(116 A.)

the appellee company, wrote to the appellants saying:

"Because of changed conditions and requests received from those in authority, you are notified that no commissions will be allowed on the bonds received by this company covering officers and employé of the city tax collector's department.

"While we regret to be obliged to send this notice, we trust you will understand we have no other alternative.

"This is to take effect beginning October 1, 1918, and will apply to business for the year beginning October 1st."

On the 15th day of April, 1919, the suit in this case was brought by the appellants against the appellee to recover said commissions.

The declaration as originally filed contained but one count, which was upon the contract or agreement consisting of the letter of the appellee to the appellants, dated September 13, 1912, and the acceptance by the appellants of the offer therein contained, leave of the court to recover commissions but later an additional count was filed by upon the insurance procured by the plaintiffs for the appellee for the year beginning October 1, 1918.

At the trial of the case the facts that we

On the 23d of September the appellants answered Mr. Bland's letter to them. In their have stated were produced in evidence, toanswer they called the appellee's attention together with the further fact that, when Wilits letter of September 13, 1912, in which it agreed to pay the commissions therein stated, and also to the disagreement between them arising out of its refusal to pay the commissions for 1917, and the result of said dis

agreement.

The record does not disclose any further correspondence between the appellants and Mr. Bland, but on the 1st day of October the appellants took out a license permitting them

to act as insurance brokers until the 1st

day of May thereafter (1919), when by the statute (chapter 257 of Acts 1916; section 218, art. 23, of the Code [vol. 4]) the license expired.

After taking out said license, the appellants, on the 9th day of October, 1918, wrote the appellee asking it to send to them a list of the employees in the tax collector's office insured by it for the year commencing October 1, 1918. This letter is not in the record, but on the 11th day of October, 1918, the appellee, through John N. Richardson, superintendent of its official bond department, replied to said letter saying:

"We have your letter of October 9th asking for a list of the employees of the city tax department. Kindly take up this matter with Messrs. Riggs, Rossman & Hunter, Inc., our city representatives, who will give the matter attention."

liam C. Page, tax collector of the city from October 1, 1916, to May 1, 1920, was called to the stand, he denied that statement made in the letter of Riggs, Rossman & Hunter to Goldsmith & Dell, dated October 15, 1918,

that he had instructed them to credit the

business to another account, saying that he had given no instructions whatever to any from the placing of the bonds of the emone as to crediting the commissions arising ployees of the city tax collectors' office.

At the conclusion of the plaintiffs' case a prayer offered by the defendant which asked

that a verdict be directed for the defendant ficient, under the pleading, to entitle the because of the want of evidence legally sufplaintiffs to recover, was granted.

In the course of the trial one exception was taken to the court's ruling upon the evidence. This and the exception taken to the court's ruling upon the prayer are the only exceptions found in the record.

It is the contention of the defendant that the plaintiffs are barred from recovery beOctober, 1918, they were without insurance cause of the fact that until the 1st day of broker's license enabling them to act as insurance brokers. The Statute (section 218 of article 23 of the Code) provides that

Any one who "for compensation,, acts or aids. As directed in the above letter, the appel-surance or reinsurance, or placing risks or efin any manner in negotiating contracts of inlants on the 14th day of October, 1918, wrote fecting insurance or reinsurance for a person Riggs, Rossman & Hunter saying: other than himself, and not being a duly appointed solicitor, agent or officer of the com

"Please send us the usual list of the bonds of the employees of the city tax department, as we wish to enter them on our books, and oblige."

In reply to this letter, Riggs, Rossman & Hunter, on the 15th day of October, 1918, wrote, appellants saying:

"Acknowledging your letter of the 14th inst., we must advise that the city tax collector has instructed us to credit this business to another account, and we will, therefore, be unable to give you the data requested."

is effected,
pany in which such insurance or reinsurance
* shall be deemed an insur-
ance broker within the meaning of this article."

And in the same section and article it is provided that

"All licenses for the purposes of conducting the occupation or business of an insurance broker, or broker's solicitor, shall be granted by the Insurance Commissioner of the state of Maryland, and all such licenses granted by said Commissioner shall expire on the 1st day of May thereafter."

*

"Any person who shall use or exercise within this state the business or occupation of an insurance broker, * without having procured a license therefor, as required by Sections 218, 219, 219A and 219B of this article *** shall be subject to a penalty of five hundred dollars for each such offense."

In section 220 of said article it is also pro- | into between them. The terms and provivided thatsions of this agreement were complied with, not only during the first administration of Mr. Preston-the limit of time fixed by such agreement-but continued thereafter until the year 1917, when the defendant again refused to pay commissions for the succeeding insurance year. The grounds for its refusal at that time are not disclosed by the record, but, whatever they may have been, the plaintiffs were told to see Mr. Cowden, deputy insurance commissioner, which Mr. Goldsmith did, and as a result of his conference with him the relations of the plaintiffs and defendant were resumed and the commissions paid for that year.

This statute was before this court for construction in the case of Goldsmith & Dell v. Manufacturers' Liability Insurance Co. of New Jersey, 132 Md. 283, 103 Atl. 627, in which we held that broker's insurance license was not required for revenue alone, but also for the protection of the public against the wrongdoing, imposition, and fraud of persons engaged in such business, and that any insurance contract entered into by an unlicensed broker in the course of his business could not be enforced by him. The opinion in that case was handed down on February 23, 1918.

It is shown that the plaintiffs were licensed insurance brokers on and after October 1, 1918, to May 1, 1919, but not before that time, and the decision in this case will hinge upon whether they, as holders of such license for the period mentioned, are, upon the facts of the case, entitled to have their

claim for commissions enforced.

The evidence discloses that early in the first administration of Hon. James H. Preston, mayor of the city of Baltimore, the business of insuring the employees of the tax collector's department of the city was intrusted to the care of the plaintiffs-that is to say, authority was given to them to place that insurance with such insurance company or companies as they might select, and the evidence discloses that they selected the defendant. It seems that this authority to them emanated from the mayor, and upon the resignation in 1911 of Mr. Numsen, who was tax collector in the early part of Mayor Preston's first administration, the officials of the defendant company became apprehensive as to whether the authority of the plaintiffs would thereafter be retained by them, and, moved by that apprehension, Mr. Bland called upon plaintiffs, and he, with Mr. Goldsmith, went to see the mayor, and they were assured by him that the plaintiffs would not be disturbed in their authority to place the insurance.

The defendant's reason for its refusal to pay commissions at that time may have been the one they assigned a year later-that the plaintiffs were not licensed brokers and not entitled, so long as they remain unlicensed brokers, to receive the commissions.

At this time, however, the question whether a contract made by an' unlicensed insurance broker or brokers was an enforceableone was pending in the court, and the decision in Goldsmith & Dell v. Manufacturers' Liability & Insurance Company of New Jersey had not been made.

There was at no time, so far as the record discloses, any denial made by the defendant. of the fact that the plaintiffs were authorized by those in power to place this insurance until the plaintiffs were told by Riggs, Rossman & Hunter in their letter of October 15, 1918, after the contracts of insurance had. been executed, that the city tax collector had instructed them to credit the business to another account, which statement William C. Page, collector at that time, denied when upon the stand. It was under this authority that the insurance of previous years had been placed, and the commissions paid by the defendant to the plaintiffs, and it was. this same authority that was recognized by Mr. Riggs when he said to Mr. Goldsmith that commissions for the year 1918 would not be paid to plaintiffs unless they took out insurance broker's license, from which statement the plaintiffs were entitled to infer that if they did take out such license the commissions would be paid to them. The plaintiffs took out a license that became effective from the first of the succeeding insurance year, commencing October 1, 1918, the time when the next annual insurance was to be placed.

In the following year, 1912, Mr. Goldsmith again called upon the mayor, this time be- It is true that Mr. Bland wrote the plaincause told by Mr. Bland that his company tiffs on September 21, 1918, that commiswould not pay the plaintiffs commissions for sions would not be paid them for the sucthe succeeding year, saying he “had made ceeding year which commenced on October different arrangements with his firm," and, 1, 1918, stating therein that such refusal as a result of his conference with the mayor, was "because of changed conditions and rethe agreement contained in the defendant's quests received from those in authority." It

(116 A.)

(140 Md. 14)

(Court of Appeals of Maryland. Jan. 11, 1922.)

whether this letter was written before or after the conversation between Messrs. BARNES et al. v. UNITED RYS. & ELECRiggs and Goldsmith, in which the former TRIC CO. OF BALTIMORE. (No. 49.) told the latter that the commissions for said year would not be paid unless the plaintiffs took out an insurance broker's license, but it may be reasonably inferred that the con-1. Damages 105-One who recovers full valversation was after the writing of the letter, for in the letter the specific ground of refusal is withheld, whereas in the conversation the ground of the refusal is specifically

stated.

ue of automobile cannot recover value of use. One who recovers the full value of an automobile, as for a complete destruction, cannot also recover the value of the use thereof. 2. Street railroads 113(2)-Ordinance limiting speed admissible.

In an action for damages to an automobile truck struck by a street car at a street

The record shows no further communication between the parties after the letter of Mr. Bland and the answer thereto, or the conversation between Messrs. Riggs and intersection, an ordinance in force at the date Goldsmith, whichever last occurred, until after October 1, 1918, the time when the new annual insurance was to become effective, and at which time the plaintiffs became licensed insurance brokers.

of the trial, limiting the speed of street cars crossing open streets within the city, was admissible.

3. Street railroads 81 (4)-Care required in crossing streets.

Greater care must be exercised in running

136 (25)-Cause of injury for

Where the evidence is conflicting as to whose negligence caused an injury, the question is for the jury.

In this case the plaintiffs had insurance which they were authorized to place with whom they might select. They entered into a street car across the streets of a city than in crossing a highway in the country. a contract with the defendant, as shown by defendant's letter of September 13, 1912, and 4. Negligence their acceptance of it, to place that insur- jury. ance with the defendant for and during the term of the "then present administration" which expired long before the controversy arose in this case. The placing of said insurance thereafter was from year to year, and the consent of both parties was required thereto for the renewal of the insurance at each succeeding year. Either could have refused to continue it.

5. Street railroads 117(8)—Negligence held for jury.

truck struck by a street car at a street intersection, evidence held sufficient to require submission of the question of defendant's negligence to the jury.

In an action for damages to an automobile

6. Assignments

119-Pledges

37-Seller

and assignee held entitled to sue for damages to respective interests in damaged truck.

The conditional seller of an automobile truck

At the expiration of the insurance year of 1917, new insurance was to be issued for the year 1918, and this it seems was done in the way of renewal, without consultation and conference with the plaintiffs, as would appear from the record, but, as their authority and a corporation to which it assigned its inhad not been revoked, as shown by the evi-terest in the contract and purchase-money note dence, it would thus seem, upon the facts and any claim for damages for injury to the stated, that the plaintiffs were entitled to property as collateral security for the indorsetheir commissions thereon upon their ap- ment of a note may sue for damages for inproval of the contract executed by the de- jury to their respective interests. fendants when the same became effective, if at such time they were licensed insurance brokers, which the record shows they were. The court below, we think, erred in granting the defendant's prayer.

[2] This brings us to the exception upon the evidence. Mr. Goldsmith was asked "if the authority conferred upon the plaintiffs to place the insurance was ever revoked, not only by the mayor, but by any one." This question the court refused to permit the witness to answer. In doing so we think the court erred, as it was, in our opinion, a pertinent inquiry.

Because of the errors mentioned, the judgment of the court below will be reversed.

Judgment reversed, and a new trial awarded; appellee to pay costs.

7. Damages

64-Right to sue for damages not defeated by insurance.

defeat the right to sue for damages thereto.

The fact that a truck was insured does not

Appeal from Superior Court of Baltimore City; James M. Ambler, Judge.

"To be officially reported."

Action by Lester E. Barnes, Finance & Guaranty Company and another against the United Railways & Electric Company of Baltimore. Judgment for defendant, and the two last named plaintiffs appeal. Reversed and remanded.

Argued before BOYD, C. J., and BRISCOE, THOMAS, URNER, and OFFUTT, JJ.

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

Hilary W. Gans and S. Ralph Warnken, | Ill. App. 559; 2 Sedgwick on Damages (9th both of Baltimore, for appellants. Ed.) par. 435a.

(116 A.)

according to what is reasonable and proper | on Park Heights avenue, and vehicles cannot in view of the circumstances, surroundings, come down this avenue east of the car tracks, and location; provided, however, that in crossing any such street or intersecting public highway or private street in the thickly congested or business parts of the city such street car shall not be operated at a rate of speed exceeding 15 miles an hour. There was error, therefore, in the ruling of the court in sustaining the objection to the introduction in evidence of the ordinance, set out in the record, in the third exception, as it was proper evidence, and should have been admitted.