enfans perdu of her army. Would any rational man submit to one of the most tolerable of these drudgeries, for all the artificial enjoyments which policy has made to result from them? By no means. And yet I need suggest, that those who find the means, and those who arrive at the end, are not at all the same persons. On considering the strange and unaccountable fancies and contrivances of artificial reason, I have somewhere called this earth the Bedlam of our system. Looking now upon the effects of some of those fancies, may we not with equal reason call it likewise the Newgate and the Bridwell of the universe! Indeed the blindness of one part of mankind co-operating with the frenzy and villany of the other, has been the real builder of this respectable fabric of political society. And as the blindness of mankind has caused their slavery, in return, their state of slavery is made a pretence for continuing them in a state of blindness; for the politician will tell you gravely, that their life of servitude disqualifies the greater part of the race of man for a search of truth, and supplies them with no other than mean and insufficient ideas. This is but too true; and this is one of the reasons for which I blame such institutions.

In a misery of this sort, admitting some few lenities, and those, too, but a few, nine parts in ten of the whole race of mankind drudge through life.-Burke-Vindication of Natural Society.

DLXII.

Nothing new in Morality.-We are come too late by several thousand years, to say any thing new in morality. The finset and most beautiful thoughts concerning manners, have been carried away before our times, and no

thing is left for us, but to glean after the ancients, and the most ingenious of the moderns.—Bruyere.

DLXIII.

Knowledge.-Let no man boast of his intellect, knowledge, or understanding, in coming to just conclusions; but let him first consider what may be his local preju dices, the prejudices of the age, his country, or education. The grave opinions and decisions of the most learned men at the bar on the subject of witchcraft, only two centuries ago, are now exploded and ridiculed as having no real foundation; and how can we of the nineteenth century be certain that our opinions and decisions may not some of them be equally erroneous now, and, in future ages, be alike ridiculed and despised.-B.

DLXIV.

Intuition. Kant's Philosophy.—If man be really en-` dowed with intuition, it is indeed to be regretted that he should so long have walked in the rugged road which experience points out. To what purpose has he been toiling in the search of knowledge, which was already obvious to his understanding? Why does he still think it necessary to wait for the tardy decisions of time; and why does he so anxiously follow the intricate windings of induction and analysis? Why had the disciples of Kant to learn his philosophy; and why did they not lisp transcendental truths in the arms of their nurses. Anticipation, then, is the basis of this philosophy which is called new, and which has been built by Kant out of the rubbish of the schools.-Drummond's Academical Questions.

DLXV.

Legendary Tales.-In countries where education and learning abound, legendary and miraculous tales lose ground; exciting but little interest and less belief, and at last almost becoming a dead letter. Mankind in a state of ignorance, with little education, are credulous, and fond of the marvellous; and there have not been wanting in all ages, men of craft and invention to gratify that passion in others, and turn it to their own advantage.-B.

DLXV1.

Refinement. It is a doubt whether the refinements of modern times have or have not been a drawback upon our happiness; for plainness and simplicity of manners have given way to etiquette, formality, and deceit, whilst the ancient hospitality has now almost deserted our land; and what we appear to have gained in head we seem to have lost in heart.-B.

DLXVII.

The Intent of Punishments.-The intent of punishments is not to torment a sensible being, nor to undo a crime already committed. Is it possible that torments and useless cruelty, the instrument of furious fanaticism, or of impotency of tyrants, can be authorized by a politi cal body; which, so far from being influenced by passion, should be the cool moderator of the passions of individuals? Can the groans of a tortured wretch recall the time past, or reverse the crime he has committed? The end of punishment, therefore, is no other than to prevent the criminal from doing farther injury to society, and to prevent others from committing the like offence. Such punishments, therefore, and such a mode of inflicting

\them, ought to be chosen as will make the most lasting impressions on the minds of others, with the least torment to the body of the criminal.-Beccaria.

DLXVIII.

Practice of Philosophical Necessity-If, as a necessarian, I cease to blame men for their vices in the ultimate sense of the word, I continue to do so as much as other persons; for how necessarily soever they act, they are influenced by a base and mischievous disposition of mind, against which I must guard myself and others, in proportion as I love myself and others. I, on my system, cannot help viewing them with a tenderness, and compassion, that will have an infinitely finer and happier effect: as it must make me more earnest and unwearied in my endeavours to reclaim them, without suffering myself to be offended, and desist from my labour through provocation and disgust.-Priestley.

DLXIX.

Mankind governed by Pain and Pleasure.-Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, Pain and Pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand, the standard of right and wrong; on the other, the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjec ion, will serve but to demonstrate and to confirm it. In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire; but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while. The principle of utility recognises this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of

that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law. Systems which attempt to question it, deal in sounds instead of sense, in caprice instead of reason, in darkness instead of light.

The happiness of the individuals, of whom a community is composed, that is, their pleasures and their security, is the end which the legislator ought to have in view; the sole standard, in conformity to which each individual ought, as far as depends upon the legislator, to be made to fashion his behaviour. But whether it be this or any thing else that is to be done, there is nothing by which a man can ultimately be made to do it, but either pain or pleasure.-Jeremy Bentham.

DLXX.

Labour. It has been computed by some political arithmetician, that if every man and woman would work for four hours each day on something useful, that labour would produce sufficient to procure all the necessaries and comforts of life; want and misery would be banished out of the world, and the rest of the twenty-four hours might be leisure and pleasure.-Franklin.

DLXXI.

The World a Madhouse.-Delusive ideas are the motives of the greatest part of mankind, and a heated imagi nation, the power by which their actions are incited; the world, in the eye of a philosopher, may be said to be a large madhouse.--Mackenzie.

DLXXII.

Science.--Science, the partisan of no country, but the