as a fact, but also appear on the journals of that legislature in a certain way. The Constitution thus, in plain words, clearly indicates the way and the only way, that the legislature can authorize the counties and the cities of the State to exercise the power of taxation. The entry of the yeas and nays on the last two readings must appear on the journal in order to comply with the requirements of the Constitution, and unless they do so appear the bill has not become a law, and the evidence of its nullity is the journal provided by that Constitution itself." Board of Comrs. of Stanley County, N. Car., et al. v. Coler, et al., 37 C. C. A. 484, 96 Fed. 284.

Refunding indebtedness without vote.

765. (Colo 1899.) Section 6 of article 11 of the Constitution of Colorado, prohibiting the creation of indebtedness by municipalities of the State without a favorable vote of the electors, does not limit the power of the legislature of that State to empower the municipal and quasi-municipal corporations to refund their debts without a vote of the people. Such refunding creates no indebtedness. Greer v. Board of Comrs. of Ouray County, Colo.; Comrs. of Ouray County v. Greer, 38 C. C. A. 250, 97 Fed. 435.

Constitutional debt limit; computa

tion of amount of indebtedness. 766. (Iowa, 1900.) When bonds are issued in excess of a constitutional limitation, and are therefore void, they are not to be included in computing the indebtedness of the county to determine the validity of indebtedness subsequently incurred by it. Lyon County, Iowa, v. Keene FiveCent. Sav. Bank of Keene, N. H., et al., 40 C. C. A. 391, 100 Fed. 337.

Constitutional requirement that pro

vision be made for collection of tax to pay bonds and interest; presumption of compliance with; recitals in bonds; bona fide purchaser.

767. (S. Dak. 1894.) The Constitution of South Dakota required that, when bonds should be issued by a public corporation in that State, provision should be made for the collection of an annual tax to pay the interest and principal thereof.

By reason of recitals in bonds, importing full compliance with all provisions and conditions of law, and in

favor of a bona fide holder of such bonds, the constitutional requirement referred to was conclusively presumed to have been complied with, although in fact it had not been. National Life Ins. Co. of Montpelier v. Board of Education of the City of Huron, 10 C. C. A. 637, 62 Fed. 778.

To the same effect: (S. Dak. 1900.) Hughes County v. Livingston, 43 C. C. A. 541, 104 Fed. 306.

Constitutional provision requiring provision to be made at time of creating debt for levying and collecting a sufficient tax to pay the interest and create a sinking fund. 768. (Tex. 1902.) The Constitution of Texas provides that, "no debt for any purpose shall ever be incurred in any manner by any city or county, unless provision is made at the time of creating the same, for levying and collecting a sufficient tax to pay the interest thereon and provide at least two per cent. as a sinking fund."

On June 8, 1883, the council of the city of Columbus, Texas, adopted an ordinance providing for issuing $25,000 00 of bonds and further provided in said ordinance that, "There shall be levied and collected an annual ad valorum city tax of one-fourth of one per centum of the cash value thereof, estimated in lawful money of the United States, on all the movable property and all the real property situated and owned in this city, on the first day of January in each and every year, except so much thereof as may be exempted by the Constitution and laws of the State of Texas, and by ordinances of the city."

Subsequently the council passed another ordinance which was intended to appropriate to the payment of the bonds and interest all the revenues of the city, including poll, occupation and other taxes.

Held, that the bonds were valid to the amount only of the tax provided for contemporaneously with the authorization of the bonds. City of Columbus v. Woonsocket Institution for Savings, 52 C. C. A. 118, 114 Fed. 162.

Impairment of creditors remedies or rights by provision of State Constitution not permitted.

769. (Ky. 1904.) In a proceeding in mandamus to compel the levy and collection of a tax under a law

of Kentucky, to pay a judgment rendered against a county on its bonds, it was contended that a provision of the new Constitution of that State repealed the law theretofore in force which authorized the levy and collection of such taxes and that by reason of such repeal there was no authority to levy and collect such tax. On this question the court say:

"But with respect to this particular law it was impossible that the Constitution should have repealed it. It did not nullify this statute when it declared that statutes inconsistent with it should be void at that time or at some future time unless the Constitution should provide a certain equivalent; and this the Constitution did not do. It supplied no new remedy, and, if the old was not continued, there would have ensued a complete lapse of the obligation of the contract, with a prospect that perhaps some remedy would be supplied by future legislation. With respect to the obligation of a municipality, the substance of its value consists of the means provided for its enforcement; and it is no more possible for the people, by a provision of their Constitution, to impair the obligation of such a contract, than for a legislature of a state." Guthrie v. Sparks, 65 C. C. A. 427, 131 Fed. 443.

Constitutional requirements in enacting laws.

770. (Neb. 1907.) This was an action at law on coupons clipped from bonds of school district of Nebraska. It was contended that an amendment of the enabling act was invalid because certain constitutional requirements were not complied with in its enactment.

"The legislative journals, as published by authority, disclose these facts respecting the bill for the act in question: It originated in the House of Representatives, where it was passed by the constitutional majority, the vote being taken by yeas and nays which were entered upon. the journal. In the Senate it was amended and passed in its amended form by the requisite majority; the vote being taken and entered as in the House. It was then returned to the House with the request that the amendment be concurred in, but whether this was done, and if so

by what majority, and in what manner the vote was taken, are matters in respect of which the journal of the House is silent. As enrolled under the supervision of the joint committee on enrollment, as signed by the presiding officer of each house, and as presented to and approved by the Governor, the bill embodied the amendment.

"It is insisted that the amendment could only have been concurred in by a vote of the House in which the yeas and nays were taken and entered upon the journal, and that the absence of such an entry renders the act void. Whether or not the insistence is well taken is to be determined by ascertaining what is the proper construction and application of the State Constitution, as settled by the decisions of the court of last resort of the state. South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U. S. 260, 24 L. Ed. 154; Post v. Supervisors, 105 U. S. 667, 26 L. Ed. 1204. Turning to the decisions of that court, we find that in Hull v. Miller, 4 Neb. 503, it was held that a provision in the State Constitution of 1866, substantially the same as that in section 10, supra, respecting the entry upon the journal of the yeas and nays on the passage of a bill, did not apply to a vote of concurrence by either house in an amendment of the other, but only to the vote taken upon the passage of a bill following its last or third reading in each house, which was treated as the vote on its final passage. And in State, ex rel. v. Liedtke, 9 Neb. 490, 4 N. W. 75, which related to an act passed after the adoption of the present Constitution, the court, after observing that 'the words "final passage," as applied to matters of legislation, were well known to the framers of the Constitution, and presumably to the people who adopted it,' held that the requirement of section 11, supra, that the bill and all amendments thereto shall be printed before the vote is taken upon its final passage,' does not apply to an amendment proposed by a committee of conference after disagreeing votes in the two houses, but only to amendments proposed before the vote following the last or third reading in each house, which was again treated as the vote

on final passage. These decisions

show that, under the authoritative

interpretation of the State Constitution a concurrence by one house in an amendment of the other is not the final passage of a bill on which the yeas and nays are required to be taken and entered upon the journal.

"It is next insisted that, though such concurrence be not the final passage of a bill within the meaning of section 10, supra, the entire silence of the journal respecting a concurrence by the House renders the act void. But the rule in Nebraska is otherwise, at least in respect of matters like this which are not specially required by the Constitution to be entered upon the journal."

"The validity of the act is also questioned because the bill, after its amendment by the Senate, was not read at large on three different days in each house. But of this it is enough to observe that it is authoritatively settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the State that amendments made during the process of enactment do not take from a bill the status obtained by prior readings or make it necessary to begin the readings anew. Cleland v. Anderson, 66 Neb. 252, 262, 92 N. W. 306, 96 N. W. 212, 98 N. W. 1075; State v. Liedtke, 9 Neb. 490, 4 N. W. 63."

"Another objection urged against the act is that it did not pass both houses and receive the approval of the Governor under the same title. The facts bearing upon the objection are these: When the bill was introduced, its title, as is alleged in the

answer of the school district, was that of a bill for 'An act to amend an act entitled "An act to provide for the issuing and payment of school district bonds," approved February 26, A. D. 1879, being subdivision 15 of chapter 79, Revised Statutes.' And such is the title of the enrolled act as authenticated by the presiding officers of the two houses and as approved by the Governor. The journals contain no affirmative statement that the title was at any time changed or amended. Save in one unimportant instance, they identify the bill by the number given to it when it was introduced. In some instances they also give the full title as here set forth, but more frequently, as in the entries reciting its final passage, they designate it as 'A bill for an act to amend an act to provide for the issuing and payment of district bonds.' The objection rests upon the assumption that each form of identification must be accepted as conclusively establishing what the title was at that time. The assumption is not well founded. There is no constitutional or other requirement that the journal entries shall identify the bill to which they relate by a recitation of its title. State v. Burlington & Missouri River R. R. Co., 60 Neb. 741, 748, 84 N. W. 254; Nelson v. Haywood County, 91 Tenn. 596, 20 S. W. 1; Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 671, 12 Sup. Ct. 495, 36 L. Ed. 294." School Dist. No. 11, Dakota County, Neb. v. Chapman et al., 82 C. C. A, 35, 152 Fed, 887.