reach an effective decision of a dispute; to recommend military contingents in case of an attack upon a member of the League; to make recommendations to prevent hostilities between nonmembers; and finally to supervise the prohibition of trade in white slaves, opium, etc., and the administration of international bureaus. The only cases in which the Council has power to take action that has a binding effect of any kind upon the members of the League are three. First, if a plan for a reduction of armaments is voluntarily accepted by the members, no one of them can exceed it during the period for which it has been adopted without the consent of the Council. Second, if in case of an inquiry into a dispute the Council makes a recommendation which is unanimous (except for the parties thereto) no members of the League can attack another member that complies with it. And, third, if a member chooses to accept a mandate over a backward territory it must do so on the terms agreed upon by the members of the League, or fixed by the Council. In two other cases the Council has power to take action that has a binding effect, but not on the members of the League. It can determine conditions on which an outside power may join the League, either for the purpose of settling a particular dispute, or permanently, and in this last case it can regulate the military equipment the new member may possess. We may observe that only in matters of procedure and appointment, and in publishing facts and recommendations in a dispute where it cannot make a report with any binding effects, can the Council act by majority. In all other cases, even where it only gives advice, its vote must be unanimous. The only exception is that in deciding a dispute the votes of the parties thereto are not counted. The United States might thus be prevented by act of the Council from attacking a member of the League when all the other members of the Council thought we were in the wrong. Save in that case, no action of the Council, even the making of recommendations, can take place unless the United States concurs. The fear, therefore, of a super-sovereign, a loss of our national sovereignty, or of a Council that rules of the world, is the result of inattentive reading of the documents or of an overheated imagination. OBJECT OF UNANIMITY 121 No. 10 VOTING, PROCEDURE, SECRETARIAT, IMMUNITIES ARTICLES V, VI AND VII Procedure and the appointment of committees in the Assembly and the Council are to be decided by a majority vote; almost all other matters require unanimity. The function of these bodies being mainly discussion, the requirement of a unanimous vote on questions of procedure would enable one member to prevent any subject from being debated; and if it were required for the appointment of committees one member could prevent gathering the information needed for intelligent discussion. The object of demanding unanimity for other matters was really to still the alarm of people who did not understand that the organs of the League are given no substantial power to direct the conduct of the members. But the provision is by no means inconsistent with the principle on which the League is based—that of automatic action by the members on matters specifically set forth in the Covenant itself, and beyond this conferences with a view to voluntary concerted action by all the members. For the last purpose a unanimous vote is not inappropriate. It may be well to explain here more precisely what is meant by automatic action on the part of a member of the League. It denotes action that is automatic so far as the League or its organs are concerned, not in regard to the constitutional branches of its own government. Under Article XVI, for example, if one nation resorts to war against another in disregard of its covenants the other members of the League agree immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade and financial relations, and to prohibit all intercourse between their citizens and its citizens. This is automatic in the sense that it is a direct and immediate obligation, wholly independent of any action by any organ of the League. It is not automatic in the sense that the severance of relations takes place automatically without any action by the Governments of the several members of the League. Nor does it determine what branch of a national government has power to put it into effect. That depends upon the constitution of the nation. With us it would require legislation, and therefore action by Congress; but Congress is under a moral obligation, like that imposed by every treaty which pledges the good faith of the nation, to enact the legislation required. The League will obviously need a considerable body of men to carry on a voluminous correspondence among the members, to record the proceedings of the different organs, to collect such information as they may require, and to assist the various committees and standing commissions. In fact the convenience of the representatives, and the ease of working the organization, will be greatly promoted by the efficiency of such a secretariat and its chief. This is especially true because in popular governments— and no others are expected to be members of the League-the men who hold the high offices of state change frequently, and hence the representatives in the Council and Assembly are not likely to remain long enough to be thoroughly familiar with the details of previous transactions, but must depend for much information upon the Secretariat. In order, therefore, to render efficient service the Secretary General and his subordinates should be permanent, fully conversant with the history and condition of international relations, but not themselves political persons. Their duty is to serve the League, not to direct it; and in view of the large influence that any permanent expert, with the details of all matters at his fingers' ends, can exert over a changing body of political superiors, it is of the utmost importance that the Secretariat should be as free from bias and from political motives as possible. Their object should be the success of the League as an institution, not the special interest of any particular country. If rightly administered the Secretariat may well become one of the most important and beneficial organs of the League. Article VII needs little comment. It confers upon the delegates to the Council and Assembly, to their commissions, to the secretaries and to the buildings they occupy, the freedom from interference by local laws and local officials conferred by universal custom upon ambassadors and embassies in foreign lands. In order to insure for the League complete independence from influence and pressure by any great nation, and still more from any suspicion of such influence, it was wise to place the seat of the League in a small and traditionally neutral country. No better place could have been selected than Geneva. RELATION OF ARMAMENT TO WAR No. 11 REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS ARTICLE VIII 123 By Article VIII the League members expressly declare that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations. Taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each state, the Council is to formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments. The League members agree to exchange full information as to the scale of their armaments, their military and naval program and their warlike industries. After adoption by the several Governments of the plan of reduction, the limits of armaments therein fixed are not to be exceeded without the concurrence of the Council. The plans are to be reconsidered and revised at least every ten years. The League members agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections, and the Council is to advise how these evils can be prevented. This is the first of the four great steps toward securing permanent peace in the League constitution and is as important as any. One of the great factors in bringing on this war and in making it what it was, was the race in armaments between the European nations. Prussia under Bismarck perfected its military establishment by winning three wars, first against Denmark, secondly against Austria, and then against France. Thus the German Empire was made in 1871. From that time on, the German armament has been increased and has kept pace with the growth of German desire for world domination. A thorough and drastic system of conscription, military training and reserves built up the German military establishment so that it was a perfect machine and far more formidable than that of any other Government. Fear of it prompted every continental nation not in alliance with Germany to enlarge its armament. Germany's allies, AustriaHungary and Italy, joined in the race at her instance. Thus these huge war establishments went on increasing from decade to decade. After a time, Germany acquired naval ambition, and then the race began between her and Great Britain. The inevitable result of all of this with its intent was war, war came. and First-Grievous burdens of taxation were imposed upon the peoples of the competing countries. Their producing capacity was seriously impaired by consuming three years of the best producing part of the lives of their young men. Second-Consciousness of the power of such a military establishment produced a truculence and bullying tendency on the part of Germany who kept ahead in the race. The Kaiser flaunted to the world the diplomatic triumphs he achieved by standing forth in his "shining armor." His military machine and his knowledge of the defects of the Russian and French machines led him to improve the occasion of the Austro-Serbian difficulty to seek war before the defects of his rivals could be supplied. Thus the race of armament brought on this war. Third-The growth of these enormous armaments under such conditions has made this war the most destructive in history. Peoples and civilizations have been the objects of attack, not armies merely. The killing of noncombatants, old men, women and children, and the permanent devastation of enemy country have been features of the German campaigns and all because the vast military preparations and the organization of suitable machinery naturally led to this method of winning lasting victory and permanent conquest. This succession of causes with the result is bound to recur again unless the great powers of the world lead all nations to suppress such dangerous competition. The end is to be achieved, so far as Germany, Austria and Turkey are concerned, by compulsory terms of peace. The drastic provisions of the treaty just presented to the Germans for their signature leave no doubt on this point. But how as to the other nations? How can they be restrained? No other method has been or can be suggested but by an agreement such as is embodied in the League. Why should the United States not enter the agreement? It is objected that by doing so this nation is delegating to a foreign body in which it has only one representative the limiting of its power to defend itself from foreign aggression and possible destruction. It is said that it leaves us "naked to our enemies." |