No. 14

CHANCES OF WAR REMOTE

ARTICLE X (continued)

There is a third answer to people who object that Article X is likely to involve us in wars all over the world.

Those who look to the successful operation of the League do not expect war at all. The obligation of the members of the League to impose in the first instance a universal boycott against a recalcitrant faithless member constitutes a most formidable threat against any member seeking to violate Article X or the covenants of the following articles. Such a boycott will be a withering ostracism and isolation of a nation that few could endure. No single nation, unless it be the United States or some of the greater South American nations, could live if denied food and raw materials from the rest of the world, and if forbidden the use of a foreign market for the sale of their products.

Second, no nations would willingly face the overwhelming force of the world organized to punish it for violation of its covenants. The minatory influence of a world League, with its members obligated to unite in economic pressure, and proposing, if need be, to use military force, can hardly be exaggerated. Of course if a number of nations entered into a conspiracy to fight and subdue the rest of the world, then this minatory influence might not be controlling, but in that case all the members of the League would wish to join in the war, just as they did in this, and defeat such a conspiracy and vindicate the power of the League for its useful ends.

What we are now answering is the objection that there will be a lot of little wars all over the world, in which we shall be engaged, which will claim our money and our men. It is in restraint of the smaller war in which a large nation attempts to bully a weaker one that the minatory effect of the League will be so controlling. The result will be that the League, having the power completely to suppress the bullying nation, will not need to exercise that power. Indeed it is hardly too much to say that the nations of the League will never need to go beyond the effective discipline of a universal boycott. But if such a war does break out in which we shall deem it our duty to intervene under Article X or the other

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articles, one instance of suppression by the joint forces of the League will be a lesson for the world, not needing repetition. It will be worth all it costs in demonstrating that the way of the transgressor who breaks the covenants of the League will be hard.

This conclusion as to the minatory effect of the covenants of the League and the organization of its members to enforce them does not rest merely on an a priori reasoning. We have in our own history a striking confirmation of it. In 1823, the Holy Alliance consisting of all the powerful nations of Europe, except Great Britain, gave indication of an intention to aid Spain in recovering her lost colonies in this Western Hemisphere. We had recognized the independence of those colonies, Canning, the British minister for foreign affairs, urged upon President Monroe and John Quincy Adams, the secretary of state, the wisdom of uniting with England in a league to resist the Holy Alliance in overthrowing the independence of these new American states. Thomas Jefferson was consulted, and he advised making a league with England, which he said would not be an entangling alliance, against which he had warned his countrymen, but would be justified by its great public purpose. Monroe and Adams, however, thought it wiser to act alone. John C. Calhoun, the secretary of war, advised strongly against sole action. Nevertheless, President Monroe in his message of that year made the declaration which has since been known as the Monroe Doctrine, and notified the members of the Holy Alliance that the United States would regard any attempt on their part to overthrow an independent state in the Western Hemisphere as an act against the interest of the United States which we should resist. Calhoun and others thought that such a declaration and policy would certainly involve us in many wars.

What has been the result? For now nearly a century, the Monroe Doctrine has been maintained inviolate through a constant assertion of it by succeeding administrations and without firing a shot or the loss of a single soldier. During the Civil War, Napoleon III did attempt to violate it by setting up Maximilian in Mexico as an emperor. As soon as our hands were free, however, and we were able to send Sheridan with an army to the Mexican border, Napoleon withdrew his French troops and Maximilian collapsed. If such a threat by the United States alone, not always so strong as she now is, maintained inviolate a decla

ration like the Monroe Doctrine for a century, it follows a fortiori that the declaration of the League uniting the power of the world in proposed maintenance of a similar doctrine will be equally effective, and that it will not involve the members of the League in any more wars than we have been involved in by reason of the Monroe Doctrine.

Finally, it is objected to Article X that it is too rigid, that progress of the world may need rearrangement of boundaries, an enlargement of one country and a reduction of another or the creation of new states. Article X does not forbid changes in boundaries or the enlargement or reduction of states or the establishment of new states. All that it forbids is the taking of territory by force from a member of the League, or overthrowing its government by violence. Article X does not protect any nation against internal disturbance, rebellion or revolution. It does not prevent the division of states by these means. The objection assumes that war by one existing nation upon another is necessary to the progress of the world to secure useful changes in boundary. We need not deny that a war of aggression may achieve a useful end, but the basis upon which the League rests is that such advantages are outweighed by the suffering in modern war and the possibility that a small war may lead to a general war and an enormous damage to civilization. The effort in the formulation of the present treaty is to make just boundaries and the effect of Article X will doubtless be to maintain those boundaries, in so far as to prevent foreign aggression from affecting them.

The suggestion that Article X was intended to bring to the aid of Great Britain the power of the United States to suppress a revolution in Ireland is of course wholly unfounded, because a revolution in Ireland would not be an attack upon the territorial integrity or political independence of Great Britain by external aggression.

The insinuation against Article X that Great Britain secured it in order to get the aid of the United States and other members of the League to defend and protect "her far-flung empire" is also without basis. No war in the last century has been begun against Great Britain to take away territory from her. Neither she nor the United States would feel called upon to invoke the defense of the League to protect their boundaries. They can defend themselves. No other state is likely to attack them, with the purpose of

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violating Article X. The reason for Article X is the protection of weaker nations against stronger ones. Great nations are seldom attacked except in case of a conspiracy like that of this present war, and when such a conspiracy exists, all of the members of the League will be anxious to join in its suppression. Article X is one of the great steps forward provided in the League for the securing of general peace.

No. 15

THE BASIC PRINCIPLE

ARTICLES XI, XII, XIII

Article XI proclaims the great doctrine of the community of interest in the universal maintenance of peace. It contains the basic principle of the League, worked out in practical form by the other articles; that peace and friendly relations among nations are the concern of all free peoples; that these peoples are justified in protecting one another and in maintaining order in the world for the common good; and that international morality, fair dealing and respect for the rights of others are duties which every country owes to mankind, and which mankind is entitled to expect and demand.

Article XII embodies the substance of the agreement made by the Bryan treaties with a score of nations. It is the culmination of principles for which the United States has long stood. With some exceptions, mostly of small countries, the United States has concluded such treaties with all the states named in the Annex to the Covenant as admitted to the League, or has signed with them treaties which only await formal ratification; and the effect of this article is to cause them to make with one another the agreement for arbitration before war which we have negotiated with each of them.

This article, like the Bryan treaties, is based upon the idea that delay is in itself of great value quite apart from any compulsion to abstain from war after an award has been made. It removes the opportunity for a sudden attack upon an unprepared victim, and it gives a chance for a calm consideration of the consequences of war, instead of the rush of excitement that comes when a nation is plunged into a conflict without reflection.

But the Covenant goes farther by attaching some compulsion to the award, or rather by protecting the nation which complies with its terms. By Article XII the members of the League must submit any dispute between them, likely to lead to a rupture, either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council. If they agree that the case is suitable for arbitration, they agree further by Article XIII to carry out the award. Now by Article XXI of the Covenant it is provided that this shall not affect the Bryan treaties. But under those treaties the parties are not bound to carry out the award, and one may ask whether this article imports into them an obligation to do so. Clearly it does not, because those treaties cover controversies of all sorts, including such as the nations involved might not be willing to submit to arbitration with a duty of that kind attached; while Article XIII deals only with arbitrations voluntary in each case and accompanied by an agreement to carry out the award. Nevertheless, the provisions of this Covenant certainly prevent a nation dissatisfied with an award under the same treaty from going to war without submitting the dispute to inquiry by the Council. The Bryan treaties furnish therefore an additional means of reaching an accord, but it is not intended that they should impair the guaranties of peace in the Covenant.

The second clause of Article XIII gives examples of the kind of questions deemed suitable for submission to arbitration. They are such as depend upon issues of law or fact, including the interpretation of treaties,-matters that can properly be decided by a court on strict legal principles. They have been termed justiciable questions, in contradistinction to those which are not purely legal but involve divergencies of national interests and policy. These last are political in their nature and must be adjusted or compromised on grounds of international fair dealing and expedi

ency.

The two classes of questions had better not be confused, but each referred to the body most appropriate for its consideration; but a difficulty may arise in deciding whether a question is justiciable or not. One of the parties may well claim that an act performed or threatened by the other, while not strictly a breach of international law, is one which affects its vital interests or security, and that to submit the question to a tribunal to decide on purely legal grounds is to abandon its claim. If Turkey, for example, had proposed before the war to transfer to Germany a tract of