law. (U. S. Rev. Stat., secs. 2785, 2786; Reg. Sec. Treas. (1890), art. 18 et seq.)

2. Merchandise entered previous to said October 6, 1890, "without the payment of duty and under bond for warehousing, transportation, or any other purpose, for which no permit of delivery to the importer or his agent has been issued."

Each of these classes, unless embraced in the proviso which we next consider, is made dutiable under the new law of 1890, the said section declaring that they "shall be subjected to no other duty than if the same were imported respectively after that date," meaning after the date when the new law took effect.

3. The third class is described in the first proviso of the said section 50, which is a limitation of the other two classes above mentioned, and reads as follows: "Provided, That any imported merchandise, deposited in bond in any public or private bonded warehouse, having been so deposited prior to the 1st day of October, 1890, may be withdrawn for consumption at any time prior to February 1, 1891, upon the payment of duties at the rates in force prior to the passage of this act ; i. e., at the rates of duty imposed by the act of March 3, 1883.”

The question is whether this merchandise comes within the influence of this proviso, the effect of which is to qualify, restrain, or otherwise modify the preceding clauses of the section, so as to create an exception to the general language employed. To bring the merchandise within the terms of this exception, the following conditions must each be fulfilled:

1. The imported merchandise must have been "deposited in bond, in a public or private warehouse," within the meaning of these words as used in the statute.

2. Such deposit must have been made prior to the first day of October, 1890.

3. The offer of the importer to withdraw the merchandise for consumption must be made prior to February 1, 1891.

The vessel, as we have said, arrived before October 1, 1890, and was presumptively entered at the custom-house before that date. The goods were not entered, however, until October 1, when the entry was verified by affidavit of the importer, as required by section 2786 of the Revised Statutes, and the Treasury Regulations enforcing the requirements of that section. The construction of the proviso, as applied to this case, turns on the meaning of the phrase "deposited in bond in any public or private bonded warehouse, having been so deposited prior to the 1st day of October, 1891." The language is different from that

used in section 10 of the act of March 3, 1883, which was construed by the United States Supreme Court in Hartranft vs. Oliver, 125 U. S., 525, and the more recent case of Sherman vs. Robertson, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep., 1063.

That section provided "that all imported goods, wares, and merchandise which may be in the public stores or bonded warehouses on the day and year when this act [meaning the act of March 3, 1883] shall go into effect * * *shall be subjected to no other duty, upon the entry thereof for consumption, than if the same were imported respectively after that day."

The court said: "Ordinarily, goods in the custody and control of officers of the customs are placed in a public store or bonded warehouse, and thus the designation of the goods as thus placed is, in the legislation of Congress, in effect, a designation, and no more, of their being in such custody. But goods on board of a ship, in charge of a customhouse officer, preliminary to their removal to a public store or a bonded warehouse, and during the time necessary for that purpose, are in like custody, and so are, within the spirit and intent of the law, subject only to such duties as are leviable when the goods are freed from such custody”—a status fixed to the merchandise by said section. But in customs practice merchandise can not be "deposited in bond," within the meaning of this section, until it has been duly entered for warehousing, or other purpose, in the mode prescribed by law. Deposited in bond means, therefore, entered in bond, and so soon as this is done, the merchandise, although on ship-board, and in the custody of the customs officials, will be regarded as constructively in a public or bonded warehouse, although not actually there, under the rule declared in decisions above cited. Any other construction would make the proviso entirely swallow up the purview of the entire section, and thus annul its operation in the two classes of goods there described and provided for in express terms.

Our conclusion is that the merchandise in question, not having been "entered," as required by law, does not fall within the terms of the proviso. It was therefore subject to the duties provided for by the new tariff law of October 1, 1890, as decided by the collector, and not to those of the act of March 3, 1883, as contended by the importers.

The other grounds of protest are founded on objections not supported either by the record or by any evidence before the Board, and are held not to be well taken.

The decision of the collector is affirmed.

(10677.-G. A. 261.)

Plushes of goat's hair, silk, and cotton.

Before the U. S. General Appraisers at New York, January 22, 1891. In the matter of the protests, Nos. 1608 and 1609 a, of George T. Knight, against the decision of the collector of customs at New York as to the rate and amount of duties chargeable on certain merchandise, imported per Wyoming, August 2, 1890, and Wisconsin, September 17, 1890.

Opinion by HAM, General Appraiser,

The importation in this case consists of certain so-called plushes, a textile fabric composed of goat's hair, silk, and cotton. In certain of these manufactures, according to the return of the appraiser, silk is the component of chief value, while in certain others goat's hair is the component of chief value; but all the merchandise was classified for duty at 35 cents per pound and 40 per cent. ad valorem, under paragraph 363 of the act of March 3, 1883; and appellant asserts in his protest that the component of chief value in all the merchandise is silk, and claims hence that it is dutiable at 50 per cent. ad valorem, under paragraph 383 of said act. But we must assume that the appraiser's return is a true statement of the facts in regard to component materials, and hence hold that the merchandise in which silk is the component of chief value is properly classifiable at 50 per cent. ad valorem, under said paragraph 383.

This conforms to various United States circuit court decisions, and especially to the rule laid down in Meyer vs. Hartranft, 28 Fed. Rep., 358, affirmed on appeal in 135 U. S., 235, cited in our decision of October 24, 1890, G. A. 74.

In regard to the merchandise in which goat-hair is the component of chief value, and predominates in quantity, the classification made by the collector, under said paragraph 363, must be sustained, since the language of the general clause of this paragraph is explicit, namely:

and all manufactures of every description, composed wholly or in part of worsted, the hair of the Alpaca goat, or other animals, * * * not especially enumerated or provided for in this act," etc. The entry will be reliquidated accordingly.

(10678.-G. A. 262.)

Act of October 1, 1890-Application to goods which arrived before October 6, but entry for which was not completed prior to that date.

Before the U. S. General Appraisers at New York, January 22, 1891.

In the matter of the protests, Nos. 3058-62 a and 3251-59 a, of E M. Knox and others, against the decision of the collector of customs at New York as to the rate and amount of duties chargeable on certain merchandise, imported per vessels named in the accompanying schedule.

Opinion by SOMERVILLE, General Appraiser.

The importations in these several cases were made prior to October

6. 1890, the day on which the new tariff act of October 1 went into operation, i. e., the vessels in which the goods were brought arrived at the port of New York prior to October 6 last.

The entries of the merchandise, however, were not verified by the oath of the importers so as to be complete until the new law took effect, on or after said date.

The collector held that the goods were dutiable under the provisions of the act of October 1, 1890, on the ground that no legal entry had been made before the new act went into effect.

The importers contend that the merchandise is dutiable under the tariff act of March 3, 1883, on the ground that the importing vessels arrived before the repeal of that law, and that the rights of the importers accrued and became fixed under that law while it was in full force. The first inquiry raised is, When must an entry of merchandise be regarded as legally complete?

The "entry" here alluded to is the one required to be made by the owner or consignee of the merchandise, in the form prescribed by section 2785 of the Revised Statutes. It must be in writing, filed with the collector, and must "specify the name of the vessel, and of her master, in which and the port or place from which such merchandise was imported; the particular marks, numbers, denominations, and prime cost, including charges of each particular package or parcel whereof the entry shall consist, or, if in bulk, the quantity, quality, and prime cost, including charges thereof, particularly specifying the species of money in which the invoices thereof are made out." This entry is required to be subscribed by the person making it, whether the owner, consignee, or the agent of either.

Section 2786 of the Revised Statutes provides also as follows: "The entries to be made by any importer, consignee, or agent, under the preceding section, shall be verified by the oath of the person making the same."

It is manifest that the oath required by the statute is an essential part of the entry, and that an entry without verification is incomplete, because it is lacking in a requirement exacted by law. This is rendered plain by an examination of the regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury on this subject, made pursuant to the authority conferred by law on that official. (Treasury Reg. 1890, art. 18 et seq.; Regulations 1884, arts. 351 and 667.)

We are of opinion that the collector properly held, in these cases, that the entries of the merchandise, not having been verified before October 6, 1890, were not complete before such verification. (Elmes'

Law of Customs; Synopsis 446 and 447.) They were not, therefore, made under the act of 1883.

The status of the merchandise is regulated by section 50 of the act of October 1, 1890, which provides that all merchandise imported previously to October 6-the day when that act went into operation-"for which no entry has been made ** * shall be subjected to no other duty upon the entry or the withdrawal thereof than if the same were imported respectively after that day." There are provisos to this section which qualify it, but they have no bearing on these cases. The first proviso does not apply, because the merchandise was not deposited in bond prior to October 1, 1890, the vessels all arriving after that date. The second proviso relates to the matter of the weight of merchandise, as to which no question is here raised. The plain meaning of the sec

tion is that where the entry is made after October 6, 1890, the merchandise shall be subject to the rates provided for in the new tariff law, and not to those provided for by the act of 1883, although the importing vessels arrived before that time. It follows that if section 50 governs the case, that no right accrued to the importers under section 55 of the new tariff law, or under section 29 of the act of June 10, 1890, to have their goods assessed or classified under the act of March 3, 1883, as is contended for by them in their protests.

The contention that the act of October 1, 1890, is unconstitutional has been many times decided by the Board not to be well founded. It need not be further considered. (Case of Marshall Field & Co., decided December 15, 1890, G. A. 203.)

(10679.-G. A. 263.)

Merchant appraisers-Appointment of--Legality.

Before the U. S. General Appraisers at New York, January 22, 1891.

In the matter of the protests, 1017 a, 1030 a, and 1031 a, of Schefer, Schramm & Vogel, against the decision of the collector of customs at New York as to the rate and amount of duties chargeable on certain woolen goods, imported per Saale, June 17, 1890, Aurania, June 23, 1890, and silk and cotton velvets per Obdam, June 24, 1890.

Opinion by SHARPE, General Appraiser.

The merchandise involved in these cases was imported in the month of June, 1890, under the tariff act of 1883. On a portion of the goods a re-appraisement was called for, and on such portion duty was assessed on the value of the merchandise per se, returned by the officers acting on the re-appraisement. On all the other goods duty was assessed on the values of the merchandise per se returned by the original appraising officers.

The protests are very voluminous, and expressed in very general