if you wish. Mr. CONABLE. Only if it is a sufficiently significant statistic to indicate some trend. The CHAIRMAN. The figures will be placed in the record at this point. (The information requested follows:) In calendar year 1968 there were approximately 1,973,189 pounds of fresh oranges imported into the United States from Japan with a value of approximately $298,882.00. In calendar year 1969 there were approximately 1,474,904 pounds of fresh oranges imported into the United States from Japan with a value of approximately $211,753.00. It is important to keep in mind when referring to fresh orange imports from Japan that these oranges are under foreign quarantine. Entry is allowed only into Alaska, Washington, Oregon, Idaho and Montana. Additionally, there is a domestic quarantine on these oranges. That means that they are not permitted to move in interstate commerce from the states into which they are imported, to oher states. If Japanese oranges have been noticed in stores in the New York area, in all probability they were illegal. Mr. PETTIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this moment to commend Mr. Heron for representing the league and for his statement today. Having been a citrus grower for 25 years or more, I want to say we really have a problem in the California and Arizona areas. I hope we can solve it soon. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Pettis. Thank you, Mr. Heron. Mr. HERON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. STATEMENT OF LEONARD K. LOBRED, SECRETARY-TREASURER, U.S. NATIONAL FRUIT EXPORT COUNCIL Mr. LOBRED. I am Leonard K. Lobred, secretary-treasurer of the U.S. National Fruit Export Council, representing producers and processors interested in furthering the exploration of fruit and fruit products. Following is a list of the member organizations: California-Arizona Citrus Industry, Pure Gold, Inc. Redlands, Calif.; Sunkist Growers, Los Angeles, Calif. California Canning Peach Association, San Francisco, Calif. California Grape and Tree Fruit League, San Francisco, Calif. Canners League of California, San Francisco, Calif. Cranberry Institute, Duxbury, Mass. DFA of California, Santa Clara, Calif. Florida Canners Association, Winter Haven, Fla. Florida Citrus Mutual, Lakeland, Fla. International Apple Association, Washington, D.C. National Apple Institute, Washington, D.C. National Canners Association, Washington, D.C. National Red Cherry Institute, East Lansing, Mich. Northwest Horticultural Council, Yakima, Wash. Pineapple Growers Association of Hawaii, SanFrancisco, Calif. Texas Citrus and Vegetable Growers and Shippers, Harlingen, Tex. Some of these organizations are submitting statements to this committee on their own behalf. I do not appear as the direct representative of any of them, but only for the group, on matters of common concern affecting the exploration of fruit and fruit products-fresh, dried, canned, and frozen. None of these is priced-supported. Exports of these products contribute an average of more than $300 million annually to our balance of payments. The U.S. National Fruit Export Council met in Washington May 25, 26, 27. As is our custom at such meetings, collectively we took stock of the factors influencing agricultural exports in general and fruit products exports in particular. ECONOMIC FACTORS DETERRING U.S. EXPORTS We again identified inflation as one of the major deterrents to exports, and the U.S. National Fruit Export Council gives its general support to measures designed to curtail inflationary forces. Another disadvantage to U.S. fruits in our principal export markets is the wide disparity in ocean freight rate from U.S. ports and from major competing origins such as Australia, Israel, South Africa, and Taiwan. Fruits from competing origins are carried to the same destination at disparate ocean freight charges, putting U.S. fruits at a distinct competitive disadvantage. The U.S. National Fruit Export Council believes that ocean freight rate on U.S. fruits and fruit products should be in balance with those charged exporters of other countries, to the end that U.S. fruits and fruit products shall not be rendered uncompetitive by reason of discriminatory ocean freight charges. However, our chief concern is with U.S. trade policy, more specifically its execution or lack of execution. We need and request the support of this committee and of the Congress to impress on the executive branch the following: FOREIGN IMPORT RESTICTIONS Exports of fruits and fruit products are impeded by a continuing and growing agricultural protectionism, of which the most extreme is that of the European Community. Our Government successfully challenged the EEC when the Commission proposed to institute a tax on soybeans. But the executive branch declines to challenge the EEC on its number one trade restriction, the variable levy system, which we regard as an absolute violation of the GATT, and even more restrictive than measures which are expressly prohibited by the GATT. Various regulations under the EEC's common agricultural policy are formidable barriers to the importation of U.S. fruits. Variable levies, reference prices, and minimum import prices are bad for U.S. agricultural exports not only because of high ad valorem protection but additionally because of their side effects, which create nuisances for the trade. The U.S. National Fruit Export Council considers that the United States should oppose the excessive protectionism which is embodied in the EEC's common agricultural policy. We consider that the United States should continue to press for agricultural trade liberalization in other countries, as well, notably Japan, where prospects for trade appear favorable if there were market access. LOSS OF U.S. AGRICULTURAL MARKETS IN AN ENLARGED EEC Fruit and fruit products exporters are very much concerned about the consequences to our export trade if the United Kingdom and other applicant countries become members of the EEC. The United Kingdom, Denmark, and Norway are major export markets for U.S. fruits. The tariffs there are bound at low rates pursuant to the GATT. As such concessions have been bought and paid for by the United States in past international negotiations, the United States is entitled to continue to deliver goods into those countries under the same conditions of market access. However, membership in the EEC will mean, for each of the applicant countries, scrapping of their existing tariff systems. The applicant countries will be obliged to adopt the Common External Tariff for industrial products and the common agricultural policy and market regulations for agricultural production and trade. The customs duties on fruits and fruit products entering the EEC are higher, in almost every instance, than the duties on the same fruits entering the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Norway. Furthermore, importation of fresh fruits into the EEC is burdened by the reference price system, and for canned fruits there is a sugar levy on top of the tariff. If the EEC's system is made applicable also in the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Norway, market access and export opportunities for U.S. fruits will be seriously impaired. We consider that the variable levy system is illegal and that the United States should have challenged its legality under GATT long ago. In the event that the United Kingdom, itself a major market, is added to the EEC, the United States should take necessary measure to assure that market access there will be no less favorable than under existing GATT bindings. As a practical matter, we don't know what measures might be taken, short of an end to the variable levy system. With the prospect that the variable levy will be effective in 10 countries rather than six, the United States should reexamine its position and should institute the long overdue challenge to the EEC variable levy system. OPPOSITION TO EXPORT SUBSIDIES The variable levy system is not only an import protection, it provides funds with which the EEC subsidizes its agricultural exports in third country markets in competition with American agricultural products. The variable levy and export subsidies thus nullify comparative advantage both in the EEC and in world markets. Some other countries also subsidize their agricultural exports in third country markets in competition with U.S. fruits. The U.S. Na |