DOCUMENT 13.

Memorandum of Major-General Tasker H. Bliss for President Wilson, January 14, 1919, criticizing the Draft of the Covenant (autographed original).

AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE.

Hotel de Crillon, Paris,

January 14, 1919.

Suggestions in Regard to the Draft of the

COVENANT.

1. Preamble There are some people who who may be frightened at the use of the words "in order to secure an orderly government". They may regard this as a suggestion of the possible use of the League of Nations to put down internal disorders wherever they occur. As the one essential object of the League of Nations is to prevent international war, and as the prevention of such war will be secured by the doing of the things set forth in the preamble, and as the prevention of such war results in security and will have the greatest tendency to produce orderly government, it is suggested for consideration that the first line of the preamble might read as follows:

"In order to prevent future international wars by the prescription of," etc., etc.

2. The idea in the word "COVENANT" is so good that it is suggested that it be adhered to in the subsequent phraseology, notwithstanding the repetition that will necessarily result. Thus, it is suggested, that the words, "Contracting Powers" be made to read "Covenanting

Powers"; and that, wherever the word "agreement" (referring to the constitution of the League of Nations) is used, it be replaced by the word "covenant."

3. It is suggested that there should be a positive declaration to provide against secret treaties. In no other way can the League be assured that an alliance may not be formed within itself, with a tendency adverse to the peace of the world. It is suggested that the right of the League to scrutinize individual treaties should be confined to the object of determining whether the treaty is for the purpose of effecting a private alliance.

4. Article III.-In the second line, after the word "integrity," insert the words "as against external aggression.

Do the words, which appear in Article III, “and also such territorial readjustments as may in the judgment of 3/4ths of the Delegates be demanded by the welfare and manifest interest of the peoples concerned," contemplate the possibility of the League of Nations being called upon to consider such questions as the independence of Ireland, of India, etc., etc.?

5. Article IV.-It does not seem that so important a matter as the reduction of national armaments should be liable to a veto by the action of, possibly, one small power. All hope of disarmament consists in the action of the Great Powers. Until they agree to some disarmament there is no use in talking about the matter. When they should agree to disarm, they might well be permitted to exercise such pressure as they, in agreement, should think practicable in order to compel general disarmament.

6. Article V.-It would seem that some time limit,say one year,-might well be fixed, within which an award by the arbitrators or a decision by the Executive Council must be rendered.

In clause 4 of Article V, should there not be some limits imposed on the right of appeal?

În the first sentence of clause 6 of Article V appcar the words, "the parties to the dispute shall apply to the Executive Council," etc., etc. In the second sentence of the same clause appear the words, "the Council shall

immediately accept the reference and give notice to the other party or parties," etc., etc. It appears that a change in these wordings is necessary.

7. Article VI.-Is it the intent of this article to provide two steps, instead of one, in order to bring about the full status of international war? Is it intended that, first of all, there shall be a complete diplomatic, economic and financial pressure exerted, and that only in case this fails in attaining its object there shall be a resort to hostile acts of war as contemplated in the second clause of Article VI? If the latter be the intent, it is to be noted that the breaching Power, being at war with the League, may immediately use its land and naval forces against the League, while the latter must wait for a recommendation from the Executive Council before the several members of the League know what military and naval forces they are to contribute.

In the third clause of Article VI, omit the words "to perpetual disarmament and"; and change the figure 3 to the figure 4.

8. In regard to Articles VI and VII, it is again suggested that a careful consideration be given to seeing whether a form of words cannot be used that will largely accomplish the object in view, without appearing, in the mind of anyone, to yield (with respect to the United States) to the League of Nations powers which are vested in the American Congress.

9. Article X.-This article relates to a dispute between a Contracting Power and a Power which is not a party to this Covenant. The Article provides for action only in the case when the Power not a party to this Covenant "takes hostile action against one of the Contracting Powers before a decision of the dispute by arbitrators or before investigation, report and recommendation by the Executive Council in regard to the dispute, or contrary to such recommendation." There is no assumption that the Contracting Power itself may be in the wrong, and it is provided that all of the other Contracting Powers shall come to the assistance of the Contracting Powers against which hostile action has been taken. How shall

we provide for the case where the enlightened sense of the world holds the Contracting Power itself to be in the wrong?

It would seem that careful note should be taken of the possibility of a "Dred Scott" decision being made by the tribunal of the League of Nations.

10. Article XI.-Under the second clause of Article XI, there is the same possibility of the difficulty which may occur under Article X. Two nations not Covenanting Powers may have a dispute. One of them, which is in the wrong, offers to submit its interests to the decision of the League of Nations. This State immediately becomes, for the purposes of the dispute, one of the Contracting Powers; and as such, the League is bound to support it, right or wrong, as would be the case under Article X.

11. Article XII.—Change the word "may" at the end of the fourth line of this Article to the word "shall."

SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENTS.

1. Article I.-It would seem desirable to avoid phraseology that would give color to the idea that the proposed League of Nations has for one of its principal objects the control of situations growing out of the present war. If it is possible to avoid the use of the names "AustriaHungary" and "Turkey" and "the German Empire" it is believed that it would be better.

2. Under the Supplementary Agreements, is it obligatory upon one of the Covenanting Powers to accept the functions of "agent or mandatory" appointed by the League of Nations, or may it decline to exercise this function?

3. What financial obligations are imposed upon a mandatory which accepts its functions as such? It is evident that a mandatory must establish a quasi supervising government of its own. It must appoint someone who will be its local director, and this latter must have a large staff of assistants. If the people of the United States accept this general proposition, they will have an interest in knowing the expense to which they may be

subjected. It is easily possible that the representative or agent of the mandatory cannot perform his functions without the support of a powerful military force. Will the United States, for example, be expected to maintain in some foreign country an armed force of their own in order to perform their functions as mandatory?

The sole object of the proposition of General Smuts is to bring the United States into line with Great Britain in exercising supervisory control over certain areas of the earth. The people of the United States will understand that a great burden is contemplated to be thrust upon them by this plan. It is believed that to secure good chance of acceptance by the United States these things should be made clear, or else it should be made clear that no state can be made a mandatory without its own cordial consent.

In the third clause of Article III, it should be made clear that the mandatory state is not to maintain a military force, of native troops, in the state of which it is the mandatory, in excess of the standard laid down by the League. This provision in General Smuts's plan is evidently to prevent a nation, acting as mandatory over a densely populated area, from there raising a great military force under the guise of internal police, which might be used by the mandatory in case of a war outside of this

area.

4. In the first clause of Article IV, the provision with respect to conformity to certain standards as to military and naval forces might well be made to apply to all states entering the League after the date of its creation, instead of making them simply apply to territories of the former empires of Austria-Hungary and of Turkey. This will assist in avoiding the giving to the League of Nations the appearance of being a new form of the old Holy Alliance.

It is not improbable that before the League of Nations can become an accomplished fact, it may be quite as desirable "to watch over the relations inter se of all new and independent states arising or created out of the empires of Russia and Germany as it is to do so over the