which we have heretofore held ourselves bound to treat all similar questions. But there are circumstances in the relation of the two countries which require us to act, on this occasion, with even more than our wonted caution. Texas was once claimed as a part of our property, and there are those among our citizens who, always reluctant to abandon that claim, cannot but regard with solicitude the prospect of the re-union of the territory to this country. A large portion of its civilized inhabitants are emigrants from the United States; speak the same language with ourselves; cherish the same principles; political and religious; and are bound to many of our citizens by ties of friendship and kindred blood; and more than all it is known that the People of that country have instituted the same form of Government with our own; and have, since the close of your last session, openly resolved, on the acknowledgement by us of their independence, to seek admission into the Union as one of the Federal States. The last circumstance is a matter of peculiar delicacy, and forces upon us considerations of the gravest character. The title of Texas to the territory she claims is identified with her independence; she asks us to acknowledge that title to the territory, with an avowed design to treat immediately of its transfer to the United States. It becomes us to beware of a too early movement, as it might subject us, however unjustly, to the imputation of seeking to establish the claim of our neighbors to a territory, with a view to its subsequent acquisition by ourselves. Prudence, therefore, seems to dictate that we should still stand aloof, and maintain our present attitude, if not until Mexico itself, or one of the great foreign powers, shall recognize the independence of the new Government, at least until the lapse of time, or the course of events shall have proved, beyond cavil or dispute, the ability of the People of the country to maintain their separate sovereignty, and to uphold the Government constituted by them. Neither of the contending parties can justly complain of this course. By pursuing it, we are but carrying out the long-established policy of the Government-a policy which has secured to us respect and influence abroad and inspired confidence at home.

Having thus discharged my duty, by presenting with simplicity and directness the views which, after much reflection, I have been led to take of this important subject, I have only to add the expression of my confidence that, if Congress shall differ with me upon it, their judgment will be the result of dispassionate, prudent, and wise deliberation; with the assurance that, during the short time I shall continue connected with the Government, I shall promptly and cordially unite with you in such measures as may be deemed best fitted to increase the prosperity and perpetuate the peace of our favored country.

APPENDIX.

PROTEST,

APRIL 15, 1836.

To the Senate of the United States:

It appears by the published journal of the Senate, that on the 26th of December last, a resolution was offered by a member of the Senate, which, after a protracted debate, was,on the twenty-eight day of March last, modified by the mover, and passed by the votes of twenty-six Senators out of forty-six, who were present and voted, in the following words, viz :

"Resolved, That the President, in the late Executive proceeding in "relation to the public revenue, has assumed upon himself authority and 'power not conferred by the Constitution and laws, but in derogation of 'both."

Having had the honor, through the voluntary suffrages of the American People, to fill the office of President of the United States during the period which may be presumed to have been referred to in this resolution, it is sufficiently evident that the censure it inflicts was intended for myself. Without notice, unheard and untried, I thus find myself charged on the records of the Senate, and in a form hitherto unknown in our history, with the high crime of violating the laws and Constitution of my country.

It can seldom be necessary for any Department of the Government, when assailed in conversation, or debate, or by the strictures of the press or of popular assemblies, to step out of its ordinary path for the purpose of vindicating its conduct, or of pointing out any irregularity or injustice in the manner of the attack. But when the chief Executive Magistrate is, by one of the most important branches of the Government, in its official capacity, in a public manner, and by its recorded sentence, but without precedent, competent authority, or just cause, declared guilty of a breach of the laws and Constitution, it is due to his station, to public opinion, and to proper self-respect, that the officer thus denounced should promptly expose the wrong which has been done.

In the present case, moreover, there is even a stronger necessity for such a vindication. By an express provision of the Constitution, before the President of the United States can enter on the execution of his office, he is required to take an oath or affirmation in the following words:

"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office

' of President of the United States; and will, to the best of my ability, 'preserve, protect, and defend, the Constitution of the United States."

The duty of defending, so far as in him lies, the integrity of the Constitution, would indeed have resulted from the very nature of his office; but by thus expressing it in the official oath or affirmation, which, in this respect, differs from that of every other functionary, the founders of our Republic have attested their sense of its importance, and have given to it a peculiar solemnity and force. Bound to the performance of this duty by the oath I have taken, by the strongest obligations of gratitude to the American people, and by the ties which unite my every earthly interest with the welfare and glory of my country; and perfectly convinced that the discussion and passage of the above mentioned resolution were not only unauthorized by the Constitution, but in many respects repugnant to its provisions and subversive of the rights secured by it to other coordinate departments, I deem it an imperative duty to maintain the su premacy of that sacred instrument, and the immunities of the department intrusted to my care, by all means consistent with my own lawful powers, with the rights of others, and with the genius of our civil institutions. To this end, I have caused this, my solemn protest against the aforesaid proceedings, to be placed on the files of the Executive Department, and to be transmitted to the Senate.

It is alike due to the subject, the Senate, and the People, that the views which I have taken of the proceedings referred to, and which compel me to regard them in the light which has been mentioned, should be exhibited at length, and with the freedom and firmness which are required by an occasion so unprecedented and peculiar.

Under the Constitution of the United States, the powers and functions of the various departments of the Federal Government, and their responsibilities for violation or neglect of duty, are clearly defined or result by necessary inference. The Legislative power, subject to the qualified negative of the President is vested in the Congress of the United States, composed of the Senate and House of Representatives. The Executive power is vested exclusively in the President, except that in the conclusion of treaties and in certain appointments to office, he is to act with the advice and consent of the Senate. The judicial power is vested exclusively in the Supreme and other Courts of the United States, except in cases of impeachment, for which purpose the accusatory power is vested in the House of Representatives, and that of hearing and determining, in the Senate. But although for the special purposes which have been mentioned, there is au occasional intermixture of the powers of the different departments, yet with these exceptions, each of the three great departments is independent of the others in its sphere of action; and when it deviates from that sphere, is not responsible to the others, further than it is expressly made so in the Constitution. In every other respect, each of them is the coequal of the other two, and all are the servants of the American people, without power or right to control or censure each other in the service of their common superior, save only in the manner and to the degree which that superior has prescribed.

The responsibilities of the President are numerous and weighty. He is liable to impeachment for high crimes and misdemeanors, and, on due conviction, to removal from office, and perpetual disqualification; and notwithstanding such conviction, he may also be indicted and punished according to law. He is also liable to the private action of any party who may have been injured by his illegal mandates or instructions, in the same manner and to the same extent as the humblest functionary. In

addition to the responsibilities which may thus be enforced by impeachment, criminal prosecution, or suit at law, he is also accountable at the bar of public opinion, for every act of his administration. Subject only to the restraints of Truth and Justice, the free People of the United States have the undoubted right, as individuals or collectively, orally or in writing, at such times, and in such language and form as they may think proper, to discuss his official conduct, and to express and promulgate their opinions concerning it. Indirectly, also, his conduct may come under review in either branch of the Legislature, or in the Senate when acting in its Executive capacity, and so far as the Executive or legislative proceedings of these bodies may require it, it may be examined by them. These are believed to be the proper and only modes, in which the President of the United States is to be held accountable for his official conduct.

Tested by these principles, the resolution of the Senate is wholly unauthorized by the Constitution, and in derogation of its entire spirit. It assumes that a single branch of the Legislative Department may, for the purposes of a public censure, and without any view to legislation or impeachment, take up, consider, and decide upon, the official acts of the Executive. But in no part of the constitution is the President subjected to any such responsibility; and in no part of that instrument is any such power conferred on either branch of the Legislature.

The justice of these conclusions will be illustrated and confirmed by a brief analysis of the powers of the Senate, and a comparison of their recent proceedings with those powers.

may

The high functions assigned by the Constitution to the Senate, are in their nature either Legislative, Executive, or Judicial. It is only in the exercise of its Judicial powers, when sitting as a Court for the Trial of Impeachments, that the Senate is expressly authorized and necessarily required to consider and decide upon the conduct of the President, or any other public officer. Indirectly, however, as has already been suggested, it may frequently be called on to perform that office. Cases may occur in the course of its Legislative or Executive proceedings, in which it be indispensable to the proper exercise of its powers, that should inquire into, and decide upon, the conduct of the President or other public officers: and in every other such case, its constitutional right to do so is cheerfully conceded. But to authorize the Senate to enter on such a task in its Legislative or Executive capacity, the inquiry must actually grow out of and tend to some Legislative or Executive action; and the decision, when expressed, must take the form of some appropriate Legislative or Executive act.

The resolution in question was introduced, discussed, and passed, not as a joint, but as a separate resolution. It asserts no Legislative power; proposes no Legislative action; and neither possesses the form nor any of the attributes of a Legislative measure. It does not appear to have been entertained or passed, with any view or expectation of its issuing in a law or joint resolution, or in any other Legislative action.

Whilst wanting both the form and substance of a Legislative measure, it is equally manifest, that the resolution was not justified by any of the Executive powers conferred on the Senate. These powers relate exclusively to the consideration of treaties and nomination to office, and they are exercised in secret session, and with closed doors. This resolution does not apply to any treaty or nomination, and was passed in a public session.

Nor does this proceeding in any way belong to that class of incidental