FUNCTION OF POWERFUL NATIONS

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United States have a broader outlook than Rumania or Bolivia which see a comparatively narrow part of the interests of mankind, and have a more local vision. At the same time the lesser states ought not to be wholly left out of the smaller body. Their point of view, and the fact of their presence, are indispensable. The Covenant of Paris has sought to meet this difficulty by an ingenious compromise.

The Covenant wisely leaves the method of appointing the representatives to the states themselves; but as there has been some difference of opinion on that point among the advocates of a League in this country it may not be out of place to discuss it briefly. The Council of the League is intrusted with the function of recommending to the members sundry things in addition to those which by the Covenant they specifically undertake to do. Sometimes it may recommend positive action, and therefore it is important that the representatives should, so far as possible, be in a position to speak for their respective Governments. If one of the Balkan states, for example, should pursue, or allow its citizens to pursue, a course of conduct which while not amounting to a hostile act, is highly and properly offensive to a neighbor and likely to lead to a breach of the public peace, the question would arise what representations, if any, should be made to that state by the members of the League acting in concert. Since the Council has no power of its own, and any action must be that of the several members of the League, it is clear that a discussion by people who could not speak with authority for their nations would not attain the end desired. In such a case the Council must be in fact a meeting of the ambassadors of members of the League, not a debating society for the expression of every variety of divergent opinion. This is, indeed, one of the chief reasons for including in the Council the representatives of the powerful nations whose opinions cannot fail to carry weight with states that are fomenting trouble.

Moreover, the function of the Council being merely to make recommendations, these are far more likely to be accepted by a nation if prepared by the official representatives of its own Government, than if by spokesmen of a minority, or by any other men who do not act under the directions of the political authority of the nation; and that must continue to be the case so long as the League is an alliance of independent states seeking to promote

harmony of action, not a common government for the peoples of those states. Mr. Root is clearly right that it would be wise to have the American members of the Council appointed and confirmed like ambassadors, since that is in effect the position they are to hold.

This applies much less to the Assembly, which, with its very restricted functions, is intended to be a body for discussion, and will serve its most useful purpose in ventilating the opinions of all mankind. Here again, however, it would be better not to have any rigid system of minority representation such as has been suggested, but to leave the matter to be determined in each case according to the class of questions likely to arise. If, as we hope, the Assembly should undertake a revision of international law, it would be highly expedient to select jurists learned in that subject without much regard to party; and the same thing is true of other matters requiring technical knowledge of economic or social questions.

In these opening letters THE COVENANTER has tried to set forth the general principles on which any League of Nations must be based. After considering certain questions particularly affecting the relation of the United States to a League, it will be of interest to examine in what way, and to what extent, these general principles are applied in the Covenant of Paris.

No. 4

SOVEREIGNTY

Every civilized nation must, in the interest of its citizens, make treaties, and, like ordinary trades between individuals, these must be negotiated on the principle of "give and take." Whatever it agrees to do or to refrain from doing imposes a restriction which detracts from its complete sovereignty. But it does not thereby unduly surrender its independence, unless the restriction makes its ordinary governmental functions subject to control by another country, as was the case, for instance, with Cuba, when she accepted the terms of the Platt Amendment, and thereby subjected her national financial policy and her foreign relations to the supervisory control of the United States. A nation's independence is

ACTION BY NEAREST GUARANTOR

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not unduly impaired by a treaty by which it receives advantages which compensate it for what it concedes.

It is too late to argue in this country that international agreements to make or to refrain from making war, to guarantee protection to the territory of other nations and to limit armament, unduly impair a nation's sovereignty; for numerous instances of such agreements in existing treaties will be found in our diplomatic history. Nor can it be said that such agreements were not contemplated when our Constitution was adopted, for the Supreme Court has held that under the treaty-making power, the President and the Senate may make any agreement they regard as appropriate, provided it does not result in “a change in the character of the Government or in that of any of the states or a cession of any portion of the territory of the latter, without its consent."

Article X of the Covenant is criticised as involving an impairment of sovereignty. By that article there is created a defensive alliance of the nations of the League to prevent external aggression threatening the territorial integrity or the political independence of any member nation. The alliance is designed primarily to give protection to the seven new republics in Europe and the four autonomous nations in the near East, created as a result of the war; and the obligation to join in such an alliance was thrown upon us because, by the Fourteen Points on which the armistice was expressly based, we made ourselves responsible not only for the erection of the new states but also for their protection against attacks from without, threatening their status as it was to be established by the Treaty of Peace. For this we are to receive the further advantage of the continuous co-operation of the League in preserving the peace of the world.

Furthermore, the obligation imposed by Article X will probably be less burdensome than opponents of the League have assumed, for if it were sought to have the Council advise that the United States should intervene in what we regarded as an unsuitable case, we could veto the suggestion by our single vote. But it is altogether improbable that that would be necessary; for in any concrete case it would naturally happen that the burden of performing the guaranty would, in the first instance, fall on the nation nearest at hand or politically most concerned. The chance that we should often, if ever, be called upon to send troops or warships to Europe or Asia to repel local aggressions would be

remote, since in practice they would have to be dealt with summarily by the nations more directly affected, precisely as, under the reservation of the Monroe Doctrine in Article XXI, we would be expected to deal with aggressions upon countries of the Western Hemisphere.

In considering whether we are unduly hampered by Article X "the real question," in the words of Sir Frederick Pollock, an eminent authority on the subject, "is whether the security for the common peace to be gained by the establishment of a common power is worth its price." When we became implicated in the European situation, we committed ourselves to the proposition that the price paid by our becoming a party to the guaranty of Article X was not out of proportion to the security we expected to enjoy in the future. It was in the interest of the people of this country that the United States should become a decisive factor in the world's affairs. We cannot, with national honor, now escape a responsibility corresponding to our contribution to the winning of the war. That is imposed upon us by the dictates of international morality, and no nation can be said unduly to surrender its sovereignty by discharging such an obligation.

No. 5

SOVEREIGNTY (continued)

The chief purpose of the League is to preserve international peace. It is sought to accomplish this through the reduction of armament (Art. VIII), the suspension of war during the process of the settlement of disputes by arbitration or through mediation (Arts. XII, XIII and XV), and an economic boycott for a violation of the Covenant (Art. XVI). In view of America's past efforts to avoid war by procuring the settlement of disputes by arbitration, even though they involve vital interests or national honor, it seems unnecessary to argue that such a comprehensive scheme for preserving the peace of the world as that worked out in the Covenant does not involve an undue surrender of sovereignty. Furthermore, all of the obligations assumed for the beneficent purpose of the League have their counterpart in covenants contained in earlier treaties:

WHAT AMERICA HAS AGREED TO

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In 1817, by the Rush-Bagot treaty, this country and Great Britain agreed to limit their naval armament upon the lakes forming the boundary between this country and Canada.

By the Webster-Ashburton treaty, Great Britain and this country agreed in 1842 that they would maintain a naval force on the coast of Africa for the suppression of the slave trade.

By the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850, between Great Britain and the United States, the two countries guaranteed the neutrality of any ship canal that might be built between the Atlantic and Pacific, and agreed, among other things, that neither nation would ever "obtain or maintain for itself any exclusive control over the said ship canal," or "erect or maintain any fortifications commanding the same or in the vicinity thereof, or occupy, or fortify, or colonize, or assume, or exercise, any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast, or any part of Central America," or "take advantage of any intimacy or use any alliance, connection or influence that either may possess with any State or Government through whose territory the said canal may pass, for the purpose of acquiring or holding, directly or indirectly, for the citizens or subjects of the one any rights or advantages in regard to commerce or navigation through the said canal which shall not be offered on the same terms to the citizens or subjects of the other." The treaty also provided that vessels of the two high contracting parties should be exempt in case of war between them, from blockade, detention or capture.

In 1846, by Article 35 of a treaty with Colombia, the United States guaranteed "positively and efficaciously . . . the perfect neutrality" of the Isthmus of Panama. In 1901, the Panama Canal treaty was made with Great Britain, by which it was provided that the canal could never be blockaded, and that no act of hostility could be committed within it.

In 1903, this country by treaty guaranteed and agreed to maintain the independence of the Republic of Panama.

By a treaty with Honduras in 1864, the United States guaranteed the neutrality of the Honduras Railroad.

In 1889, by treaty with Germany and Great Britain, the signnatory powers recognized the neutrality of the Samoan Islands and provided that the three powers should have equal rights within the islands.