there before [but] who had not got on with the Arabs because he had stood too much on his dignity. Even Captain Cousse, however, had not been able to get on well. Afterward, General Allenby had sent a British Financial Expert, and had invited M. Picot to send a French Financial expert. The British adviser, Colonel Graves, had coöperated with M. Moulin, the French adviser. They reported very badly on finance. There had practically been no budget. Then General ALLENBY had withdrawn Colonel Graves. M. Moulin was still there, but was meeting great difficulties owing to Ali Riza el Rikaby's dislike of the French administration. General ALLENBY had visited Damascus with M. Picot and had there interviewed Riza el Rikaby Pasha. General ALLENBY produced at the Conference a document containing the gist of the communication made by him to Riza el Rikaby Pasha. A copy of this document in Arabic and English had been left with Riza el Rikaby Pasha.

In reply to Mr. Lloyd George he said that at Damascus there was a brigade of infantry and two regiments of cavalry. The Sherifian troops were only used for police purposes, since the Sherifian army was still in process of formation.

(At this point there was an adjournment.)

President WILSON suggested that the fittest men that could be obtained should be selected to form an InterAllied Commission to go to Syria, extending their inquiries, if they led them beyond the confines of Syria. Their object should be to elucidate the state of opinion and the soil to be worked on by any mandatory. They should be asked to come back and tell the Conference what they found with regard to these matters. He made this suggestion, not because he lacked confidence in the experts whose views he had heard, such as Dr. Howard Bliss and General Allenby. These, however, had been involved in some way with the population, with special objects, either educational or military. If we were to send a commission of men with no previous contact with

Syria, it would, at any rate, convince the world that the Conference had tried to do all it could to find the most scientific basis possible for a settlement. The Commission should be composed of an equal number of French, British, Italian, and American representatives. He would send it with carte blanche to tell facts as they found them.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he adhered in principle to an inquiry, but it was necessary to have certain guarantees. The inquiry must not confine itself to Syria. Mandates were required for Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Armenia, and other parts of the Turkish Empire, as well as Syria. The peoples of these districts were not isolated. They were all connected by historical and religious and other links, including mutual feuds, and old quarrels existed between all of them. Without contesting what General Allenby had said, he wished it to be recorded, if there were a procès-verbal, that many Syrians were not Arab, and that if the Syrians were put under the Arabs they would revolt. He knew quite well the great share taken by Feisal in the Syrian campaign, and he thought that the British were also a little afraid of it. The whole inquiry would be an extremely delicate one. Orientals were very timid and afraid to say what was at the back of their minds. It was very difficult to get the real feelings of the people. It was very important, therefore, that the inquiry should not be merely superficial. Hence, he would ask for twenty-four hours of reflection before setting up the Commission. He might like to send some French Arabs there, as Feisal only represented one side of the Arab race. Moreover, Feisal was practically a soldier of England. That was a fact that all the world knew. He said he would revolt if the French were at Damascus, but, as a matter of fact, French artillery had recently been sent there and had been received quite well. He had made every effort to bring himself to agree with the principles propounded by President Wilson, but something must be said for the historical claims and for the efforts that nations had made in different regions. For example, insistence on an Arab outlet to the sea would destroy the claim of one nation in that part of the world. The

members of the Commission must be very carefully selected, and they must inquire into every Turkish mandate. Subject to these provisions he was prepared to accept President Wilson's proposal in principle.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said he had no objection to an inquiry into Palestine and Mesopotamia, which were the regions in which the British Empire were principally concerned. Neither would he object to an inquiry into Armenia, in which they were not so closely concerned.

President WILSON said he saw advantages in an unified inquiry into Turkish mandates.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said if this extension was to be given to the Commission it was essential it should get to work at once, as the burden of military forces in Turkey fell mainly on the British.

Mr. BALFOUR said that he felt these proposals might postpone the making of peace.

President WILSON said this was not so. For the purposes of peace all that was necessary to tell Turkey was that she would have nothing.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said that Turkey was entitled to know who would be the mandatory for Turkish territory. President WILSON said it was rather that they ought to know how much was to remain Turkish.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said that the question of who was to be mandatory of Anatolia would make all the difference for the arrangements for Turkey.

President WILSON said that Turkey was entitled to know if she was to have territory of her own, and that other parts of Turkey were to be placed under the League of Nations. Subsequently she would be informed who would be her next-door neighbor.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said that he supposed that if the evidence were so overwhelming that, for example, the British Empire was ruled out of Mesopotamia, they would be free to consider whether they could take a mandate elsewhere in Turkey?

President WILSON said this was an administrative matter and not one of sovereignty. Turkey was entitled to knowledge on all questions affecting the sovereignty.

M. PICHON Suggested that, in order to avoid delay, the Commission might divide into sub-commissions working in different sections.

Mr. BALFOUR asked whether it would be wise to include Western Anatolia in the purview of the Commission. Constantinople was mainly a military question (President Wilson said a strategic question), but south of the region which went with Constantinople came regions to which the Greeks laid claim.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said there was no suggestion that the Commission was to travel beyond Armenia.

At Mr. Lloyd George's request, President Wilson undertook to draft a Terms of Reference to the Commission.