Crosley agt. Cobb. claimed, it is not competent for the plaintiff to show that, by reason of the defamatory matter, he was less esteemed by a particular person. A question is not competent, on cross-examination, which does not relate to any matter inquired into in chief. When the trial judge is dissatisfied with the verdict, and sets it aside for reasons which he deems sufficient; on appeal, the burden is on the apellant to show that the order appealed from was erroneous. Fourth Department, General Term, November, 1885 Before HARDIN, P. J., BOARDMAN and FOLLETT, JJ. A. P. Smith, for plaintiff and respondent. PER CURIAM.-The defendant had a verdict at circuit. The plaintiff moved, on the judge's minutes, for a new trial, which was granted, upon the ground that errors were committed in the reception of evidence, and upon the ground that the verdict was contrary to the evidence. The defendant appeals from the order. The learned judge who presided at the trial set aside the verdict on his minutes because it was against the evidence, and because of errors committed in the reception of evidence; but no opinion having been written, the exceptions held valid, or the issues held to have been erroneously determined by the jury are undisclosed. Many independent charges, prima facie libelous, are contained in the article declared upon. Some of the charges are justified in the answer, and as to others, and perhaps as to all, mitigatory circumstances are alleged. Before attempting to apply the rules of the law of libel to this case, it is important for the court to know which of the charges are justified in the answer, and to which charges only mitigatory circumstances are pleaded. The mode in which the answer is framed and the case printed, renders it impossible to ascertain, with accuracy, what charges are justified. Twelve clauses of the complaint are referred to in the answer as being between certain folios, which are evidently the folios of the original complaint, and not the folios of the appeal book. Be Crosley agt. Cobb. sides, reference is made in the answer to other parts of the answer by folios which do not correspond with the folios of the appeal book. This mode of pleading and preparing cases is condemned (Caulkins agt. Bolton, 98 N. Y., 511). When by inadvertence, an answer has been drawn referring to the original folios of the complaint, the appeal book should be so printed as to render the pleadings intelligible. Whether the verdict in this case was against the evidence, depends largely upon which of the charges in the complaint were justified in the answer; and being unable to ascertain this fact, the exceptions only will be considered. A witness called by the plaintiff to prove the publication of the libel, was asked on cross-examination, if the article complained of affected his opinion of plaintiff's reputation. To this the plaintiff objected. The objection was overruled, and an exception taken. The witness answered, that the article did not affect his opinion, and that he did not shun or respect the plaintiff less by reason of the article. In an action for defamation of character where general damages only are claimed, it is not competent for the plaintiff to show that by reason of the defamatory matter he was less esteemed by a particular person (2 Roscoe's N. P. Ev., 799). Special damages are not claimed in the complaint; or at least, a claim for special damages is not well pleaded therein (1 Wms. Saund., 243; Towns. S. and L., sec. 345), and no evidence of special damages was given by the plaintiff. This question was not competent on cross-examination, because it did not relate to any matter inquired into in chief. It was not competent as affecting the credibility or recollection of the witness. It was not competent as affecting the question of damages, for the defendant had no right to attempt to lessen the plaintiff's general damages by showing that special damages had not been occasioned. Usually, a case will not be reversed for the admission of erroneous evidence upon the question of damages when the jury has found that the plaintiff is entitled to no damages. But in this case the damages are not capable of being computed, and The People ex rel. Ryan agt. The Civil Service Supervisors. rest very much in the discretion of the jury. The same evidence was obtained from two other witnesses, and is to the effect that no damages were sustained, and how far this evidence may have affected the general result, we are unable to determine. The trial judge was dissatisfied with the verdict and set it aside for reasons which he deemed sufficient, and the burden is upon the defendant to show that the order was erroneous. This, we think, he has not done. This is one of the cases which, we think, might have been better disposed of upon a case at special term than upon the minutes at circuit (Hinman agt. Stillwell, 34 Hun, 178). The order appealed from must be affirmed, with costs to abide the event of the action. All concur. SUPREME COURT. THE PEOPLE ex rel. RICHARD W. RYAN agt. THE CIVIL SERVICE SUPERVISORY AND EXAMINING BOARDS OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, &C. Civil service laws - New York (city of) officers and employees of the aqueduct commission are local officers and subject to the civil service regulations of the city. Officers and employees of the aqueduct commission, created and appointed under and by the provisions of chapter 490 of the Laws of 1883. are local officers; the functions they are to perform are for the peculiar corporate and pecuniary benefit of the corporation of the city; the corporation of the city of New York is liable for their acts; they are agents of the city and the act expressly recognizes the city's liability upon their contracts. The appointees and employees of the aqueduct commissioners should be examined by the civil service boards of the city of New York as local city officers, and not by the state civil service commissioners as state officers. New York Chambers, December, 1885. The People ex rel. Ryan agt. The Civil Service Supervisors. Cary & Whitridge, attorneys for relator; F. W. Whitridge, of counsel. E. Henry Lacombe, counsel to the corporation attorney for the respondent; D. J. Dean, of counsel. LAWRENCE, J.-This is an application for a peremptory mandamus to compel the civil service supervisory and examining boards of the city of New York, and Charles H. Woodman, the secretary thereof, to entertain the application of Richard W. Ryan and notify him to appear for examination pursuant to the New York city civil service regulations: It appears by the affidavit of the relator that he has applied to the secretary of the said boards for examination for employment by the commissioners for building the new Croton aqueduct, and that his application has been refused on the ground that the said commissioners are not officers of the city of New York and their employees are not included within the civil service of the city of New York. It appears also from the papers submitted on the part of the relator, that in the month. of August, 1884, the mayor of the city arranged a certain classification of the civil service of the city of New York, and that in such classification were included the clerks and employees of the aqueduct commission, and that such employees were so included after consultation with the state civil service commissioners, and upon their advice that such employees were persons in the employ of the city and not of the state. It appears from the papers read by the counsel to the corporation that the contrary opinion has been expressed by him and his predecessor in office, and this proceeding has been brought for the purpose of determining whether officers and employees of the aqueduct commission are subject to the civil service regulations of the city or those prescribed by the state civil service commissioners. It cannot be disputed that the aqueduct commissioners are new officers, and that at the time of the passage VOL. III 6 The People ex rel. Ryan agt. The Civil Service Supervisors. of chapter 490 of the Laws of 1883 creating such commissioners, there were no officers in existence in the city government who were authorized to exercise the powers confided to said commissioners by said act. This, however, is not conclusive upon the question whether the commissioners are to be regarded as state or city officers. Nor does the case of The People ex rel. Wood agt. Draper (15 N. Y. Rep., 532) determine the question which is here presented for consideration. That case holds that section 2, article 10 of the constitution of 1846 leaves the legislature at liberty to provide for the election or appointment, in any manner it may deem suitable, of all officers, local or general, whose offices might thereafter be created by law; and also of all other than county, city, town or village officers whose offices were then in existence, but the mode of whose election or appointment was not prescribed by the constitution. Under that decision the legislature may create a new city office and may prescribe the manner in which the same may be filled, whether by election or appointment, or in any manner it may deem suitable. The case of the Metropolitan Board of Health agt. Heister (37 N. Y. Rep., 661), is to the same effect (see, also, People agt Pinckney, 32 N. Y., 382). Some light may, however, be thrown upon this question by the decisions which were made by the supreme court and late court of errors in relation to the liability of the city of New York for acts done or omitted by the water commissioners appointed under the acts of 1833 and 1834, under which the Croton water was first introduced into this city. The powers conferred by those acts upon the commissioners therein provided for were very similar, although not specified in the acts so much in detail as those confided to the aqueduct commissioners of 1883. In Appleton agt. The Water Commissioners of New York (2 Hill Rep., p. 432), it was intimated, although not expressly decided by BRONSON, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, |