peasantry with taxes the most severe; the clergy and nobility fed in luxury, whilst the miserable poor lingered out a wretched existence. The noble earl then proceeded to refute all the objections made as to the impracticability of treating with France, and argued, that if these were well-founded, it was impossible to say when peace might be restored. As to the impracticability of treating on account of our alliances, had we held that doctrine in our late dispute with Russia, we must have still been at war. To those who argued that to treat with France for a separate peace, would be a violation of different treaties which the executive government had entered into with foreign powers, he would say, that no treaty ought to have been made by which this country was prevented from making a separate peace, when her interests required it. The privileges of parliament would be annihilated indeed, and we should be acting on principles not British but truly Prussian and German, if ever we allowed the king or his ministers to make treaties which bound the parliament and the people of this country not to have peace till the impracticable views of those who entered into such treaties were gratified.

the minds of parliament, and of the people at large, the true, legitimate, and fundamental principles of the war, and of reminding them, how much they had at stake in the event, and how necessary it was to prosecute it with their united strength. Impressed with this idea he would enter into the primary causes of the war. He believed, however, there were but few who then heard him that were not convinced that it was a war, on the success of which the existence of every thing they valued in life depended. A noble duke had very naturally asked, what new ground had occurred in the space of the last few weeks to change the opinion of parliament, which had lately gone to the foot of the throne to pledge itself to support the war? What new measures had arisen now to hold out the idea of peace, though not a substantial one? A noble lord had challenged those who were advocates for the war to declare, whether they could express the objects they had in view? This challenge he was willing to accept, and, in one word, would tell their lordships the object was security. A noble duke had adverted to the speech of a right hon. friend of his delivered in the other House in February 1792, in which he had congratulated the nation on the prospect of a lasting peace. Had his right hon. friend even gone so far as to speak with that degree of certainty stated by the noble duke, allowance might be made for zeal, and the frailty inseparable from human opinions. But, would any man compare the state of Europe in 1792 to its situation when the war began? There was in 1792 something like a government in France. The amiable mo

The Earl of Carlisle wished it not to go abroad, that there was in this country any aversion to peace. The true ground of objecting to treat was, that the proper time for treating was not yet come. Let their lordships consider what the effect of voting such a motion would be on the other side of the water. Our enemies would believe, that we were unable to prosecute the war, and rise in their demands when we proposed peace: It could not be pretended that the war had been un-narch, who had fallen a victim to a regiproductive of advantage. The advantage of driving the French back from Holland and the Austrian Netherlands was great; the advantage of driving them out of India was also great; but more important than all the rest, was in his opinion, the advantage of cutting off all communication with France at a time when war was declared, a circumstance of the utmost importance to the internal tranquillity of this country, and which nothing but war could have so completely effected.

Lord Grenville said, that whatever the real object of the motion might be, and whatever was the real intention of the noble marquis in making it, it would at least have one happy effect, namely, that of confirming and impressing more deeply on

cidal faction, had then some little power; and the scanty authority which he had was made use of to compose the tumultuous dispositions of those who had usurped the power in that country, and to avert the menaced hostility of the surrounding nations. At his solicitation, the most friendly conduct was pursued by the government of this country; and there were strong hopes entertained by those in his majesty's councils, that this amicable disposition would have met with no interruption. The Emperor had shown a similar forbearance, with the hope that hostilities would be prevented. But there was a party in the Convention who were actuated by the basest principles that ever were displayed in any country. They ar

Austrian Netherlands, Valenciennes, Condé, Le Quesnoi, and a number of other towns. They had a victorious army in Champagne, and Savoy, and had penetrat

gued, that if the king should become popular, he would at length become powerful. They therefore frustrated all his pacific views, compelled him to discharge his ministers, and substitute Brissot's fac-ed even to Holland, where they threatened tion in their stead; and then came on the war with Austria. Actuated by malignity and perfidy, they forced the king to abandon peace, in order the better to bring about their private ends, and establish a republican government.-Much had been said of the manner in which M. Chauvelin had been treated, and much blame had been attempted to be thrown on ministers for their conduct in that transaction. But here he must declare, that their treatment of M. Chauvelin, so long as he conducted himself with discretion, was conciliating and indulgent; but from that period in 1792, when the Jacobin faction had usurped the government, M. Chauvelin left no means of corruption unattempted, to debauch the minds of the people, promote disaffection to the government, and raise them up in opposition to the established authority of the country. Such was the extent of the mischief then. But had it been diminished since? It had not, nor ever would, but by crushing the very source from which it sprung; for if sedition reared its head here, how could it be successful but by uniting with the factious banditti in France? His lordship then went into a detail of the original circumstances that gave rise to the war, and drew inferences from it, to show that the war, on the part of Great Britain, was defensive in spirit and in fact. But if none of this had passed, subsequent acts of aggression would have rendered it impossible for us to remain at peace. The question then before the House was simply resolved to this, shall the horrors of France be introduced into England? A noble lord had expressed his disbelief of the adoption of atheism by the French. Thus far he would agree with the noble lord, that atheism had not become universal with the people there; but that it was adopted by the ruling powers, no one could doubt. His lordship then adverted to what had fallen from the noble marquis, touching the last campaign, which he had censured as unproductive of any advantage; but as facts were at all times able to countervail mere assertion, he would lay before the House the comparative state of France at the beginning of the campaign in February, and at the close of it. In February, the French were in possession of the

to subjugate Holland, and make the wealth and fleets of that Republic the instruments of descent on Great Britain. This was their state in February. But what was it at the conclusion of the year? The French driven from Williamstadt, and finally out of Austrian Flanders, their commerce destroyed, and the seas cleared of their cruizers: the grand fleet in the Mediterranean destroyed, their navy crippled, and their principal arsenal rendered useless; while almost all the ports in Europe were shut against them. To all this was to be added the various possessions taken from them in the West-Indies, and their total expulsion from the continent of India. These were successes which were greater than had ever attended the first campaign of any war. Lord Grenville here defended the Dutch from some insinuations that had been thrown out against their military character. He thought they had much better have been avoided, for they were calculated to do essential mischief. Something of a similar nature had been said of the king of Sardinia, who had been represented as continuing the war for no other reason than to benefit himself by the subsidy granted to him. Nothing was more false. His majesty was an honourable man, and was perfectly entitled to the assistance granted him. His lordship then turned to the conduct of the allies to neutral nations. He said, the intention was, to prevent nations, under the pretext of an affected neutrality, from supplying the enemy with the materials for carrying on the war; and on this subject the language of the cabinet to those neutral powers was in a tone of moderation, good temper and firmness; and he avowed, that if, notwithstanding such remonstrances, they still persisted, the arm of war ought to be brought in aid; for it was indispensably necessary to the successful prosecution of the war, that such collusive dealings should be put an end to. As to America, which the noble marquis had said was disposed to go to war with us, he had reason to be of a different opinion, and was persuaded, that if she departed from her neutrality, it would be on the side of the allies.-Lord Grenville said, he was astonished to see two men, such as the

Hessian troops brought home from America were landed in the Isle of Wight, in consequence of he river Weser being frozen, which rendered it impossible to send them to their own country till a thaw took place. His majesty's ministers brought down a message to the House, informing parliament of the circumstance and of its cause. There was a resolution of the House of Commons in 1611, in these words :-" Resolved, that any person who shall recommend to his majesty to employ foreign troops within this realm, shall be deemed an enemy to the constitution and the country, and punished as such." He begged their lordships to consider, that if they threw out his bill, they would establish a precedent ex

king to employ at any time an unlimited number of foreign troops in English pay, without the consent of parliament. His lordship then brought in a bill “to indemnify such persons as have advised his majesty to bring within the dominion of Great Britain certain Foreign Troops belonging to the Landgrave of Hesse."

The bill was read a first time. On the question for the second reading,

measure was adopted in time of war; but | The precedent of 1784 was, when the he would the more contend, that what was deemed by the spirit of the constitution to be illegal in time of peace, ought to be deemed still more illegal in time of war. The next proof, upon which he meant to establish the illegality of the measure was, the act of settlement. That act states, that it shall be illegal for any person not born in England, Ireland, or Scotland, or their dependencies, except such as had been naturalised, or were born of English parents, to hold any trust, civil or military. This, therefore, is directly against the measure that has been adopted, for the troops landed in Great Britain were commanded by foreign officers, which was a military trust; and which trust the act of settlement made it illegal to exercise; the landing and keep-tremely dangerous: it would authorise the ing the private soldiers was also made an illegal act by the Mutiny Bill. These were strong points, and such as he conceived would establish the illegality of the measure. He had therefore prepared a bill of indemnity for those persons who had advised his majesty to it. His lordship then ran over the precedents of 1745, 1756, 1775, 1782, and 1784. In 1745, when the country was threatened with invasion, and a number of foreign troops were landed, the king had sent a message to parliament, expressive of the circumstance; but such was the jealousy which their lordships' ancestors manifested on that occasion, that in 1746 they entered into a formal protest against the measure. In 1756, his majesty again made a requisition of foreign forces, and at that period his majesty's ministers thought fit to give notice to parliament. In 1775, a motion was brought forward for the purpose of empowering his majesty to send foreign troops to Gibraltar and Port Mahon; the motion was lost by an evasion, as it was said by the ministers of that day, that Gibraltar was out of the kingdom; but such was the opinion of several noble lords, that they entered against this measure also a strong protest. A bill of indemnity was introduced at that day; it passed the Commons, but had been rejected in the Lords, because the preamble ran thus, in the usual form: " Whereas doubts having arisen;" but their lordships, struck with the word "doubts," objected to the bill in toto. For to admit that, was, in some measure, to admit the justification of ministers at a future period. The next precedent was that of 1782, which he explained. [VOL. XXX. ]

Earl Spencer congratulated the House and the noble earl, on having begun his political career with sentiments that reflected the highest honour on him. He also gave the noble earl credit for having stated the precedents correctly; and if the present instance was a deviation from those precedents, he would very readily second his motion. But the Bill of Rights was not violated in this case, because it particularly forbad the keeping a standing army without the consent of parliament. The act of settlement did not affect it, because the troops now in England were no more than an armed people stationed at different places. The officers did not command in their present state, and therefore they held no trust. The present case was similar to the precedent of 1784. The Hessian troops taken into British pay had come to the place of rendezvous, off the Isle of Wight; their destination was not known; and if it had, ministers would have been very wrong to have published it; still a message had been sent to the House, declaring their arrival, and the reason of their landing. In what instance, then, had the law been violated. With regard to the resolution of 1641, he did not [4 Y]

conceive it could apply to the present | case; it was not a law; but he thought it the less worthy of notice, as it took place before the Revolution, from which time only the constitution had taken that glorious form which it had retained ever since. The spirit of the present motion clearly was, that the king should not keep an army in this country, without the consent of parliament previously obtained. This would be true, if it were either stated or believed that he kept this army for the purpose of using it. If any man were to assert that his majesty could use those foreign troops, or any foreign troops in actual service, without the previous sanction of parliament, he would be the first to impeach that man. It was the bounden duty of that House to watch the conduct of ministers in this respect, and it was certainly true, that their vigilance was most demanded in dangerous times, when innovations might be most successfully attempted. But he saw no violation of law or the constitution in the present act.

duction of foreign troops was not illegal The doctrine was contrary to every idea he had of the constitution.

Lord Grenville could not reconcile it to himself to give a silent vote upon this occasion. That the prerogative of the crown did not extend to the right of keeping a foreign force in this country, during the time of peace, he was ready to admit; but that did not imply that a case of necessity might not arise, in which ministers might feel it absolutely requisite to admit them; and this he conceived might be done without the smallest breach of the constitution. Now, if nothing irregular had been done, no bill of indemnity could be required. The precise question was, whether the act of landing a small body of Hessian troops destined on a foreign service, which was retarded by accident, whose health required, that they should be so landed, and of which landing, notice had been given to parliament as early as possible, was illegal; Now, as all the prerogatives of the king were to be executed under the responsibi lity of his ministers, it was the duty of that House, to examine the exercise of each prerogative; but they would not, he conceived, be ready to question and arraign prerogative itself. They would not

Lord Auckland contended, that so far from the constitution being violated the people of this country felt its beneficial effects in the highest degree. He had heard of no law which proved the illegality of landing foreign troops; but if he was disposed to enter at large on the ques-presume abuse, they would not lay it tion, he would argue, from the spirit of the constitution, that the conduct of ministers was just and proper. As the constitution was silent on the point of emergency which required the landing of foreign troops, it was fair to argue, that it left the matter to the wisdom of the executive power. It had been said, that such an unbounded prerogative of the crown might be employed by a vicious prince, to over-run the country with foreign troops. Fancy was often employed to give ima ginary danger to the exercise of the royal prerogative; but could any individual lay his hand on his heart, and say, that there had any improper or dangerous use been made of that prerogative? In times of danger, like the present, it was wise to have confidence in, rather than suspicion of, the discretionary power of the crown, exercised through the ministers. On these grounds, he would move the pre.vious question.

Lord Romney did not think the present a fit case to call for an act of indemnity; but though he should vote against the bill, he must declare his utter dissent from the noble lord who spoke last, that the intro

down as a maxim, that where there was prerogative there must be abuse of it. To keep an army in England without consent was contrary to law; but to introduce a body of troops merely on an emergency, and to communicate the same to parliament, was regarded as a sound exercise of the royal discretion. The crown, indeed, could not keep up a standing army in this country, as the standing council of the nation, the parliament, held a full security against it namely, the army could not be quartered, disciplined, nor paid without their authority. What, then, was to be apprehended from the admission of a few foreign troops, in a case of necessity, avowedly engaged for foreign service, and who could not possibly act here? The danger could be none; and therefore it appeared the more strange that an indemnification should be thought necessary for those whom no man could fairly charge with having done wrong.

The Earl of Lauderdale said, that on a liberal interpretation of the Bill of Rights, there was no difference between the landing of foreign troops, either in peace or war. This principle was recognized by