WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT DOCUMENT 1. Minutes of the Secret Conference of the Four Secret, I. C.-163-A. NOTES OF A CONFERENCE held in the Prime Min- SYRIA AND TURKEY. M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that M. Pichon should open the discussion. M. PICHON began by explaining that the origin of this question was the agreement of May 1916 (Sykes-Picot) concluded between Great Britain and France in regard to Mesopotamia, Syria, and the adjoining regions. This agreement had two objects. First, to detach the Arabs from the Turks; second, to decide the claims of Great Britain and France. He then proceeded to explain the principles of the dispositions made on a map. The agreement fixed a zone colored blue within which France would exercise direct administration, and a zone colored red in which England would exercise direct administration. In addition, there was a zone colored white enclosed by a blue line within which France should exercise indirect administration, known as zone A, and a corresponding zone enclosed in a red line within which Great Britain would exercise indirect administration (zone B). At this stage it was unnecessary to say anything of the subsequent agreement with Italy. Within the A and B zones it was intended to favor the creation of an independent Arab State or Confederation of Arab States. In area A France, and area B Great Britain, should alone supply advisers or foreign functionaries at the request of the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States. In addition Great Britain was to be accorded the ports of Haifa and Acre. Haifa was to be a free port as regards the trade of France, and there was to be freedom of transit for French goods through Haifa by the British railway, for which facilities were to be given. Alexandretta, which fell in the blue area, was to be a free port as regards the trade of the British Empire, and there was to be freedom of traffic for British goods through Alexandretta by railway through the blue area. In addition, there were certain customs and political stipulations. Such were the general dispositions of 1916 which, he emphasized, were designated: (1) to favor the establishment of an Arab State or Confederation of States and to detach the Arabs from Turkey; and (2) To decide between the claims of Great Britain and France. The above agreement, confirmed by an exchange of Notes between M. Paul Cambon and Sir Edward Grey (Lord Grey), declarations which had been made by Great Britain as early as 1912, in which Great Britain had disinterested herself and recognized the rights of France in Syria, subject only to Great Britain's insistence on keeping untouched her economic rights. In short, Great Britain had declared she had no political claims, but that her economic rights must remain intact in Syria. Since the conclusion of the Agreement of 1916 there had been a long further correspondence and an exchange of many Notes between France and Great Britain concerning particularly various local interests. This brought us to the most recent period in which the French made, he would not say a protest against, but a series of observations in regard to, the British attitude in Syria. The whole series of these had recently been handed by the President of the Council to Lord Milner. The incidents referred to in this correspondence were chiefly due to the disproportion in the relative contingents furnished by Great Britain and France to the campaign in Syria. It had only been possible for France to send a very small number of troops to Syria in consequence of the large demands made on her for the protection of French soil and to the prominent part played by her armies in Salonica. Great Britain, however, had interested herself far more in the Turkish campaigns, and had sent many troops which had been led by General Allenby. From that disproportion there resulted a great many incidents. Eventually, the President of the Council had thought it right to bring them before the British Government with a view to putting an end to the faction and the friction which now existed. From all the declarations made by the British and French governments he only wanted to quote one, namely, that of November 9, 1918. This was particularly important as showing the disinterested attitude of both governments towards the Arabs. This declaration had been communicated shortly after its issue by the French Ambassador in Washington to President Wilson. Mr. LLOYD GEORGE interpolated at this point that this announcement, which was the latest expression of policy by the two governments, was more important than all the old agreements. M. PICHON then read the declaration of November 9, 1918, as follows: The aim which France and Great Britain have in view in prosecuting in the East the war let loose by German ambition is the complete and final liberation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks, and the establishment of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the native populations. In order to give effect to these intentions, France and Great Britain have agreed to encourage and assist the establishment of native governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia already liberated by the Allies, and in the territories which they are proceeding to liberate, and they have agreed to recognize such governments as soon as they are effectively established. So far from desiring to impose specific institutions upon the populations of these regions, their sole object is to ensure, by their support and effective assistance, that the governments and administrations adopted by these regions of their own free will shall be exercised in the normal way. The function which the two allied governments claim for themselves in the liberated territories is to ensure impartial and equal justice for all; to facilitate the economic development of the country by encouraging local initiative; to promote the diffusion of education; and to put an end to the divisions too long exploited by Turkish policy. As the difficulties between the two governments continued, and as the French Government particularly did not wish them to reach a point where ultimate agreement would be compromised, the President of the Council, on his visit to London in December, 1918, had asked Mr. Lloyd George to confirm the agreement between the two countries. Mr. Lloyd George had replied that he saw no difficulty about the rights of France in Syria and Cilicia, but he made demands for certain places which he thought should be included in the British zone, and which, under the 1916 agreement, were in the French zone of influence, namely, Mosul. He also asked for Palestine. M. Clemenceau had, on his return to Paris, been desirous that this suggestion should be examined in the most favorable spirit. In consequence, he had ordered a scheme of agreement to be prepared, with the inclusion of Mosul in the British zone of influence, and this had been handed to the British Government on the 15th of February, 1919. The letter which accompanied this proposal had asked for a recognition of the historic and traditional case for including the regions claimed in the French zone. It had pointed out that there was no government in the world which had such a position as France in the regions claimed. It had given an exposition of the historic rights of France dating from the time of Louis XIV. M. PICHON Continued by pointing out that French intervention in Syria had been frequent, the last instance being the case of the expedition organized in Syria and Lebanon in 1860, which had resulted in the establishment of the status of the Lebanon. France, he pointed out, had a great number of hospitals in Syria. There were a great number of schools in many villages, and some 50,000 children were educated in French primary schools. There were also a number of secondary schools and one great university in Beyrout. Moreover, the railway system of Syria was French, and included the Beyrout to Damascus line and the TripoliHoms line, which later it was proposed to prolong to the Euphrates and to unite with the Bagdad system. Altogether it was contemplated to have a system of 1,233 kilometers, of which 683 kilometers had already been constructed. Beyrout was entirely a French port. The gas and electricity works were French, and the same applied to the lighting along the coast. This was not the limit of French enterprise, for France had perfected the agriculture and the viticulture of Syria and had established many factories. No other country had anything like so complete a development in these regions. Hence, France could not abandon her rights. Moreover, France strongly protested against any idea of divid |