fore taken for the admission of Latin America, and assent was obtained by diplomatic correspondence. Two of the three conventions of 1899 were open, that is to say, the non-signatory states were invited to sign, and upon signing, to assume the obligations and benefits under the conventions. The convention for the peaceful settlement of international conflicts was a closed convention and the assent of the powers was necessary in order that the Latin-American States might be permitted to sign. The reason for this was that while the powers represented at the First Conference were willing to arbitrate and to enter into certain relations with the states represented at the First Conference, they were unwilling to contract generally. As one of the delegates said at the second convention, he was unwilling to open his door to any newcomer who chose to knock. No objection was made, however, to the adhesion of the Latin-American States, and on the 14th day of June, 1907, consent to their adherence was formally given.

In all, forty-four states were represented at the conference and forty-four states answered the roll call. Two states of Latin America were not represented, Costa Rica and Honduras. The former approved of the conference and adhered to the conventions of 1899, but was not represented. The absence of Honduras was explained by the recent revolution, which paralyzed its efforts. The restoration of peace led to an application to be admitted and the application was favorably acted upon. Delegates were appointed, but they did not arrive in time to participate in the work of the conference.

Following then the order of the Final Act, the first is the convention for the pacific solution of international conflicts, the nature of which has been sufficiently explained.

It should be said, however, that the commission of inquiry was much enlarged in the light of the experience - experience gained in the Dogger Bank incident, previously referred to. The language of the convention was carefully revised, provisions were given greater clearness, and a few sections added on summary procedure. The great framework of 1899 was untouched; for the additions of 1907 do not change the nature of the structure, although the architects of 1907 would doubtless pronounce the additions to be undoubted improvements.

The second is the convention restricting the use of force for the recovery of contract debts. This was introduced by the American

delegation, loyally and devotedly seconded by Dr. Drago, who has battled for the doctrine to which he has given his name. Without the support of Dr. Drago, it is doubtful if Latin America for whose benefit it was introduced would have voted for this very important doctrine. The proposition is very short; it consists of but three articles, but we must not measure things by their size. In full it is as follows:

In order to avoid between nations armed conflicts of a purely pecuniary origin arising from contractual debts claimed from the government of one country by the government of another country to be due to its nationals, the contracting powers agree not to have recourse to armed force for the collection of such contractual debts.

However, this stipulation shall not be applicable when the debtor State refuses or leaves unanswered an offer to arbitrate, or, in case of acceptance, makes it impossible to formulate the terms of submission, or after arbitration, fails to comply with the award rendered.

It is further agreed that arbitration here contemplated shall be in conformity, as to procedure, with Title IV, Chapter III of the convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes adopted at The Hague, and that it shall determine, in so far as there shall be no agreement between the parties, the justice and the amount of the debt, the time and mode of payment thereof.

In commenting upon the convention, President Roosevelt wisely and truly said that "such a provision would have prevented much injustice and extortion in the past." It is emphatically a peace measure, for the creditor renounces force and binds himself to submit his claim to arbitration. Pressure is thus brought upon the debtor to accept arbitration or take the consequences of a refusal. It should not be overlooked that these three paragraphs will banish foreign fleets from American waters, and American ports are not likely again to be blockaded, as in the past, for the collection of contract debts due from one government to citizens of the blockading nation. The Monroe Doctrine has made its first and formal entry into the public law of Europe as well as America.

The third convention relates to the opening of hostilities and provides, in Article I, that the contracting powers recognize that hostilities between them should not commence without notice, which shall be either in the form of a formal declaration of war or of an ultimatum in the nature of a declaration of conditional war. This is to protect belligerents from surprise and bad faith. Article II is meant to safeguard the rights of neutrals. The state of war should

be notified without delay to neutral powers, and shall only affect them after the receipt of a notification, which may be sent even by telegram. However, neutral powers can not invoke the benefit of the absence of notification if it is established that the neutral powers know that war actually exists. Those two articles mean that while the nations should declare war, although they may perhaps rush into war without notification, neutrals are not to be subjected to the burdens of war until they have been fully notified and are, therefore, able to take the proper steps and measures to preserve their interests.

The fourth convention concerns the laws and customs of land warfare. This has been previously stated to be a revision of the convention of 1899. It is highly technical and codifies in a humanitarian spirit the warfare of the present.

The fifth convention attempts to regulate the rights and duties of neutral powers and of neutral persons in case of land warfare. Short, but important, its guiding spirit is expressed in the opening paragraph of the preamble, namely, to render more certain the rights and duties of neutral powers in case of warfare upon land and to regulate the situation of belligerent refugees in neutral territory. The framers of the convention felt that although a fragment, it would at least define neutrality until it might be possible to regulate as a whole the situation of neutrals in their relation to belligerents. The nature of the convention is thus evident. Its further definition would involve us in technical details.

The sixth is the convention concerning enemy merchant ships found in enemy ports or upon the high seas at the outbreak of hostilities. Custom forbids the capture of enemy vessels within the port of the enemy on the outbreak of hostilities and allows them a limited time to discharge or load their cargo and depart for their port of destination. The attempt was made to establish this custom or privilege as a right. The proposition, however, met with serious opposition and, instead of the right, the convention states that it is desirable that enemy ships be permitted freely to leave the port. The convention, therefore, was restrictive rather than declaratory of existing international practice. The same might be said of another provision of the convention concerning the treatment of enemy merchant ships upon the high seas. It may be said that the expression of a desire is tantamount to a positive declaration, but, strictly construed, the convention is not progressive. It lessens rights acquired by custom

and usage, although it does, indeed, render the privilege granted universal. The American delegation, therefore, refrained from signing the convention.

The seventh convention deals with the transformation of merchant ships into ships of war, and it must be said that the positive results of this convention are of little or no practical value. The burning question was whether merchant ships might be transformed into men-of-war upon the high seas. As the transformation of merchant vessels into war vessels upon the high seas caused an international commotion during the recent Russo-Japanese War, Great Britain and the United States insisted that the transfer should only be allowed within the territorial jurisdiction of the transforming power. Some of the continental states, on the contrary, refused to renounce the exercise of the alleged right. The great maritime states were thus divided, and as the question was too simple and too plain to admit of compromise, it was agreed to drop it entirely for the present. In order, however, that something might remain of the careful and elaborate discussions of the subject, a series of regulations was drawn up regarding the transformation of merchant ships into vessels of war, declaratory of international custom. For example: The vessel transformed should be placed under the direct and immediate control and responsibility of the power whose flag it bears; that the vessel must bear the outward signs of a man-of-war; that the commander should be in the service of the state and duly commissioned; that his name should appear upon the list of officers of the navy; that the crew should be submitted to military discipline; that the vessel in its operations should conform itself to the customs of war; and that the transforming nation should notify, as soon as possible, the transformation of the merchant vessel. It will be seen that all reference to the place of transformation was thus carefully eliminated and a series of unobjectionable and unquestionable resolutions declaratory of the international custom and practice was adopted. Indirectly, the rightfulness or wrongfulness of privateering was concerned, and inasmuch as the United States would not consent to abolish privateering unless the immunity of private property be safeguarded, the American delegation abstained from signing the

convention.

The eighth convention relates to the placing of submarine automatic mines of contact, a subject of present and special interest.

to belligerents; while the interest of the neutral is very general. Warfare permits belligerents to attack and to destroy each other in order to bring about a state of calm and repose which we call peace, but the action of the belligerent should be confined to the belligerents themselves. Neutrals should be, as far as possible, unaffected. Mines break from their moorings and endanger neutral life and property. The conference, therefore, desires to regulate the use of mines in such a way as not to deprive the belligerents of a recognized and legitimate means of warfare, but to restrict, as far as possible, the damage to the immediate belligerents. The following articles were therefore agreed to:

Article 1. It is forbidden: 1. to use unanchored automatic contact mines, unless they are so constructed as to become innocuous at the latest one hour after control over them has been lost; 2. to place anchored automatic contact mines which do not become innocuous on carrying away their moorings; 3. to use torpedoes which do not become innocuous when they have missed their target. Article 2. It is forbidden to place automatic contact mines in front of the coasts and ports of the adversary with the sole object of intercepting commercial navigation.

Article 3. When anchored automatic contact mines are used, all possible precautions should be taken for the safety of public navigation.

The belligerents engage, as far as possible, to provide that these mines shall become innocuous after a limited period of time, and in case they cease to be guarded, to give notice of the dangerous localities, as soon as military exigencies permit, by a notice to shipping which will also be communicated to the governments through diplomatic channels.

Article 4. Any neutral power which places automatic contact mines in front of its coasts must observe the same rules and take the same precautions as those which are imposed upon belligerents.

The neutral powers must make known to shipping, by previous notice, the regions where automatic contact mines are to be moored. This notice must be communicated speedily, as urgent, to the governments through diplomatic channels.

Article 5. At the close of the war, the contracting powers engage to do everything in their power to remove, each for himself, the mines which it has placed. As to anchored automatic contact mines which one of the belligerents has placed along the coast of the other, their situation shall be indicated by the power that has placed them to the other party and each power shall proceed in the shortest possible time to remove the mines which are found in its waters.

Article 6. The signatory states which are not yet provided with improved mines, such as are required by this regulation, and which consequently can not actually conform to the rules established by Articles 1 and 3, agree to transform, as soon as possible, their mines, so as to comply with the prescriptions mentioned above.

Article 7.

The stipulations of the present regulation are concluded for the